

A Cognitive Linguistic Analysis of Visual Perception Verbs in Natural Language
—With Special Reference to English Verbs "Look" and "See"—

自然言語における視覚動詞の認知言語学的分析
—英語動詞の Look と See を中心に—

(Doctoral Dissertation)

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Purpose

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the meanings conveyed by the English visual perception verbs “look” and “see,” by considering their various usages in modern standard American English. There is a wide range of contexts in which these verbs appear as will be demonstrated throughout this study. The question I seek to answer through this study is what it means for a person to “look” or to “see” under different circumstances. As it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, I intend to take a cognitive linguistic approach in my attempt to answer this broadly stated question.

The second purpose, which follows from the first, is to present my view on how word meanings are structured in our cognitive system, and what kind of cognitive processes are involved when the verbs “look” and “see” are used in daily language by the speakers and writers of English in various contexts. Therefore, the descriptions and analyses in this study are usage-based and organized according to the contexts in which the verbs appear. In other words, they are not organized according to the clear-cut sets of definitions provided, for instance, in dictionaries. Rather, the purpose is to lay out why the words are interpreted as having the meanings that are established and accepted by most native speakers today.

Finally, this study aims to explore why the suggested cognitive structure is efficient and what motivates humans to engage in the above-mentioned cognitive processing that is necessary for creating and identifying different meanings of a word or phrase.

Japanese translations for some of the example sentences are included, where applicable, to give the readers an idea of the differences and similarities in the ways visual perception verbs are used in English and Japanese. This, I hope, contributes to possible pedagogical applications of this study.

1.2. Scope

This study mainly focuses on the English visual perception verbs “look” and “see” and phrasal verbs and idioms that contain these two verbs. The study does not, however, include the analyses of “look” as a copular verb as in “You look wonderful!” or as a noun as

in “the look on his face.” Likewise, the verb “seem” is excluded from the analyses of “see” in order to avoid complexities that are beyond the scope of this study.

As it will be laid out in the succeeding sections, the study considers “literal” and “figurative” uses of the verbs. This distinction, however, is not clear in many cases, and there is also the problem of how to define what it exactly means for the interpretation of a word to be “literal.” For this reason, I have opted to categorize the meanings of the verbs as “physical” and “figurative” instead, with the former referring to the activities that mainly consist of physical visual perception, i.e., those which are conventionally considered not possible with one’s eyes closed, and the latter, “figurative,” to refer to other activities that are often thought to be near synonyms of “look” and/or “see,” but do not necessarily require eyesight, such as “pay attention,” “understand,” and “judge”. It must be noted here, however, that even this distinction is rather blurry for reasons presented in the chapters to follow.

Although the Japanese translations of the example sentences are provided in some parts of this study, they are given more as references than for any specific analytical purposes. While the comparison between “look” and “see” is within the scope of this study, no systematic comparisons between English and Japanese visual perception verbs are intended.

1.3. Language Material

The example sentences are mostly from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)¹. The sentences taken from COCA are indicated by the subject word or phrase being marked by **underlined boldface** letters followed by a citation of the source and its year of publication indicated in parentheses at the end of the sentence. Any other sources are properly cited as required. The example sentences that are without citations are created by myself or, otherwise, are set expressions that are common enough to allow the omission of citations. The Japanese sentences represented in alphabetical pronunciation (i.e. romanized format)² and their rough translations are also my creations.

1.4. Organization

This study is organized into a total of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is this Introduction. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework, on the basis of which the succeeding descriptions and analyses are conducted. The chapter also includes a discussion of relevant linguistic as well as cognitive scientific issues that are to be addressed in this study. Presented in the second half of Chapter 2 are previous studies mainly on English visual perception verbs, while those on Japanese and other cross-linguistic studies are also mentioned for reference.

Chapter 3 presents a semantic analysis of “look.” There are two types of uses of the verb “look”: (1) “look” used as an intransitive verb without any object, and (2) “look” followed by a preposition, which is most commonly found in daily language in the form of “look at”. This chapter is devoted to the analyses of the former, that is, “look” without the preposition, and explores how its meaning shifts from physical vision to further cognitive activities.

The analysis presented in Chapter 4 covers the meanings of “look” followed by a preposition/prepositions or an adverb, with a particular focus on the use of “look at” in the first half of the chapter. First, the analysis begins by considering the meanings of the preposition “at” by itself then proceeds to examine the meanings of “look at” as physical perception. This is followed by the examination of the uses of “look at” according to the target, or the object, that is being “looked at”. The second half of Chapter 4 considers “look” followed by a preposition other than “at” or by an adverb. The analysis first focuses on physical meanings and proceeds to idiomatic, or conventionalized, meanings of phrases containing “look”. This analysis is intended to demonstrate how “look” semantically interacts with different prepositions/adverbs and gives rise to new interpretations.

Chapter 5 analyzes the meaning of “see,” specifically as visual perception in the physical sense. The discussion revolves mainly around temporal span, tense/aspect, and telicity of the verb. Chapter 6 deals with the figurative meanings of “see,” which are roughly classified into those meanings in which the physical perception is presupposed and those in which it is not. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the findings of this study and their implications, and presents a conclusion and issues which deserve further exploration in the

future.

1.5. Terminology

In the analyses of “look” and “see,” I have chosen to use the term “physical” to describe the meaning of the verbs that refer to what one does when a tangible and concrete visual input is present within one’s potential field of vision and one notices its presence mainly by visually capturing its external appearance. In contrast, the term “figurative,” or sometimes “abstract,” is used to describe the meanings other than or in addition to those that are “physical”.

The term “object” in this study is not used only to refer to a part of speech in the grammatical sense. Instead, it is used to refer to whatever entity the act of “look (at)” or “see” is directed toward. The term “subject” is also not used in the sense of a part of speech, but as a general term to refer to the one who performs the action. I have intentionally avoided the use of the term “agent” to avoid the confusion with the use of the same term in linguistics to specifically refer to a doer with an intention. In this study, a “subject” refers to anyone who does the “seeing” or “looking,” regardless of presence or absence of one’s intentionality.

Instead of using the term “word,” the term “lexical item” is used, where appropriate, to refer to either a single word or a phrase, as long as it represents a single linguistic unit of meaning larger than that of a morpheme. In this study, therefore, the term “lexical item” is used to refer to either a word, a phrase, or an expression.

Finally, the term “perception” is, in principle, used in the general sense, roughly referring to sensory input, though I am aware of and will discuss in some detail the complexity of the meanings implied by this term in Chapter 2.

Notes

1. COCA <http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/>
2. The romanization of Japanese pronunciation follows the Hebon (Hepburn) Style:
<https://www.japannet.jp/ca/procedure/apply/hebon.pdf>

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies

2.1. Theoretical Framework: Overview

There are two major questions regarding the functions of human language that are to be pursued throughout this study. One is how language represents our cognitive system, and the other is how it is used to accomplish communication. Language consists of components such as sounds, morphemes, words, sentences, and discourse, which are combined or separated, as required, for the purpose of communication.

This study focuses on the words “look” and “see”. Each of these is a linguistic unit to which multiple concepts are attached and therefore, as mentioned above, the verbs are “lexical items” that are stored in the human conceptual lexicon. While there are different ways to interpret what a human conceptual lexicon is, this study employs the description provided in Givón (2001) as its basis.

The human conceptual lexicon is a repository of relatively time-stable, relatively socially-shared, relatively well-coded concepts which, taken together, constitute a cognitive map of our experiential universe:

- the external-physical universe;
- the social-cultural universe;
- the internal-mental universe

By *time-stable* one means knowledge that is not in rapid flux. That is, the meaning of ‘horse’ today will probably remain the same tomorrow. Though gradual change of meaning is not precluded.

By *socially-shared* one means that when launching into communication, speakers take it for granted that words have, roughly, the same meanings for all members of their speech community. Though membership is conceded to be a matter of degree.

By *well-coded* one means that each chunk of lexically-stored knowledge is more-or-less uniquely, or at least strongly, associated with its own perceptual code-label. Though again, well-codedness may be a matter of degree.

(p. 8)

The descriptions given in the above excerpt serve as the basis of the major claims this study intends to make. First, the lexical items are, in effect, code-labels for respective concepts. Second, the concepts coded by lexical items are not absolute but relative; their discreteness is a matter of degree. Third, lexicon, which is a repository of lexical items, is a cognitive map, or network, of what we experience in the external-physical, the social-

cultural, and the internal-mental universe.¹ These claims are also supported in Evans (2010a, 2010b, 2013), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Langacker (1987, 1999, 2013), and Yamanashi (2000, 2004, 2012), and are regarded as the foundations of cognitive linguistics. In the sections to follow, these claims are further elaborated to substantiate the analysis and description of the lexical items “look” and “see”. Furthermore, claims and findings made by some of the perceptual psychologists, cognitive psychologists, and neuroscientists are also presented in order to consider the meanings of “look” and “see” from an inter-disciplinary point of view.

2.1.1. Lexical Concepts and Conceptual Structures

Langacker (2013) illustratively summarizes the difference between (a) Dictionary Semantics and (b) Encyclopedic Semantics as presented in Fig. 2-1.




Fig. 2-1

Dictionary and Encyclopedic Semantics (Langacker 2013, p. 39)

In the dictionary view of linguistic semantics depicted on the left in Fig. 2-1, “The circle represents the total body of knowledge speakers have about the type of entity in question. Indicated by the heavy-line box is the small, discrete set of specifications constituting the lexical item’s meaning” (p. 33). In contrast, the diagram on the right in Fig.2-1 represents:

An alternative view, ...referred to as **encyclopedic semantics**, is generally adopted in cognitive linguistics. ...In this approach, a lexical meaning resides in a particular way of accessing an open-ended body of knowledge pertaining to certain type of entity. This knowledge is represented...by a series of concentric circles, indicating that the

knowledge components have varying degrees of centrality.

(p. 39)

The thin-line circles in the right diagram of Fig. 2-1 represent specifications that are central to the entity and are likely to be activated almost always when an expression is used, while the thick-line ellipses are specifications that are evoked according to contexts.

Therefore, the definitions that are listed in dictionaries are a series of heavy-lined boxes depicted in Fig. 2-1 (left) that are discretely separated from one another. In contrast, in cognitive linguistics, a lexical item is defined as a relatively stable set of concepts that are activated, according to not only linguistic, but also external-physical, sociocultural, as well as internal-mental contexts.




Fig. 2-2

Overlapping Domains (Langacker 2013, p.48)

The encyclopedic view of semantics is further elaborated in Fig. 2-2, where the ellipses represent the conceptual domains and the heavy-lined circle, the central entity designated by the expression which is associated with all the relevant domains. Important to note in Fig. 2-2 is that it "...clearly indicates that rather than being disjoint, the domains of a complex matrix overlap with one another, often to the extent of full inclusion....The heavy-line circle represents the entity designated by the expression (its profile), which has some role in all the domains of the matrix." (pp. 47-48). In other words, while the domains potentially comprise an open-ended set, the set is not a chaotic assembly of disassociated or disjoint concepts. Rather, they are structured in a way which enables us to retrieve the

domains to varying degrees when multiple concepts are evoked by a certain lexical item.

The importance of such a conceptual structure is also pointed out in Lakoff (1987) in relation to his discussion of preconceptual experiences. He describes our concepts as being structured, both internally and relative to one another. It is this structuring that enables us humans "...to reason, to comprehend, to acquire knowledge, and to communicate" (p.267). If there were no structures at all to our concepts, it would be impossible for us to perform any of these cognitive activities, which would have made us into a completely different organism from what we are now. Lakoff goes on to argue that the presence or the availability of this conceptual structure alone does not make the structure meaningful. We need to make use of its availability. In other words, we need concepts to build our conceptual structures, and we gain concepts through our bodily experiences. Therefore, what makes our conceptual structures meaningful is our what Lakoff calls "preconceptual" bodily experiences. We need bodily experiences to give rise to preconceptual structures, which, in turn, are necessary for constructing our conceptual structures.

Our bodily, or physical, experience is the primary basis of our concepts. According to Lakoff, the concepts we gained through our repeated direct physical experiences contribute, in turn, to the formation of abstract conceptual structures. He claims, "Abstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood because of their systematic relationship to directly meaningful structures" (Lakoff 1987, p. 268). We are therefore capable of understanding and structuring abstract concepts because they are backed by our direct physical experiences that we gain in the real world.

2.1.2. Cognitive Role of Mental Images and Prototypicality of Lexical Meanings

As mentioned above, in cognitive linguistics, it is assumed that we gain knowledge and concepts through our bodily physical experiences. This view is further supported by Lakoff (1987) through his theory that places importance in what is called "mental images" that are constructed and organized through our worldly experiences (p. 268). These images are different from and more unconsciously accessed than the pictures that sometimes come into our mind when we think of our loved ones, for instance. They are more unconscious, yet give us the basis for understanding this universe and enable us to grasp this

world relative to our physical existence.

Through this mechanism of forming mental images, concrete, as well as abstract, concepts are formed, categorized, and structured into conceptual domains. A lexical item stands for a group of overlapping conceptual domains formed according to some criteria as it has been described and depicted by Langacker (2013) as Fig. 2-1 and 2-2 above. There still remains, however, the question of in what ways the conceptual domains are structured and what exactly the “central,” or “prototypical,” meaning of a lexical item refers to.

2.1.2.1. Cognitive Role of Mental Images

Lakoff (1987) proposes that there are two kinds of preconceptual structures, namely, “basic-level structure” and “kinesthetic image-schematic structure.”² Physical vision, or our ability to visually perceive physically existing entities, is a kinesthetic phenomenon. We perceive much of the physical-external as well as social-cultural universe through vision, which is one of our sensory motors. In this sense, vision is a bodily experience. In fact, of the five senses, vision is regarded as the most effective means of collecting information around us. (Arnheim 1968)³

What makes Lakoff’s proposal particularly important with regard to the present study is its pre-assumption of the existence of what he calls “mental images.” The basic-level structure consists of “our ability to form rich mental images” (p. 267). On the other hand, the kinesthetic image-schematic structure is a structure comprised of “images” by default, as its name suggests, and the image schemas are formed through our everyday bodily and sensory experiences, thus, the structure is “kinesthetic.”

Langacker (1987) also agrees that the experiences we gain through our senses are cognitive events, stating that “A primary sensory experience is a cognitive event evoked directly by the stimulation of sensory organ” (p. 111). Although Langacker is cautious about isolating visual perception alone as the source of information we gain from the world (pp. 116-117), his theory of profiling and backgrounding the concepts that are activated by a lexical item, depending on the perspective from which an event is viewed, suggests that our cognition resorts to abstract spatial images in selecting what to focus on. While the discussion on the relationship between concept and perception will be considered in more

detail in Section 2.1.4 below, it is worth noting here that mental vision and images are regarded by Lakoff and implied by Langacker as a key framework that supports the foundation of our cognition as well as that of our linguistic system. Our linguistic system is comprised of image-based structured conceptual domains that are selectively evoked, or profiled or backgrounded, by individual lexical items as well as through their combinations.

2.1.2.2. Prototypicality of Lexical Meanings

While there are extensive discussions on concept categorization in both Lakoff (1987) and Langacker (1987), particularly relevant for the purpose of the present study are the theories on prototypes. As mentioned in both Lakoff and Langacker, though in different ways, categorization plays a major role in conceptualizing the experiences we gain through our senses. We categorize the concepts into groups according to what we perceive as similarities. While there may or may not be an attribute, or a property, shared by all the members, there are good examples and bad examples within a given category.⁴ A prototype, simply put, is the best example. As already presented in Fig. 2-1 and 2-2 from Langacker (2013), in cognitive linguistics, it is assumed that there exists a prototypical (central) meaning or a set of meanings attached to a lexical item, which is almost always evoked when the item is used.

Important to note here, however, is that a lexical item is rarely, if ever, used to encode its prototypical meaning alone. It almost always activates multiple domains, including the central domain, with some being evoked more often than others. Furthermore, while Fig. 2-1 may give one an impression of the prototypical meanings depicted by the concentric thin-lined circles in the diagram as being established and stable, its stability is a matter of degree. The same applies to the thick solid-lined central circle in Fig. 2-2. This is because “To speak of a prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to is judgments of degree of prototypicality.” (Rosch 1978, pp. 40-41, as cited in Lakoff 1987, p. 44). I consider this Rosch’s view as being important for analyzing the meanings of lexical items, particularly of those referring to abstract, intangible concepts, including the verbs of perception. This is because the prototypicality of their meanings is much more difficult to test or to verify than, say, simple nouns such as a “bird” or a “chair”.

My framework for the subsequent analyses of “look” and “see” is therefore going to be based on an assumption that the semantics of a lexical item is to be represented by a modified version of Fig. 2-2: a cluster made up of potential meanings (concepts) prompted by a lexical item, with a relatively stable, yet fuzzy, central set of meanings, plus an infinite number of overlapping potential conceptual domains, as illustrated in Fig. 2-3. In this




Fig. 2-3

Representation of Lexical Item

figure, unlike in Fig. 2-2, the circular center where all the domains overlap is represented not by a solid line but by a dotted line, indicating that even the meanings that are almost always evoked when a lexical item is used may also vary in its degree of presence depending on the context.

Furthermore, since I intend to demonstrate that the shifts in the lexical meanings (or the changes in the selection and the degree of activation of domains) take place when the item is in use, these clusters of domains intricately, but not randomly, overlap with and influence one another. This is abstractly represented in Fig. 2-4, which is a simplified representation of how the semantics of lexical items in use interact with one another. Each of the clusters in the figure represent a lexical item. When they are used together in a series in an expression, as shown in the diagram, the domains that are profiled or backgrounded in each cluster are mutually influenced to give rise to particular meanings.




Fig. 2-4

Representation of Lexical Items in Use

These meanings are shown by the different dotted-line ellipses drawn under each cluster. To be sure, these dotted-line ellipses are abstractions, and therefore, it does not mean that a single particular conceptual domain is extracted from each cluster. Rather, the ellipses are to be understood as the representations of a cluster of domains, each of which is profiled or backgrounded to different degrees.

These clusters of extracted conceptual domains, in turn, combine and merge again to give an overall meaning to a group of lexical items, which usually takes the form of a sentence or a construction. Therefore, the meaning of a sentence or a construction as a whole is to be understood as is depicted in Fig. 2-5. The overlaps in the figure indicate that




Fig. 2-5

Representation of Meaning of Sentence or Construction

these extracted clusters are also neither independent nor discrete and that they continue to influence one another in evoking the meaning of the sentence or the construction. While not included in Fig.2-4 and 2-5, there are also extralinguistic factors that play a significant role in determining the ways in which the presence of domains are affected. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, the same sentence can be interpreted in a variety of ways depending on the shared knowledge between the speaker and the hearer, the situation in which the linguistic utterance is expressed, as well as on our real world encyclopedic knowledge.

2.1.3. Polysemy and Semantic Shifts: Problem with Metaphorical Extension

The question that follows from the above is how the focus on those conceptual domains shifts according to the context in which a lexical item is used, evoking an optimal meaning for that specific context. Some domains are more profiled than others, while other domains are more backgrounded to the extent that they become irrelevant to, or even totally disappear from, the given usage event. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, our concepts are structured in a certain way to enable us to engage in various cognitive activities, including reasoning and categorizing. Lakoff (1987) assumes that there are two types of so-called preconceptual structures: one called the kinesthetic image-schematic structure, based on our bodily kinesthetic experiences, and the other called the basic-level structure, which, I interpret as being based on our innate abilities to survive in this world, including our ability to form rich mental images. Since the kinesthetics-based structure depends on our bodily experiences, the abstract conceptual structures are formed in the basic-level structure. There are two ways proposed by Lakoff to accomplish this.

- A. By metaphorical projection from the domain of the physical to abstract domains.
- B. By the projection from basic level categories to superordinate and subordinate categories. (p. 268)

In simpler terms, we conceptualize abstract entities from our physical bodily experiences, either through metaphor (A) or metonymy (B). The expressions such as TIME IS MONEY

or LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p.115) are examples of metaphors, whereby the domain of the former is projected on to that of the latter. Likewise, the example of “The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself.” (Lakoff 1987, p.77) uttered by one waitress to another is an example of metonymy, with the “ham sandwich” standing for the person eating the sandwich. The metaphor and metonymy probably do have a role to play in our association of one concept to another. I take issue, however, with metaphors being interpreted as merely a straightforward projection from one domain to another. That is too simplistic. In many of the studies that attempt to describe polysemy of certain lexical items by metaphor (Arizono 2005, 2013, Hyun 2003, Minashima 2006, Ning 2000, 2001), the cognitive processes that must be taking place in making the projection are often dismissed or else not sufficiently considered.

As it is presented above in reference to Lakoff’s claim, the very purpose of resorting to metaphor lies in associating our physical experiences to abstract concepts. What motivates the projection from one domain to another is our physical experience. Therefore, two entities that appear to be unrelated are associated via experiences we have with each of them, rather than by presupposed fixed properties attributed to the given domains. It appears that many of the discussions on metaphoric semantic extensions rely too heavily on the idea of projection based on seemingly similar properties without questioning how or why the projection occurs.

In his argument questioning the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, Barnden (2010) presents conventional definition of metaphor and metonymy as follows: “... metaphor involves similarity whereas metonymy involves contiguity or related notions of semantic/pragmatic connection..., and ... metonymy preserves links to the source domain item as part of the message whereas metaphor does not...” (p. 2). Barnden then continues on to question the widely assumed metaphorical correlation between seeing and knowing, claiming that “whether this metaphorical view is ...a matter of similarity is a contentious matter” (p. 6).⁵

What must be taken into account and emphasized, in my view, is the significance of the experiences that are associated with each of the domains activated for deriving what is assumed to be a metaphor. As it is presented in the following Section 2.1.5., based on the

newer findings concerning the physiology of vision, and as it has also already been widely claimed by major cognitive linguists (Givón 2001, Langacker 1987, 1999, 2013, Yamanashi 2000, 2012, 2015), human concepts are structured in the form of a network. As it is said in Givón (2001), “Concepts are likened in this model to nodes in a connected network. Adjacent nodes activate each other, and such activation can, at least in principle, spread on and on” (p. 31). Furthermore, the networks are connected in the manner of circuitry, which is the reason why the activation can go “on and on”. Moreover, no one part of the network is disjointed from the rest. We are capable of processing, incorporating, reacting to, and storing information and entities in our memory and retrieving them as necessary, because our knowledge, I believe, is built through uninterrupted association. Every experience we encounter is associated with all of our other experiences, though this may occur on the subconscious level.

This view is particularly crucial in the present study of visual perception verbs “look” and “see,” since visual perception is intricately linked with cognition and serves to activate various cognitive activities. (See Sections 2.1.4. and 2.1.5. for details.) Therefore, it is misleading to assume the association between perception and cognition as being metaphorical. In other words, within the framework I propose through this study, the analogy UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 48), for instance, cannot be fully accounted for, since seeing is directly linked with understanding, though the resultant depth of understanding may vary. There is no analogy or metaphor involved in the connection between the two. Seeing and understanding overlap, hence, they do not comprise separate domains. Therefore, the metaphor, defined as a projection of one domain to another, is not possible in this case.

If our concepts are structured, and if the structure is in a form of complex circuitry network, it follows that all concepts are connected in one way or another, no matter how distant they may seem to be. If so, then there are no metaphors in the strict sense of the term. What exist are expressions that are more “metaphorical” than others, presumably because the two domains that are being referred to are more distant from one another than other expressions. The domains are only distant, not separate, since every domain is a part of the same network. It then follows that every concept is contiguous with all other

concepts. The metaphor/metonymy dichotomy itself is not to be regarded as something as clear-cut as it has been made to seem. It is only that some metaphors are more metaphoric than others (Hanks 2006).⁶ Again, it is a matter of degree and gradation. Every concept is contiguous with all the other concepts to a certain degree within the network of conceptual structure.

In the present study, the polysemy of the words “look” and “see” is not considered as either metaphoric or metonymic extensions. Instead, the polysemy is regarded as shifts in activated domains. That is, I take a view that when a lexical item is uttered, the subtleties of its meanings are evoked through graded shifting of the domains that are either profiled or backgrounded as appropriate. In other words, of the domains that make up the cluster represented in Fig. 2-3, some are profiled and some are backgrounded to various degrees to match the given context. The domains are, in principle, all connected and sometimes overlap within a circuitry network that consists of numerous subnetworks. This means activation of one part always has some bearing on all of the other parts. On the basis of this theoretical framework, in the chapters to follow, I intend to show that lexical meanings are non-discrete and gradient in nature.

2.1.4. Visual Perception and Cognition

In his book *Visual Thinking*, Rudolf Arnheim (1969) provides a number of clues that are directly relevant to the present study, as well as to the study of human cognition in general. Although I have been more or less casually using the terms such as “perception” and “cognition” so far, these terms deserve clarification before considering the visual “perception” verbs “look” and “see”. I shall draw heavily on Arnheim’s claims in the following paragraphs in order to understand what we mean by to “perceive” an entity.

Crudely stated, Arnheim’s claim is that perception is no different from cognition, though the word “perception” itself may mean different things to different people. He writes:

Some take the term very narrowly to describe only what is received by the senses at the time when they are stimulated by the outer environment. This definition is too narrow for the purpose of this book because it excludes the imagery present when a

person with eyes closed or inattentive, thinks of what is or could be. (p. 16)

In the present study, the phrase “visual perception” is defined as: an act of obtaining any kind of concept and/or knowledge that is visually obtainable about some subject of the external-physical and the internal-mental world. In Japanese, “perception” is usually translated as “chikaku” written as 知覚 with 知(“chi”) meaning “know, wisdom” and 覚 (“kaku”) meaning “memorize,” “learn,” “remember,” “awake,” or “sober up.”⁷ Despite the richness of meanings supposedly conveyed and implied by these Chinese characters, it does not mean that the kind of confusion similar to that in English is nonexistent in Japanese.

Arnheim, as well as neuroscientists such as Fujita (2007), makes a case against the distinction between passive reception and active visual perception:

My contention is that the cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself. I am referring to such operations as active exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion, correction, comparison, problem solving, as well combining, separating, putting in context.... There is no basic difference in this respect between what happens when a person looks at the world directly and when he sits with his eyes closed and thinks. (Arnheim 1969, p. 13)

The above is more poetically rephrased as:

Through the world roams the glance, directed by attention, focusing the narrow range of sharpest vision now on this, now on that spot, following the flight of a distant sea gull, scanning a tree to explore its shape. This eminently active performance is what is truly meant by visual perception. (p.14)

In sum, when we perceive an object, we are not merely receiving the visual input as the camera lenses do. We are actively engaged in various cognitive activities to understand and to react to what we physically perceive through our sensory motors, through our vision, in particular. This is the overall view I intend to take in my examination of the verbs “look” and “see” in this study. While the two verbs are both visual perception verbs, my aim is to explore the cognitive domains that are activated by each of these verbs, depending on the context, as well as in relation to our encyclopedic knowledge about the universe.

Therefore, in the discussions provided in the major part of study, although I make a distinction between “physical” and “figurative,” or “abstract,” meanings of these verbs (see Section 1.5 Terminology), the distinction is mostly for analytical purposes. Throughout this study, I remain fully aware of and draw heavily on this inseparable nature of vision and cognition.

2.1.5. Cognitive and Neuroscientific Observations about Vision

The claims made in Arnheim (1969), as well as those by cognitive linguists, are substantiated through physical scientific observations. The evidence from fields other than linguistics serves as clues for understanding and analyzing the meanings of the verbs “look” and “see,” as will be demonstrated in the paragraphs to follow.

First, vision is an innate faculty of humans as well as of other animals. Neither humans nor animals need to be taught how to see. It is said that by about the age of one month, babies blink for protection if something moves towards their eyes. By three months they move their eyes to construct boundaries of objects, and by one year, they learn most of what is necessary for visually identifying and constructing their surroundings and begin to




Fig.2-6

Kanizsa Triangle (Fujita 2007, p. 76)

learn the names for objects, actions, and relations. (Hoffman 1998, pp. 12-13)

Second, human vision is not totally veridical, that is, it does not capture reality as is. “The image at the eye has countless possible interpretations....By ‘image at the eye’ I mean the retinal image, i.e. the image cast on light-sensitive tissue at the back of the eye” (p.13).

This again points to the fact that our vision is not merely a receptor of input. The same claim is also found in Fujita (2007), in which he presents optical illusion as an example. We see what is not there by supplementing the missing parts according to the context, as demonstrated by the famous Kanizsa Triangle presented in Fig. 2-6. Changizi (2009) makes a point of our ability to see the future, referring to our ability to foresee a ball that is thrown to us, for instance (p. 118). Thus, we do not simply receive visual input as is. We process the input with our cognition, which is precisely the claim made by Arnheim (1969) discussed in the previous section.

Fujita (2007) makes an interesting point concerning the difference and separate cognitive operations involved in “looking” and to “seeing” by giving examples of disorders such as face-blindness and visual kinetic apraxia. Even if a person is aware that he or she is “looking” at a face, a person with face-blindness cannot recognize whose face it is (pp. 39-45). Fujita’s rather philosophical comment on the idiosyncrasy of an individual person’s vision is worth noting here. By referring to the concept of “qualia,” though everyone can feel the qualia of things around them, he says, that to see is equivalent to creating ones subjective experience. Even if two people are shown the same color red and picked the same red color pencil that most closely resembles that red color, there is no proof and there is no way to prove that the red one person is seeing is the same red as that being seen by the other person (p. 85). This resonates with Langacker (1987), in which he writes, “Given an encyclopedic account of meaning, two speakers seldom if ever have precisely identical conceptions of any notion, ...their conceptions vary with experience, but nevertheless often have enough in common to permit successful communication.” (p. 136).

These suggestions by Fujita and Langacker indicate that our cognition is subjective and personal; no two people have exactly the same notion of “red” or any other concepts. However, as Langacker says, we have enough in common to enable us to communicate with one another. I consider this as another reason for regarding our linguistic system, the meanings of lexical items, in particular, as being relative, flexible, and gradient. If the meanings of lexical items are discrete and rigid, there cannot be any leeway to allow for the adjustments necessary to understand one another.

There are also studies in neuroscientific and cognitive scientific fields that support the

view that our concepts are organized into structures. Physiologically, "...the first step in seeing an object is the generation of pattern of activity that is distributed across hundreds, ..., if not millions of photoreceptors. These in turn activate many other neurons in more central structures, (Ghose & Maunsell 1999, p. 79) and this activation is said to involve a process known as binding, which is the process of linking the attributes of the object. The rationale behind this hypothesized process is that "While our gaze might fall on an effectively infinite number of different objects, the critical question is not how many different objects might appear; rather, it is how many our visual system allows us to distinguish from one another." (p. 80). In its review of studies on binding, Ghose and Maunsell (1999) concludes that the field of neuroscience still lacks a framework to explain how and what kind of neurophysiological activities are involved for converting the visual input into perception and behaviors. Nevertheless, the assumptions that the activated photoreceptors activate other neurons in more central structures and that our visual system is made to be selective about what to see suggest a close parallel to the cognitive linguistic view of how the concepts are evoked and processed in response to different linguistic inputs.

Finally, Kossylin (2005) proposes a distinction between visual mental imagery and visual perception. "Visual perception occurs while a stimulus is being viewed, and includes functions such as visual recognition (i.e., registering that a stimulus is familiar) and identification (i.e., recalling the name, context, or other information associated with the objects" (p. 334). The visual perception is believed to be comprised of two types of mechanisms: "bottom-up" mechanisms driven by the input from the eyes, and "top-down" mechanisms using stored information (i.e. knowledge, belief, expectations, and goals). On the other hand, visual mental imagery is "a set of representations that gives rise to the experience of viewing a stimulus in the absence of appropriate sensory input." (p. 334).

These cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroscientific observations indicate that our visual experience is always accompanied by cognitive processing abilities that are natural to humans. In line with the theory of semantic networking, the neurons in our brain are structured and activated according to the stimulus, though we are selective in what we choose to cognitively process from what comes into our eyes. Given the multitude of information we obtain through vision, we choose to "look" or "see" what is worth

processing. On the other hand, as optical illusions and the so-called future-seeing capabilities demonstrate, we have the ability to supplement or extend our visual capabilities for seeing what is absent or what has not yet occurred. These neuroscientific observations parallel the claims about language studied from a cognitive linguistic viewpoint and have both direct and indirect implications for the linguistic analysis and understanding of the meanings of “look” and “see”.

2.2. Previous Studies

2.2.1. Previous Studies on Verbs “Look” and “See”

There are mainly two types of studies focusing on the semantics of visual perception verbs, both in English and Japanese: those that attempt to clarify the semantic difference among different visual perception verbs and those that give explanations for the polysemy of a particular visual perception verb.

2.2.1.1. Studies on Semantic Difference of Visual Perception Verbs

In trying to understand the difference in meanings of “see,” “look at,” and “watch,” Hattori (1968) lays out the properties “intention/active,” “focus,” “curiosity,” “stationary,” and “ability” as the parameters to differentiate the meanings according to whether these properties are plus, minus, or neutral (zero) with regard to the verb in question. His list also includes Japanese rough equivalents of “see,” “mieru,” and “look,” “miru,” and “nagameru,” a rough equivalent of “watch”.⁸ Another study on the verbs of vision through analysis of different properties is Shabanova (2000), which attempts to differentiate the meanings of words such as “stare,” “gaze,” and “glance” by presenting the characteristics of the verbs, such as, ±intensive look, ±unmovable look, ±application of willing force, etc. It also discusses properties related to the direction of the look, acquisition of information, and the appearance of the object’s image in the eyes of the subject, as well as the purpose.

While these binary or ternary evaluation of properties assigned to lexical items may prove useful for presenting the differences in a clear-cut manner, as it is noted in Langacker (1987), “A simple plus/minus value or yes/no answer is not always sufficient in specifying whether a linguistic structure has a certain property, belongs to a particular category, or

participates in a given relationship. These conditions are often matters of degree....” (p. 15). Therefore, although the parameter “intention” is minus for “see,” for instance, the degree of intention on the part of the person engaged in “seeing” varies depending on the situation. Likewise, properties such as “intensive look” and “application of willing force” are also a matter of degree, which makes this method inadequate for fuller semantic analyses of visual perception verbs.

Gruber (1967) attempts to analyze the semantic difference of “look” and “see” from the surface structure in accordance with the tradition of generative grammar.⁹ His main claim focuses on the unacceptability of the use of preposition “to” after “see,” as in the sentence:

- (1) *Astronomers have seen to Andromeda, but nowhere else. (p. 938)

He then goes on to argue that “look” can be followed by prepositions such as “at” or “toward” by giving the following examples:

- (2) *John looked to the tree. (John looked at the tree.)
(3) *John looked the tree. (John looked at the tree.)
(4) The bird flew toward the tree.
(5) The bird looked toward the tree. (pp. 942-943)

Although it is argued that “look” is often followed by “toward,” which has a stronger sense of directionality than “to,” the study explains neither why the directionality is semantically important for “look” nor why “at” is preferred over “to.” The observation is mostly focused on the surface structure and the study is concluded by stating that “The semantic distinction between *see* and *look* is largely due to the distinction in the underlying prepositions demanded by them.” (p. 942) without providing sufficient explanations regarding the semantics of the lexical items that are considered or the ways in which the items interact with one another. We are left with the questions regarding the semantic nature of the verbs and the prepositions, as well as the interaction between the two.

Boldyrev, Babina, and Bundantseva (2014) considers visual perception verbs by presenting a conceptual taxonomic model to account for various concepts represented by the verbs. This study assigns “to see” and “to look” at the basic level that consists of two tiers and presents a conceptually based network of visual perception verbs. This allows for the descriptions of not only fixed meanings but also of its changes under different contexts. Although the study does not adequately explain why different verbs belong to their respective levels within the proposed conceptual hierarchy, it proposes that the concepts are structured and networked along with the linguistic units.¹⁰

Sawada (2006) discusses in detail the difference between “see” and “can see.” By referring to Palmer (1990), he presents that “can see” represents different meanings depending on the context. His analysis advances to suggest that some uses of “can” with perception verbs, with “see” in particular, indicate spontaneity instead of either ability or possibility. (Sawada 2006, p. 387)¹¹ Also mentioned is the requirement of continuity in relation to collocation of “can see” and progressive form contained in the object phrase, as in “In this photograph you can see Joan blinking.” (Kirsner and Thompson 1976, p.218, as cited in Sawada 2006, p.395). This is proposed as another condition that gives rise to the meaning of spontaneity of the auxiliary verb “can.”

2.2.1.2. Studies on Polysemy of Visual Perception Verbs

Alm-Arvius (1993) is a comprehensive review of the meanings of the English verb “see”. It first describes in detail the meanings of “see” in terms of criterial qualities, temporal span, and in various grammatical contexts based on subject argument and object argument. In the second section, she presents pragmatic variation of “see” and considers pragmatic expansion and diversion from the literal meaning. In the final section, she goes on to describe the uses of “see” as near-synonyms of verbs such as make sure, understand, consider, etc. The bases of the distinction between what she calls “pragmatic variation” and “near-synonyms,” however, are left vague and unclear.

One of the major etymological studies on perception is presented in Sweetser (1990). In her discussion of the relationship between metaphors and perception, she points out that the focusing ability of visual sense is similar to the way we focus our thought to a particular

entity. Furthermore, she reasons that vision is closely connected with intellection because it is our “primary source of objective data about the world” (p. 39). On the basis of her thorough survey of etymology related to vision of Indo-European languages, she presents how our sight is connected to knowledge and mental vision, control and monitoring, physical




Fig. 2-7

Metaphors of Perception (Sweetser 1990, p. 38)

manipulation and grasping, mental manipulation and control. Fig. 2-7 shows the way in which Sweetser had presented how the meaning of perception verbs were extended to other related concepts. The linkages among different concepts based on sight has much to contribute to the synchronic analyses of polysemy of visual perception verbs today.

Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999) is a cross-linguistic study of the polysemy of perception verbs in English, Basque, and Spanish. The semantic extensions of the verbs are considered both synchronically and diachronically. The analyses of vision verbs, as well as those of other sense, are mostly descriptive centering on grouping and subgrouping of the English verb “see” and its counterparts in Basque and Spanish. The major groups are the “Intellection group” which contains meanings such as ‘to understand,’ ‘to consider,’ and ‘to

study, the “Social group” which contains ‘to meet,’ ‘to visit,’ ‘to go out with,’ and the “Assurance group,” which contains ‘to find out,’ ‘to make sure,’ and ‘to take care.’ It also discusses the varied telicity, or the finiteness, of the verb “see” depending on the complement, by referring to Lyons (1977).¹² The study concludes by stating that the mapping between the source domain and the target domain is carried out through either selection of properties or through metaphor.

A cross-linguistic empirical study on the frequency of the use of vision verbs and other perception verbs is reported in San Roque, Kentrick, Norcliffe, et al. (2015). In the study, the data were taken from conversations of people in domestic settings, during activities such as preparing food, doing laundry, or just talking together. The languages studied included Chintang, Mandarin, and Tzetal, in addition to more familiar Indo-European languages such as English, Italian, and Spanish. The results revealed that in 12 out of the 13 languages that were studied,¹³ vision verbs were the most frequently used perception verb. The possible reasons for this outcome, according to the authors, include that much of our brain is devoted to visual processing, that there are simply more occasions to talk about visual objects than, for example, taste, and that sight is the most readily and regularly shared experience.

Another synchronic study on the polysemy of visual perception verbs is the one that has attempted to explain how the word “miru” (rough equivalent of “look”) in Japanese came to include meanings such as understanding, judging, and handling, through semantic extensions based on metaphors and metonymies by Tanaka (1996).¹⁴ Similar approaches based on linear semantic extensions are also found in the studies of idiomatic expressions containing body parts in Japanese. (Arizono 2005, Shoji 2010, etc.).

Finally, Johnson (1999) considers the uses of “see” in adult-child interaction in a corpus database (CHILDES)¹⁵ by categorizing them into use types, such as, demonstrative, visual, tag, ascertain, etc. (p. 163). He reports that 54.3% of adult uses of “see” in the “ascertain” situation involved clear overlap between visual and non-visual interpretations. He concludes from the data that:

...for a child “see” in “I see what you mean” and “I see a dog” may not be different

use-types. If this is the case, then learning of the mental adult sense(s) of *see* is a matter of differentiating use-types from one another, not of extending an established use-type to a new conceptual domain. (p. 166)

From this, he hypothesizes that the child develops a ‘conflated’ sense of the word, which is then later ‘deconflated’ into two distinct meanings. Grady (2005), referring to Johnson (1999), also says that at a fairly early age, children come to conceptualize the verb “see” as a combination of the domain of visual concepts and the domain of thought and understanding. He argues, however, that Johnson’s findings cannot sufficiently account for primary metaphors, since words such as “hot” in the Anger-as-Heat metaphor does not frequently appear in conversation with a dual meaning as “see” does.

2.2.2. Summary

The previous studies on verbs “look” and “see” and other visual perception verbs appear to be based more on differences than similarities. The aim of many of the studies so far has been to characterize the verbs according to some syntactic or semantic criteria in an attempt to delineate their usages. As mentioned earlier, semantic analyses based on parameter-based evaluation without sufficient examination of the verbs in use fall short of grasping the subtleties of the meanings expressed in different contexts. With regard to the previous studies on the polysemy of visual perception verbs, many seem to follow the idea of semantic extension that results in emergence of different meanings of the verbs. While various processes of semantic extension are likely to have taken place diachronically, the approach is not fully adequate for analyzing the different meanings evoked by the verbs. This is mainly because the theory based on semantic extension assumes emergence of related, but separate, meanings from the original visual perception verbs.

In the present study, different meanings of “look” and “see” are considered on the assumption that the concepts evoked by respective verbs are gradient, flexible, and adjustable according to contexts. The analyses are usage-based to illustrate how the meanings of the verbs adapt to different situations and how they interact with other lexical items. Under the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, the study aims to present a novel approach to analyzing lexical items, by focusing on “look” and “see” in particular.

Notes

1. Givón (2001) also writes:

Lexical concepts are conventionalized types of experience rather than individual tokens of experience. That is, they are generic. Such conventionalization presumably involves the development of prototypical activation pattern of a cluster of connected nodes. A lexical concept may represent a relatively time-stable entity—physical object, landmark, location, plant, animal, person, cultural institution or abstract concept—thus typically a *noun*. It may represent a more temporary action, event, process or relation, thus typically a *verb*. It may represent a time-stable quality or temporary state, thus typically an *adjective*. Cognitive psychologists have long recognized the conceptual lexicon under the label of *permanent semantic memory* (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968). (p. 8)

2. Lakoff (1987, p.267) defines the two structures as follows:

- A. Basic-level structure: Basic-level categories are defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception, our capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich mental images.
- B. Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc.

3. Arnheim (1969) writes, “Although the senses of smell and taste, for example, are rich in nuances, all this wealth produces—at least for the human mind—a very primitive order. Therefore, one can indulge in smells and tastes, but one can hardly think in them” (p. p.18).

4. See Lakoff (1987, p. 5-57) for further details.

5. Barden (2010) also writes, “...we ask why metaphorical links shouldn't themselves be regarded as contiguities....The term 'contiguity' is in itself highly metaphorical and susceptible to a wide range of interpretations, as has often been observed. It is thus perhaps surprising that the question of metaphorical linkage counting as contiguity has not been raised more often.” (p. 7)

6. Hanks (2006) suggests the following parameters to evaluate the metaphoricity of an expression: semantic class, salient cognitive (or perceptual) features, resonance,

collocation, register and domain, and frequency, and argues that “In the most metaphorical cases, the secondary subject shares fewest properties with the primary subject.” (p. 169)

7. Cited from Kanji-A-Day.com

<http://www.kanji-a-day.com/dictionary/kanji.php>

8. Adapted from Hattori (1968: p.198)

	<i>mieru</i>	see	look at	watch	<i>miru</i>	<i>nagameru</i>
intention/active	—	—	+	+	+	+
focus	—	0	+	+	+	—
curiosity	—	0	+	+	+	+
stationary	0	0	+	—	0	0
ability	+	0	0	0	0	0

9. See Chomsky 1957, 1965 for details.

10. See Boldyrev, Babina, and Budantseva (2014, p.383) for a flow-chart showing the network of visual perception verbs.

11. The difference between “see” and “can see” is exemplified by following sentences

(Sawada 2006, p. 387):

(9) I can see the moon. (Palmer 1990: 86)

(10) a. He has marvellous eyes; he can see the tiniest detail. (Palmer 1990: 87)

b. He has been blind (deaf) a long time, but now he can see (hear) again.

(Visser 1963-1973: 1737)

(11) From the top you can see the whole of the city. (Palmer 1990: p.87)

(12) I see the moon.

While the “can” in sentences (10a) and (10b) indicates “ability,” and that in sentence (11), “possibility,” Sawada claims that sentence (9) with “can” is almost equivalent to (12) without it.


12. The sentences given in Ibarretxe-Antuanano (1999) are:

- (a) John saw the car.
- (b) John saw Mary crossing the street
- (c) John saw that Mary crossed the street.

It is noted that while “see” in (a) and (b) refer to physical perception, (c) does not. The study says, “...the verb to see does not encode the acquisition of sense data through the eyes, but the mental manipulation of an information gathered by the eyes” (p. 55).

13. The languages studied were: Avatime, Cha’palaa, Chintang, Duna, English, Italian, Lao, Mandarin, Semai, Siwu, Spanixh, Tzeltal, and Whitesands. (San Roque et al. 2015: 44)

14. Adapted and translated by the author from Tanaka (1996, p. 136)



15. CHILDES Clark Corpus

<http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/access/Eng-NA-MOR/Clark.html>

Chapter 3 Semantic Analysis of Verb “Look” as Physical Perception

3.1. Introduction

The English verb “look” is a verb to mean visual perception, which is generally considered to be a rough equivalent of “miru” in Japanese. It is a verb which is commonly followed by a preposition “at” or others.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the meaning of physical perception of the verb “look” as follows:

To give a certain direction to one’s sight; to apply one’s power of vision; to direct one’s eyes upon some object or towards some portion of space. The usual prep. introducing the object of vision is now *at*;

- a. with phrase or adv. expressing the direction or the intended object of the vision.
- b. with the direction or object left indeterminate, or merely implied by the context.

(Adapted from Oxford English Dictionary)¹

In other words, “look” is a verb “to apply one’s power of vision” as well as “to direct one’s eyes” upon or towards some entity, with preposition “at” most commonly found after the verb.

This first section of this chapter begins with the examination of the meanings of “look” that primarily indicate physical perception, which means that the object of visual perception is concrete and exists within the possible field of vision, though in some of the uses, this precondition is not strictly satisfied, as when “look” is used only to refer to the movement of one’s attention instead of the actual visual line. Whether this second use of “look,” referring only to the movement of attention, qualifies as physical perception or not may be controversial. In the sections to follow, I proceed to argue and provide examples to illustrate that this attention-movement use of “look” is indeed “physical” in a broad sense of the term.

In analyzing the semantics of “look” in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the verb is distinguished into two types: the one that is used singularly without any prepositions

following it, and the other that is followed by a preposition/prepositions other than “at” or an adverb.

This chapter is devoted to the examination of “look” without a preposition, starting with its analyses centered on meanings related to physical visual perception, which is followed by the consideration of its meaning shifts to profile more of the attentional aspects of the verb. The final part of the chapter examines some common conventionalized phrase and structures using “look.”

3.2. “Look” with an Emphasis on Physical Perception

In order to apply one’s power of vision and direct it towards something, there obviously needs to be an object. This is because it is generally thought that to complete an activity that is considered as to “look,” it is necessary for something, an object, to be reflected into one’s eyes. Nevertheless, there is a group of uses of “look” that does not, at least grammatically, require an object and can be used in the same manner as an intransitive verb as in:

- (1) She covered her eyes because she was afraid to look.
- (2) She heard the steps behind her so she turned around to look.
- (3) Mary quietly left the classroom while the teacher wasn’t looking.
- (4) If you look carefully, you should be able to figure out that the picture represents the face of a man.

The verb “look” in all of the above sentences are “look,” with the direction or object left indeterminate, or merely implied by the context, as it is stated in (b) in the Oxford Dictionary definition given at the beginning of this chapter. This use of verb “look” is in fact generally classified as an intransitive use of the verb in various English dictionaries. This can be demonstrated by the unacceptability of the questions asking what the object is. The questions below are based on (1) ~ (4) above and are all considered ungrammatical:

- (5) * What was she afraid to look?

- (6) * What did she turn around to look?
- (7) * What was the teacher not looking?
- (8) * What do you (need to) look carefully?

What is peculiar about this verb “look” is that while questions (5) ~ (8) are unacceptable, there still exists an implied object in each of the sentences (1) ~ (4). It is supposedly an intransitive verb, but semantically, it can be said to be a transitive verb whose object can be identified from the context. Furthermore, in the following sentences, while (9) and (10) are grammatical, (11) and (12) are not.

- (9) She walked for two hours.
- (10) He shouted in anger.
- (11) * She looked for two hours.
- (12) * He looked in anger.

In (9) and (10), “walked” and “shouted” are both actions which do not require any object either explicitly or implicitly. In contrast, (11) and (12) are ungrammatical in the corresponding sentence structures, which makes “look” different from what is normally considered as intransitive verbs in dictionaries.²

Returning to (1) ~ (4) with “look” without an overt object, the degree to which the implied object, as well as the direction of the movement of the visual line that can be understood, or profiled, varies depending on the context. In (1) we only know that the object of “look” is “some entity she did not want to look at,” without any further clues to narrow down what exactly that is. In (2) however, the object is more specific, “the person who was making the footsteps.” On the other hand, in (3) it can be assumed that the potential object of “look” was Mary. Therefore, the sentence implies that the visual line of the teacher was not directed at Mary when she left the classroom. Finally, in (4), it is quite evident that the object of “look” is the picture.

From the above observations, it can be said that when “look” is used, the object and/or the direction of one’s visual line is made known from the context beyond a single sentence,

though the degree to which the implied object is specified may vary. It then follows that this, in turn, makes a difference also in the degree to which one's visual capacity was intensified, as well as the direction and the amount of movement of one's visual line.

In (1) the eyes were covered to prevent activation of her visual capacity whatsoever. On the other hand, in (2) and (3) what is being profiled is not the intensification of one's visual capacity, rather, it is the direction of one's visual line that is being profiled. In (4), since the implied object of "look" is "the picture," which can be either big or small, the movement of the visual line is considered to be profiled if it is big, and the activation of one's visual capacity is profiled if the picture is small enough to fit within one's single field of vision.

The observations made above apply also in larger contexts as can be demonstrated by the following sentences extracted from COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English):

- (13) ...there were two tickets to U_i , for two weeks later at the Auditorio Nacional, sitting beside his laptop. Buht took them up and moved quickly to the hallway **to look**. Toro was turning a corner down by the counseling office. (Paris Review (2013))
- (14) Let's get dressed up and go glam rock and make a really fun night out of it. So we did, and as soon as we walked into the place, people started **to look**. (Cosmopolitan (2008))
- (15) Something about the sound of his voice drew me down to the keyhole. Like a moth pulled into the back draught of a fan, I had **to look**. The room was lit by slits of sun through slanted blinds. (The South Carolina Review (2004))
- (16) "Would you come home with me, Cahal? Would we walk out to where I am?" All this was spoken to his back while Cahal walked on. He knew who was there. He knew who it was, he didn't have **to look**. (New Yorker (2004))

The verb "look" in sentences (13) ~ (16) all involve activation of visual capacity and movement of visual line within the domain of physical perception. However, the degree to which other different domains are profiled or implied depends on such parameters as the subject, the purpose, and the overall situation or context. For example, "look" in (13), the identification of the person who had left the tickets is profiled as the purpose. In (14), it is the curiosity and the surprise of the people that are being implied and profiled from the

context.

A natural reading of sentences (15) and (16), on the other hand, would be one in which the subject's intention is backgrounded. That the subject "had/didn't have to look" implies that the intention of the subject did not play a major role in performing the action of "look". This supports Langacker (1999), which claims the difference in "agentivity," or the strength of intention on the part of the subject, depending on the context in which a verb is used.³

The verb "look" in sentences (13), (15), and (16) share the nuance of "checking" or "finding out" something, which is implied by the context. In contrast, in (14), as mentioned earlier, the purpose of "look" is not so much to check or find out something as to satisfy one's curiosity. Also, "look" in (14) differs from the other three with regard to the temporal frame of the act of "looking," because of the plurality of the subject and also because of the depicted situation. The most common reading of the sentence would be the one in which people directed their visual lines to the subjects but probably not for a long time. Given that they were at the site of glam rock, their attention must have been dispersed to all the things that were going on around them, so it is natural to interpret their act of "looking" was neither concentrated nor continuous, but relatively short-lasting and intermittent.




Fig. 3-1

Basic Domains of "Look"

In the discussions so far, I have presented that the different semantic domains are profiled or backgrounded to various degrees depending on the context in which "look" is

used. The semantic domains of “activation of visual capacity” and “movement of the visual line,” however, are always being evoked, which indicates that these concepts are central to the meaning of “look,” as is illustrated in Fig. 3-1.

Various other concepts and implications are profiled or backgrounded around these central domains according to the context. Communication is accomplished through mostly unconscious, yet appropriate, adjustment of the meaning of lexical items, to meet the needs of the given context in the broad sense, including our real world knowledge, the state of our mental-internal world, and the specific situation in which the lexical items are used.

3.3. “Look” with Emphasis on Attention

The consideration in Section 3.2 above has revealed that the meaning of “look” as physical perception takes on various implications through subtle adjustments by profiling or backgrounding the relevant concepts. One of the major domains that is often profiled when “look” is in use is the domain of attention, yet with activation of visual capacity and movement of the visual line still remaining central to the meaning of the verb. Consider the following sentences.

(17) Look! There’s a mountain!

(18) Look! Here she comes.

Both sentence (17) and (18) are instances of “look” used with a greater emphasis on attention than in the previous examples. They differ grammatically from (1) ~ (4) and (13) ~ (16) in that “look” is placed at the head of the sentence, and therefore, that it is an imperative. The verb “look” in (17) and (18) serves the speech act of catching the hearer’s attention, while also directing the hearer’s visual line to the object in question. In other words, while the verb profiles the activation of visual capacity and the movement of visual line in the physical sense, at the same time, the message it conveys and the speech act it accomplishes are those of catching the hearer’s attention and directing it to a specific entity. In these sentences the actual physical existence of the object is presupposed to be within the extent to which the hearer’s field of vision is capable of reaching. Therefore, “look” in (17) and (18) takes on

the meaning of both physical and mental activities.

In the following sentences, whose structure is basically the same as that of (17) and (18), a greater shift can be witnessed towards “attention.”

(19) Look, I think I’ve had enough. I’m ready to go now.

(20) Look. Why don’t you think it over and give me your answer on Friday?

In sentences (19) and (20), “look” no longer requires physical visual perception. In both sentences, the verb serves to temporarily interrupt the speech of the interlocutor and call for attention to what the speaker is going to say. In other words, “look” is more like a pragmatic marker with no specific meaning other than to call for the listener’s attention to the speaker. The verb serves a similar function as “Hey,” “Listen,” and even “Well.” Nevertheless, the choice of “look” instead of these does more clearly profile the direction of mentally envisioned direction associated with one’s attention, which suggests the close relationship between the physical line of vision and the mental line of attention.⁴

The same “look” when used without the sense of exclamation conveys a different message.

(21) Look. There’s the mountain.

Although (21) is exactly the same as (17) in structure except that it has no exclamation mark, and therefore, lacks exclamatory nuance, the use and the function of this sentence can be very different from those of (17). In (21), the actual existence of the mountain within the field of vision is no longer required. It is perfectly conceivable to hear this sentence being uttered, say, in an urban office where no such mountains are in sight. If, for instance, people were discussing and considering a highway construction project, without taking note of the fact that a mountain existed along the planned route, and if one person happened to realize that, he or she would say this sentence to interrupt the discussion and remind others of the mountain. Again, the function is to direct the listeners’ attention to what the speaker is going to say.

The use of “look” with an emphasis on attention therefore demonstrates profiling the

physical perception to different degrees, from those which actually directs one’s visual line to a certain object to those which merely serve to call for attention of the hearer without the need for the object to be actually existing within the extent of the physical field of vision.

From the above observations, I propose that the concept of “attention” is also central to the meaning of “look,” along with “activation of visual capacity” and “direction of visual line.” Although these concepts are central to the meaning of “look” and are all evoked whenever the verb is used, they are not evoked to the same degree in all instances. Even the concepts that are central to the meaning of a lexical item demonstrate variation in which they are profiled or backgrounded depending on the context. Fig. 3-2, 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 represent this variation according to the sentence in which the verb is used, by taking up example sentences (4), (17) and (21) above.

Fig. 3-1 above is a conceptual diagram of the central meaning of “look” in the example sentence (4) “If you look carefully, you should be able to figure out that the picture represents the face of a man.” In this situation, what is implied the most by “look” is to activate visual capacity to find the face of a man. Since the activation of one’s visual capacity inherently intensifies one’s attention as well, the two domains are closely interrelated and are




Fig. 3-2

“If you look carefully, you should be able to figure out that the picture represents the face of a man.” (when the picture is big)

strengthened together. The movement of attention, however, varies depending on the amount of movement of the visual line. While the movement of the visual line to find the face of a

man may be required if the picture is big, if the picture is small enough to fit one's focused field of vision, then one only needs to intensify one's attention. Both Fig. 3-2 and 3-3




Fig. 3-3

"If you look carefully, you should be able to figure out that the picture represents the face of a man." (when the picture is small)

represent sentence (4), with the former representing the case where the picture is big, and the latter, where it is small.

It must be noted here that there is no temporal ordering involved here. All of the central meanings of the verb "look" are simultaneously evoked. It is only that the degree to




Fig. 3-4

"Look! There's the mountain!"

which each is profiled varies, as is described in parentheses in the figures. Fig. 3-4 represents example sentence (17) “Look! There’s the mountain!” In this case, all of the three central concepts are evoked almost to an equal degree. The speaker is asking the hearer for one’s attention, as well as to direct one’s visual line and activate one’s visual capacity to recognize the physical presence of the mountain. For this reason, all of the central meanings are almost equally profiled.

In the case of example sentence (21) “Look. There is the mountain,” which preserves the same structure as (17), without the exclamation mark, physical sense of the visual line and activation are backgrounded, since the object is no longer present within the extent of one’s physical field of vision. So the “attention” is what is profiled the most, though, it must be noted that the concepts of both the visual line and activation still exist within the central meaning of “look” even in this sentence, only that they now refer more to mental vision instead of actual physical perception, as it is illustrated in Fig. 3-5. The movement of attention is not as sudden as in the case of Fig. 3-4, because of the assumed softer voice of speaker, as well as of the lack of immediacy of the topic. There is a mountain, but not here and now.

Although Johnson (1999) proposed, with regard to “see,” that a child first learns the meaning of the word in a “conflated” form referring to both physical vision and the domain of thought, and later “deconflates” it to distinguish the two meanings, I believe that the conflated




Fig. 3-5

“Look. There’s the mountain.”

form, which Chris Johnson (1999) and Grady (1997, 2005) regard as the basis of “primary metaphor,” remains intact at some level of cognition. Likewise, with regard to “look,” the physical domain and the mental domain coexist as its central meaning. It is not a matter of when or how the two domains become distinct in the course of child development. The conflated form survives throughout a native speaker’s life. It is only that one comes to realize which of the domains are more profiled or backgrounded depending on the context as one gains knowledge about the world one lives in.

3.4. Other Uses of “Look”

There are other uses of “look” which may be considered more or less idiomatic, in the sense that these uses are fairly conventionalized with an established construction. They are not, however, totally independent of the physical perception and attention implied by “look” discussed above. The meanings connoted by the expressions and phrases listed hereunder overlap and are associated with the semantic core, or the central meanings, of the verb “look,” though the shift of evoked domains may vary.

3.4.1. “Look and Look”

There exists an English expression “looked and looked” without an object, as in:

(22) I looked and looked but couldn’t find the ticket in my bag.

As the sentence suggests, the phrase means to “look for” or “search for” something, though with the intensified meaning implied in an iconic manner by the repetition of the verb. Again, the object can be inferred from the context. As I have already presented in the beginning of this chapter, the implied object does not necessarily have to be found within the same sentence. It can be elsewhere, linguistic or non-linguistic, as long as the reader or the hearer is able to identify it from the context beyond the confinement of a single sentence, as in:

(23) One day, while walking through the forest of Reading, he lost the knife and could

never find it. He **looked and looked**, until he finally gave up. (Southwest Review (2014))

It can be assumed that what the subject in (23) “looked and looked” (for) was the knife he had lost, as it is suggested in the preceding sentence. This does not mean, however, that the meaning or the object of the phrase “looked and looked” can be recovered from any context. The phrase does not make sense whatsoever, if the context falls short of providing the necessary clues.

(24) ? He woke up. He looked and looked, until he finally gave up. Then he decided to make a phone call.

Although there is nothing syntactically wrong with sentence (24), it is semantically and pragmatically inappropriate, since anyone who reads or hears it would have a difficulty trying to figure out what the object of “looked and looked” is. Therefore, while the sentence in question itself is exactly the same in (23) and (24), the one in (23) is appropriate but (24) is not, not because of the sentence structure or the word combination, but precisely because of the context in which it occurs.

How then does the phrase “look and look” differ from “look for,” which is more commonly used to mean to search for something? Compare the following two sentences:

(25) I looked and looked and managed to find the ticket on the table.

(26) I looked for the ticket and managed to find it on the table.

While the subject of both (25) and (26) had engaged in the act of “searching,” there is a difference in the manner in which one did the searching. Intuitively, “looked and looked” gives a greater sense of desperation by its repetition of the verb, which profiles the domain of emotion. The visual capacity is also profiled to a greater degree in (25) than in (26), as a natural result of aroused emotion. In addition, the stronger sense of desperation implies greater body movement as well, such as, walking around the room, moving chairs, opening books, or whatever the subject thought was necessary to find the ticket. In (26), in contrast,

while bodily movements may also have been involved, unless otherwise implied by the context, the activity of “searching” is likely to have been more moderate.

In other words, as the sense of desperation is profiled, so are the other domains according to our encyclopedic knowledge of what desperation leads one to do. Thus, in addition to the intensification of the central meanings of “look” described in the previous section, other domains also get activated, triggered by the profiling of the sense of desperation. Fig. 3-6 shows that the mimetic repetition creates the meaning of intensification, which may evoke a sense of desperation, which, in turn, gives rise to the impression of an increased bodily movement. Again, the diagram does not represent any temporal sequence of these concepts. They all occur simultaneously and unconsciously in the minds of native speakers.




Fig. 3-6

Increase in desperation and bodily movement by iconic repetition

The use of the construction “look and look,” however, does not always imply the sense of desperation demonstrated in (25). The following sentences demonstrate this point:

- (27) “What are you doing?” asked the young man. “I am looking for the elephants,” said the old man. “There is one, and there is one, and there is one,” he said, pointing to three blocks of stone. The young man **looked and looked and looked**, but all he saw were blocks of stone. (Highlights for Children (2002))
- (28) At first, I couldn't spot anybody in the gloom. I **looked and looked**, and then, before the tennis court, I saw a bulky figure shuffling like a zombie under the frangipani trees whose blossoms I like to put on my pillow. (Ms (1996))

There are two semantic implications to be noted in sentences (27) and (28). First, the mimetic repetition of “looked” (three times in (27) and twice in (28)) suggests intensiveness of the search in an iconic way as it did in (25). Second, in both of these sentences, the result of “looked and looked (and looked)” is “saw,” which indicates that the repetition of “looked” implies intensification of one’s visual capacity, but not so much desperation as it did in (25), though it again depends on why the subject was trying to find the elephants. Since the subject was looking in the direction to which the old man had pointed, little movement of the visual line is implied. The same applies to (28). Although the expression “looked and looked” does evoke a sense of intensification of some sort, because the subject was trying to find someone in the gloom, it is reasonable to assume that what was intensified more was the subject’s visual capacity than either his or her attention or the movement of the visual line.

The above observations suggest that the phrase “look and look” has a tendency to profile the intensified visual capacity in search of something, but this, again, is not its fixed meaning. The “look for” or “search for” meaning of the phrase can be flexibly adjusted, depending on the depicted situation as well as from the tone of the description of the scene.

There are also cases where “look and look” is straight-forwardly given the meaning of “search for” or “look for” by the preceding sentence.

(29) All that night my mother waited, but my father did not come home. The next day my mother went out on the mountain, in the fog, searching for him. She **looked and looked**, but she could not find him. (Analog Science Fiction & Fact (2001))

(30) We looked for the nest. According to my guide, the yellow-throated vireo builds in a fork near the end of a branch. We **looked and looked**, exercising the patience of gatherers, but did not find the nest. (Sierra (1991))

In (29) and (30), because phrases such as “searching for” and “looked for” are respectively found in the preceding sentence, it is more natural to interpret “looked and looked” as a substitute for these phrases, with the meaning of intensification of the search itself profiled, more so than that of the act of “looking”. While the central three concepts are still implied

by each of the “look” in these sentences, the meaning shifts more towards “search” than “look” compared to (25) where there was no preceding context to overtly indicate or narrow down its meaning to the concept of “search.” In (25), the interpretation of “looked and looked” allows for more flexibility and imagination compared to (29) and (30).

Finally, the phrase “look and look” can also be used only to mean the intensification of one’s visual perception per se, without any additional nuance of “search for” or “look for”.

(31) I just went out there in all that white sand and got me a dune and went up on it and **looked and looked** and just let it sink in, and I never saw anything like it, never felt anything like it. I think I could stay out there in that white sand for a real long time, and I don't know exactly why. (Atlantic (1993))

In (31), there no longer exists the intention on the part of the speaker to “find” something. The phrase only means intensification of visual capacity, attention, and the movement of the visual line on the part of the subject, for remembering the scene. The subject was trying to let the scene “sink in.” He or she was not searching for something, but was trying to remember by performing the act expressed by the phrase “looked and looked.”

The discussions in this section on the memetic and iconic expression “look and look,” which is a conventionalized and idiomatic use of “look,” again demonstrated that this phrase, like “look” used by itself, flexibly shifts its meaning among “look for”/“search for,” the intensification of the central meanings of “look,” and that of the emotion resulting in desperation, all depending on the context, while the central meanings remain present to one degree or another in all instances.

3.4.2. “Just Looking”

The second type of conventionalized phrase using “look” is “just looking” as in the following sentence.

(32) No thanks. I’m just looking.

This is a familiar expression which one might use at a shop, in response to the question, “May

I help you?” by a shop clerk. It serves to mean that you are not “looking for” something specific, but “just looking,” as the words literally express. While this is a familiar set phrase, it helps to elucidate the semantic difference between “look” and “look for.”

As it has been presented in this chapter so far, the verb “look” is normally understood to mean the activation of visual capacity, movement of the visual line, and directing one’s attention. Its meaning may also shift to profile the meaning of “look for” or “search for” when an appropriate context is given, especially in the phrase “look and look.” Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated with regard to “look and look” that the implied intensification of the central meanings may give rise to the interpretation that includes “desperation” and additional “bodily movement” in some cases. In the use of “look” in the phrase “just looking,” however, all of these meanings are neutralized, though, again, the neutralization is a matter of degree and the three central meanings, in particular, remain present, at least when used in the situation of shopping. The implication of “just looking” in (32) then lies in its contrast with the intention to buy. The phrase is used more or less as a substitute for “I don’t have any intention to buy anything.”

Below are other examples of the use of the phrase “just looking,” in the situations other than shopping.

(33) I could see through the glare that it was a policeman, and that he was from Garden City. “What are you doing here?” He was young, or young compared to Officer Dennis, who would have understood why I was here and to whom I could have explained my curiosity. “**I ’m just looking**,” I said. (Ploughshares. (1996))

(34) I had never seen anything quite like it. There was stuff piled everywhere. ... “Get away from here, you mangy mutt!” a short black dog snarled at me. “This is my yard. Get on your way. I have work to do.” “Chill, mister, **I ’m just looking**. Besides I don't know how to get in there anyway.” (Wallace, Carol and Wallace, Bill. *The meanest hound around*. (2004))

In (33) and (34), the subject means that while she or he is visually receiving the input, there is no further specific purpose for doing so. Whether the speaker is being honest or not aside, at least the intended speech act is to stop the other party from bothering or suspecting the subject of doing anything beyond reception of the visual input. From the observations of verb “look” in this chapter so far, we know that this verb evokes at least its three central meanings

and that these central meanings are shared, though mostly unconsciously, by native speakers. Also, we know that any visual perception verbs cannot mean only “reception” of visual input, since there is always some kind of cognitive processing involved. (See Sections 2.1.4. and 2.1.5.) If so, the expression “just looking” in (33) and (34) is self-contradictory, since one cannot “just look” without evoking any of the central meanings of “look” or activating some kind of cognitive processing.

Such being the case, the expression “just looking,” which neutralizes the central meanings of “look,” is a highly conventionalized use of the verb with a specific speech act assigned to it. The meaning of “look” is reduced to mean only the “reception” of the input with its core meanings being stripped away.

A similar expression is used in Japanese as well in the same situations as those described above. In Japanese, a similar speech act is performed by using the verb “miru,” a rough equivalent of “look”.

(35) Miteru dake desu. ((I’m) just looking.)

Sentence (35) is perfectly natural in any of the situations assumed in (32) ~ (34). It is also interesting to note here that in English, as well as in Japanese, the use of “see” (roughly translated as “mieru” in Japanese) is not appropriate in these cases.

(36) *I’m just seeing. (uttered in a shop)

(37) *Mieteru dake desu. (I’m just seeing)

The use of the verb “see” in the above situation sounds awkward in English, perhaps because although both “look” and “see” are visual perception verbs, “see” is a verb that connotes more cognitive activities together with the perception of a visual input as will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

3.4.3. “Look” with Interrogative-Pronoun

There is a set of expressions in English in the form [look + interrogative-pronoun] as in:

- (38) Look who's here!
- (39) Look where we are!
- (40) Look what's happening!

These instances of the use of “look” are similar to those that were discussed above in 3.2, which profile the domain of “attention,” one of the central meanings of the verb “look.” Physical perception of the object in sentences (38) ~ (40) depends on the context. In (38) and (39), it is probably possible to physically perceive the person who is here as well as the place where we are, since both a person and a place are physical entities, though, understandably, a “place” can also refer to a point in time, in which case, physical perception would not be possible. In (40), however, since the object is more abstract covering some time range and may or may not be within the field of vision of the interlocutors when the sentence is uttered, “look” shifts more towards mental vision of than in (38) or (39). Nevertheless, when one hears sentence (40), it is natural to assume that at least one’s attention is being called for.

This call for attention implied by “look” in all of the sentences (38) ~ (40) is further enforced by the object being expressed in the form of interrogative-pronoun, which may be interpreted as a pronoun but also as an embedded question as in “Do you know what’s happening?” If the interrogative-pronoun is taken to mean more as a question than as a pronoun, the activation of attention implied by “look” is strengthened. This is because when




Fig. 3-7

Relationship between interpretation of interrogative pronoun and meaning of “look”

a question is thrown at a person, one is likely to try to answer it by giving it a thought and directing one's attention more to the question at issue. This mutual effect of "look" and the interpretation of an interrogative-pronoun is illustrated in Fig. 3-7. In this respect, "who," "where," and "what" in the example sentences are ambiguous, shifting between the role of a pronoun and that of an interrogative, again, depending on the context.⁵

Nevertheless, sentences (38) ~ (40) are imperatives in form, not questions. No answers from the hearer are expected, despite the fact that they all permit the interpretation as containing an embedded question. In this sense, the embedded question part of the sentences are more like rhetorical questions (Goto 2012), which are used as a means to exclaim, express surprise, and to share information. The speaker is not expecting to gain any new information from the hearer. Rather, the purpose is to call for the hearer's attention with an intention of sharing the information and making sure that the hearer also knows or realizes the answer to the question. While "look" used as an imperative as in (17) "Look! There's a mountain!" also fulfills the speech act of sharing information, as does "Look where a mountain is!", the existence of a mountain is presupposed in the latter, while it is not in the former. Even in the sentence "Look what's there!", a close parallel to (38) "Look who's here!", there is a stronger nuance of presupposed and shared expectation of something being there than in "Look! There's a mountain!."

Interestingly, the direct translations of (38) ~ (40) sounds rather unnatural under the given contexts:

(41) ?*Dare-ga kita ka mite! (Look who came (who's here)!)

(42) ?*Doko-ni iru ka mite! (Look where we are!)

(43) ?*Nani-ga okotteru ka mite! (Look what's happening!)

These Japanese sentences would sound quite awkward for conveying the meaning implied by their English counterparts. The English use of this [look + wh-pronoun] has no equivalent in Japanese. In fact, it is very difficult to translate (38) ~ (40) into Japanese, since the rhetorical questions are relatively rare in Japanese compared to English. The author's intuition would be that a statement which expresses unexpectedness, regret, excitement, happiness, or other

emotional elation would be used to accomplish the speech acts of (38) ~ (40). For example, rough translations of (38) “Look who’s here” could be any of the following, depending on the context:

- (44) a. Kare-ga kita! (He’s here!)
b. Kare-ga kuru-towa omowa-nakatta! (I didn’t expect him that he would come.)
c. Kare-ga kuru-nante! (It is too bad that he’s here. /I am so excited/happy that he’s here.)

As for the expression “Look who’s here!” in English, it can be also said directly to the person who has actually arrived, in which case, the expression turns into a message of welcome as in:

- (45) Finally she looked up from her book, stared at me for a moment, and then her face opened in pleasure and she reached for my hand. "Well, **look who's here!**" she exclaimed. "I'm so glad you came." (Ms. (2007))
- (46) ..., and I was walking around thinking how nice it would be if I didn't exist and at that moment somebody slapped me on the shoulder and shouted: "Well, well, well, **look who's here!**" At that very moment my pleasant daydreaming about non-existence dropped like a rock into a pool of water,.... (Review of Contemporary Fiction (2007))

In the above examples, the expression “Look who’s here!” is used to convey the excitement and the feeling of welcoming a guest. Although the central meanings of “look” may be still implied, they are largely backgrounded, together with the purpose of sharing or ascertaining the hearer’s understanding of the given information, since obviously the hearer, the guest, knows he or she is the one who is here. It is a highly conventionalized use of the expression “Look who’s here!” which can be translated into Japanese only as:

- (47) Ma, yoku kite-kuremashita! ((Oh, I’m glad that) you came (for me)!)

The above observations suggest that the more a lexical item becomes conventionalized, the

more it tends to shift away from its central meanings, which, in turn, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to translate directly into Japanese.

Finally, there is another use of [look + interrogative-pronoun] exemplified in a sentence such as the following:

(48) Look what you did!

Sentence (48) is pragmatically ambiguous even with an exclamation mark at the end. The sentence can be interpreted as either negative or positive, depending on the situation in which it is uttered, though the negative reading is seemingly more prevalent. In the negative reading, it would roughly mean something like “You have done something terrible. I hope you realize that,” and in the positive reading, “You have done something wonderful. I realize and I hope that you also realize the good results of it.”

This is also an expression which cannot be translated in the similar construction to Japanese. Although there are many possibilities, a few examples of a Japanese translation of (48) would be as follows:

- (49) a. ?*Anata-ga shitakoto-wo mite! (Look at what you did.)
- b. (Mite.) Kore, anata-ga shita-no yo. ((Look.) You’ve done this.) (negative or positive)
- c. (Mite.) Kore, anata-no sei yo. ((Look.) This is because of you. (You are to be blamed.) (negative)
- d. (Mite.) Kore, anata-no okage yo. ((Look.) This owes to you.) (positive)

The above Japanese sentences will serve the similar speech act as that of the English sentence (48). I have put “mite,” an imperative form of “miru,” a rough equivalent of “look,” in parentheses to indicate that the word is optional. This is because in Japanese, starting the sentence with a demonstrative pronoun “kore” (this) is sufficient to draw the hearer’s attention and adding “mite” on top of that somehow sounds awkward and redundant, though not completely unacceptable.

Therefore, while the central meaning of “look,” namely, attention, movement of visual

line, and activation of visual capacity are also part of “miru” in Japanese, there appears to be a discrepancy in the extent to which these verbs are used to draw the hearer’s attention.

3.5. Summary

This chapter began by considering various uses of “look” as physical perception. The verb “look” is a visual perception verb, meaning that it is a verb which presupposes the existence of some kind of visual stimulus and input. When the verb is used in the form of “look” without a preposition or an object, sufficient context beyond a single sentence needs to be available to infer what the object is.

The verb “look,” when it is used to connote physical perception, that is, when the supposed stimulus is a physically visible and tangible object, the central meaning of the verb covers mainly two domains: (a) activation of visual capacity, and (b) movement of the visual line. This physical sense of the verb is also used to refer to activation and movement of one’s attention, with or without the existence of the actual object within the extent of one’s field of vision. The examinations in this chapter demonstrated that attention is also an integral part of the central meaning of “look”.

There are some idiomatic, or conventionalized uses of “look”. The expression “looked and looked,” which roughly means to “look for” something is an activity with an intention to find an object. The object is again implied by the context. The memetic and iconic repetition of the verb adds the nuance of intensification, either of the central meanings of the verb or that of the emotional state of the subject. Thus, the phrase “look and look” may evoke a sense of desperation and the resultant greater bodily movement when appropriate.

The expression “just looking,” on the other hand, diverts from the basic concept of visual perception. As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.1.4, visual or any other type of perception involves further cognitive activities. The use of the verb “look” in the expression “just looking,” however, suggests that the meaning of “look” can be used to purposefully pretend that “looking” only implies reception of the input without any cognitive processing.

Finally, the consideration of the construction [look + interrogative-pronoun], which is

often used in English to draw attention and to share information with the hearer, demonstrated that the pronoun itself shifts in its meaning more towards an interrogative when used in this construction. The embedded question that results from this shift, however, is not for seeking new information. Rather, it serves to have the hearer confirm the understood answer to the question. Since rhetorical questioning is relatively uncommon in Japanese, the most natural translation of this type of sentence for conveying the similar speech act of catching attention and sharing information is usually performed in the form of a statement.

The examination of “look” in this chapter demonstrated that the semantics of the verb is flexible and shifts according to the context. When the implied object is something that actually exists, its meaning focuses more on physical perception involving activation of visual capacity and movement of the visual line. On the other hand, “look” can be also used with a stronger emphasis on “attention,” in which case, the object to which the attention is to be directed does not necessarily need to be within the potential field of vision. Some of the conventionalized expressions and constructions also suggest that the central meanings of the verb “look” may be backgrounded as the conventionalized meaning use become widely accepted by native speakers, as with the expression “Look who’s here!” directed to the very person that has shown up.

Notes

1. The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) (1989). Prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, Volume IX, Oxford University Press.
2. Merriam-Webster <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/look>
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English
http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/look_1
Weblio (English-Japanese/Japanese-English) Online Dictionary
<http://ejje.weblio.jp/content/look>
3. Langacker (1999) claims that the same lexical item can bring about different degrees of intentionality, or volition, even when it is considered as an agentive verb as can be

demonstrated by “frighten” in the following sentences (p.305):

- a. Edward frightened the hikers by jumping out of the bushes and shouting at them.
- b. Edward frightened the other hunters by accidentally firing his rifle.
- c. Edward frightened the priest by believing in satan.
- d. Edward frightened the children by being so ugly.
- e. Edward frightened his parents by not being among the children getting off the bus.

4. In the field of so-called attentional semantics (www.mind-consciousness-language.com), whenever we are conscious of our experience, we are directing attention to the experience and when anything is verbalized, the words evoke our attention to the entity that is represented by the word.

The visual conscious experience is determined by the fact that we have applied our attention to our organ of sight (and not to some other organ); the conscious experience of the physical qualities of the cat is determined by the results of the operations performed by our attention on, and by means of, the organ of sight: focusing on the scene, scanning the scene, retaining the shape of the foreground while discarding what lies in the background, fusing the shape with its surface characteristics, following its movements, and so on; the conscious experience of the other physical qualities of the cat derives from the application of attention to the other sense-organs. (Marchetti 2005, p. 6)

5. This fluctuation between pronominal and interrogative use of wh-words becomes apparent when one tries to translate a sentence such as “I know what he did” into Japanese, since “what” in this sentence can be translated as “nani” (interrogative) or “koto” (the thing). Thus, this sentence can be translated as:

- (a) Karega shita-koto ga wakaruu. (I know the thing that he did.)
- (b) Karega nani-wo shitaka wakaruu. (I know what it is that he did.)

Chapter 4 Semantic Analysis of “Look” with Preposition/Adverb

4.1. Introduction

In this section, the use of the verb “look” followed by various prepositions are examined. While [look at + N] is the most commonly found construction, “look” may be followed by a number of different prepositions, with each preposition profiling different semantic aspects of verb “look” according to linguistic, as well as extra-linguistic, contexts. Furthermore, the meaning of the preposition itself also shifts depending on the context.

In the following discussions, I will first focus on the phrase “look at” through close examination of the meanings expressed by “at” and how they, in turn, shift when combined with “look” and other verbs. Such an approach is necessary, since although prepositions are lexical items that mostly provides some kind of information related to location or time, and therefore, they are often referred to as spatial or temporal particles, the meanings of these particles vary depending on the nature of the event that is being described. For example, Tyler and Evans (2003) gives the following examples.

(1) The picture is over the mantel.

(2) The hummingbird hovered over the flower.

(3) The cloud passed over the city. (p.10)

It is argued that the same preposition “over” refers to different trajectory of movement in each of the above examples. In (1), the picture, as well as the mantel, is static and they are on the same vertical plane. In (2), the hummingbird is mobile and the flower is more or less static. Since the verb “hover” implies flying within a limited space, “over” in sentence (2) is understood to specify a limited space above and around the flower. In contrast, in (3), since the verb “pass” has the meaning of going through a space, “over” is interpreted to cover the trajectory of the cloud as one which enters above the city, then continues to proceed all the way until it exits the space above the city.¹

In this way, it is important to bear in mind, the mutual effect of the lexical items including prepositions. Therefore, in the sections to follow, the meanings of “look + at” are

analyzed by first considering the semantics of the preposition “at”.

4.2. “Look At”

As with “look” without a preposition, the physical sense of “look” followed by a preposition or an adverb, is centered on the activation of visual capacity and the movement of visual line, which also implicitly suggests activation and movement of one’s attention. The addition of “at” immediately following the verb in the construction [look + at + N] broadly indicates that the meanings expressed or implied by “look” is directed towards N, according to the most widely accepted meaning of “at” when combined with “look”.

To understand the semantic characteristics of “look at” in detail, however, the different meanings that are expressed by “at” according to the context are clarified in this section, which is then followed by the analyses of various meanings that may be conveyed by the phrase “look at”.

4.2.1. Meanings of “At” as a Spatial Particle

The preposition “at” can be used as either a spatial (as in “at the airport”) or a temporal (as in “at 10 o’clock”) particle. The following analyses focus primarily on its usage as a spatial particle, since the ultimate purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the meanings of “look at,” in which “at” generally plays the role of indicating a place or a direction.

There are two types of spatial “at”: one that refers to a place or an occasion where some event takes place, and the other, that which roughly refers to the direction in which a certain action is carried out. For the sake of convenience, I call the first type “location-oriented” and the second type, “action-oriented”.

4.2.1.1. Location-Oriented “At”

Below are the example usages of location-oriented “at”. The noun phrase that follows the preposition designates the place or the occasion where the action or the state indicated by the verb took place.

(4) I was standing at the bus stop.

- (5) Which hotel are you going to stay at?
- (6) We met at my friend's farewell party.
- (7) This topic was brought up at the meeting this morning.

Of the above examples, the nouns that succeed “at” in (4) and (5) refer to actual tangible places that physically exist, while in the case of (6) and (7), it refers to an event, or an occasion.

Even in (4) and (5), there is a difference in the space denoted by “at”. A natural interpretation of (4) would be the one in which the subject is standing right by the bus stop sign, occupying a space equivalent to the person's body. In (5), the noun “hotel” following “at” refers to a room with the hotel. In the case of (6) and (7), the nouns respectively refer to a farewell party and a meeting. While the party and the meeting are actually occasions that are held at a certain place, the spatial meaning of “at” is backgrounded, and the occasions themselves are profiled. These examples suggest that although this “at” is a spatial particle in a broad sense, its use is not necessarily limited to physical locations.

Furthermore, although “at” is thought to be a preposition to indicate the place or the occasion where the action expressed by the verb takes place, it also contributes to determining the timeframe of the event. For example, in (4), the subject was probably “standing at the bus stop” until the bus arrived, so the event expressed by the sentence had probably lasted for an hour or so at the most under the normal circumstances. In contrast, “staying at the hotel” in sentence (5) is an event that requires at least one night. In (4) and (5), the duration of the verb is equivalent to the duration of being “at” the place.

The temporal implication of “at” in (6) and (7), however, is different from that of (4) and (5). The farewell party in (6) may have lasted for hours, but the event described as “meeting” each other obviously did not last as long as the party did. Our common sense tells us that for a person to “meet” and become acquainted with someone for the first time does not take hours, though, admittedly, it is difficult to specify and assign the exact timeframe required for accomplishing the task of “meeting” someone. Still, it can be safely said that the event “we met” did not go on and on throughout the party.

Likewise, in (7), the topic was not “brought up” throughout the meeting. The meeting may have lasted the whole afternoon, but not the act of bringing up the topic. The precise

definition of “bringing up” a topic is also subject to temporal ambiguity as “meeting someone” is. The topic could have been “brought up” but immediately dismissed, in which case the action lasted only for a few minutes or even a few seconds. On the other hand, to “bring up” a topic can be interpreted as having spent some time discussing it, as well. Thus, sentence (7), by itself is ambiguous, yet the ambiguity hardly ever becomes an issue in daily language use, since speakers constantly adjust the meaning to fit the situation by resorting to their common sense and extra-linguistic knowledge about the situation. Compare (7) with the following sentence:

(8) I was with John at the meeting this morning.

A common interpretation of (8) would be one in which both the subject and John were present throughout the meeting. However, in another reading, it could be that the subject was “with John” during a part of the meeting. Either one of them could have left before the end of the meeting. In the first reading, the state of the subject being “with John” lasted as long as the meeting did, so the meaning of “at” shifts more towards the meaning of “throughout”. In the second reading, however, being “with John” could have been shorter than the duration of the meeting itself, in which case the meaning of “at” shifts more towards “during”.

Thus, while the function of “at” is supposedly to specify a place or an occasion, its meaning shifts according to the nature of the verb, the relationship between the verb and the place/occasion, as well as the temporal relationship between the duration of the verb and that of the occasion.

4.2.1.2. Action-Oriented “At”

The phrase “look at” is usually regarded as a phrasal verb because the two are often used together. Although “look” without a preposition is also used in various contexts as described in Chapter 3, its use is much less common, probably because it requires a larger context to identify the object.

In order to understand the meaning of “look at” as a phrasal verb, I will first consider the directional meaning of action-oriented “at”.

Below are some examples of the action-oriented “at” in use.

- (9) The little boy threw a stone at me and ran away.
- (10) He aimed at the target and pulled the trigger.
- (11) She shouted at me in anger when I made the mistake.
- (12) His anger was directed at his company, though he was actually the one who caused all the trouble.
- (13) He laughed at me when I told him how upset I was.
- (14) The audience laughed at his joke about the upcoming presidential election.

In all of the above example sentences, “at” serves to direct the action expressed by the verb to the given target. For the purpose of comparison, all sentences are expressed in the past tense. In (9), “at” is part of the actual movement of an object. It expresses the direction in which the stone moved (was thrown) from the “boy” towards “me”. In contrast, in (10) the movement involved is only that of the subject “he”. A bullet may have headed for the target after the trigger had been pulled, but nothing else but the subject’s body needed to move to “aim at” the target. The only thing that has moved in (11) was the shouting voice, not a tangible object, but a sound perceivable by hearing. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the two persons existed in the same physical space, though it is also possible that the subject was shouting through a microphone while monitoring “me” on a distant display.

In (12), what is supposed to have moved is the “anger” of the subject, something that is abstract and intangible. There is no need for the subject and the target (the company) to be sharing the same physical space. The subject could be angry about what the company had done to him, but he does not necessarily have to be at the company to “direct” his anger “at” it. In both (13) and (14), the verb is “laugh”. Nevertheless, when you “laugh at” a person, it often implies a feeling of contempt, while to “laugh at” a joke which is meant to make people laugh in the first place, the verb is interpreted as a positive action.

The above observations suggest that the action-oriented “at” can evoke many different meanings depending on the verb with which it is used, ranging from the direction of the actual movement of a physical object to the abstract direction of one’s emotion. Likewise, the target

expressed by “at” also ranges from concrete and tangible objects to abstract entities such as organizations and utterances (e.g. jokes).

4.2.2. “Look At” as Physical Perception

As discussed in Section 3.2., “look” without a preposition is used to profile either visual capacity, direction of the visual line, or attention, though the degree to which each of them is profiled may vary. In the case of “look” without a preposition, the target is implied by the context, which usually extends beyond a single sentence and also involves extra-linguistic situations.

In contrast, in the [look + at + N] construction, the target is specified by N. This does not mean, however, that “look at” itself has a fixed meaning. Its connotation varies depending on context. In this section, the meanings of “look at” as a physical perception are considered by examining the meaning shifts according to following parameters: movement of visual line, the degree of visual focus/attention, and the timeframe/duration.

To examine each of these parameters in detail, first, consider the following sentences:

(15) She looked at the ceiling, lying on her bed with having nothing to do.

(16) She looked at the ceiling, hearing someone walking upstairs.

(17) She looked at the ceiling to find a hole in it.

All of the above three sentences indicate that the subject’s vision is directed towards the ceiling, as is indicated by the preposition “at”. Nevertheless, what is implied by each differs, again, depending on the context.

4.2.2.1. Movement of Visual Line

Understandably, the movement of the visual line is presumed to be necessary to accomplish the act of “looking at” the ceiling. In (15), the subject had been probably already lying on her bed on her back, and therefore, her visual line had been directed towards the ceiling before actually “looking at” the ceiling. From this it is presumed that “look at” in this sentence did not involve much of the movement of the visual line.

In contrast, in (16) it was only after the subject had heard someone walking upstairs that she “looked at” the ceiling. Therefore, the most likely interpretation of the sentence would be the one in which the subject moved her visual line from the normal straight forward position to up “at” the ceiling and let it wander around the ceiling in an attempt to find where the sound came from. The same applies to (17). The subject moved her visual line to “look at” the ceiling. It can be also assumed that the movement of visual line was more thorough than in (16), because the subject was trying to find a particular thing that was relatively small but visible (i.e. hole), rather than “looking up” more or less by instinct as the subject did in (16).

These differences in interpretation also indicate the subtle meaning adjustment of the preposition “at”. As discussed in Section 4.2.1., the meaning of the apparently simple preposition “at” can also vary in different parameters according to the context. When the movement of visual line is less salient as in (15), the “at” in “look at” takes on a more stative meaning and simply serves to connect the subject’s vision to a physical entity, the ceiling. On the other hand, in the sentences such as (16) and (17), where the movement of visual line is involved, “at” serves to designate the goal, or target, of the movement of the visual line, though there is a difference between (16) and (17) in this respect as well, since in (16) although the subject’s vision was directed towards the ceiling, what he or she was trying to find out by looking “at” the ceiling was not something actually on the surface of the ceiling but the sound above it. Therefore, the subject was not really looking “at” the ceiling per se as did the subject in (17) who was trying to find a hole on the surface of the ceiling.

4.2.2.2. Degree of Visual Focus/Attention

As discussed in Chapter 3, there are cases where “look” without a preposition is used to profile a person’s “attention,” rather than one’s sense of vision itself. The same also holds for “look at,” though, because the object of vision is more clearly specified by “at” being added, the focus of physical vision is a requirement for fulfilling the indicated action, at least when the phrasal verb is used to mean physical perception. Therefore, in the following discussion, visual focus and attention are not separated. After all, when a person focuses his or her vision on a particular entity, the person is also directing his or her attention to it as well.

With regard to the example sentences (15) ~ (17), the degree of visual focus is the

weakest in (15), since the subject's purpose of "looking at" the ceiling is uncertain. She did not have any particular reason to do so, except that she had nothing else to do. It is therefore assumed that the subject did not exert much effort to focus on anything in particular. In (16), the subject probably did focus on the ceiling more so than the subject did in (15). She, however, did not know what to actually focus on. Her vision was focused on the ceiling, but not to a specific portion of it. She may have been able to guess where the sound came from, but she was not expecting any visual clues to help her identify the source of the sound on the surface of the ceiling. In contrast, the subject in (17) was aware of what she was trying to find. While she may not have known the exact size of the hole to be found, she knew that she had to focus her vision on the surface of the ceiling, and therefore, her vision was more strongly in focus than either in (15) or (16). Thus, the more the activity requires one's attention, the higher the degree of the required visual focus is.

4.2.2.3. Timeframe/Duration

All events require a timeframe in which they take place. In (15) ~ (17), the timeframe, or the duration, in which the act of "looking at" took place is not specified in these single sentences, though it is reasonable to guess that the subject in (15), not having anything else to do, may have spent more time "looking at" the ceiling than the others. As is the case with "look" without a preposition, what appears ambiguous in a single sentence can be clarified in a larger context.

(18) She looked at the ceiling, hearing someone walking upstairs. Not having any idea who it might be, she stood up and went right under where the sound was coming from to listen to it more carefully.

(19) She looked at the ceiling, hearing someone walking upstairs. She then realized that it must be her father cleaning the hallway, so she immediately went back to her work.

It is only after additional information is supplied that the timeframe of the action becomes more specified. In (18), the reader can now assume that the subject was "looking at" the ceiling for some time, since she continued to engage in the act of finding out the source of the sound. However, in (19), the sound upstairs attracted the attention of the subject for only a

few seconds, since it did not take her long to figure out the source of the sound. Therefore, her act of “looking at” the ceiling probably did not last more than a few seconds.

In this way, the duration implied by “look at” changes with the context. While most native speakers are unaware of such subtle semantic adjustments in most cases and never really question how long the subject in each sentence was actually looking at the ceiling, native speakers are in fact making these adjustments on a subconscious level to understand the implied specifics of the sentences.

Physical sense of “look at” is telic, meaning that the action has a beginning and the end. When one “looks at” an entity, one has “looked at” it. However, because the object is not affected by being “looked at” in any concrete way, it is difficult for a third person to specify when, exactly the action is complete. While I intend to discuss the nature of visual perception verbs by referring to the classification given by Vendler (1957, 1967) in Chapter 5, more in relation to the verb “see,” it is worth noting here that the act of “looking at” an entity is considered as being completed the moment the subject directs his or her visual line and attention to the object. However, in the progressive form as in “He is looking at the tree,” the phrase implies a continuous, ongoing process. The act of “looking” covers the timeframe starting at the moment he directed his visual attention to the tree and could theoretically go on until the end of the subject’s life. While the so-called accomplishment and achievement verbs are considered as being telic, meaning that they have an end to it, as in “I reached the top of the mountain” (achievement) and “I drew a circle on the wall” (accomplishment), it is difficult to classify “look at” according to this criteria since, as mentioned above, “look at” can be completed in an instant as do the accomplishment verbs, but it also can also be regarded as an accomplishment since “He is looking at the tree” entails “The tree was looked at by him”. In addition, since “He is looking at the tree” can go on theoretically forever, or at least as long as his life lasts, as do “He is running in the park,” it behaves also like an activity verb. Timeframe and duration of the verb phrase “look at” is therefore ambiguous.

The action can go on for some time and be expressed in the progressive form, yet the action implied by the phrase is completed, in principle, the moment the subject directs one’s visual attention to the object. In addition, if “look at” something is considered as a task, then it may be considered an accomplishment. This makes this “look at” and other lexical items

involving perception to be an anomaly that cannot be accounted for by the usual classification of the verbs.

4.2.3. Figurative Uses of “Look At” According to Object Characteristics

The phrasal verb “look at” can connote a type of activity that is beyond physical perception of a concrete object by vision. As stated earlier, the verb “look” without a preposition can also imply the movement of direction not only of visual line, but also that of attention, which is an abstract entity. In this section, the word “figurative” is used in a broad sense, to cover the uses of “look at” that refer not only to visual perception and attention, but also to other cognitive activities that are regarded to involve what may be called mental vision. In the following analyses, the figurative uses of “look at” are considered by mainly analyzing the following parameters: (a) characteristics of the object, (b) additional cognitive activities that are involved, and (c) the timeframe and duration of figurative use of “look at”.

The nature of the object of “look at” affects the meaning of this phrasal verb to include not only physical perception but also some other cognitive activities. It seems reasonable to assume that the objects of “look at” can be either concrete or abstract entities and that the meaning of “look at” shifts from physical to more figurative domains according to the type of object. This section examines the validity of such an assumption regarding the object type and the resultant semantic shifts of “look at”.

Below are the examples taken from COCA as a starting point to consider the different characteristics of the objects that appear in sentences containing the figurative use of the phrase “look at”:

- (20) In a country as large and troubled as Somalia, stability and effective governance inevitably will be slow in coming. ... “People **look at** a map and they don't realize the tyranny of distance and size there,” said the senior administration official. “These rebuilding efforts take time.” (Washington Post (2015))
- (21) “If you **look at** the products that are currently available today, ” he told Retro Report, “there is not a scientific consensus that there is an impact on human health at the levels that we encounter in homes.” Of course, one reason for the absence of scientific consensus is that few of those substances have been tested by independent researchers. (New York Times (2015))

In both (20) and (21) above, the noun that follows “look at” is a tangible, concrete objects, namely, “a map,” and “the products”. In either of the sentences, however, the “look at” does not refer only to physical visual perception.

The verbal phrase “look at” in (20) does not mean that people only visually perceive, but also internalize what is drawn on the map in their own way. It means that they also gain information on where the countries, the islands, and the oceans are, as well as the sizes of the lands, their relative location, etc. What each one obtains as pieces of information from a single map may vary, again, depending on the purpose and the context, but, overall, those listed above are at least part of what he or she recognizes upon “looking at” a map, with the physical perception playing a significant role for gaining information from and understanding a map. Yet, “look at” in (20) is different from the one used in the following sentence.

(22) I turned around to look at a map hanging on the wall and was amazed at its beautiful design and colors.

Sentence (22) is an example in which the meaning of physical perception implied by “look at” is more profiled than that in (21). While it is not known from (22) whether the subject looked at the map to eventually obtain some geographical information from it or not, the sentence suggests that the subject “looked at” it as a piece of artwork when it first came into his or her field of vision. Thus, the subject was more attracted to the map’s beauty than to the geographical information depicted on it. In (21), the use of “look at” is more abstract than in (20), with the physical visual perception being backgrounded. Sentence (21) is an example which illustrates that “look at” can mean an abstract mental activity, despite the fact that the object of perception is something concrete, namely, “the products”.

What is important to note here, however, is “the (non)boundedness of a physical property of the entity it denotes” (Hay, Kennedy, & Levin 1999, p. 128). In (21), “the products” are not concrete objects in a strict sense. The speaker is not using the phrase “the products” to refer to a specific set of products that can be visually perceived or touched at the time when this sentence was uttered. Moreover, the speaker, as well as the hearer, is not assuming a person can “look at” all the products that are available. How the object is interpreted affects the degree of abstractness implied by the phrasal verb. The phrase “look

at” in Sentence (21) is very different from “look at” in sentence (23) below, though they are both followed by a noun phrase, or the objective phrase, “the products”.

(23) If you look at the products right over there on the display, you will notice that they are all of a same flower pattern.

Even with the same noun phrase “the products” being the object, the meaning of “look at” in (23) differs from that in (21). In (23), “the products” are tangible, within the physical space where the interlocutors can easily access. They are concrete objects that are physically visible and exhaustive. One can “look at” all of “the products” that are on display and make judgements about them according to what they actually visually perceive on their surface, which is “the same flower pattern,” in this case.

In (21), on the other hand, given that “the products” are abstract and that “look at” also implies non-physical activity as a result, the expected outcomes are also intangible entities such as “consensus” and “impact on human health”. The comparison of (21) and (23) therefore demonstrates that the meaning of “look at” shifts between physical and figurative according to the characteristics of the object, which, in turn, also affects the abstractness of other entities mentioned in the context. Below are additional examples of what people “look at”.

(24) When you **look at the data**, there's no evidence that states that have the death penalty have a lower crime rate. (NPR (2012))

(25) It is tempting for teachers to **look at the lists** and come to the conclusion that the strategies listed are of a universal nature and any one of them would work equally well with any twice-exceptional student. (Teaching Exceptional Children (2015))

In the above two examples (24) and (25), the objects of “look at” are respectively “the data” and “the lists,” both of which are at least physically perceivable by vision, even if they are not actually tangible as hard copies. Therefore, the following sentences are considered unacceptable.

(26) *I looked at the data, but the data was invisible.

(27) *I looked at the lists, but the lists were carefully kept in a safe.

(28) *He looked at the data/the lists, though he was completely blindfolded.

The unacceptability of the above sentences demonstrates that visual perception is a requirement for the sentence (24) and (25) to make sense. The object must be visually detectable. The use of “look at” in the two sentences, however, differs from the kinds we saw in (15) ~ (17) where the object is something more concrete and immediate than “the ceiling,” though, as have already been discussed, the word string “look at the ceiling” can also vary in meanings depending on the context.

The object of “look at” can be something more abstract, in which case, the meaning of “look at” also shifts more towards abstractness, with the implication of physical perception becoming increasingly backgrounded.

(29) There are two ways to **look at the results** of this study. One suggests that the community college setting provides an opportunity to fulfill one's goal of being a college professor without the perceived need to sacrifice parenthood. (Community College Review (2007))

How much the “look at” in (29) involves physical perception is a function of how one interprets the meaning of “the results”. “The results” can be more abstract than “the data” or “the lists,” both of which imply some kind of written representation, may it be on paper, a computer, or other media. In contrast, while “the results” can be documented, they can also refer to some resulting situation or condition, in which case, physical vision is no longer the central means to perceive them. In (29), since “the results” are of “this study,” the implication of the results being represented in written form is likely, given our extra-linguistic knowledge that the studies are usually concluded by presenting the results in writing. However, there are “results” that are interpreted merely as a set of consequences as in:

(30) If you look at the results of what John has done for the community, I'm sure you will be moved.

In the case of (30), “the results” can be a set of conditions that owed to John's efforts and the

meaning of physical perception implied by “look at” is weakened, since the conditions of the community can also be perceived through other senses and by other means. Under the normal circumstances, mere visual inspection is not enough to evaluate something as expansive and abstract as “the community”. So even when the object of “look at” is “the results,” how much physical perception is implied by the verb depends on the context beyond the construction [look + at + N].

The object of “look at” may also be something that cannot be perceived by actual physical vision.

- (31) Public libraries should **look at their own communities and the community's needs**. Targeting specific age groups allows programming to meet certain needs and is more likely to attract an audience. (Reference & User Services Quarterly (2015))

The “communities” are entities that are intuitively regarded as visible, but they are in fact abstract in the sense that their being depends on the interaction of the people belonging to it. Communities are similar to organizations and companies, whose existence is contingent on its membership. Without people, they cannot be. The “community’s needs” are even more abstract and intangible, since they can be defined only by identifying the conditions that have given rise to them, as well as by specifying the nature of the needs, including who and what are involved.

Another common example of an abstract entity being the object of “look at” is the time period.

- (32) "When we **look at** 2017, we will be able to weather this downturn," Warden said. With more than 22,600 active wells, Weld County is far and away Colorado's biggest energy player. As such, the industry's impact on the county is oversized. County projections show a marked decrease in the assessed value of oil and gas production over the next couple of years. (Denver Post (2015))
- (33) It is vital for us to **look at** the past in an utterly honest way, informed with a concern for the truth and with love. Beyond the judgment which belongs to God alone, may we be given the grace to create the opportunities and the atmosphere which permit frank dialogue, mutual and attentive listening, penitence and pardon. The fellowship of churches within the CEC is implicated by the actions and omissions, the choices and decisions, of previous assemblies. (Christian Century (1992))

Sentences (32) and (33) are cases where physical perception is no longer playing a role. It is not possible to actually “look at” the future or the past. When the phrase “look at” is used in such a context, it is referring to mental imagery and mental scanning of expectations based on present knowledge, in the case of future, or of our memory, in the case of the past.

There are a variety of entities that may serve as the object of “look at,” and it is virtually impossible to cover every one of them. Nevertheless, the examples and the discussions so far suggest that in many cases whether the object is concrete or abstract is not sufficient to determine whether the meaning of “look at” is physical or figurative. Some entities are concrete in one sense, but abstract in another, depending on the context. When the object is at least partially considered concrete, the use of “look at” referring to physical perception is evoked to a certain extent, mainly as an inception for proceeding on to further cognitive activities. There are also, however, also some entities that are clearly abstract such as the future and the past. In these cases, it is presumed that “look at” is used figuratively with no actual physical perception involved.

As observed above, there are various meanings of “look at” that are evoked, when used figuratively, depending on the object as well as the context. In trying to describe cognitive activities that are evoked by such figurative uses of “look at,” there is a need to understand the distinction between physical vision and mental vision. (Ghose and Maunsell 1999) Physical vision basically refers to physical visual perception. Any activities that involve physical vision cannot be completed, in principle, without visually perceiving the object with one’s sight. On the other hand, mental vision is the imagery that comes up in one’s mind, when trying to imagine or envision something that cannot be perceived by physical vision at the given moment.

Another concept that must be taken into account in discussing the figurative use of “look at” is the complexity of human cognition and perception. As was discussed in Chapter 2, visual perception, even in its physical sense, cannot be isolated from various cognitive activities that take place along with it. Therefore, to “look at” something always evokes a set of complex cognitive activities which, though often not recognized by native speakers, are also

contained in the overall meaning of “look at.” Of these activities, some are profiled more, and others, less, according to our interpretation of the context, our encyclopedic extra-linguistic knowledge, our individual and personal linguistic characteristics, and how each of us understand the external, the sociocultural, and the internal mental world of oneself as well as those of others.

That being said, the purpose of the following subsections is to examine which of the cognitive activities implied by the phrase “look at” are profiled in which types of figurative uses. In trying to do so, I have grouped the uses to those that imply physical vision and those which do not, in addition to some borderline cases. The analyses hereafter are based on the characteristics of the objects that are being “looked at”.

4.2.3.1. Painting/Photograph/Motion Picture

Examples:

(34) I haven’t had the time to look at her photos on the Facebook today, but I hear that they are quite impressive.

(35a) He has looked at many video clips to verify his research on human nature.

(35b) ?He looked at his favorite movie for hours.

When one visually perceives photos, video clips, or the like, though the objects are usually only images without any written words except for some captions in some cases, one also interprets what is being depicted, try to understand the content, and may even decide whether one likes it or not. All these cognitive processes are integral part of the act of perceiving something. When the expression “look at” is used, the appreciative sense of viewing the object is backgrounded, and the activity of directing one’s visual attention to the object for obtaining information is profiled instead. Therefore, (35b) sounds awkward. This does not mean other cognitive activities are absent. However, at least for the one who is using the phrase “look at,” the focus at the moment is more on the act of directing one’s eyes to the object. As it has been mentioned earlier, visual input is never totally separated from cognitive processing of the obtained information. It is only that the choice of the expression

“look at” enables profiling of a particular aspect of visual perception. Also, when the phrase “look at” is used, viewing time is often understood as being short or precursory, or else, too frequent to enjoy the experience, particularly in the contexts assumed in (34) and (35a).

4.2.3.2. Newspaper/Article/Document

Examples:

- (36) When I looked at the newspaper this morning, I noticed that they had moved the sports section to another page.
- (37) He looked at the documents submitted by his subordinates and was happy to know that things were going well.

Unlike the examples given in 4.2.3.1 above, the possible objects of “look at” in this group all contain written information, which implies an activity is involved that requires “reading”. Nevertheless, how much in detail that information is actually read by the subject depends on the context. In (36), for example, the subject could have only “looked at” the photos in the newspaper without paying attention to any of the writing part and still notice the change in the layout. In (37), the subject must have at least leafed through the documents to derive at the conclusion, but he probably did not actually read them to understand the content in great detail. This is what is implied by the use of the phrase “look at,” instead of the phrase “carefully read through,” for instance. While the apparent contents of the documents may have encouraged him, it was the overall impression, rather than the thorough consideration, that had led him to be satisfied with them. Again, as in 4.2.3.1 above, the activity expressed by “look at” for obtaining information is regarded as being completed within a relatively short time period. When a person “looks at” something written, while the meaning of “reading” is evoked to some degree, the activity is often interpreted as short-lasting, which, in turn, backgrounds the meanings that are usually associated with reading, such as, thorough understanding, deciphering, enjoying, etc.

4.2.3.3. Data/List/Graph/Map

Examples:

- (38a) She looked at the list over and over again to find her name on it.
- (38b) She looked at the list without much attention.
- (39) The sales manager looked at the graph to find out which age group was purchasing the new product the most.
- (40) If you look at the data, the happiness gained from an increase in salary seems to last longer among those in lower income brackets.

This group of objects consists of items that present information in some detail that is discernible through visual perception, with usually minimum amount of sentence-reading. Nevertheless, the information itself is more intricate and requires a greater attention to detail to understand, separating this group from pictures or films listed in 4.2.3.1. When a person has “looked at” a list as in (38a), it means that she concentrated on absorbing the information presented on it. This contrasts with (38b), in which “looked at” means not much more than its physical meaning of visual perception, with attention being backgrounded. Data and graphs, as well as maps, are usually considered to require more cognitive processing than do the lists. In (39), the sales manager did not just simply direct his or her attention to the graph. She or he must have at least interpreted the graph to understand the purchasing trends of different age groups. In (40), which is a sentence one is likely to hear at a meeting or a convention, it is natural to assume that the speaker is urging the audience to “look at” the data than to “read” them in detail, largely due to the time limit in the likely context of a meeting or a convention, though to “consider” them is implied so that the audience would agree with the speaker’s observation.

4.2.3.4. Organization/School/Company

Examples:

- (41) When you look at the education board, you will be surprised by its gender inequality.
- (42) A CEO must be able to look at the company and accurately judge its performance as a whole.

This group of objects are abstract entities whose existence depends on their members. Without the members, they cannot maintain their existence. In this sense, they are abstract as a whole, but their components, or the members, are concrete beings. When a person “looks at” an organization, his or her attention is presumed to be primarily directed towards the entire entity. Often, the act of “looking at” an organization is carried out to evaluate its performance or make judgements about its values, as demonstrated in sentences (41) and (42). While the object entity is abstract, because it is comprised of members, physical vision is not totally backgrounded by the use of “look at”. It is not possible for a person to “look at” the board of education without paying attention to its members. Likewise, when a CEO “looks at” a company, it would be impossible for her or him to ignore the employees. In other words, one cannot “look at” any organization without directing her or his attention to the members, since they are indispensable components for the existence of the organization. This, again, is a matter of degree. In (41), since what the subject is supposed to notice is the gender inequality, his or her attention is precisely directed to the members and not so much on the performance of the board. On the other hand, in (42), while a CEO will probably “look at” the employees but she or he will also “look at” the company as a whole, including such matters as the sales performance, costs of materials, profitability, reputation, etc., in which case, the CEO will be required not only to visually perceive concrete aspects of the company, including the employees, the condition of the office building, etc., but also to take note of its abstract aspects as well.

4.2.3.5. Society/Community/World

Examples:

(43) You need to look at the community as a whole before making decisions on public projects.

(44) When you look at the world, it is quite obvious that our country ranks pretty high as far as the literacy rate is concerned.

The objects listed in this group are similar to those listed above in the previous subsection, in that, they are also abstract entities whose being is determined by their members.

Unlike the organizations of the kinds listed in 4.2.3.4, however, the members are backgrounded to a greater degree because of their number and a greater degree of anonymity. When one “looks at” a society, a community, the world, or even the universe, the attention is drawn less to its members than it is in the case of a specific organization. While physical vision is still at work to get a grasp of the overall state of an entity, as well as to examine various kind of data that may be available, since it is impossible to observe the entity itself in its entirety, the meaning of “look at” shifts more towards cognitive process of understanding than the physical capacity of vision. In (43), “look at” has the implication of directing one’s attention to mostly abstract aspects of the community: the needs of the people, the financial situation, and other issues. In (44), since it is impossible to actually “look at” the entire world in the physical sense, what is implied by the phrase is to get a general grasp or a feeling of what is going on in the world. In other words, though physical vision may serve as a primary means for accomplishing the task, the focus has shifted to more abstract mental activities.

4.2.3.6. Plan/Strategy/Project

Examples:

(45) I have to look at your plan in detail, before I can give you a permission to go ahead with it.

(46) Once you look at this project, you will be convinced that it is worth continuing.

Plans, projects, and strategies are endeavors with designated processes to bring about the expected outcome. Before they are implemented, they are abstract ideas represented in written or drawn forms, which makes it possible for one to physically “look at” the contents. That is what is implied by “look at” in (45). As long as the plan is laid out on sheets of paper or on a computer screen, it is possible to “look at” it in detail, meaning to study, consider, or carry out any other cognitive activities that are necessary to speculate the outcome. However, once a plan, a project, or a strategy is put into action, they are processes which are physically observable only on a stage-by-stage basis. It is not physically possible for anyone to “look at” the entire process. Therefore, in order to “look at” the project, as mentioned in (46), one

has to make judgements, predictions, and inferences, on the basis of information obtained via one's physical vision. Thus, the meaning of "look at" implies a greater degree of such cognitive activities, though, again, physical vision is a means for achieving the expected tasks.

4.2.3.7. Situation/Condition/State

Examples:

(47) Be sure to carefully look at the condition of the car before you decide to buy it.

(48a) My father looked at the financial condition of our household and decided not to buy the car for the time being.

(48b) ?The president looked at the economic condition of the country and decided to implement the new fiscal policy.

Unlike plans or projects in the previous subsection, situations, conditions, or states are entities that are already present, though they may vary in their duration. There is no definite temporal delineation regarding how long a situation has to be in order to be called a "situation." In addition, there is also an ambiguity involved in how much time one needs to "look at" a situation, and, what and which portion of the situation can be grasped by vision and other senses. The same also applies to conditions and states. If one is to "look at" the condition of a car as in (47), for instance, one can probably obtain a certain amount of information by visually checking the appearance of different parts of the car, though, of course, touching and opening the parts, turning on and listening to the engine, and even driving the car may be also included in the meaning of "look at". If one is to "look at" the financial condition, as in (48a), visual capacity is backgrounded, more so than in the case of a car, since the object is no longer concrete or tangible. While the father may be able to "look at" a bankbook to visually input the figures indicating the financial condition of the household, he is not actually "looking at" the condition itself. The figures are merely representations or clues for understanding and judging the condition.

While "look at" followed by situation, condition, or state implies understanding and judgment as in (47) and (48a), its acceptability in (48b) is questionable because of the scale and profundity of examination and evaluation required in the depicted context. One can

“look at” a condition or a situation that is personal and/or relatively small in scale, but not that of a national scale involving political decisions. This indicates that there is a sense of casualness implied by the phrase “look at” when followed by the object in this group, as well as by those in other groups, particularly when the purpose of the act of “looking at” is to make some kind of judgment about it

4.2.3.8. Way/Method

Examples:

- (49) Just look at the way I fix this and you’ll soon be able to do it yourself.
- (50a) When you look at the way she walks around the office, I don’t think you would want to work under her.
- (50b) When you look at the way she treats other people, I don’t think you would want to work under her.
- (51) She looked at the method they used for conducting this experiment and suspected the validity of the results.

This group is different from 4.2.3.4 ~ 4.2.3.7 above, for the object is directly visible in many cases, though still intangible. How much of the object is actually visually detectable, however, again depends on the context. In (49), the use of “look at” implies that the method of fixing is assumed to be a visible process. It does not involve any behind-the-scenes tricks, unless, of course, the speaker is intentionally trying to confuse the hearer. Also, the timeframe of (49) is probably reasonably short, since it is highly unlikely that the phrase “look at” instead of “follow” or “keep track of” is used, if the process of fixing takes longer than a few minutes. It is difficult for one to “look at” the whole procedure, if it lasts for a month, for instance. The sentences (50a) and (50b) are of exactly the same structure except that the objects are different. In (50a), the object is “the way she walks around the office,” and in (50b), it is “the way she treats other people”. This difference in the objects gives rise to different semantic shifts of the meaning of “look at”. In (50a), the actual visual witnessing takes on a greater weight, since a person walking around an office is visually perceivable. It has a definite timeframe and movement from which one can make judgments. On the other

hand, while the way a person treats other people is also partly visible, it is more abstract because of the psychological aspects involved. It requires more inferences and imagination on the part of the observer. The choice of the phrase “look at,” instead of “carefully observe” or “watch,” again implies relatively casual observation. This, in turn, indicates that the way the person treats other people is rather overt and detectable, not subtle or clandestine. Sentence (51) referring to “method” is different from the rest of the sentences, though “way” and “method” are often regarded as close synonyms, both being translatable as 方法 (“hoho”) in Japanese. However, because a “method” usually refers to more official and often laid out in written form, in the context of (51), the most natural reading would be that what she “looked at” was not the procedure itself, but a document of some sort that described the “method.” This then shifts the meaning of “look at” closer to the meanings implied by the objects such as data and lists in 4.3.2.3. Depending on how and where lexical items are used, there are constant, subtle adjustments in their meanings.

4.2.3.9. Past/Future

Examples:

- (52) Sometimes it helps to look at one’s past and reflect on cherished memories.
- (53) We must look at the past to find the origin of the present problem.
- (54) Look at the future and don’t dwell on things that have already happened.
- (55) When you look at the future of this company, you will realize the potential value of your investment.

This is the only group of objects for which presumably no physical vision plays a role, since it is generally thought that the past or the future is not an entity that exists here and now. When one “looks at” the past, one is directing one’s attention to the events or the progress of events by retrieving them from one’s memory. That would be the most widespread understanding of a sentence such as (52). Sentence (53), however, differs from (52), for the origin of the problem may or may not be in the subject’s memory, which is an important point to note when discussing the use of the phrase “look at” in relation to the past or the future. The retrieval of one’s memory is valid as long as the past actually refers to one’s own past,

though understandably, what is stored in one's memory, of course, is not facts but interpretations of the events that took place in one's life thus far. In (53), however, the subjects may or may not have been the part of the past referred to in the sentence. In this case, "looking at" the past does not necessarily mean that the subjects recall the past from their memory. Rather, it is more likely that they would consider past records or events in some form that are externally available to them. Therefore, while to "look at" the past may seem to indicate a figurative use of the phrase, it is worth considering what "the past" actually refers to.

The same applies to (54) and (55). Sentence (54) has the personal nuance similar to that of (52). However, in (55), one does not "look at" the future of the company in a totally abstract sense. The subject is not trying to instinctively foretell what is going to happen to the company. The future that is being referred to is the prediction or inference that can be derived through the records of past and present performance of the company.

For these reasons, the use of "look at" in these sentences are not so much different from that of the objects listed in 4.3.2.3 ~ 4.3.2.8 above. Physical vision does have a role to play in at least in the contexts of (53) and (55), and there are a number of similar uses of "look at" found in COCA, some of which are presented below:

- (56) While we may be tempted to **look at the past** through rose-colored glasses, the reality is that issues surrounding the need to advocate for our programs have existed throughout the history of music education in the United States. The challenges we face today are much like those faced by previous generations of music educators. (Music Educators Journal (2014))
- (57) It is our critical-thinking hat, and the one that most of us feel most comfortable wearing. Although it is often overused, it is still important. It allows us to **look at the past** and at future projections with a critical eye. It is also the hat that can keep us from making serious mistakes. (Independent School (2006))
- (58) When you **look at the future** of globalization - world trade without borders - intellectual capital is something that can swiftly shift from one nation to another nation. In fact, you would never know which nation was producing that intellectual capital. (Denver Post (2000))
- (59) The absence of a meaningful European response to the Bosnian crisis was even more perplexing, demonstrating once again that without U.S. leadership the Europeans were still unable to tackle serious challenges to European security. In 1995, these and other circumstances indicated that it might be worthwhile to **look**

at the future of European security from the perspective of a declining NATO: What would happen to European security if NATO disappeared? (World Affairs (1998))

All of these excerpts from COCA, when read carefully, to “look at” the past or the present refers to careful examination of the present and any other available records on the basis of which to evaluate and make judgements about the times other than the present. Therefore, it can be concluded that “look at” the past or the future is figurative when used in personal sense, calling for a person to retrieve pieces of memory through mental vision, but in most other cases, it is figurative only to the extent that some inferences are made based on some what is supposed to be factual record.

When the use of “miru” (look at) and “kako” (the past) or “mirai” (the future) in Japanese is considered under the similar context, the direct translations of sentences such as those listed in (52a) ~ (55a) turn out to be somewhat awkward.

- (52a) ?Tokiniha jibun no kako wo mite, taisetuna omoide nitsuite yukkuri kangaeru no wa yoikotodesu. (Sometimes it helps to look at one's past and reflect on cherished memories.)
- (53a) ?Genjo no mondai no genin wo mitukeruni wa, kako wo miru hitsuyo ga aru. (We must look at the past to find out the origin of the present problem.)
- (54a) ?Shorai wo mite, sugisatta koto ni kodawaruno wa yame nasai. (Look at the future and don't dwell on things that have already happened.)
- (55a) ?Kono kaisha no shorai wo miru to, gojibun no toshi no senzaiteki kachi ga wakarimasu yo. (When you look at the future of this company, you will realize the potential value of your investment.)

The underlined section of each of the above Japanese translations sounds unnatural, though the general idea will be conveyed. In Japanese, when considering the past or the future, the preferred expressions would be as follows:

- (52b) ...jibun no kako ni me wo mukeru... (...direct one's eye to one's past...)
- (53b) ...koremade no keii wo miru hitsuyo ga... (...need to look at what has happened so far...)
- (54b) ...shorai ni me wo mukete... (...direct one's eye to the future...)

(55b) ...kaisha no kongo wo kangaeru to... (...if you think of future prospects of the company...)

While a closer consideration of why and how these Japanese translations are considered more acceptable is beyond the scope of this paper, the differences observed in English and Japanese indicate that the direct translation of “the past,” (“kako”) and that of “the future” (“shorai”), as well as that of “look at,” do not evoke the same domains when used in the above contexts. This again demonstrates, though cross-linguistically, that the lexical items that are superficially considered to have the same meanings when isolated from context present meaning shifts when placed together with different lexical items.

4.2.4. Findings on Uses of “Look At”

This section explored the meanings implied by the phrase “look at,” beginning with the examination of the meaning shifts of the preposition “at” itself. While “at” is a preposition mostly used to specify spatial location, its meanings, including its implications of temporal duration, shift according to context. Furthermore, “at” can refer to either a stative location or a target at which a particular action is directed. In the case of “look at,” “at” indicates the target of the action to “look” which involves movement of the visual line and attention. However, it is also possible to use the phrase “look at” in physical sense to profile the activation of visual capacity and attention more than movement of the visual line and attention. From these observations, the central meanings of “look at” in the construction [look + at + N] consist of “attention,” “activation of visual capacity,” and “movement of visual line”. The notion of “attention” implied by the verb “look” may be further specified into “activation and/or movement of attention” depending on the object.

The second half of this chapter examines what are considered to be the figurative uses of “look at,” whose meanings go beyond exclusively physical perception, according to the type of object. When “look at” is used with objects such as paintings, photographs, newspapers, data, and maps, native speakers are not usually conscious of the actual cognitive activities involved beyond mere physical perception. However, as has been demonstrated in the above discussions, a closer examination of the use of the phrase in these contexts demonstrated that expressions such as, “I looked at the photograph” connote activities that are

more complex than mere physical perception, and therefore, the use of the phrase “look at” with these objects is also considered “figurative” for the reasons described in Section 4.2.3. Furthermore, when the objects themselves are abstract entities, the phrase “look at” also takes on a figurative meaning. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that even when the objects are abstract, the central meanings of “look” as physical perception also have a role to play as a means to obtain the necessary information, while other semantic domains are also evoked according to the nature of the object.

Finally, the consideration of the use of “look at” in relation to the past and the future, which is often generally presented as a primal case of the figurative use of “look at,” has demonstrated that the subject is not actually expected to “look at” the past or the future per se, but rather, at the more or less tangible evidence that represents the event or a series of events that have happened in the past or are expected to happen in the future. While “looking at” one’s own past or future has a more reflective meaning than it does in other cases, involving more of what may be called mental vision that reviews one’s past or imagines one’s future, what is actually taking place can be considered as subjective interpretation of one’s past or future on the basis of the present subjective knowledge that is available.

The awkwardness of the direct translations of “look at” “the past” or “the future” into Japanese also suggests that though there are presumed direct translations for these lexical items provided in dictionaries, the meaning inevitably shifts according to context.

4.3. “Look” with Other Prepositions/Adverbs

While the construction [look at + N] considered in the section above is the most common form of the use of “look,” the verb may be followed by various other spatial prepositions as well. This is understandable, given that “look” evokes the concept of directionality of one’s attention and visual line, both physical and mental. It has been presented in the previous sections that “look” and “look at” are used in a variety of physical and figurative contexts that are related to one’s attention, since vision is the primary means of obtaining knowledge and information and attention is the key to accomplishing the task.

The discussions in the following sections demonstrate that many of the figurative uses of [look + preposition] have a close connection with their physical meaning and directionality.

In addition, the verb “look” never abandons the central three concepts it covers, namely, attention, visual line, and visual capacity, which are not mutually discrete, particularly when the verb is used in a figurative sense as presented in the previous section.

4.3.1. Meaning of Prepositions

Before proceeding to the examination of [look + preposition], it is first necessary to consider the role of prepositions in relation to the verb “look”. As presented above, the phrase “look at” connotes a variety of meanings, representing different aspects of the activity, whether it is used in either a physical or a figurative sense. Such being the case, it is sufficiently reasonable to assume that this applies also to the use of “look” with other prepositions as well.

As “at” shifts its meaning depending on the context in which it is used (see Section 4.2.1.), so do other prepositions. The most well-known discussion on this issue is presented by Lakoff (1987, pp. 416-461) in his presentation of different interpretations of the preposition “over”. His detailed examination of the possible meanings that can be conveyed by “over” is based on his theory of kinesthetic image schemas serving as the conceptual basis for associating meanings to a lexical item. Tyler and Evans (2003) argues that Lakoff’s view still limits the meanings that can be attached to a lexical item asserting that:

...linguistic elements, while crucially important in the meaning-construction process, are merely prompts for conceptualizations which are far more complex than the conventionalized representations encoded by lexical forms. That is, the distinct senses associated with a form such as over are not ‘fully specified’, in the sense of Lakoff. Rather they are sufficiently abstract representations, such that when integrated at the conceptual level with contextual cues, a range of on-line interpretations can be derived. (p. 553)

These basic claims that the meanings are modified through “on-line interpretations” and that lexical items serve to prompt various concepts for meaning construction¹ are adopted in the following analyses of [look + preposition].

As the following discussions will demonstrate, the use of different prepositions with the visual perception verb “look” is at least partly, if not entirely, based on kinesthetic image schemas that humans have gained through physical experiences. In the following analyses

the term “proto-scene” adopted from Tyler and Evans (2003, p. 26) is used to refer to spatial configuration between two entities and a functional element.

4.3.2. Horizontal Orientation

First, “look” is widely used with a preposition to refer to the horizontal movement of either or all of the three central concepts embraced by the verb. What makes a perception verb different from other verbs is that it refers to an internal experience of the subject. One end of the spatial configuration, usually the landmark, is assumed to be the subject, though, it is also possible for a person to see oneself from a third party point of view as well.

The phrasal verbs of “look” with a prepositions or an adverb indicating direction or movement in horizontal orientation include: “look about,” “look after,” “look ahead,” “look around,” “look back,” “look beyond,” “look forward (to),” “look to,” and “look towards.” In the following subsections, the semantic implications of these phrases are examined and the ways in which the proto-scene of the perception is adapted to include the meanings beyond the immediate physical experience are considered.

4.3.2.1. “Look About/Around”

The spatial prepositions “about” and “around” refers to circular motion, covering either a partial or total rotation, with the former having a more continuous and rotational and circular connotation, and the latter, with an added sense of “here and there” when preceded by “look”.² Both phrases are used to refer to physical movement of visual line, along with attention. The proto scenes of “look about” and “look around” are as illustrated in Fig. 4-1(a) and 4-2(b), respectively.



Fig. 4-1(a)

Proto Scene of “look about”




Fig. 4-1(b)

Proto Scene of “look around”

- (60) The very act of reading is unsocial, a kind of melancholy barbarism. If you **look about** you in a railway train, in a street car, or bus you will observe that everyone is reading. Silent, glum, their eyes glued to book or paper, they sit, like so many savages brooding in a jungle. (Saturday Evening Post (2014))
- (61) Jack Biddlecomb took a moment to **look around** the cabin. The deckhead and the ceiling planking were fresh painted and brilliant white in the morning sun. The light reflecting off the water of the Delaware River below the counter made bright, dancing patterns on the overhead. (The French prize: a novel (2015))

In the above example sentences, the subject is moving one's visual line to obtain information of the physically perceivable scene through one's vision.

The same expressions can be used in a more figurative way, with the object being some entity that is not within the subject's direct field of vision.

- (62) And the point was, I was saying that we ought to **look about** the breakdown in the city and if we are losing our compass toward values, traditional values, family values, the values of hard work, integrity, and personal responsibility. (CNN_King (1992))
- (63) The new programs probably will be more similar to those in the previous cycle because it is possible to **look about** the country, identify the most successful programs, and duplicate them. # However, strong differences remain between programs that are itinerant and those based in a center; a third type of program is a combination of both. (Re:View (1995))

In (62) and (63), the objects are no longer visible within the immediate field of vision. As the objects become more abstract, the proto scene of the expression "look about" are used figuratively and shifts from the simpler meaning of obtaining available information to that of searching for particular entities for a designated purpose. This kind of shift in meaning suggests that humans have a sense of mental vision, probably linked to imagination, which enables us to scan through the entities with a purpose of locating particular information.

The phrase "look around," which is more commonly found in today's American English also demonstrates similar shift in meaning as with "look about".

- (64) The subway cars got running, and so really, when you **look around** the city right now, you see people going to lunch, shopping, people out going to Broadway shows, as if none of this ever happened. Clearly, though, a lot of people suffered a great deal during the huge blackout Thursday night into Friday. (CNN_LiveSat (2003))

Sentence (64) is an example of “look around” being used with the object referring to an entity other than that which is visible in one’s immediate field of vision. The phrase “look around” could shift between physical and figurative sense, more so than for (63) or (64) since the ultimate object to be located is “people,” which are concrete beings that can be visually detectable. The on-line interpretation of this sentence therefore can vary even between the speaker and the hearer, though the variation would have no effect on accomplishing a successful communication. A person may mean scanning the city in a very abstract way or actually going out and “looking around” the city to locate the people engaged in the said activities. In the case of the former, the image would be similar to that of Fig. 4-1b, with the person being static and mentally “looking around” the city. However, if the sentence is interpreted with a greater shift towards physical sense of “look around,” then, because of the size of the area to be covered by the activity, “look around” will have an additional meaning




Fig. 4-2

Meaning of “look around” with a greater physical movement sense

of moving the entire body, i.e. walking, at least along the streets of the city. Therefore, the meaning implied by “look around” profiles bodily movement as well as shown in Fig. 4-2.

- (65) When I **look around** and ask what do I want to do in society, nothing else appeals to me," de Buhr says. " That's why we went into business for ourselves. We want to do what we can to make our community a better place for everybody." (Christian Science Monitor (2015))
- (66) Right now, when you **look around** and survey the options, it's certainly not money-market mutual funds but online savings banks that tend to have more competitive yields, generally in the realm of 0.9% per year some as high as 1% per year. So I think that's the best deal going for investors who can get comfortable with the idea of being with an online savings bank. (Money (2015))

When given more context, “look around” shifts more towards the meaning of “search,” as is demonstrated in (64) and (65). The profiling of the purpose to find out something makes the expression more abstract. The “look around” in these sentences implies physical as well as cognitive activity to fulfill the purpose of finding something. Again, while the vision is the means for carrying out these searches, with the preposition “around” implying that one needs to direct one’s attention to a wide range of possibilities, since the entities to be found are abstract, the physical sense of vision is backgrounded, giving greater weight to the concepts related to “searching”.

Finally, the existence of this concept of “searching” evoked by “look about” as well as “look around” is further substantiated by the fact that these phrases are sometimes followed by “for” as in the following examples:

- (67) You may wish to **look about for** other employment, and London is by far the best place to do it. (Balogh, Mary. *At last comes love*. (2009))
- (68) Quite a few small companies developed a nice business during the PC boom, but are now just barely holding on, still trying to pretend being big-time manufacturers. When they get into trouble, it isn't unusual to see them **look around for** someone else to blame. (PC World (2005))

In the above sentences, the “search” sense of the phrases “look about” and “look around” implied in (62) ~ (65) are overtly profiled by the addition of “for”.

4.3.2.2. “Look After”

The expression “look after” is probably most widely used as a near synonym of “take care of”. The proto scene of “after” is as presented in Fig. 4-3, which is adapted from Tyler




Fig. 4-3

Proto-scene for “after” (adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003:176))

and Evans (2003). In the case of “look after,” the source is the subject and the object is some entity which is facing back seen from the subject’s perspective. That the object is facing back is a requirement for the subject to be “looking after” it. Therefore, the preposition “after” in “look after” does not only specify the spatial order but also the direction in which the object is facing, precisely because since “look” is a verb of perception, the arrangement of two entities, that is, the subject and the object, is understood as viewed by the subject.

Tyler and Evans (2003) argues that “the functional element associated with after in its spatial reading is that of following or pursuing, and hence involves intentionality and purpose rather than location per se” (p. 174). This is true of the verbs such as “run.” Consider the following sentences.

(69a) The police ran behind the wall.

(69b) *The police ran after the wall.

(70) The police ran after the suspect.

While (69a) is an acceptable sentence, (69b) is not, because while the preposition “behind” only describes the spatial relationship between the police and the wall, the use of “after” in (69b) does not make sense since there is no apparent purpose. In contrast, (70) is fully acceptable, since the function, or the purpose, of running is to catch the suspect. This also applies to “look”.

(69) I looked behind the curtain.

(70) ?*I looked after the curtain.

The meaning of (69) is that the subject looked at what was there on the other side of the curtain, but (70) cannot be interpreted in the same way and is ungrammatical, unless it has the meaning that the subject was in charge of keeping the curtain in a good condition for some reason.

The above observations indicate that “after” implies not only the spatial relationship but also the direction in which the subject and the object are facing, as well as the purpose of the action. Then it is reasonable to assume that the idiomatic meaning of the phrase “look after”

has its basis in the merger of the concepts evoked by “look” and “after”, resulting in the rise and specification of the concept of purpose, though linguistically not overtly expressed but still the key element for evoking the gestalt meaning of “look after”. Fig. 4-4 is a conceptual diagram that suggests “look” and “after” and the concept of “purpose” mutually influencing profiling of the domains prompted by the expression.




Fig. 4-4

Conceptual Diagram of “look after”

Thus the meaning of “look after” has evolved to roughly mean “take care of”, though, this meaning of “take care of” takes on different concepts depending on the object as well on the relationship between the object and the subject, as well as our non-linguistic knowledge of the external world.

- (71) Elaine would be ready for marriage. But she would continue to **look after** Grandma, making sure that all of her needs were met. (Brunstetter, Wanda. *The decision*. (2015))
- (72) They look at Iran, they look at Gaza, they look at Hezbollah in Lebanon, they look at the collapsing states around us, and Mr. Netanyahu did a much better job than Mr. Herzog in portraying himself as the leader who can **look after** the security of the state and of the individual citizens in the state. (PBS (2015))

The phrase “look after” in (71) means a woman takes care of her grandmother and meets the grandmother’s needs, which may include a wide range of daily chores as well as healthcare. It is a provision of care on a very personal level. In contrast, in (72), what is to be taken care of is the security of the state and the individual citizens, which involves a totally different

series of tasks and procedures from what is implied by “look after” in (71). Nevertheless, the basic proto-scene depicted in Fig. 4-3 remains valid, that is, the object is assumed to proceed its own course, while the subject follows it with a particular purpose in mind.

4.3.2.3. “Look Ahead (To)” and “Look Forward (To)”

The phrases “look ahead” and “look back”, when used in the physical sense, are relatively simple to understand and straight forward. However, there is a difference between the phrase “look ahead” and “look forward” even when used to refer to physical vision. Consider these sentences in which “look ahead” is used in physical sense:

- (73) She **looked ahead** and saw the sign in the distance, SASSY'S, in bright, hot-pink neon letters; the color clashed with the golden orange of the Cajun moon. (Gunn, Gigi. *Cajun moon* (2008))
- (74) He **looked ahead**, saw the bay, and pulled the visor down to shield his eyes from the sun. (Southwest Review (2013))
- (75) Then exhale and relax your back without relaxing your abs; at the same time, lift your chin to **look ahead** of you (not up) and lift your buttocks slightly. (Backpacker (2001))
- (76) a. Put on your headset and **look ahead**. b. Make eye contact, then point to your ear and ask what he's listening to. (Cosmopolitan (2005))

Sentences (73) ~ (76), the phrase “look ahead” has the nuance of intention, determination, and a sense of purpose on the part of the subject. Even in (75) and (76), both of which are imperative sentences, the instructions imply that the subject keep proper form. The phrase “look ahead” also appears to indicate less of the movement of the visual line. In (73) and (74), while it is unclear from the context which direction the subject was looking before the person “looked ahead,” there is an implication of extension of one’s visual line, or visual focus, to something in the distance.

These characteristics of “look ahead” contrasts with those of “look forward” found in the following sentences:

- (77) He settled back into his chair, prepared to wait. The man on his right fidgeted; the one on his left **looked forward**, but remained still and silent, and Roman's boss ignored them all as he did something on his computer. (Monroe, Lucy. *Close*

quarters (2010))

- (78) "What's the Outbreak?" Ginger asked. "It's the Northern Cheyenne," he began. Then he **looked forward**, watching the hot red embers." In the late 1870s, that tribe was living on a miserable little reservation in Oklahoma. (Fantasy & Fiction (2009))

In sentence (77) and (78), the subjects seem to be demonstrating less intention or the sense of purpose for “looking forward”. Their visual lines were directed forward, but neither of them were trying to find out something or intending to fulfill some purpose by doing so. The concept of attention, involving intention and determination, is backgrounded in the meaning of “look” when followed by “forward” in the physical sense. Instead, the movement of visual line is profiled, more so than in “look ahead,” as it is implied in sentence (78). Finally, below is another example from COCA which helps to elucidate the difference between “look forward” and “look ahead” used in the physical sense.

- (79) Hang on to the child for a while until they're stable, and then just kind of let them go and encourage them to pedal. He's doing a great job. McEWEN: He sure is. How do you get them to look at – **look forward** and not look down at their feet or at the sidewalk? Mr-ROBERTS: Well, it's really important when they're riding a bike to **look ahead**. They need to be able to focus on an object in the distance. (CBS_Morning (1999))




Fig. 4-5

Proto-scene of relative association between kinesthetic experience and temporal concept

In (79), which is an excerpt explaining how to teach a child to ride a bicycle, the phrase “look

forward” is contrasted with “look down,” which profiles the directionality of visual line implied by the former. On the other hand, in his answer, the respondent uses the phrase “look ahead” to express the importance of not only to “look forward” but to pay attention and focus on an object in the distance. The respective uses of these phrases in this excerpt support the characteristic difference between the implications of “look forward” and “look ahead,” which have been observed in the previous sentences. The difference in meaning becomes more evident when the phrases “look ahead to” and “look forward to” are compared, both of which are used in figurative sense of directing one’s attention to the future, which is considered as what lies in front of us, not behind us. Fig. 4-5 represents the proto-scene of temporal concept based on our kinesthetic physical experience. As discussed in Chapter 2, this study is based on the idea that our kinesthetic physical experiences serve as the basis for building our conceptual structures. Fig. 4-5 is a representation of how our bodily experience enables us to structure our temporal concepts.

First, we know that physical activities progress through time and that the time required for any activity cannot be reversed or recovered. The time progresses with our movement, and we cannot move back in time. This knowledge gives us the concept of time moving forward. Second, since our physical experience tells us that we are moving forward in time, we associate the abstract movement through time with our physical bodily experience of moving forward with our faces facing front, not back. We retain this orientation with regard to past, present, and future. This then leads to our viewing the future as something in front of us, and the past, behind, both of which are abstract, yet we can “look” by directing our attention in the proper direction.

Returning to the examination of “look ahead to” and “look forward to,” the expression “look ahead” can be used more comfortably and is more commonly than “look forward” to mean direct one’s attention to future, as in:

(80) It wasn't some big trauma, either. It was just... out of the ordinary. Way out. And I wasn't interested in looking back. I only wanted to **look ahead**. (Parrish, Robin. *Nightmare* (2010))

(81) And as we **look ahead** now, one of the things to watch in 2012, the most bitterly divided issue for this administration, health care. (NBC_MeetPress (2011))

In both (80) and (81), “look ahead” roughly means think of the matters of the future. While “look forward” without “to” can also mean to refer to directing one’s attention to the future, the instances of such as use is much less common than that of “look ahead”. The implication of “look ahead” referring to the future is neutral, with no expectations or concerns about the future attached to it. This is also true of the phrase “look ahead to”.

(82) I want to **look ahead** now, way ahead, **to** 2016. (ABC (2013))

(83) **Look ahead to** your spending in retirement, says financial planner Harold Evensky, and calculate what portion you'll have to fund with investments rather than Social Security or a pension. (Money (2013))

As in (80) and (81), the addition of “to” merely serves to what in the future one is supposed to direct one’s attention to. This greatly contrasts with “look forward,” which, when used in physical sense profiled more of the directionality of one’s visual line, with intention or determination more backgrounded than in the case of “look ahead”. The expression “look forward to” always means to await for something that is exciting or brings happiness. The concepts of positive emotion are presupposed when it is used. To avoid this and still neutrally designate what to “look” in the future context, occasionally, preposition “at” is used instead of “to”.

(84) And I would ask you, when I **look forward at** our future, what kind of a world do we face if Iraq is in a position to take control of all the supplies on which we rely, Iraq which has an ideology which is very similar to Nazism and believes in Arab regional supremacy. (CNN_Talkback (2003))

(85) And like Miles was saying, it needs to be more proactive. We need to **look forward at** things, not just reactive and that’s the case. (CNN (2015))

Sentence (84) and (85) are two of the few instances where “at” follows “look forward” used in a figurative sense of viewing the future. In both of these examples, the future itself or an entity in the future is being referred to with no emotional concepts attached to it. It is possible to conjecture that the use of “at” in this context may have emerged as a way to avoid the confusion in the meaning with “look forward to”. The question then is why “look forward

to,” rather than “look ahead to,” is considered preferable to mean the feeling of positive anticipation.

Although there are no etymological records available to answer this question, the adverb “forward” initiates the concept of movement, more so than does “ahead”.³ Consider the following sentences:

(86) **Throw** the ball **forward** and up. Release the ball higher/more forward. Throw the ball using a whipping action. (Physical Education (2005))

(87) Then he used all his strength to **run forward** and kick the bobber. (Highlights for Children (2002))



Fig. 4-6

Difference in profiling trajectory and target between “forward” and “ahead”

In (86) and (87) “forward” cannot be replaced by “ahead”. This indicates that the trajectory of the movement is more profiled by “forward” than “ahead,” which also accords with the observation mentioned above regarding the difference between “look ahead” and “look forward” with no succeeding prepositions or adverbs, when used in physical sense. While “forward” and “ahead” are both adverbs referring to the front, the former tends to profile the movement more, while the latter, the target. This may be the reason why the physical sense of the phrase “look forward” in sentence (77) and (78) appears devoid of any particular intended purposes compared to “look ahead” in (73) ~ (76) above. Although the target is not mentioned in the any of the sentences (73) ~ (78), the concept of target is inherently implied and profiled more by “look ahead”. Fig. 4-6 illustrates this difference between “forward” and “ahead”.

The addition of “to” to “look forward” then enhances the movement as well as the

existence of the target, since the preposition “to” is closely associated with movement from one point to another as in “I go to school” and “The train runs from Osaka to Kobe,” for instance. What makes “look forward to” to mean pleasant anticipation for supposedly exciting and happy occasion, then, is the profiling of the trajectory and the target in the abstract sense. When one “looks forward to” something, it implies that one is actively directing one’s attention to the target as well as activating the trajectory to the expected target, which altogether evokes the meaning of pleasant anticipation.

4.3.3. Vertical Orientation

There are prepositions and adverbs indicating vertical movement that may be combined with the verb “look”. As has been discussed in the previous section, the physical meaning of a phrase is closely associated with its abstract or idiomatic connotations. Through our physical experience, we gain the basic spatial relations between ourselves and another entity. The proto-scenes for “up” and “down” are presented in Tyler and Evans (2003) as below.⁴




Fig. 4-7

Proto-scenes for *up* and *down*
 (adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003, p. 137& 142))

In Tyler and Evans (2003), “up” and “down” is explained as the relationship between landmark (LM) and trajector (TR) as both having vertical orientation of “top” and “bottom,” respectively, with the human body serving as LM of the proto-scene. Therefore, in English, the word “head, which is the highest body part, is used to describe the person or entity at the “top” of hierarchically structured organizations, for instance (p.136).

When “up” is used within a context, while the vertical direction indicated in Fig. 4-7 is maintained, the range which it covers may vary, as demonstrated by the following sentences:

(88) She pulled up her socks.

(89) He pulled up his shirt to show his scar.

(90) ...he **raised up** his cheap wine and gave a toast...(Kenyon Review (2014))

(91) She picked up a dime on the floor.

In the above examples (88) ~ (91), the range of the physical movement indicated by “up” vary depending on the context as shown in Fig. 4-8.




Fig. 4-8
Different ranges covered by “up”

“Pulling up” one’s socks and “pulling up” one’s shirt covers a different range, which is understood by the context. Likewise, the range of movement indicated by “up” in “raising up wine” is different from that in “picking up a dime”.

4.3.3.1. “Look Up (From/At/To)”

The same applies to the phrase “look up,” but in this case, there is no LM but the “source” which is the visual line of the subject, which could be facing any direction prior to its movement. So any movement from the original position of the visual line in the direction depicted in the proto-scene Fig. 4-7 is considered “up”.

(92) "Did you hear me?" said Gabe. Henry didn't **look up**, and Gabe saw that he was drawing on a blue-and-pink-lined index card. (Ferguson, Mark Andrew. *The lost boys symphony*. (2015))

When “look up” is used as in (92) without any preposition following, it merely indicates the direction of the movement. It can be inferred, however, that Henry was looking down at the index card. The following example gives a clearer clue regarding the original direction of the subject’s visual line by having “from” added to it.

(93) The clerk doesn't **look up from** his desk until I say, Excuse me, I'd like to buy a license. (Henry, Joe. Lime Creek (2011))

(94) At the second or third stop, the pneumatic doors hiss open and close, the bus starts forward with a slight lurch, and I **look up from** the paperback I'm reading (a novelization of the science fiction movie Forbidden Planet) to see this really tall kid making his gangly way down the aisle toward where I'm sitting. (The Hudson Review 2005))

In both (93) and (94) the original direction of the movement of the visual line is profiled and specified the object following the preposition “from”. On the other hand, it is also possible to profile the endpoint of “looking up” by designating it with an object following “at”.

(95) Ducks, geese, and a pair of swans swam and dove and preened their feathers in the pool. He stopped at the dam's base to **look up at** the structure. To support that mass of water hanging overhead, the dam would have to be about as wide at the base as it was high. (Fantasy & Science Fiction (2015))

(96) “I **looked up at** the cloudless blue sky above us. A slight breeze released a single leaf from the white birch tree in front of my apartment.” (Dyer-Seeley, Kate. Slayed on the slopes (2015))

Sentences (95) and (96) “at” is used after “look up” to indicate the endpoint of the movement of the visual line. This structure can be used also in a figurative sense as in:

(97) She wanted to do good works in her life, but she also wanted to **look up and out at** the world, rather than stare deeply into a pair of prayer-folded hands, whispering words of devotion and salvation. (Sheibe, Amy, *A fireproof home for the bride* (2015))

In (97), the phrase “look up...at” is used in a figurative sense to indicate the subject’s desire to experience what is outside her present situation. Here again, “at” indicates the destination of her desired direction of visual line in an abstract sense.

In English, the phrase “look up to” is mostly used as a near synonym of “respect” as in:

(98) "Who in your life do you **look up to** the most?" # Smiling confidently, she answered, " I would have to say my grandmother, because she's the one who took me to church for the first time and introduced me to Jesus Christ, my personal Lord and Savior." The crowd ate it up like deep-fried pickles. The only acceptable role models for young girls in a Kentucky pageant were their grandmothers and Jesus, and Miranda had name-checked them both without sounding like she was pandering. (Butler, Kirkir. *Pretty ugly* (2015))

(99) So he's always been someone I've **looked up to**. And I'm always afraid to try to work with someone who I idolize because I don't know if I can make my movie as good as his best movie, so then why waste his time? (NPR (2012))

In both "look up at" and "look up to" the destination of the visual line is specified, though figurative in "look up to" meaning "respect". First, "look up to" has the sense of something being higher than oneself as being superior (Lakoff 1987, Tyler and Evans 2003). The use of "to" is preferred to that of "at" in this case can be attributed to the inherent proto-scenic relationship between the two entities. Tyler and Evans (2003) describes the difference between "to" and "at" as both not having any specification regarding the orientation of TR, the object by giving examples such as the following.

(100) In this picture, Diana is standing to my left

(101) In this picture, Diana is standing on my left

(Tyler and Evans, p. 150)

In sentence (100) and (101), "to" and "on" can be both substituted by "at" which also has no directional orientation. This view, however, falls short of explaining why "at" is used in (95)




Fig. 4-9

Difference between “look up to” and “look up at”

~ (97), but not in (98) and (99). The prepositions “at” and “to” have different meanings at least when they follow the phrase “look up”. When one “looks up at” something, it is likely that the target or the desired facet of the target is facing towards the subject. That is, when one “looks up at” the structure as in (95), the target one intends to “look at” is facing the subject. This does not necessarily mean that target must be facing front as one can also say “he looked up at the side of the structure.” In either case, the subject is in control of which part of the target to “look up at”.

However, in the case of “to” in “look up to,” as it is claimed in Tyler and Evans (2003), the orientation of the object either does not matter, or else, is not under the control of the subject. The use of “to” reduces the subject’s control of the orientation of the object, while with “at,” the subject’s intention of which facet to “look up at” is more specific and controllable. Fig. 4-9 illustrates the difference of “to” and “at”. As noted in Tyler and Evans (2003, p.148), “to” is a preposition that serves to designate the orientation, not necessarily the actual endpoint of the visual line when used after “look up”. There remains a sense of distance between the source and the target. In addition, the facet of the target which the subject chooses to “look” is undetermined. In contrast, the phrase “look up at,” which is mostly used in a physical sense, connotes that the visual line actually reaches the target at the endpoint and that the subject’s intention to “look up at” a certain facet (indicated by the white crescent in Fig. 4-9) of the target is fulfilled. This holds even when the subject “looks up at” what seems to be a flat plane like the sky as in sentence (96). Obviously, the subject’s intention is to “look at” the part of the sky that is facing the earth, not its other side facing other galaxies. The sense

of distance and the uncontrollability of the target by the subject, together with the tendency to conceptualize something physically higher up as being superior or higher in rank, contributes to the meaning of “respect” evoked by the phrase “look up to”.

4.3.3.2. “Look Down (At/Over/On)”

The opposite of “look up to” is “look down on,” a near synonym of “despise” or “regard with contempt”. As with “look up,” “look down” can be also used in the physical sense of directing one’s visual line downward.

(102) They had hiked up the hill to **look down at** the ranch. (Everett, Percival. *Half an inch of water* (2015))

(103) I would **look down at** the speedometer as the needle crept with smooth confidence toward triple digits. I did not need to make good time. I did not want to make good time. I was doing only what the road wanted me to do. (Newsweek Global (2015))

The phrase “look down” in the physical sense may be also followed by the prepositions such as “over” and “on”.

(104) Juan indicated with a languid movement of his hand that the two fishermen should turn and **look down over** the harbor and the city. That was not necessary, they preferred to look that way any.... (Review of Contemporary Fiction (1995))

(105) My father and mother go to the rail of the boardwalk and **look down on** the beach where a good many bathers are casually walking about. (Shwartz, Delmore. *In Dreams Begin Responsibilities*.(2014))

In (104) and (105), “over” and “on” are used to indicate the expanse of the object as seen by the subject. As is discussed in detail in Langacker (1987) and Tyler and Evans (2003), “over” can be interpreted in many different ways. In the case of (104) and (105) above, the choice between “over” and “on” seems to depend on how the expanse of the subject’s field of vision and its movement is interpreted. In (104), the assumed field of vision is wider and the visual line probably made a greater movement to right and left to capture the entire view of the harbor and the city, which are likely to be in distance. In (105), on the other hand, the beach is assumed to be more directly below where the subjects are and, therefore, not much movement

of the field of vision and visual line is necessary to capture the view of it.

The difference between “look down at” and “look down over,” and “look down on” are illustrated in Fig. 4-10. As shown in the figure, “look down at” has a stronger sense of visual connection between the source and the target, with the target being relatively small in size and




Fig. 4-10

Differences among “look down on,” “look down on,” and “look down over”

the subject assuming a greater control over and quite specific about what to capture with one’s vision. The relationship is basically the same as that of “look up at” except that the target is located below the subject rather than above. When one physically “looks down on” something, the size of the target may vary from a small object to an object occupying a relative large area, such as the beach in (105). When the target is relatively large, the visual line more or less reaches the target and moves across its surface to capture the whole view. In the case of “look down over,” on the other hand, the nuance is to move one’s visual line and the field of vision to capture the general view without necessarily reaching the object itself, as shown by the dotted arrows in Fig. 4-10. In the case of “look down,” the orientation, or the facet, of the object does not become an issue as it did with “look up,” since it is generally assumed that the object is seen from the top when one “looks down” at/on/over it from above.

When “look down on” is used as a near synonym of “despise,” the meaning of “down” and that of “on” together synergize to evoke a sense of hierarchy as well as that of “contempt”. This stems from a lower position being regarded inferior, in contrast to that which is above being superior. The preposition “on” also has a nuance of oppression, since in the physical sense, when a person steps or pounds “on” something, it means the affected object is battered

in some way. The supposed hierarchy is also at least partly based on such physical advantage of being above the object. Thus, something that is below is regarded as being inferior, and above, superior. The use of “on” further reinforces this concept, in that it denotes contempt towards the object in its entirety. It evokes the meaning of degradation of not only a part of the target which is often a person, but in its entirety, as demonstrated in the following sentences.

(106) "There's sort of a feeling like people who have gone to a university, they **look down on** you because you haven't, " says Negenman-Vr, whose four children opted not to go to college, two of them following her husband's line of work at the railways." (Christian Science Monitor (2015))

(107) They need to talk about their feelings of failure. But they don't. They just keep it inside. I know guys who lost their jobs who lie to their wives because they can't be honest, because they think their wives are going to **look down on** them. (CNN_Hughley (2009))

In (106), what is being “looked down on” is not only the fact that one has not gone to college, but the individual as a whole. Likewise, in (107), the men who lost their jobs are not merely afraid that their wives will “look down on” for the very fact that they have no jobs, but of being belittled as a man as a whole. Thus, as illustrated in Fig. 4-10, “on” reinforces the range of contempt by encompassing the entire object.

The phrase “look down on,” may be used for objects other than humans. Consider the following sentences.

(108) Mainstream media outlets that once appeared to **look down on** Catholicism now excitedly report on Francis, making him a sudden pop culture icon. Even the irreverent and often antagonistic website Gawker.com referred to Francis as a superhero. (U.S. Catholic (2014))

(109) The post-Civil War era was a period of robust economic expansion, and the class of businessmen and entrepreneurs, the elites of the time, set the values the Court protected. In our time, the dominant class consists of intellectuals (very broadly and loosely defined) and knowledge workers. Its members tend to **look down on** business and to elevate freedom of speech and personal morality over the economic freedoms required by a healthy economy. (American Spectator (2008))

In the above examples, the object of “look down on” is not a human being, but a religion in (108) and business in (109). The meaning of “look down on” does not differ much from that

in (106) or (107), nevertheless, since what is being regarded with contempt is not one aspect of the object, but the abstract object in its entirety.

4.3.3.3. “Look On”

Unlike the phrase “look down on,” “look on” has a neutral meaning of directing one’s visual attention to something without having any strong judgment about the object. Also, “on” in this use does not imply any difference in elevation of the position of the subject vis-à-vis the object. Thus, there is no sense of despise involved. The use of “on” instead of “at,” again expands the field of vision that is covered. The focus is more dispersed and wide-ranged. The phrase is mostly used in the physical sense, with the object being actually present within the subject’s physical field of vision. It is generally used to mean a person “observing” something or some situation with some interest or purpose, but without emotional involvement.

(110) As Meredith **looked on** the summer revelers now, she thought, Leo! Carver! Leo. Poor Leo. For all of the years of their growing up, Leo had taken care of Carver. (Hilderbrand, Elin. *Silver girl: a novel*. (2011))

(111) The order came after a hearing today turned into a near-circus. Some lawyers bickered and nearly came to blows, while others waved at the cameras as the judge **looked on** the entire time. (PBS_NewsHour (2011))

In both (109) and (110), “look on” is used to mean that the subject directed the visual line and attention towards the object, but the attention was not backed by any particular emotion towards the object itself. The subject objectively perceives what is happening within one’s field of vision. As it can be understood from (110), however, the scene may be associated with some other scene the subject may have experienced in the past. This fact in itself indicates that the subject’s real attention was not directed towards the object that was in front of one’s eyes. In (111), given one’s expected professional responsibility, the judge might have been quite attentive to what was going on, but not with any emotional involvement. The use of the phrase “looked on” indicates to us that the judge had remained calm throughout the incident.

4.3.3.4. “Look Over”

The phrase “look over” may be used in the physical sense as in “He looked over the audience from the stage,” in which case, the use is similar to that of (104) in which the fishermen were told to “look down over” the harbor. The absence of the word “down” does not mean that the stage was not elevated from where the audience were seated, but the term “over” itself suffices the implication of vertical relationship between the subject and the object. In this sense, “down” in (104) can be regarded as being redundant, though effective in emphasizing the vertical locational relationship between the two entities and signifying a greater bodily movement required for “looking down”.

There is a figurative meaning of “look over,” which roughly means to check something in a hasty manner. The object is usually, but not necessarily, something written. As with “look on” above, there no longer is the sense of superiority of the subject, though, the eyes of the one who “looks over” some document, for instance, must be located above the document under normal circumstances. Below are two example uses of “look over”.

(112) I saw a list I had made that afternoon of things I wanted to get done that day. None of it got done. All I'd really accomplished was picking up some packing boxes, getting myself coffee, and picking up some uniforms for Corey. I **looked over** my list, but I wasn't focused on it. Instead, I was trying to remember who CPT Alvarez was. (War, Literature & the Arts: An International Journal of Humanities (2015))

(113) Hollis's long, thin fingers braced in backward arcs on the tabletop, her expression as stoic and seemingly detached as it had been that morning when she'd **looked over** the folder of contracts and paperwork I'd signed. (Wingate, Lisa. *The story keeper*. (2014))

To “look over” something in the sense of performing cursory inspection and consideration evokes an image that is similar to that of “look down over” in Fig. 4-10 above, with a greater emphasis on the horizontal movement of the visual line as illustrated in Fig. 4-11. As in the case of “look down over,” the subject’s visual line is not in contact with the object. It evokes the sense of checking something not word by word but by directing one’s attention to the entire object from beginning to end without reading everything that is written.




Fig. 4-11
Diagram of “Look over”

4.3.4. Other Orientations and Meanings of Phrases Using “Look”

The verb “look” may be followed by prepositions and adverbs whose meanings no longer designate either vertical or horizontal direction. While the core concepts of “look” are still present, the phrases demonstrate implications that are beyond the original meaning of “look” when combined with different prepositions or adverbs. Below are two such phrases, “look for” and “look up,” that are commonly used in today’s American English.

4.3.4.1. “Look For” (as a near synonym of “search for/expect”)

The phrase “look for” is very commonly heard in today’s American English. There are close to 19,000 examples of “look for” listed in COCA as of October 2016, a large majority of which have the meaning of “search for” or “expect”. A closer examination of the phrase, however, reveals subtle shifts in its meanings as will be demonstrated in the discussions to follow. First, below are two examples of the sentences in which “look for” may be considered as a very close synonym of “search for”.

(114) When I began to **look for** stand-up desks a few years ago, I found, to my dismay, that many sleek options cost upward of \$1,000. Eventually, I came across a \$150 bright yellow, portable cart for audiovisual equipment, retrofitted with a keyboard tray. (Mother Earth News (2015))

(115) Every time mortgage rates go up, the size of the house the couple can buy shrinks because their financing costs increase. At the moment, they’re planning to **look for** a home in the \$300,000 to \$350,000 range. (Denver Post (2014))

In both (114) and (115), the object is a concrete tangible entity yet to be found but is assumed to be available and locatable by the subject.

Tyler and Evans (2003) argues that while “for” is a prompt for a direction towards an object, it does not necessarily involve the movement of trajector (the subject) towards landmark (the object). Below are their examples illustrating this point in comparison with the use of “to”.

(116) a. The timekeeper whistled/gestured/signalled/called to the referee.

b. The timekeeper whistled/gestured/signalled/called for the referee.

(p. 146)

They claim that while the timekeeper directs one’s whistle, gesture, signal, or call directly at the referee in example (a) above, in the case of (b), the referee may not be in the immediate vicinity and that there may be an intermediary to accomplish the task requested by the timekeeper. From this observation, Tyler and Evans calls the object of “for” an “oblique goal” (p. 147). They compare the proto-scenes of “for” and “to” as in Fig.4-12.



Fig. 4-12

Comparison of proto-scenes of “to” and “for” (adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003, p. 148))

Applying the above proposal to the present study, compared in Fig. 4-13 are the images implied by “look at” versus “look for”. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, “look at” can also convey different meanings, both physical and figurative, depending on the context. When used in the physical sense, the endpoint of the movement of the visual line is

the object. In other words, “look at” implies that the subject’s vision, or the source, has reached the object and the object is usually something definite, though there is a possibility that the subject would not recognize what it is. Still, the meaning of “look at” maintains the fact that one’s visual line has been extended all the way to the object as illustrated in Fig. 4-13.




Fig. 4-13

Image of relationship between source and object for “look at”

In contrast to “look at,” “look for” in the physical sense does not imply a concrete endpoint of the visual line, which concurs with the description of “for” in Tyler and Evans (2003) presented in Fig. 4-12. When the proto-scene of “for” is applied to its use in the phrase “look for,” the combination gives rise to shifts in the meanings of both of the lexical items. In the case of “look for,” the abstractness of the object is reinforced since there is no definite object for one to direct one’s vision to yet. The subject has an idea of the object and believes that it exists, but it does not refer to a specific concrete object. This then, therefore, adds additional obliqueness to the object than as assumed in the proto-scene of “for” alone. Furthermore, in the case of “look for,” because the location of the object remains indefinite, the direction of the visual line is uncertain. As a result, a greater range of movement of the visual line is conveyed than it is normally assumed with the verb “look” without any prepositions. The following sentences are typical examples of “look” without any prepositions following.

(117) I put the tiny rubber-tipped spoon down in to one of the two sections of the peach-

colored plastic bowl and **turned around to look** at Jay's face. It was clinched and stern and I couldn't tell whether he was trying to hold back tears or if he was furious and trying not to show it. (Little, Benilde. *Acting out: a novel* (2003))

(118) After a while I casually asked her if she thought it would rain, since the wind began to get very gusty. But there was no answer, so I **turned around to look**, and nobody was sitting in the back seat! (Saturday Evening Post (2002))

In the above examples, the subject “turned around” before one “looked,” therefore, the range of movement of one’s visual line after turning around must have been limited to the maximum field of vision that could be covered without much of any further movement of one’s head or body. This is the range that is normally assumed to be covered with the use of the verb “look,” if not otherwise specified with further context. The range of movement of the visual line, as well as one’s head and body, indefinitely expands from this baseline when “look” is combined with “for”. Therefore, the proto-scene of “for” illustrated in Fig. 4-13 above is modified as shown in Fig. 4-14 for the phrase “look for” to show the wider range covered by “for,” when




Fig. 4-14

Visual directions of “look for”

combined with “look”. While the proto-scene of “for” alone has a single orientation, the image evoked by “look for” is one which theoretically allows for the direction of the visual line to be in any direction as shown abstractly in Fig. 4-14. In addition, though not represented in Fig. 4-14, the phrase also allows for the movement of the source, or the subject,

itself, if the context implies such a necessity as in sentences (119) and (120) below. The obliqueness of the object is the same as that of “for” in Fig. 4-12 and Fig. 4-13, except for the additional possible directions in which the object may be located.

(119) Susan Nicholson is an Atlanta-based cookbook author and registered dietitian. She can be reached by email at susan7daymenu.com **Look for** Susan's book, "The 7-Day Menu Planner for Dummies," in bookstores. (Atlanta Journal Constitution (2015))

(120) Imagine instead a river with sandy beaches where families can wade, splash and enjoy picnics. A river where kids at summer camp can collect and identify bugs or **look for** animal tracks in the soft sand. (Orange County Register (2015))

In (119), one obviously would have to walk around, first, to find a bookstore, and then, in the store to find the book. Physical locomotion and movements are indispensable. Likewise, children would have to walk around to find the animal tracks in the sand in (120). The phrase “look for” in these sentences not only implies such bodily movements together with the movement of the visual line. In addition, since the objects are concrete entities, they are less oblique than when they refer to abstract entities, though, understandably, they remain indefinite.

The objects of “look for” also exhibit different degree of obliqueness. In general, they become increasingly oblique as they become more abstract, which, in turn, results in backgrounding the directionality of the search to a greater extent.

(121) Therefore, I reviewed the videotapes of the peer tutoring sessions to **look for** behavioral differences between the experimental and comparison tutors. Also, I looked for differences between the behaviors and reading performance of their tutees. (Reading Improvement (2015))

(122) But it wasn't such a storybook situation back in 2000 when Syler-Jones, then an unemployed mother of two young boys, moved to Texas to be closer to her family and **look for** a job. She found one in the marketing department at TCU but faced plenty of challenges along the way. (USA Today (2015))

In sentences (121) and (122), what the subjects are “looking for” is abstract. Although it is not possible to accurately measure the degree of abstractness of the objects per se in these sentences, in the case of (121), the presence of “behavioral differences” is presupposed as a

fact, while in (122), neither the availability nor the type of “job” were presupposed conditions when the subject was “looking for” it. This then causes a shift in the meaning of “look for” in these sentences. The subject’s target was more focused and narrowed down in the former than in the latter. Nevertheless, in either case, the lexical items referring to the objects, “behavioral differences” and “a job,” evoke relatively specific concepts and images associated with them, which enables the hearer or the reader to interpret the meaning of “look for” accordingly on the basis of real world knowledge.

In contrast, in the following examples, the concepts evoked by the objects are more oblique, and therefore, the phrase “look for” takes on a more abstract meaning, with the physical meaning of vision being more backgrounded.

(123) In the long term, the Saudi government was forced to **look for** other solutions for the food security challenge, notably purchasing lands abroad and creating food stockpiles that could reduce the challenge in any future food crisis. (Middle East Quarterly (2015))

(124) "Those are areas that President Peña Nieto has signaled are important to him as well," the official added, "so we're going to continue to **look for** ways to work with them on that." (Christian Science Monitor (2015))

The objects in (123) and (124), “solutions” and “ways” are more abstract compared to those of (121) and (122). While the possible solutions are described in the subsequent sentences in (123), the subject’s method of “looking for” the object, “other solutions” greatly differs from that performed by the subject of either (121) or (122). There is less sense of the involvement of physical movement, not to speak of that of physical vision. The same applies to (124). A reader or a hearer who encounters these sentences would interpret “look for” in (123) and (124) differently from and more vaguely than one would for (121) or (122), because of the objects being more abstract, with even their availability being uncertain. Thus, as already presented in Section 4.2.3 in the discussion of “look at,” the nature of the object influences the nature of the verb, as well as that of the preposition. The more abstract or less specific the object is, the meaning of the verb or the verb phrase tends to shift farther away from the physical sense, both in the minds of the speaker/writer and of the hearer/reader.

4.3.4.2. “Look Up” (as a near synonym of “check and find”)

The verb “look” followed by the vertically-oriented adverb “up” is also used as a near synonym of “check and find,” in which case, the actual movement of the visual line and its concrete directionality, together with the movement and intensification of attention and the intensification of visual capacity, all of which are central to the concepts of the physical meaning of “look,” becomes more figurative. While all of these concepts are still present in the “look” use in the phrase “look up” in the following examples, “up” no longer serves to indicate the direction of “look”. Rather, it seems to evoke a sense of thoroughness and selection as in “pick up,” as opposed to the sense of completion as in “use up,” and “drink up” presented in Tyler and Evans (2003, p. 140).

An expression similar to “up” or “raise up” in Japanese can be used also add a sense of completion to the verb in Japanese by adding “-ageru” suffix to a verb as in “shi-ageru” (do up or finish up), “kaki-ageru” (write or draw up), “nui-ageru” (sew or stitch up), “ami-ageru” (weave up), “tsukuri-ageru” (make-up), “shirabe-ageru” (examine completely), all meaning to




Fig. 4-15

Meaning of “up” as in “pick up” or “look up”

complete the action indicated by the verb by accomplishing a certain task. While Tyler and Evans argues that this completion meaning derives from the kinesthetic experience of something, most likely a container, being physically filled means its filling has been completed, in Japanese, since many of the verbs that allow the addition of the suffix “-ageru” are related to handwork, my intuition on the association between “up” and completion in Japanese leans towards more of an image of raising up one’s hand away from one’s work, often with a sense of relief and pride, upon completing the task.

In the case of “look up,” however, this sense of completeness is not very evident, at least when it is used to mean to “check and find”. I am inclined to associate with the meaning of “picking up” one from many, in the way illustrated in Fig. 4-15, which has perhaps merged with the meaning of thoroughness implied by completeness. Being “up” means being more visible and standing out to attract more attention. Below are two examples of “look up” used to roughly mean “check and find”.

(125) ...and then I'll want to know what they say so if I can't understand it, like if I can't make it out, if I can't read it all from what they say I'll **look up** the words. I really enjoy doing that. # Craig said his use of digital tools for Spanish conversation benefited his language learning. (Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy (2015))

(126) If you **look up** the word "drive" in the dictionary, it says to guide, or to control or to direct. You drive a golf ball, you drive a car, you drive a hammer, a nail in the hammer. (CNN_KingWknd (2003))

In the above examples, the object is “the words” or “the word.” The phrase “look up” is often taught in this context in the English language classes in Japan. It tends to evoke the meaning of taking a dictionary and leafing through the pages to find the appropriate section for the alphabet and finding the word listed in the alphabetical order. This meaning, however, is limited. The phrase “look up” may be used to refer to any activity that involves finding some kind of information via some medium on the assumption that the particular piece of information is available in the chosen source. Therefore, the medium or the tool for finding the piece of information does not need to be presented as a list.

(127) My thoughts are racing. I have to **look up** this village now -- I wonder if it is even on the map -- and then figure out a way to get there. This is not my idea of a vacation. I don't speak Hindi, not even enough to buy vegetables for dinner or ask for directions. I have spent all my life outside of India, growing up, studying, and working in London, England. (Iowa Review (2015))

In (127), the subject is trying to find out about the village: first, its location on the map, then the means of transportation to get there. The probable medium the subject is using is the Internet. The subject will probably find out more about what the village is like online. This use of “look up” to mean finding out something online is becoming increasingly widespread

as is exemplified in the following sentences.

(128) Another student commented, "Every time I don't feel well, I **look up** symptoms and remedies online. "Once self-diagnosed, students reported following online advice without confirmation from a medical professional. One student said, "I found out I could put olive oil on my toothache. It beat going to the dentist. " (College Student Journal (2015))

(129) Siri handles simple tasks and can answer straightforward questions. It can **look up** the weather, direct you to a meeting or even help settle a bar bet. # 2 MICROSOFT CORTANA # Prior questions (and answers) help this Windows Phone assistant establish context. It also learns the nuances of a user's speech. (Popular Science (2015))

Both (128) and (129) connote locating some information on the internet. In the case of (129) the subject is not even a human. A wide variety of activities that involve finding a specific piece of information from the source is referred to by "look up". The source varies, and therefore, the way in which one's visual line, visual capacity, and attention are used also varies, which is reflected in the way different domains are profiled and backgrounded. Nevertheless, the core meaning of "look," plus the meaning of "thoroughness" and perhaps "choosing" evoked by "up," gives this phrase a shared, yet flexible meaning according to the context.

Another example of flexibility of the meanings of lexical items is demonstrated in the following sentence.

(130) How do you keep a friendship so strong after so many years? The two of us? Yeah. We have a lot in common. Go ahead. SUSIE-ESSMAN# Well, we speak every day. We do. SUSIE-ESSMAN# Every morning I **look up at** my texts, are you up? Sometimes it's... 6:30. SUSIE-ESSMAN#... 4:00 in the morning. (ABC (2015))

In the above example, "look up" and "look at" are merged. The "look up" indicates the activity of choosing the screen and letting the text unfold, with the meaning of "look at" the text also implied by adding "at" after it. While this use is not found in other contexts in COCA, native speakers will be able to associate the entire phrase with the meaning intended by the speaker of this particular phrase. This is probably a new meaning and use of "look up at" being applied to the activity involved in checking one's smartphones. Although it is not

an established expression, the fact that it is understood as such by native speakers is further evidence of the adaptability, flexibility, and the combinatory and protean nature of lexical items which enable meaning shifts and adjustments as required.

4.3.4.3. “Look Into” (as a near synonym of “examine”)

The phrase “look into” is used as a near synonym of “examine” as in the following sentence.

- (131) Did the person understand perfectly well what marriage is about? Did the person understand it enough to convey it to another person? That's something we need to **look into** in depth, to analyze how we can help. (America (2015))

As indicated by this sentence, the phrase also implies analyzing something, if necessary, to understand and reveal the facts.

Besides this idiomatic and figurative use of “look into,” the phrase is also used in the physical sense as in the following example.

- (132) Charlie hid under his yellow hood and **looked into** the hole where one of his gravediggers was shoveling. "How you doing, Joe?" "Just fine" Joe Carabino said from the bottom of the grave. (Good Housekeeping (2004))




Fig. 4-16

Proto-scene for “into” (adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003, p.199))

In (132), the phrase “look into” is used in the physical, or literal, sense, with “into” indicating the direction of the visual line. Tyler and Evans (2003) describes the proto-scene of “into” as a direction oriented towards the landmark which is bounded, as shown in Fig. 4-16.

While “into” may be used as an intended direction as described in Tyler and Evans, it is more likely that the preposition actually means one’s visual line actually reaching inside the

object in the case of the physical sense of “look into” something as in sentence (132). Below are additional example usages of “look into” in the physical sense with the implication of the visual line reaching inside the object.

(133) When I saw her for the first time, a very newborn child, and I **looked into** her eyes, I fell in love with her, believe me. I love her. (ABC (2013))

(134) If you were to **look into** a crystal ball, which you don't have, and see your life 10, 15 years from now, what would you think it would look like? (ABC_PrimeTime (2009))

In both (133) and (134), the subject is not only directing one’s visual line towards the object. Rather, one is directing the visual line and having it reach the interior of the object to obtain some kind of information from it. In the case of (133), the subject obtained some feeling within oneself that was strong enough to fall in love with the newborn. In (134), to “look into” a crystal ball commonly means to find information about the future as do the fortune tellers. A fortune teller does not only direct one’s sight towards a crystal ball to do the reading. It is what one is supposed to see inside the crystal ball that reveals the course of future events.

The phrase “look inside” has a different connotation from “look into” something. Consider the following sentences.

(135) A bell chimed and she went to the other side of the room and **looked inside** an aquarium, or terrarium.... She looked at the things growing inside and typed some numbers onto her clipboard. (Analog Science Fiction & Fact (2008))

(136) The judge gave Vanicelli permission to cut open the plastic bag and **look inside** the helmet. He saw two or three orange hairs inside. (Denver Post (2015))

As in (133) and (134), the subjects in (135) and (136) also have an intention to find something inside the object. However, there is a difference in the type of information to be obtained. In the case of (133) and (134), it is not something that can be directly understood or obtained. The subject needs to find something that is beyond what is physically visible. In contrast, in sentences (135) and (136), what the subject obtains from the object is concrete and physically visible, which indicates that to “look into” something even in the physical sense of the phrase requires more cognitive activities to obtain information that cannot be accessed merely by its appearance.




Fig. 4-17

Difference between “look into” and “look inside” in physical sense

Represented in Fig. 4-17 is a conceptual diagram showing the difference between “look into” and “look inside” an object. When used in the physical sense, both phrases imply the object as being a bounded entity as illustrated by the solid squares in the figure. In the case of “look inside,” what is to be obtained as information within the bounded entity is concrete and visible, the interior of the entity, as shown by the solid line circle. On the other hand, with regard to “look into,” the information is abstract and requires further interpretation by the subject to access what is to be obtained from the interior of the entity, as one would with a crystal ball.

This then makes the phrase “look into” more suitable as a near synonym of “examine” or “analyze,” which are considered to be the type of cognitive activity to find information that is not accessible through superficial observation of the object as in the following sentences.

(137) My lab researches variations in metabolism -- essentially, we **look into** why some people are genetically more prone than others to things like deficiency diseases. (Fantasy & Science Fiction (2015))

(138) We tend to browse "news" to find out what has happened in general and then select whatever interests us to **look into** further, and sometimes we check across various sources to obtain different perspectives. (Reading Improvement (2015))

Sentences (137) and (138) are examples of the common usage of the phrase “look into” to roughly mean to “examine”. It means to find information that is not readily available or obtainable without further effort to reveal what cannot be observed from the surface. While whether such effort will produce any results or not is uncertain. Nevertheless, the phrase implies that one will direct one’s attention and the visual line, in the figurative sense, to the intended object, which is part of the core meanings of the verb “look” as well. Finally, it must also be noted that when “look into” is used in this figurative sense, the object is unbounded, in principle, though the context does imply the general extent to which the activity to “look into” is expected to be conducted.




Fig. 4-18

“Look into” in figurative sense

Fig. 4-18 illustrates the meaning of the phrase “look into” when used in the figurative sense. The square represents the object which is unbounded as is expressed by the dotted line. Inside the relatively but not totally unbounded entity are multiple abstract entities that may or may not be revealed as a result of being “looked into”. The similarities and the differences between Fig. 4-17 and the diagram of “look into” in the physical sense illustrated in Fig. 4-16 above demonstrate the ways in which a certain lexical item shifts its meaning according to the context, yet maintains the basic concepts which it evokes.

4.4. Summary

In this chapter, various uses of “look” followed by a preposition, prepositions, or an adverb were examined. The close consideration of the most commonly used “look at” demonstrated that the meanings connoted by “look” as well as those by “at” shift according to the nature of the object in order to profile certain parameters of the described event, such as the degree of movement of the visual line, visual focus, attention, and timeframe. In most of the usages of “look at,” physical vision has some role to play in the process of carrying out the depicted activity, except for the cases where “look at” is used to mean directing one’s attention to the past or the future.

The use of “look” with prepositions other than “at” or with an adverb was considered in the second half of the chapter. The analyses focused particularly on prepositions and adverbs that indicate a spatial relationship between the entities and how the physical spatial relationships, which are represented in the form of the proto-scenes, are applied to abstract concepts and relationships, causing a shift in the profiled and backgrounded concepts. The attention and directional aspect of the verb “look” has been found to be present in all of the phrases considered, though the degree and the nature of their presence vary according to the context.

Unlike “look” without prepositions, the directional aspect is obviously more profiled in the uses of “look” followed by spatial prepositions or adverbs. Nevertheless, the core concepts of “look” remained in all contexts, either physical or abstract, along with those of prepositions and adverbs.

Notes

1. See Tyler and Evans (2003, p. 3-4) for details.
2. See ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY for details.
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=about
3. According to ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, to “look forward” to mean to

“anticipate” is witnessed around 1600 and “anticipate is pleasure,” from mid-19th century.

See below for more information.

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=look+forward+to

4. See Tyler and Evans (2003, pp. 135-145) for details.

Chapter 5 Semantic Analysis of Verb “See”

5. 1. Introduction

The verb “see” is often compared with “look,” particularly when teaching the students learning English as a second language, and the difference between the two is described through such criteria as, the absence/presence as well as the types of possible subsequent preposition (Gruber 1967)¹, unacceptability/acceptability of progressive form, and the permissibility of taking non-agentive or agentive subject, all of which are what may be considered grammatical “tests” that do not delve deep enough into the essence of the meanings conveyed by the two different visual perception verb.

In the sections to follow, the verb “see” is examined from a semantic point of view with an aim to lay out its lexical meanings and the types of domains it covers. These domains are assumed to be “neither totally free nor totally fixed” (Langacker 2013, p.39) and are shifted by being profiled or backgrounded according to the context. As in Chapter 3 and 4, which covered the semantics of the verb “look,” the objective here is to examine how the meanings of the verb “see” change, given the interrelatedness of human vision and cognition (Arnheim 1969, Fujita 2007, Changizi 2009).

Because “see” is used to denote a wide variety of human perceptive and cognitive activities, in this chapter the verb is considered first by focusing specifically on its meaning that refers to physical visual perception, then proceeds to cover the meanings that involve mental aspects. It must be noted, however, that these distinctions are made strictly for analytical purposes, since the different meanings of “see” are often convergent and overlap with one another, as will be presented in the following sections of this chapter.

5. 2. Verb “See” as Physical Perception

In this section, the verb “see” used to refer to physical visual perception is examined. In doing so, the verb is first considered from the viewpoint of its temporal characteristics, such as how long it takes to perform the act of “seeing” and how much time is required (and/or considered reasonable) for confirming that a person has completed the act of “seeing” something. This then is followed by the examination of meaning shifts according

to the tense of the verb.

It is assumed here that to “see” something through visual perception is an action, as opposed to a state, though, conventionally, the verb is classified as a so-called state/stative verb, as one finds in many of the English grammar books and websites.² This view heavily relies on the superficial grammatical usage constraints of the verb, the most popular being the inadmissibility of its use in progressive form and its incompatibility with adverbs that suggest the will power of the subject, such as “intentionally,” “carefully,” and “deliberately”. While the classification of perception verbs in general, including such as “see,” “hear,” and “smell” as being “stative verbs” may be partly understandable, particularly for the sake of pedagogical convenience, there is much to be debated when considered in terms of lexical semantics. For this reason, this chapter conducts a closer examination of the meaning of the verb “see” to demonstrate that the verb is not so much a state as an action.

5.2.1. Temporal Characteristics

As with any verbs, be it an action or a state, “see” cannot be carried out without a timeframe. As is presented in Vendler (1957, 1967) and later summarized in Mourelatos (1981), there are four major types of verbs that are classified according to their relationship to time and the type of task involved: ACTIVITIES (“run around,” “run all over,” “walk and walk,” “swim along,” “swim past,” “push a car”); ACCOMPLISHMENTS (“run a mile,” “paint a picture,” “grow up,” “recover from illness”); ACHIEVEMENTS (“recognize,” “find,” “win the race,” “start/stop/resume,” “be born/die”); and STATES (“desire,” “want,” “love,” “hate,” “dominate”) (Mourelatos 1981, pp. 191-192) Fig. 5-1 summarizes the temporal characteristics of each type of verb.

Activity verbs are those that can be continued incessantly over an extended, or theoretically infinite, period of time, while accomplishment verbs are those that can also last for a certain period of time but have a clear endpoint with an end result. In contrast, achievement verbs are verbs that are instantaneously completed and implies change in state, and states are roughly described as verbs that refer to atelic conditions with no definite beginning or end.




Fig. 5-1

Temporal characteristics of activities, accomplishments, achievements, and states

While Vendler (1957) falls short of thoroughly describing the different senses of “see,” he states that seeing can be an achievement since one can say “I have seen it” as soon as one says “I see it” and that “see,” at least in the sense of “spotting,” is an achievement which “connotes a unique and indivisible time instant” (p. 155). This observation provides us with a hint that “spotting” is one of the meanings evoked by “see” when used to refer to physical perception. If so, it is possible to extrapolate that “see” can be used to refer to the instantaneous occurrence of “spotting” as well as what follows after it.

Alm-Arvius (1993) elaborates on this idea and considers different time spans the verb “see” may indicate, by distinguishing between the meanings of ‘pick up’ (spot) and ‘interpret’ (make out), both of which are considered to be contained in the meaning expressed by the verb. She gives the following example to illustrate this point:

(1) I saw something, but I couldn’t make it out. It happened too quickly. (p.20)

In (1) the verb “saw” only refers to the “spotting” of an object without recognizing what it actually was. From this, she argues that “if somebody receives visual sensations without being able to tell what they signify, he or she may be said to see in a very general sense, ...”

(p. 20). She adds, however, that this is a marked case of the use of “see” and that there is “a common assumption about seeing, which is that a person who sees something will usually be able to give some sort of account of the content of his experience” (p. 20). This characteristic described by Alm-Arvius is well demonstrated in the following sentence which includes both “look” and “see”.

(2a) She looked but didn't see it. (Weblio)³

(2b) *She didn't look but she saw it.

As discussed in Chapter 3, “look,” in contrast to “see,” is a visual perception verb which tends to profile the meanings that indicate the movement and/or intensification of attention, visual line, and/or visual capacity. In other words, the sense of “making out” is not included in “look,” at least as its core meaning. For this reason, “saw” in (1) is considered exceptional, and “see” as well as “look” in (2a) is perfectly natural and acceptable, while (2b) is considered unacceptable under normal circumstances, provided that “look” refers strictly to physical visual perception. In other words, while one can “look” without “seeing,” one cannot be said to “have seen” something without having interpreted or recognized the object that has been captured through one's visual sensation. Thus, while “see” can be instantaneous under a very specific and unusual condition as in (1), it is normally assumed that “see” connotes an occurrence, or an event, that lasts for a certain time period, at least for the time span required for recognizing what is being seen.

The time span of to “see” varies depending on the context, as is discussed in Alm-Arvius (1993) in reference to an earlier study by Vendler (1967).

(3) I saw John in the street today.

(4) I saw him as soon as I entered the room.

(5) I saw the helicopter for more than a quarter of an hour.

(Alm-Arvius 1993, p. 21)

Sentence (3) is considered ambiguous in that “saw,” strictly referring to visual sensation and

excluding the meaning of “meeting,” can be interpreted as being either inceptive or durative. If inceptive, it would mean that John was merely “spotted” for an instant by the subject. If “saw” is interpreted as having a durative sense, then the subject could be capturing the sight of John for at least a few seconds, assuming that John was simply walking down the street as the sentence would be normally interpreted. In (4), however, the meaning shifts more towards inceptive connotation, since the phrase “as soon as” imposes a temporal constraint of the verb in the main clause. On the other hand, “saw” in (5) has a clearly delineated time span of “a quarter of an hour” as overtly expressed in the sentence. Such variation in the time span of “see” is particularly worth noting as regards the questionability of categorizing “see” as a stative verb, since a state is supposed to have no specific timeframe in which for it to occur.

In her discussion, Alms-Arvius (1993) questions the validity of assuming polysemy of “see” based on different time spans, with each being individually recorded in the lexicon as separate items. She writes, “Do we really feel that there is a crucial meaning difference between an understanding of (21) [i.e. sentence (3) above] which limits the time of the perception to one single instant, and a reading that involves a longer period than that required for merely glimpsing or spotting a well-known face?” (p. 21) (Note: “[i.e. sentence (3) above]” added) Rather, she argues, the supposed polysemy of “see” witnessed in the two possible readings of (3) are in fact a proof that the “inchoative aspect is not really incompatible with more durative qualities within the verb” (p. 21), by presenting the following examples to illustrate inceptive and durative meanings of “see” may be merged when there is enough context to allow such a reading.

(6) We both saw him up on the roof, even if Mary just spotted him before he jumped down, while I saw him the whole time.

(7) I saw her as soon as she came out of the house and up to the moment when she disappeared round the corner.

(pp. 21-22)

What is missing in the above analysis by Alm-Arvius is the consideration of the different time spans as being shifts in the concepts expressed and prompted by the verb.

The question is not whether “see” should be considered polysemous or not with regard to its time span, since allowing such a case of polysemy is not only counter-intuitive but also unreasonable to assume separate entries in the lexicon for different contexts in which the same verb is used. From the cognitive linguistic point of view, such an attempt to describe polysemy through the truth condition of a single sentence is deemed inadequate for understanding and setting forth the semantic nature of any lexical items. This is because when a word appears in different sentences (contexts), it often, if not always, expresses different meanings, and therefore, any lexical item can be inherently ambiguous. Lexical ambiguity is not a matter to be examined on the basis of the truth condition of a single sentence extracted from the context of the real world. Instead, it is a matter which requires close examination of different concepts, or domains, that are evoked when a lexical item is used in a particular context in the real world.

The semantics of visual perception verb “see” is ambiguous by nature, since, as Langacker (2013) has put it, “a lexical meaning resides in a particular way of accessing an open-ended body of knowledge pertaining to a certain type of entity.” (p. 39), and as Tyler and Evans (2003) has stated, “lexical entries, . . . , act merely as prompts for meaning construction, and that meaning construction is largely a conceptual process” (p. 3). Therefore, the verb “see” in sentence (4) denotes an instantaneous occurrence, while (5), denotes an event that has lasted for a quarter of an hour. Such varied interpretation of the verb “see” is possible, precisely because of this flexible nature of the word meaning which permits subtle adjustments according to the context.

In the case of sentence (3), “saw” could have been either instantaneous, if the subject had noticed and recognized John for a split second just as he was going into a bank, for example, or could have lasted for at least a few seconds or more, such as if the subject were standing still and John leisurely strolled down the street. It is interesting to note here, however, that the act of “seeing” in this sentence is highly unlikely to have lasted for hours or even for a quarter of an hour as it did in (5) because of the constraints that are put forth by our real world knowledge. We know that people do not visually “see” someone on the street for hours. It is difficult to imagine a situation where “seeing,” in the physical perception sense, can last over an extended period of time. This leads us to question the

meaning conveyed by “see” in sentence (5).

The most common interpretation of (5) would be the one in which the subject was doing something outdoors and every time that person looked up, the helicopter was found within the field of vision, and such a situation had lasted for “more than a quarter of an hour.” In other words, the subject’s act of “seeing” did not continue without interruptions throughout the specified time period. That is, the act of “seeing” did not go on “in time in homogeneous way; any part of the process is of the same nature as the whole” (Vendler 1957, p. 146). Another example to illustrate this point is as follows:

(8) I saw a deer family all morning today in my backyard.

As in (5), the subject did not “see” the deer family all throughout the entire morning. Rather, a natural interpretation would be that the subject was in the house and doing something, but whenever the person looked out the window, there were deer or fawns or both in the backyard. Therefore, again, the act of “seeing” in this case was also not continuous, but was iterative throughout the morning. In addition, “a deer family” may have presented itself in various combinations. Nevertheless, (8) makes perfect sense to native speakers and is interpreted as described above without any difficulty or trouble of disambiguation.

From the above observations, it can be said that to “see” in the physical sense of vision refers to an event that ranges from “spotting,” which is an instantaneous event that lasts for only a fraction of a second, to “recognizing” what or who the object is. The inceptive meaning of “spotting” always precedes the durative sense of “recognizing,” since “spotting” is a requirement for initiating the act of “seeing” and “recognizing”. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the durative meaning of “seeing” lasts for more than a few seconds if it is assumed to be continuous and incessant. When the adverbial of an utterance specifies a time period that lasts for more than a few seconds, “see” is interpreted as a series of iterative instances of “seeing,” in which case, the actual object that is seen on each instance may or may not be exactly the same as in the case of the deer family.

Thus, while the inceptive meaning of “see” connotes an achievement as do verbs

such as “start,” “stop,” or “find,” whose meaning implies instantaneous change of state, the durative meaning of “see” as in “I saw John in the street” is more like an activity since the act of “seeing,” though short-lasting, continues without an interruption. When the time frame associated with “see” is relatively long as in (5) and (8), “see” is interpreted as an iterative occurrence of the same activity over an extended period of time, with each instance of “seeing” lasting for no more than a few seconds.

5.2.2. “See” in Simple Present Tense

From the argument presented above, the verb “see” is rarely used in simple present tense, because of the limited duration of each instance of “seeing”. Leech (2004) sheds light on this point and claims that “see,” when used in simple present tense, has a special implication of excitement and melodramatic experience. He writes, “... the Present Tense: *I see a bird of paradise!* is a case of the event use of the Present (where see means much the same as *catch sight of*). Here, as elsewhere, the event or ‘instantaneous’ use is rather unusual and melodramatic” (p. 26).

Leech fails to recognize, however, that the inceptive and instantaneous meaning of “see” (“catch sight of” or “spot”) may be followed and merged with its durative meaning. In other words, while a person may utter the sentence “I see a bird of paradise!” at the very moment one has caught sight of such a bird with excitement in a melodramatic tone, it is important to note here that the utterer is not necessarily limiting the use of “see” only to mean an instantaneous and inceptive visual experience. In other words, though it may be subconscious, the utterer is not necessarily presuming the experience of “seeing” to last only for only a few seconds. This is what may be called the “durational ambiguity” of the verb “see,” which Alm-Arvius (1993) has tried to elucidate by presenting the sentence such as (6) and (7) above. Nevertheless, her argument allows for only two alternatives, either inceptive or durative. The choice is binary. Even with the sentences such as (6) and (7), her argument focuses on whether the two readings of “see” constitute separate entries in the lexicon or not, though she does state that “the inchoative aspect is not really incompatible with more durative qualities within the verb” (p.21).

In the present study, on the other hand, the inceptive “spotting” sense and the

durative “recognizing” sense of the verb “see” are not regarded as mutually exclusive. Both are prompted by the use of the verb “see,” though to different degrees depending on the context. Consider the following utterance:

(9) I see a bird of paradise! Come here and see it before it flies away!

In (9), when the speaker utters the first half of the utterance, there is indeed a tone of excitement, but it does not make sense to say this sentence if the speaker has caught sight of the bird for only a split second, since that split second would have already passed by the time this sentence is uttered. Therefore, it is physically impossible to use “see” in simple present tense to express a purely inchoative experience of here and now, and therefore, according to Leech (2004), on the rare occasions where the expression is used, it is considered to add an unusual and melodramatic tone to it. Nevertheless, what remains is the issue of why the utterer has chosen to say “I see a bird of paradise!” if one’s intention is to report with excitement the fact that one has caught sight of the bird. If, as Leech implies, the inceptive meaning of “see” is a close equivalent of “catch sight of” (p. 26), then the utterer must have opted to say “I saw a bird of paradise!” or “I’ve seen a bird of paradise!” instead, unless, of course, the utterer intentionally had chosen to add some melodramatic effect to the utterance.

Moreover, if “see” in the first sentence of utterance (9) only refers to the inceptive meaning, then the second sentence would not make any sense at all. The utterer did not say the first sentence only to report one’s instantaneous experience. The acceptability of it being followed by the second sentence indicates that one has expected the experience of “seeing” to last for at least a few seconds. Therefore, the duration of the verb “see” in the sentence “I see a bird of paradise!” is flexible depending on the context and how the speaker, as well as the hearer, interprets it.

Even when “see” is used to actually mean mere “spotting,” or “catching sight of” something as in sentence (1), it still requires time, since, unlike the achievement verb “find,” to perceive something involves more than just a change of state. It therefore follows that “see” in simple present tense must imply both inceptive and durative meaning

by nature. It is impossible to isolate one from the other. The first sentence in (9), the speaker is reporting that one has “caught sight of” the bird, that one is still seeing it, and that he is expecting to see it for some time longer, all in a single “see.” There is no need for disambiguation of the sort suggested by Alm-Arvius (1993), since all phases of “seeing” is simultaneously expressed when “see” is used in simple form, may it be present or past.

This durational ambiguity of the verb “see” discussed so far are what makes this verb peculiar when considered under the framework of verb classification initially proposed by Vendler (1957, 1967). In one sense, the verb behaves like an achievement verb such as “find”. It is possible to say “I’ve seen it,” as soon as one “sees” something, just as one can say “I’ve found it,” as soon as one “finds” something. On the other hand, it differs from achievement verbs in that “seeing” may continue for more than a mere instant and does not refer merely to the change of state as other achievement verbs such as “find,” “finish,” and “start” do. Moreover, although “see” has the implication of an activity in its durative meaning, its duration normally does not last much longer than a few seconds. This differentiates the verb from other activity verbs such as “run around” or “sleep,” for instance, which can go on constantly for a significant time period. Finally, “see” may be also considered as an accomplishment verb, if there is a clear sense of task involved in the context. (See 5.2.3)

With regard to the usage of tense for the verb “see,” present tense is permissible unlike the achievement verbs. When someone finds something, one is likely to say, “I found it!”, not “I find it!”. The fact that “see” can be used in simple present tense as in (9) demonstrates its durative nature, though, unlike the activity verbs, “see” is normally not used in the progressive form.

In Japanese, a distinction is made between a cursory “seeing” of a person on the street and an emotionally uplifting visual encounter with a precious bird. In the case of the former, probably the most natural utterance would be the one using “mikakeru” (rough equivalent of “just happen to see,” “catch sight of”) instead of “mieru” (rough equivalent of “see”).

(10) Jon o machi de mikaketa. (I just happened to see John on the street.)

(11) ?Gokurakucho o mikaketa! (I just happened to see a bird of paradise!)

The acceptability of sentence (11) with the melodramatic interpretation of the experience is questionable, unless the utterer has an intention to keep on looking for the bird and this experience of having a glimpse of it is regarded as an auspicious sign. This is because the verb “mikakeru” implies short and more or less casual visual recognition of the object, with not much experiential value to speak of. More appropriate way to express (11) would be:

(12) Gokurakucho ga mieru (or mieta)! (I see (saw) a bird of paradise!)

In (12), either “mieru” (present tense) or “mieta” (past tense) may be used in Japanese, with the difference depending on whether the speaker places more weight on one’s current experience or one’s experience of having seen the bird.

Although not explicitly mentioned in Leech (2004), “see” in the simple present tense “see” and in the simple past tense “saw” have a definite difference in meaning as well as in usage. The simple present and simple past tenses of all activity verbs imply different timeframes: the former refers to habitual or iterative occurrence of the action, while the latter delineates a single specific instance of the occurrence.

(13) I go to Himeji Castle.

(14) I went to Himeji Castle.

Anyone who hears sentence (13) would interpret it as the speaker having a habitual pattern of visiting the castle, in which the activity of “going” has been probably taking place for some time, starting at some indefinite but reasonably close point in time and still continuing into the future. In this sense, the exact timeframe of (13) remains unclear without any temporal adverbials added to it. We only know that the activity is being repeated at some unspecified interval. On the other hand, on hearing (14), the hearer’s normal understanding would be that the speaker had visited the castle once sometime in the past. It is highly unlikely that (14) would be understood as some repetitive occurrence, though

such an interpretation may be possible if there is a situation where the speaker is known for going to the castle on a regular basis, on business, for instance. If the speaker is an engineer in charge of preserving the castle, and if a part of the speaker's assignment was to go check it from time to time, (14) could mean that he had been assigned to visit the facility repetitively for a certain period of time in the past, but such would be a rather unusual understanding of this sentence.

The question then is whether similar interpretations of simple present and past also apply to verb "see" as well. For the purpose of comparison, consider the following sentence:

(15) I see Himeji Castle.

The most likely intuitive interpretation of (15) with no temporal adverbials would be the one that the speaker is visually detecting the castle as he or she utters this sentence. In other words, the act of "seeing" is simultaneous with the act of uttering, whereas in the case of (13), with the verb "go," the same does not hold. The verb "see," when used in the simple present tense, connotes an instance of physical perception, directing the hearer to "here and now" rather than to an indefinite timeframe and regularity within it, as does the verb "go".

When a temporal adverbial is added, as in (16) and (17) below, "seeing" may be interpreted as being regular or habitual. Its implication of "here and now" is cancelled by the context in which it appears.

(16) I go to Himeji Castle every morning.

(17) I see Himeji Castle every morning.

In these sentences, there is no longer the difference previously observed in temporal reference of "go" and "see". Sentence (17) is perfectly grammatical as are (15) and (16). This suggests that the usual grammatical categorization, such as simple present, based on the conjugational "form" of a verb, has more flexibility than is normally assumed, at least with respect to the verb "see". The verb in the same simple present "form" can connote either

“here and now” or iterative occurrence of “seeing” over a certain period of time. The same also applies to the Japanese equivalent of “see,” which is “mieru”:

(18) Himeji-jo ga mieru. ((I) see Himeji Castle.)

(19) Mai-asa Himeji-jo ga mieru. (Every morning, (I) see Himeji Castle.)

On hearing (18), a native Japanese speaker will assume that the castle is within the visual field of the utterer at that very moment, unless otherwise qualified by some additional linguistic context or external circumstances. Sentence (19), however, is also perfectly acceptable and understandable. The hearer’s interpretation of the timeframe of “mieru” in (19) shifts from the very moment of the utterance to “every morning” when the act of seeing is being repeated.

From the above observations, there are at least four characteristics that are worth noting about the simple present tense of the verb “see”. First, “see” is not simply a state with no definite point of inception or endpoint, otherwise, the use of an utterance such as “I see a bird of paradise!” to report one’s current experience would not be possible. Second, instead of regarding inceptive and durative meaning of “see” as a semantic ambiguity, it is more reasonable to assume that “see” inherently encompasses both the inceptive and durative meaning, and that one is profiled more than the other depending on the context. Third, unlike so-called achievement verbs, “see” is not merely an instantaneous change in state, but involves duration. Fourth, the “here and now” orientation of the simple present “see” shifts to imply iterative meaning, only when certain adverbials are added.

5.2.3. “See” in Simple Past Tense

As we all know from experience, when an “event” takes place and becomes devoid of immediate current relevance, it is encapsulated in a form of memory. In English, as is observed in Vendler (1957) and Rothstein (2004), there is a group of verbs, which are classified as accomplishment verbs, whose depiction of an event in the past progressive form does not imply the same event depicted in the simple past tense. This makes them different from activity verbs whose use in the past progressive, as in “John was running in the park,”

always implies “John ran in the park”. Consider the following sentences:

(20) He was building a house.

(21) He built a house.

Adapted from Rothstein (2004, p. 6)

Sentence (20) and (21) are inherently different in that while (20) only focuses on the activity itself, (21) denotes that the subject has completed making a house through his action of building. The house now exists as a result of his action. The mere fact that “he was building a house” does not necessarily mean that he has completed the task, therefore, (20) does not necessarily imply (21). Following are additional examples to illustrate this difference based on discussions given in Hay, Kennedy, and Levin (1999).

(22) He was building a house, but the house was not built.

(23) *He built a house, but the house was not built.

(24) He was building a house for 30 days/*in 30 days.

(25) He built a house in 30 days/*for 30 days.

The above sentences suggest that what is assumed to be an accomplishment verb fluctuates in its meaning depending on tense and aspect. The verb “build” in past progressive as in (22) and (24) is more like an activity verb since it does not require a completion of the task and is compatible with for-temporal adverbial, as do verbs such as “run,” while, when used in simple past tense as in (23) and (25), the verb behaves differently from activity verbs and requires a detectable result, the existence of a house in the case above, and the delineated timeframe expressed by the in-adverbial. Although not explicitly discussed in literature so far, this observation indicates that tense and aspect in which a verb is used affect the semantics of the verb itself, since the speaker using the verb, as well as the listener, is profiling different semantic domains according to tense and aspect. In the case of the verb “build,” the sense of being ongoing is profiled when used in the past progressive aspect, but the sense of completion is profiled when in the simple past tense.

In the case of activity verbs, many of which belongs to the family of so-called intransitive verbs without an object, the durational implications differ from those of accomplishment.

(26) *He was running in the playground, but he didn't run.

(27) *He ran in the playground, but he didn't run.

(28) He was running in the playground for 30 minutes/*in 30 minutes.

(29a) He ran in the playground for 30 minutes/*in 30 minutes.

(29b) He ran the playground *for 30 minutes/in 30 minutes.

As seen from the sentences (26) ~ (29), the activity verb “run” in the above usages indicate that what is being profiled is the act of “running” itself with no additional implication of there being a task to be completed. Therefore, cancellation of the first half of the sentence in (26) and (27) does not hold. If “he was running,” or “he ran,” that means “he did run” regardless of what the consequence may have been. Likewise, since activity verbs do not require a definite endpoint, the in-adverbial in (28) which indicates the timeframe required for a completion of a task accomplished by the action is not compatible, while the for-adverbial in (29a) which merely refers to the duration with no specific task to be completed is. On the other hand, when “run” used in the context with a task to be accomplished, as in (29b), with “ran the playground” meaning “one lap around the playground,” the verb connotes an accomplishment and is compatible with in-adverbial.

In contrast, achievement verbs, such as “find,” “reach,” “start” “...capture either the inception or the climax of an act; they can be dated, or they can be indefinitely placed within a temporal stretch, but they cannot in themselves occur OVER or THROUGHOUT a temporal stretch” (Mourelatos 1981, p. 192). This means that while one can say, “I found the book at 6 o'clock/3minutes ago/last year,” one cannot say “I found the book *for 50 minutes/*in five minutes/*throughout the morning”. Vendler (1957, p.147) explains why the seemingly acceptable sentence such as “I found the book in five minutes” is considered unacceptable according to the aforementioned criterion. He says that although the compatibility with the phrase “in five minutes” may make “found” seem like an

accomplishment verb, with a little reflection, it is apparent that it was the act of “looking for” the book that took five minutes, not that of “finding” per se. It may have taken five minutes to find something, but that does not mean “finding” took place for five minutes.

To summarize the discussions so far, accomplishment verbs in simple past tense imply that the action led to the production of certain results or the completion of a task and that the action required a specific timespan with an endpoint, which may be expressed by in-temporal adverbials. They are not, however, compatible with for-temporal adverbials as are the activity verbs, since for-temporal adverbials imply that the activity was continued either throughout or iteratively within the given timeframe with no specific results or tasks being completed. On the other hand, achievement verbs are verbs whose execution requires only an instant. They cannot be stretched over a period of time, and therefore, cannot be modified by either in-temporal or for-temporal adverbials.

In the sentences below, the above observations are applied to the simple past tense of verb “see”:

(30) He saw a deer *for thirty minutes/*in thirty minutes.

(31) He saw a deer for a (few) second/?*in a second.

As shown in (30a), (30b), and (31), one characteristic that differentiates “see” from either activity, achievement, or accomplishment verbs lies in the fact that its compatibility with for-adverbials depends on the length of the specified duration, provided that ‘seeing’ is not interpreted as iterative as it is discussed earlier in this chapter. Seeing a deer “for a second” or “for a few seconds” makes sense, but “for 30 minutes” sounds awkward, because our real world knowledge tells us that seeing something in a purely physical sense (i.e. excluding the use of “see” as in “see a movie”) for more than a few seconds is not possible.

What is peculiar about the verb “see” then is that it is very difficult to conceive a single instance of “seeing” continuing for more than just a couple of seconds. Yet, it is also true that it does require some time for one to “see” things, a characteristic it shares with activity and accomplishment verbs, but not with achievement verbs. Furthermore, “see” is nevertheless very different from accomplishment verbs since the object of “seeing” remains

unaffected, at least in a physical sense, so no tangible or detectable results can be expected from the act of “seeing.” There is no task involved in seeing something, except for the rare cases where being able to “see” something is a task in itself as in the Magic Eye puzzles⁴ where you are asked to “see” a 3D image out of a 2D image by adjusting your focus, in which case, you can say “He saw the 3D image in less than 5 seconds”. The following sentence suggests that this verb behaves in the same way as accomplishment verbs such as “build” in (23) with respect to its entailment:

(32)*He saw a deer but the deer was not seen.

Therefore, while the outcome of “seeing” is not as evident as it is in the case of “building,” the verb does entail the object having been subjected to the action of “seeing”.

Table 5-1 summarizes the characteristics of different types of verbs and the peculiarity of the verb “see”. In the progressive and simple present column on the left, “see” is different from either achievement or stative verbs in its use of simple present. Achievement verbs do not allow the use of present simple tense when the event is happening right at that moment, because it refers to an instantaneous change of state with no timeframe in which to take place. In the case of stative verbs, on the other hand, the meaning of the sentence “I know the truth right now!” is not the same as “I see a deer right now!”, since the former does not mean that the subject is experiencing the event of “knowing” at that very moment. Vender (1957) argues, the sentence like “Now I know it!” used in the insight sense of knowing is more like an achievement verb (p. 153), by which he means that the subject has changed one’s state of not knowing to that of knowing at one instantaneous point in time. In contrast, as discussed earlier, with the sentence “I see a deer right now!”, the subject is reporting the ongoing experience that is taking place at the moment of the utterance.

This also applies to the entailment of the sentences. The relationship between “I know the truth” and “I have known the truth” is not the same as “I see a deer” and “I have seen a deer,” since “I know the truth” is not an event but a state that has been lasting for an indefinite time. If a person “knows” the truth now, it entails that one has “known” it since some indefinite point in the past. On the other hand, when “I see a deer” is uttered, the

speaker is reporting a new experience. Before “seeing the deer,” one has not yet “seen” it. So unlike in the case of “know,” “I see a deer” entailing “I have seen a deer” implies a newly added experience by the speaker.

	Progressive and Simple Present	Entailment	In- and For Adverbials
Activity verbs	I am/was running. I run.	I was running. => I ran	I ran for 30 minutes. *in 30 minutes
Accomplishment verbs	I am/was building a house. I build a house	I was building a house. ≠> I have built a house. ≠>A house was built (by me).	I built a house in 30 days. *for 30 days
Achievement verbs	*I am/was finding the book. *I find a book right now!	NOT APPLICABLE	I found the book *in 30 minutes *for 30 minutes
States	*I am knowing the truth. ?I know the truth right this moment!	I know the truth. ≠> I have known the truth. ≠>?The truth was known by/to me.	I knew the truth *in a few seconds *for a few seconds I knew the truth *in 30 minutes *for 30 minutes
SEE	*I am seeing a deer. I see a deer right this moment!	I see a deer => I have seen a deer. I saw a deer. => A deer was seen by me	I saw a deer ?*in a few seconds for a few seconds I saw a deer * in 30 minutes *for 30 minutes

Table 5-1

Comparison of permissible tense and aspect of different types of verbs and “see”

Likewise, “The truth was known by/to me” sounds awkward since there is no definite point at which the truth was known to the subject. The subject may have “realized” or “become aware of” the truth at some point, but not “known” it at an exact specified point in time. This again contrasts with “A deer was seen (by me)” which is considered a normal entailment of “I saw a deer”. Finally, the permissibility of in- and for-adverbials summarized in the fourth column, as discussed above, also presents the peculiarity of “see” allowing concurrence with the for-adverbial only if the designated time period is reasonably a short one. Thus, the English visual perception verb “see” in simple past tense behaves

like either an activity, achievement, or accomplishment verb, or a stative verb, all depending on the context in which it is used, though the verb is generally considered to be a stative verb.

Some of the widely-accepted grammatical tests that are used to distinguish describe “see” in relation to other verbs is English-specific and do not necessarily apply to Japanese. Presented below are the usages of “mieru,” a rough equivalent of “see” in Japanese. (In order to maintain naturalness of the sentences, subjects in (33) and (35) are omitted, which is considered as the unmarked usage of the verb “mieru” in Japanese)

(33) Jon ga mieta. ((I) saw John.)

(34) *Jon ga mierareta. (John was seen.)

(35) Jon ga mieteiru/mieteita. ((I) am/was seeing John.)

Unlike its English counterpart, Japanese “mieru” does not allow usage in passive form, so (34) is unacceptable. On the other hand, in Japanese, it is perfectly natural to use the word in progressive form as in (35). While a detailed consideration of semantic parallelism between English “see” and Japanese “mieru” is necessary before drawing any significant conclusion, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the absence of passive form and the acceptability of progressive usage of Japanese “mieru” shown above demonstrate the potential variability of tense and aspect of visual perception verbs depending on the language. In English, when “someone saw something,” it entails that “something was seen by someone,” though no results of being seen may be detectable on the object that has been “seen”. While the same entailment does not apply to “mieru,” it does to “miru,” a rough equivalent of “look”. The Japanese sentences (36) and (37) are therefore perfectly grammatical.

(36) Jon o mita. ((I) looked at John.)

(37) Jon wa mirareta. (John was looked at.)

What also differentiates between English and Japanese are the domains covered by the

passive form. “In Japanese passive voice, the subject often suffers from the action expressed by the passive verb.” (McClain 1981, p. 43), so sentence (37) also implies that being looked at was not a pleasant experience for John. There is a sense of regret or resentment of having been seen or looked at by someone, though no such tone is implied by the English equivalent.

Table 5-2 is a summary of relationships between English “see” and Japanese “mieru” and “miru”. Each of the sentences in “mieru” and “miru” rows are rough translations of the corresponding “see” sentences in the top row. As in English, the phrase “su-byo de” meaning “in a few seconds,” as opposed to “su-byo kan” meaning “for a few seconds” in the rightmost column makes sense only if there is a sense of task involved in “seeing” a deer as in the case of the Magic Eye puzzle mentioned earlier.

	Progressive Simple Present	Entailment	In- and For Adverbials
SEE	*I am seeing a deer. I see a deer right this moment!	I see a deer => I have seen a deer. I saw a deer. => A deer was seen by me.	I saw a deer *in a few seconds. for a few seconds. I saw a deer *in 30 minutes *for 30 minutes.
mieru	Shika ga mieteiru. Ima kono shunkan, shika ga mieru!	Shika ga mieru. => Shika ga mieta. Shika ga mieta =>*Shika ga mierareta	*Su-byo de Su-byo kan shika ga mieta. *30-pun de 30-pun-kan shika ga mieta.
miru	Shika wo miteiru. *Ima kono shunkan, shika wo miru!	*Shika wo miru. =>Shika wo mita. Shika wo mita. Shika wa mi-rareta.	Su-byo de Su-byo-kan shika wo mita. 30-pun de 30-pun-kan shika wo mita.

Table 5-2

Comparison of English “see” and Japanese “mieru” and “miru”

5.3. Telicity

Telicity is a parameter, or a concept, that helps to classify verbs according to the nature

or the content of the “event” described by a verb. Crudely defined, an event may be telic or atelic depending on whether there is an endpoint to the process of the event. The idea originally goes back to Aristotle.

...the aspectual distinction between “kinesis” (movements) and “energia” (actualities), both in the *Metaphysics* 1048 and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1074, naturally reads as a characterization of kinds of actions, rather than expressions. He contrasts actions which are complete in themselves (energia) and classified as atelic, such as seeing and thinking and being happy (roughly what we call states and activities), and actions which are inherently incomplete and which are directed towards an end, such as building a house or learning a poem, which we call accomplishments and classify as telic. (Rothstein 2004, p. 2)

In applying this concept to the examination of verbs, it is particularly important to understand that telicity or atelicity is not a feature of a single lexical item. It is rather fruitless to discuss whether a particular verb is telic or atelic, precisely because it is a feature that emerges as an event as a whole.

I intend to further examine “see” as a physical perception verb, by identifying its characteristics from the telic/atelic point of view and related issues, present its protean and flexible nature of its telicity, and reconsider the appropriateness of classifying “see” as a stative verb for adequately capturing the semantic domains implied by this visual perception verb.

5.3.1 Telicity by Subsequent NP and Other Phrases

This section examines how the meaning of “see” changes according to the type of noun phrase (NP) that follows it. Instead of using words such as a “predicate,” in the following sections I restrict the terminology to NP and Adverbial, with NP referring to the object of the verb, and Adverbial, to the time or locational specifications, both of which often, but not always, take the form of prepositional phrase (PP).

Rothstein (2004) writes:

The four-way classification into **states**, **activities**, **achievements** and **accomplishments**. Crudely, states are non-dynamic situations, such as be happy, or believe; activities are open-ended processes, such as run; achievements are near-instantaneous events which are over as soon as they have begun, such as notice; and

accomplishment are processes which have a natural endpoint, such as read the book.
(p.6)

The classification closely resembles that of Vendler (1957, 1967), further simplified with a greater and clearer focus on the temporal characteristics of the verb types. Table 5-3 summarizes the process and telic/atelic nature of respective types of verbs.

states	not process	atelic (no inception, no endpoint)
activities	process	atelic (no inception, no endpoint)
achievements	not process	telic (instantaneous)
accomplishments	process	telic (have an endpoint)

Table 5-3
Summary of verb characteristics: Process and Telicity

Using this framework, the verb “see” is further explored in the sections to follow, after going through certain presuppositions that require clarification prior to more detailed considerations. First of all, the temporal characteristics, including telicity and aspect of many verbs are highly dependent on the type of NP that follows. The utterer, as well as the hearer, instantaneously profiles certain domains related to the timespan of the given event as one utters or hears a sentence. This profiling, however, is not based on the inherent meaning of the head verb itself. Rather, it is usage-based and context-dependent, as is discussed in Rothstein (2004) which refers to Verykyul (1972, 1993) and gives the following examples:

(38) a. John discovered the secret room in a few weeks.

b. Children have been discovering that secret room for generations.

(Rothstein 2004, p.3)

Sentence (38a) and (38b) are structurally similar [Subj + V + NP + adverbial], yet, the timespan covered by the same verb “discover,” which is supposedly an achievement verb like “find,” behaves differently in (38a) and (38b). The verb “discover” in (38a) is telic

with an obvious accomplishment (i.e. having discovered the secret room), while that in (38b) is atelic with no definitive endpoint, though there is a task which is the same as that in (38a) is involved. In (38b) the act of “discovering” has been continuing “for generations” and may continue “for generations” to come. This difference in interpretation of “discover” is also indicated by the simple past tense of “discover” in (38a) and the present perfect progressive in (38b), which, in turn, is additionally reinforced by the in-adverbial in (38a) and the for-adverbial in (38b).

The above observation is an example which illustrates that telicity is not a function of the fixed semantic nature of the verb “discover” itself, but of the overall, or Gestalt, description of the event as a whole. Interestingly, while Verykuhl (1972, 1993), as well as Rothstein (2004), observe language not by focusing on human cognition, but from the point of view of linguistic philosophy, their observations, as well as their proposals, are similar to the claims presented in cognitive linguistic usage-based theories (Evans 2013, Langacker 1987, 2013, Evans 2013, Yamanashi 2000, 2004, 2012). The meaning of a word flexibly adapts to linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, which also suggests adaptability in the way humans perceive and verbalize external as well as internal events.

Secondly, as suggested in the earlier sections of this chapter, it is misleading to naively classify “see” as a stative verb. Conventionally, the verb “see” has been regarded as atelic, meaning that it is a state, not an event with an inception and endpoint. It is, however, counter-intuitive to assume “seeing” as a state, as has been demonstrated in a number of examples so far. As mentioned earlier, the use of the verb “see” in simple present is not very common and presumed to have a melodramatic nuance in English. (Leech 2004, p. 26) This characteristic applies particularly to the cases where the object (NP) of the verb is something immobile, or at least when its mobility is not focused, or profiled, in the sentence, as in the sentence “I see a bird of paradise!”. The bird could have been perching on a branch being still or it could have been flying freely in the vast sky to its heart’s content. The mobility or immobility of the bird, however, was not an interest of the utterer of the sentence. The subject is focusing on and reporting the existence of the bird in one’s field of vision. Nevertheless, “seeing” is not an instantaneous event and must have lasted at least as long as the bird had been in the field of vision.

If, on the other hand, the mobility of the bird is more in focus, the sentence that is uttered would be:

(39) I see a bird of paradise flying!

Returning to the issue of telicity, the timespan of “see” in sentence (39) with the progressive “flying” is more dependent on the timespan of “flying” of the bird than that of the visual perception of the subject. As it is discussed in 5.2.1, the verb “see” has an inception and involves a process, but the duration of the process is limited. One cannot continue to “see” something immobile usually for more than a few seconds. So verb is telic, in this sense, and therefore, contradicts the definition of it being a “state,” which is atelic. The verb “see” has an endpoint, though it is not as clear as that of other types of telic verbs. When (39) is further prolonged, the possible duration of “seeing” also expands.

(40) I see a bird of paradise flying gracefully from one end of the horizon to the other!

A natural interpretation of “see” in (40) would be an act which has been undertaken in a leisurely matter, most likely lasting longer than only a few seconds. Yet, “seeing” is still understood as being telic, that is, as an action that has been completed shortly after this sentence was uttered. What makes “see” more complicated in this respect is that the endpoint is internally recognized by the person who does the “seeing.” Even when the verb is used in the simple present tense as in the examples above, and though there are no observable consequence or result, perception itself is best described as an accomplishment when considered from the doer’s, or the subject’s, point of view. The doer of “seeing” accomplishes the task of “seeing” when one internalizes and interprets what one has captured with one’s visual capacity. It is a cognitive task that has been accomplished, and this task, by nature, does not take no more than a fraction of a second, but it nevertheless requires time.

5.3.2. Telicity of “See” and Tense/Aspect

Although not explicitly discussed in the literature, I propose that a verb takes on different characteristics depending on whether it is used in the simple present or the past tense, as presented in 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. There seems to be a tendency to attempt to classify verbs in the form of base infinitives, abstracted from any contexts. While such an approach may be useful in understanding the essence of the meaning of a verb, it fails to capture how we humans understand our internal and external worlds and how we choose to express them linguistically. In particular, tense and aspect also affect the meaning shifts of the verbs. For example, while “John is running in the park” is considered as a process or activity that is atelic with no endpoint, “John ran in the park” is telic with an endpoint attached because of the very fact that the event is now over. In other words, telicity is a must when an activity is expressed in the simple past tense. Such being the case, the claim that an activity verb is atelic does not fully capture how the humans cognitively process the usage-based meanings of the expressions. Recognizing this flexibility and adaptability of the verb meanings according to tense and aspect is particularly important in understanding the semantic shifts observed in “see” in the simple present and past tenses. Considered following examples.

- (41) *I see a light flash at the end of the street.
- (42) I see a light flashing at the end of the street.
- (43) I saw a light flash at the end of the street.
- (44) I saw a light flashing at the end of the street.

To examine the above sentences, it is necessary to identify the temporal characteristics of the verb “flash”. Understandably, “flashing” involves at least one instance of a light being turned on and off at a relatively fast speed, therefore, it is safe to say that it is telic in this sense. A single instance of a “flash” is the minimum unit. As it is discussed in 4.2.1., the unacceptability of (41) as opposed to (42) again largely lies in the lack of durational correspondence among the acts of “flashing,” “seeing,” and “uttering”. Since a flash of light lasts shorter than the time required for making this utterance, which is in the present tense, it is physically impossible to make this utterance in a meaningful way, if the object of

verb “see” refers to a single instance of a flash. On the other hand, when the event, a flash of light, is encapsulated as a completed event of the past, there is no longer the need for the durational correspondence, and therefore, (43) is a perfectly natural sentence. This utterance can be made without any durational constraints, since the event has already taken place and its duration being shorter than that required for completing the utterance is no longer an issue.

In the case of (42) and (44), the light is “flashing,” which adds an iterative implication to the verb “flash,” meaning that the light turned on and off not once but consecutively in a series. Both the simple past and the simple present tense of “see” is compatible with this type of event, because the time required for completing the utterance do not exceed the duration of the event “flashing,” which is an ongoing and iterative process implied by the ing-form of the verb.

Finally, a comparison between (43) and (44) suggests that while what was seen in (43) was a single instance of a “flash,” in (44) it may be rightly assumed that the “flashing” had continuing iteratively. This, in turn, means that the duration of “seeing” in these sentences differed accordingly. The verb “saw” in (43) is likely to have been instantaneous, while that in (44) lasted longer. In (44) the subject ‘saw” the light “flash” more than once, most likely for at least several times, which necessarily entails that the timespan for such an experience must have been longer than seeing a single “flash”.

If the verb describing the object is considered an activity, which is atelic (continuous without interruption), the verb “see” demonstrates a shift in its meaning along with it.

(45) I saw a deer run in our backyard.

(46) I saw a deer running in our backyard.

There is a difference in meaning between (45) and (46), but interestingly, the difference is not limited to the duration of “seeing” as in that between (43) and (44). Understandably, as in (43) and (44), a natural interpretation of “saw” in (45) is more instantaneous than that in (46). In order for one to see a deer “running,” as in (46), one must be directing his or her visual attention to the event for at least a few seconds. In (45) the verb is in the form of

bare infinitive “run” instead of “running”. Here, the verb “saw” shifts more towards its inceptive meaning of “spotting,” since the moment a person “sees” a deer “run,” the person can be said to “have seen” it, while the same does not apply to (46) with “running”.

Furthermore, when “saw” is used in the sentence with a verb in bare infinitive as in (45), there is some unexpectedness added to its meaning. Below are some examples of COCA that give further clues to this observation.

- (47) And the bottle broke and the clothing was all wet and the bread was all soaked; and that was the first time I ever **saw her cry** because she was responsible for us,...(NPR_Morning (2006))
- (48) It's a brutal world out there for young people, for everybody. Willow had one moment. The Young Turks are Willow's idol. They have a TV show online. They're like a really powerful group of young writers, hosts, and political commentators. Willow loves the Young Turks, and that was the only moment I **saw her cry**. Other than that, she's really well-adjusted with it. (Esquire (2015))
- (49) He wrote about his mother screaming when they couldn't find his father, and their joy when they **saw him run** toward them covered with dust. (USA Today (2010))

The verb “saw” in these examples, with its meaning shifting towards the inceptive sense, also profiles a nuance of unexpectedness as may be inferred from expressions such as “the first time,” “the only moment,” and “the joy”.

In Japanese, these sentences would be expressed with “mita” (rough equivalent of “looked at”) rather than “mieta” (rough equivalent of “saw”), irrespective of the verb describing the object being bare infinitive or progressive in form. This might be related to “mieta” being more dependent on the presupposed visibility of the object and therefore not suitable for describing the first time or unexpected experience. While this is only an intuitive conjecture by the author that requires further examination, the following Japanese sentences seem to illustrate that the expression “hajimete” (for the first time) collocates better with “mita” than “mieta”.

(50) Kanojo ga naku-no o hajimete mita. (I looked at her cry for the first time.)

(51) *Kanojo ga naku-no ga hajimete mieta. (I saw her cry for the first time.)

(52) Kanojo ga naiteiru-no o hajimete mita. (I looked at her crying for the first time.)

(53) *Kanojo ga naiteiru-no ga hajimete mieta. (I saw her crying for the first time.)

Furthermore, when the object of the English verb “saw” is an accomplishment, the verb exhibits temporal characteristics that are different from those with the object describing an activity. The sentences below demonstrate the difference in permissibility of the use of “saw” depending on the type of event described by the object.

(54a) I saw her cry.

(54b) I saw her crying.

(55a) I saw her write down his name.

(55b) I saw her write down his name quickly.

(55c) ?I saw her write down his name slowly.

(55d) I saw her writing down his name.

(56a) ?*I saw her dig a hole.

(56b) I saw her digging a hole.

(57a) *I saw her build a house.

(57b) I saw her building a house.

Sentence (54a) and (54b) are permissible as already demonstrated above. When the object is an activity, “saw” can be used regardless of the aspect of the activity. However, when the object is potentially an accomplishment, the use of “saw” is acceptable only when either the event is short enough to be completed within the timeframe permissible for “seeing” as in (55a) or still in process as in (55d) and (56b), that is, before the intended accomplishment is completed and while in progress. Therefore, while (54a), (55d), and (56b) are perfectly acceptable, (55c) is questionable, and (56a), more so. In the case of (56a), the acceptability of the use of “saw” depends on the time required for completing the task of digging a hole. If the hole was small enough and could be completed in a short period of time, then the sentence may be considered acceptable. On the other hand, while (57a) is almost always unacceptable under normal circumstances since it takes at least several days for a house to be

completed. The act of “seeing” cannot continue for such a prolonged time period. The examples (55a) to (57b) demonstrate that the temporal connotation of the verb “saw” shifts in a gradient manner according to the interpretation of the length of time required for accomplishing the task, which greatly depends on our external knowledge of the real world, apart from any linguistic cues.

Telicity is not only relevant in terms of classifying the type of the main verb. The telicity of the event depicted in the object of the verb “see” affects the temporal characteristics of “see” and determines the time span required for “seeing” the event, which is gradient.

5.4. Progressive Usage of “See”

It is often stated that “see” cannot be used in the progressive form (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973, Leech 2004, Leech, Cruickshank, and Benita 2001), which has been widely employed as an argument for classifying “see” as a stative verb. This, however, is not necessarily true at least in daily American English. Below is an example of “see” being used in present progressive form.

(58) He was in this car, we believe, when he shot himself. Everybody, you **are seeing** the car of Bryce Williams. That's his on-air name, the real name Flanagan. (CNN (2015))

In (58), people are in the process of visually perceiving what appears to be some special car belonging to a celebrity, something that people do not usually have a chance to “see,” and the speaker is drawing people’s attention to this fact. Unlike “see” in the simple present tense, when “see” is used in the present progressive the duration is extended. We can easily imagine people gathered around the car for at least a few minutes to “see” it. Therefore, the experience of “seeing,” which is normally considered to last no longer than a few seconds, may be extended when used in the progressive form. The following are more examples of “see” used in present progressive:

(59) But speaking of purses, if you could just stay on accessories for just a minute here. I know we saw a lot of the big bags in the last couple of years. What do you

all think about that? Ms-MOSES: Yes. Right now what **I'm** actually **seeing**, because I go out every night and I'm always trend-spotting with photos and at parties or events and it's something I've been asking about across the blogs, like is everyone carrying these luggage sized handbags? I **am seeing** these handbags, they're just getting bigger and bigger and bigger, (Tell Me More 9:00-10:00 AM (2008))

- (60) My goal in photography is to capture a moment in time. To record a subject, an event that quickly becomes lost to history. If a photograph is worth a thousand words, how do I tell the viewer all about what I **am seeing** at that second, of something that will never happen again? Most people think recording a subject would apply mostly to a photojournalism image, but the subject really does not matter. (PSA Journal (2010))

The use of “am seeing” in (59) differs from “are seeing” in (58), since the speaker is not actually referring to an experience of “here and now”. Rather, the present progressive is used in (59) according to the subject’s interpretation of her experience. The subject has placed the repeated instances of a similar experience in a single prolonged timeframe as one experience that is going on in one’s daily life. The case of (60) differs from that of (59). In (60), the use of “am seeing” can be interpreted to have at least two effects. First, it is influenced by the use of “all”. This “all” is different from that which is used in a sentence such as “I see it all now,” in which case, “see” is used in a figurative sense of “notice” or “understand”. In (60), the subject, the photographer, is actually referring to physical visual experience. Such being the case, if the verb “see” if used in the simple present tense with the usual connotation of lasting for a few seconds, it somehow contradicts with the assumed time required for seeing “all” there is to see and “tell the viewer” about it. This is one reason “am seeing” is preferred to simple present “see”. Secondly, the use of the progressive form has the effect of emphasizing the intensity and importance of the current experience, since the progressive aspect of any verbs profiles the ongoing progress of the experience.

The second observation above resonates with the description of the present progressive of “see” discussed in Sawada (2006) that the use of “see” in present progressive suggests that the object of “seeing” is something spectacular enough to announce to another person, as in the sentence:

(61) Imagine: at last I'm seeing the Mona Lisa!
(Hatcher 1951, p. 271, as cited in Sawada 2006, p. 389)

While Sawada cites Hatcher (1951) in describing a seemingly different use of “am seeing” from the one given in the last part of the previous paragraph, it can be safely said that the sense of emphasis and intensity of the experience are profiled when “see” is used in the progressive form. While “am seeing” in (60) is not used as an announcement of some spectacular experience, the purpose of the subject’s selection of the present progressive form is to emphasize the importance of the ongoing nature of the experience, at least during the process of photographing. An obvious question that arises here is how the use of the verb “see” in the progressive form differs from that of “see” in the simple present. To be more specific, how does “...how do I tell the viewer all about what I am seeing at that second” differ from “how do I tell the viewer all about what I see at that second,” and “I am seeing a bird!” differ from “I see a bird!”?

In the progressive form of “see,” as is the case with any other verb, what is in focus, or profiled, is the ongoing duration of the activity, with its inception being already assumed. After all, when a person says “I am drinking a cup of coffee,” the hearer assumes that the act of drinking coffee has already started. The same holds for (58) ~ (61). The inception part of “see” is no longer in focus, and it is its duration that matters. Therefore, when a person says “...what I see at that moment” or “I see a bird!” with a sense of excitement, the person is expressing the fact that she or he has spotted *and* seeing the bird. The fact that the experience has started is important. However, in the case of “...what I am seeing at that second” or “I am seeing a bird!”, the focus is more on the ongoing act of “seeing,” with the “spotting” part being implicitly understood but backgrounded, since the inception of the experience is not so much of interest anymore. Unlike the usual activity verbs whose inception can be physically witnessed or even proved in a concrete manner and the subject is fully aware of its inception, the inception of the event in the case of “see” is something that is well worth reporting since it is an internal experience which only the subject can identify its occurrence.

5.5. Summary

In this chapter, the literal meaning of “see” as a physical perception was examined with a focus on its inception, duration, telicity, and the interaction among the three. While “see” is conventionally classified as a stative verb which is supposedly atelic, the above observations have shown that “see” is a telic verb with an inception and an endpoint. The difficulty of characterizing this verb as belonging to any of the four verb types suggested by Vendler (1957, 1967) lies in the fact that since “see” is a personal and internal event that is experienced and perceived only by the subject. Nevertheless, we know that “seeing” requires time and that the internalization of what one has visually perceived is a “task”. This makes the verb more like an accomplishment rather than a state. However, the verb’s duration, including the time required for cognitive internalization of “seeing,” is indeed vague and indiscernible. It is, therefore, easy to be misled to think of the verb as a state, with the most widely accepted reason being the unacceptability of “see” in progressive form at least when it is used to mean mostly physical visual perception, though as presented above, there are some cases where “see” as physical perception expressed in progressive form.

Notes

1. Gruber (1967) concludes that “The semantic distinction between *see* and *look* is largely due to the distinction in the underlying prepositions demanded by them.” (p.942).
2. See Quirk and Greenbaum (1973, p.41) and Leech, Cruickshank, and Ivanic (2001, p.490).
For websites, see
Perfect English Grammar <http://www.perfect-english-grammar.com/index.html>
Guide to Grammar and Writing <http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/Grammar/progressive.htm>
3. Weblio <http://ejje.weblio.jp/content/look>
4. See below for some examples of Magic Eye puzzles:
https://www.google.co.jp/search?q=magic+eye+puzzle&lr=lang_ja&hl=ja&tbs=lr:lang_1ja&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwikttu279PPAhXKI5QKHcdEAooQsAQIHQ&biw=1285&bih=867

Chapter 6 Figurative Meanings of Verb “See”

6.1. Introduction

In Chapter 4, the meaning of “see” as physical perception was considered. In this chapter, figurative meanings of “see” are examined with an aim to find out in what ways the verb to describe one’s visual experience is associated with its figurative or abstract meanings.

Since the objective of this study is to examine human cognition from a linguistic point of view, in this chapter, the relationship between vision and cognition is considered by presenting and analyzing how the verb “see” is used in everyday American English. The analysis is based on the assumption that language reflects the way we perceive and assume our external, as well as internal, world. As is pointed out by Changizi (2009), Fujita (2007), and Ghose and Maunsell (1999, 2002), “seeing” is understood to be a mental activity that involves an astoundingly intricate networking of brain cells and neurons. While it is impossible to exhaustively describe how this networking takes place, the purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the linguistic clues that help us deepen our understanding of human perception, language use, and the relationship between the two.

6.2. Types of Figurative Meanings of “See”

As it is mentioned in Kosslyn (2005), it is important to distinguish between visual perception and visual mental imagery. Chapter 5 was devoted to the analyses of the meaning of the verb “see” from the point of view of visual perception in the physical sense, that is, how we detect concrete objects in the real world. In this chapter, the purpose is to analyze figurative meanings of “see,” which basically cover all meanings of “see” other than those that refer to physical visual perception. This later group may be further divided into those that have relatively close association with physical visual perception and those that do not. Visual mental imagery serves as a criterion for loosely categorizing a group of figurative meanings expressed by the verb “see”. According to Kosslyn (2005), “Visual perception occurs while a stimulus is being viewed, and includes functions such as visual recognition (i.e. registering that a stimulus is familiar) and identification (i.e., recalling the

name, context, or other information associated with the object” (p. 334). In contrast, “Visual mental imagery is a set of representations that gives rise to the experience of viewing a stimulus in the absence of appropriate sensory input”(p.334).

Alm-Arvius (1993) deals with figurative meanings of “see” by devoting a substantial section of her dissertation to what she calls “Pragmatic Variation and Exploitation of SEE₁,” (p. 121-166) where SEE₁ here stands for “see” referring to physical visual perception. She writes, “*Pragmatically expanded* instances appear not only to encompass the standard semantic qualities of the sense, but also certain practically compatible non-criterial meaning additions that seem to be suggested or even explicitly superimposed by the linguistic context and/or the extra-linguistic circumstances in which a particular *see* occurrence is used.”(p. 121) In other words, Alm-Arvius assumes that the meanings are “added” or “superimposed” to the “standard semantic qualities of sense” of the verb “see”.

In the present study, a lexical item is regarded as a prompt for accessing highly complex conceptualization and knowledge that we have gained through our experiences (Fauconnier (1997), Tyler and Evans (2003), Langacker (1987), Yamanashi (2000)). With regard to the verb “see,” the shifts in its meanings occur towards either those that relatively remain dependent on the physical sense of the verb or those that are more closely associated with other cognitive activities. As already presented in Chapter 4, in the case of the verb “look,” the prepositions play an important role in determining the shifts in the meaning of the verb. In contrast, with regard to the verb “see,” its figurative meanings arise according to the degree to which it prompts either physical perception or visual mental imagery.

6.2.1. Visual Perception-Dependent Meanings

In this section, figurative uses of verb “see” are considered by examining how the “shift” in its meaning occurs depending on what mental activities are involved, in addition to physical visual perception. In the discussions to follow the contexts that give rise to the meaning shifts are first classified by the types of additional activities provoked, which largely depends on the characteristics of the object of “seeing”.

6.2.1.1. To Appreciate/Read/Interpret

Visual perception in a physical sense is presupposed in the use of the verb “see”. In other words, it is assumed that the stimulus is being physically detected through vision, while additional cognitive processes beyond physical perception is required for completing the specified act of “seeing” the object. Consider the following sentences.

- (1) We are planning to go to the theater and see the play tonight.
- (2) Did you see his comment on the Facebook?
- (3) To those who wish to get an overview of this book, I recommend that you see page one of the preface.

The use of “see” above naturally evokes the meaning of actual visual perception. Nevertheless, all of them are different from the “see” discussed in the previous chapter, for they refer not only to visual perception per se, but also to any further cognitive processes that follow it. This, however, is often not consciously recognized by native speakers, as can be recognized in Vendler (1967), which presents a confusion between purely physical visual perception and visual perception involving further cognitive activities.¹

In (1) ~ (3) above, the visual perception is a means for accomplishing a task, but not an end. Roughly, “see” in sentence (1) means to visually perceive the play and understand the story, appreciate, and perhaps enjoy it if it is a good one. The same kind of “see” is used in sentences such as “I saw an interesting program on TV” or “Would you like to go see a movie with me?”. In sentence (2), the added task is to read” the comment. A person who was asked this question would not in most cases assume that the utterer is asking whether the person has visually perceived the comment or not, though, in some cases, the hearer can respond “Yeah, I saw it but didn’t bother to read it,” in which case, the original meaning intended by the utterer is twisted to refer to only the visual perception meaning of “see”. The use of “see” in sentence (3) is basically the same as that in sentence (2), in that, it also presupposes the existence of some text to be read. The activity that is called for by sentence (3) involves reading of the page and not just “seeing” the page in the literal sense as one would do when told to “see,” for instance, a hole in the wall as in “If you want to know where this picture originally hang, you should see this little hole here on the wall.”

The following examples from COCA demonstrate that the uses of “see” that are similar to that in sentence (1) above, with further semantic ramifications according to the context.

- (4) The first ever Academy Award for Best Picture was given in 1929 to *Wings*, a World War I aviation drama full of groundbreaking aerial sequences. People flocked to **see the film** largely because they longed to feel what it might be like to fly. (Christian Century (2010))
- (5) The classical dance -- it's very -- you know, it is the most -- one of the most important parts of Cambodian culture. When you **see the dance**, you can **see**, you know, the knowledge, the skills, the effort... (CBS_SunMorn (1993))

In (4), the context describes that the purpose of the people “seeing” the film was to feel the sense of flying. They did not flock to “see” the film just to obtain dry visual information presented on the screen. In sentence (5), the person who “sees” the dance does much more than just visually capturing the fancy movements performed on stage. Rather, through the experience of “seeing” them, one also senses things beyond the performance which is actually unfolding in front of one’s eyes at the moment, and feels and is moved by the knowledge, the skills, and the efforts, that have contributed to the performance.

While this meaning of “see” that is associated with some kind of emotional or mental reaction is more profiled when the object is a movie, a drama, or some kind of performance, the same meaning of “see” is evoked also when a person “sees” a painting, for instance. As Arnheim (1969) has said, the act of “seeing” cannot be accomplished without any further cognitive activities. When we “see” films, as well as paintings, photographs, a mountain, or a bird of paradise, we not only obtain cut and dried visual information from the object, but we also react to it in our cognition, either consciously or subconsciously. Therefore, whenever the verb “see” is used in this kind of context, it also implies our reaction to our experience of “seeing”. It then follows that the distinction assumed in this study between physical and figurative sense of the verb is not something definite, but again, is a matter of degree. In some cases “see” profiles more of the physical aspect, in others, more figurative aspects. Since such shifts in the meaning are not overtly evident in the linguistic system of native speakers, it is often dismissed or goes unnoticed.

The same applies when “see” is used to refer to an action that also involves reading as

in (2) and (3) above, which may be further demonstrated by the following sentence.

- (6) Ellen Silverman adjusted the cookbook stand so she could **see the page** in between bursts of chopping vegetables. (Tedrowe, Emily Gray. *Blue stars*. (2015))

Sentence (6) implies the meaning of “reading” as do sentences (2) and (3). The subject did not adjust the cookbook stand to visually detect the page and make sure it is there, for instance. Instead, the subject had the need to refer to it and read what was written on the page to properly prepare whatever she was making. Again, in many instances, when a native speaker uses the verb “see” in this context, the “reading” part of the meaning is tacitly understood, but not necessarily consciously recognized.

It is interesting to note that the same kind of usage also exists in Japanese, though in the above cases the only acceptable visual perception verb is “miru,” not “mieru”. Below are rough translations of the sentences (1), (2), and (3).

- (7) Kon-ya gekijo-ni itte sono engeki-o miru/*mieru yotei da. ((We) plan to go to the theater and see the play tonight.)
- (8) Feisubukku-no kare-no komento-o mita/*mieta? (Did you see his comment in Facebook?)
- (9) Kono hon-no gaiyou-wo shiritai hito-niwa jobun-no 1 peji-o miru/*mieru koto-o susume-masu. (To those who wish to get an overview of this book, I recommend that you see page one of the preface.)

Whether in English or Japanese, a word that connotes physical visual perception is used to refer not only to visually perceiving the appearance of the object per se but also to cover further cognitive activities such as feeling, appreciating, and reading. The use of the verb “see” in all of the above instances presupposes visual perception as the primary trigger that leads to additional cognitive activities. Since physical vision plays such a dominant part and involves direct sensory experience that can be easily recognized, the verb “see,” or “miru” in Japanese, is used to cover the entire range of cognitive processes that is actually far more extensive and complex than merely capturing something by sight.²

The meaning of “reading” implied by “see” in sentences (2), (3), and (6) can also

include the meaning which not only involves understanding of the written texts but also “interpreting” what one has captured by vision. The following sentences exemplify the use of “see” in this context.

(10) We need to see the data before jumping to a conclusion.

(11) When we see the statistics, we can tell that this is a promising project.

(12) The doctor explained to the patient what he saw in the X-ray.

In the above examples, “seeing” does not necessarily involve the “reading” of text. The data in (10), as well as the statistics in (11), may be just figures, graphs, and diagrams, though, it may as well include some text as descriptions. In the case of the X-ray in (12), there may be a noticeable shadow that deserves attention, but the doctor does not need to “read” any text to examine it. None of the objects of “seeing” in the three examples above are in the form of written text, yet the same verb “see” is suffice to imply further cognitive activities beyond mere physical perception. What “see” denotes is the activity of “interpreting” what is being physically perceived through one’s eyes.

A question arises here regarding the semantic difference between “see” and “look at,” since the meanings of “see” discussed here all overlap with the meanings of “look at” discussed in 4.2.3.1 ~ 4.2.3.3 in Chapter 4. To examine the difference between “look at” and “see,” the following analysis has been undertaken by comparing “look at the data” discussed in Chapter 4 and “see the data”. Below are examples from COCA to help illustrate the difference.³

(13) Each of the four conceptions of reflection described above are undoubtedly useful in understanding teacher reflection, and examples of each were found in our data. Each is a perspective from which to **see the data**, each revealing and concealing different things. But we concluded that none of them--individually, or collectively-accounted for what we observed about Mary and her reflection as a teacher. (Education (2008))

(14) I also want to commend your guest for saying that when you **look at the data**, the majority of addicted women are not minority, but happen to be white. But again, my real issue is the characterization of these women as being bad women, and not being women who are addicted; who have a medical disease, and a medical disease that responds to appropriate treatment. (NPR TalkNation (1998))

While both (13) and (14) describe a situation of visually perceiving the data, a comparison of their respective contexts suggests that to “see the data” involves more cognitive activities than to “look at the data”. In (13), the aim of “seeing” the data is predetermined, with an implication of the necessity for an in-depth understanding of what is presented in the data, as can be inferred from the phrase “each revealing and concealing different things”. As it will be discussed in the later section of this chapter, “see” has a stronger implication of “understanding” by internalizing and processing what has been captured by sight. In contrast, in (14), to “look at” the data is an activity that precedes the resultant activity of finding out what is being presented on the data, that is, the fact that the majority of addicted women are not minority. There is not much interpretation involved at least at the point of “looking at” the data. Thus, when one “looks at” the data, the focus is more on the act of obtaining the information available in the data as is. Below is another example to demonstrate this point.

- (15) They're not satisfied with simply getting the team back to mediocrity but note that it's progress nonetheless." You **look at the data**, you had 15 wins in five years," Snead said. (St Louis Post_Dispatch (2014))

As in (14), one “looks at” the data and then finds out the facts. While one may engage in further cognitive processing of the information obtained later on, what succeeds immediately after “looking at” the data is an activity to capture what is presented on it. On the other hand, as is mentioned above, to “see” the data involves deeper cognitive processing, as may be demonstrated further by a sentence such as the following.

- (16) The team was happy to **see the data** showing Manuel's more consistent use of his device to communicate. His peers even commented on how much easier it was to understand Manuel when he used his device and how he communicated more often now. (Teaching Exceptional Children (2014))

In (16), to “see” the data made the subject happy, not because they were given the chance to “see” it, but because they interpreted the content of the data. The subject

cognitively processed the data to an extent to evoke an emotional reaction to it. If the “see” in this sentence is substituted with “look at,” as in “The team was happy to look at the data showing Manuel’s more consistent use of his device to communicate,” the reason for the happiness shifts more towards what the subject was allowed to do, that is, “to look at the data” than the fact that Manuel was making progress, though it is again a matter of degree.

Another evidence to demonstrate this difference between “see” and “look at” can be found in sentences in which both of these verbs are used.

(17) Well, I think the financial sector has always been important in this country, it's always been involved in economic policy- making. But if you **look at the data**, the government data, from 1980, you **see** a dramatic increase in how much of corporate profits are earned in the financial sector. And of course you see a very big increase in the average compensation in that sector, relative to the rest of the country. So I think that it was - it was a boom that made sense. (NPR_FreshAir (2009))

(18) And I also think that it will force their regulators, their federal regulators to conduct more thorough fair lending and CRA compliance reviews. I mean, Wells Fargo received an outstanding from their federal regulator in 2006, where we **look at the data** in this lawsuit, we **see**, you know, all of these disparities based on racial lines. (Tell Me More 9:00 AM EST (2008))

In both (17) and (18), “look at” precedes “see”. While these sentences may seem to contract the above description of “look at” being followed by an activity to find out the facts without attempting to truly understanding or internalizing it, it is possible to interpret these sentences as having linguistically, but not cognitively, omitted the intermediate stage that connects “looking at” and “seeing”. The fact that “look at” must precede “see” in these sentences can be demonstrated by trying to replace one with the other.

(19) *But if you **see** the data,...you **look at** a dramatic increase...

(20) *...where we **see** the data in this lawsuit, we **look at** ...all of these disparities.

Neither (19) nor (20) is acceptable. As already discussed in Chapter 4, the movement of attention along with the visual line is one of the central meanings implied by the verb “look”. The unacceptability of the above two sentences serves to further support this observation.

One needs to direct one’s attention to the object, prior to recognizing and then interpreting the visual input obtained thereafter. One cannot “see” something before one “looks at” it.




Fig. 6-1
Range of cognitive processes from “look at” to “see”

From the above linguistic analysis, the following cognitive processing illustrated in Fig. 6-1 is proposed. The figure is in line with the description given in Fujita (2007) based on neuroscientific findings, which claims that to look and to see are not the same and that to recognize what one looks at and to react to it are different processes. (p. 48).

To be sure, Fig. 6-1 is a very simplified representation of the process analyzed from a linguistic, not neuroscientific, point of view. What actually happens between “look at” and “see” are not as clear-cut and linear as it may seem from the diagram and neither is it as orderly and sequential. The dotted-line ellipses represent the potential conceptual domains that may be expressed with either “look at” or “see”. The choice between the two depends on the context as well as the linguistic preference and system of individual speaker and hearer. It is a matter of tendency and the degree of semantic shifts that constantly take place when the language is in use.

6.2.1.2. To Check/Confirm

The purpose of “appreciating,” “reading” and “interpreting” is understanding and internalizing the information obtained through visual perception. In contrast, that of “checking” and “confirming” is to validate or verify the object through what came into sight. Nevertheless, the use of “see” for “checking” and “confirming” and that for “appreciating,” “reading,” and “interpreting” are not mutually exclusive. Obviously, one may need to “read” and/or “interpret” what has been captured by their physical vision in order to “check” or “confirm” the content. Therefore, the examples given in this section regarding the use of

“see” are based on the assumption that these uses are the cases in which the meaning of physical perception of “see” has shifted, in a relative sense, more towards verification than interpretation. The following sentences exemplify the use of “see” that has shifted to mean “checking” and “confirming”.

(21) Let me see your passport/driver’s license/permit.

(22) I went back to see the house I had bought last year to make sure it had not been damaged.

(23) He asked her to see the car and tell him if it is worth buying.

In the case of (21), when one is asked to show one’s passport, or any other official documents for verification, one does not expect the other party to be satisfied by only “seeing” its existence. Needless to say, one would know that one’s passport will be opened, read, and even scrutinized. Likewise, “see” in sentence (22) also implies not only the meaning of just visually perceiving it but also carefully checking it, perhaps by walking around both inside and outside the house, going into every room, and performing whatever activities that are necessary to confirm that there are no damages done to the house.

A sentence similar to (23) is given in Alm-Arvius (1993).

(24) I must see the car before I buy it. (p. 127)

In both (23) and (24), “seeing” a car does not mean just visually perceiving its appearance, though it is likely that such will be included as a part of the entire process. Alm-Arvius writes that sentence (24) “...cannot really be said to have voiced a wish to drive the vehicle in question before he makes up his mind whether to buy it or not.” However, she continues, “...the seller would presumably not be surprised at all if the prospective buyer proved to use his hands as much as his eyes when examining the vehicle” (p. 127) which means that the meaning of “see” in sentences like (23) and (24) are understood both by the speaker and the hearer as visual perception being only a part of the entire series of expected activities.

Below are additional examples used in a similar context.

- (25) Matt said, "I'm sorry to be bothering you at this hour, but I understand you're selling a car. Is there any possibility I could see the car tomorrow?" (Berntsen, Gary. Pezzullo, Ralph. *The walk-in*. (2008))
- (26) "I could give you two months' rent for the security deposit if that would help my cause" Nina shook her head. "No, that's not necessary." Though it would have helped, at least temporarily. No one else who had come to see the house had made such a generous, reckless offer. (Commentary (2013))
- (27) I couldn't wait for Ian to get home from work so that we could go see the house. We went on a weekday and none of our neighbors seemed to be out and about, which I thought worked out great for the moment. It would give him a chance to judge the house on its own merit and not because of who our neighbors happened to be. (Walker, Mari. *Never as good as the first time*. (2008))

As in (23) and (24), the purpose of the subject in (25) ~ (27) for “seeing” a car or a house is to buy it. The activities implied by the verb “see” in (25) are similar to those implied by (23) and (24), in both of which the object is also a car. Likewise, the object of (26) and (27) above is a house as in (22). While the subject in (22) went to “see” her own old house to check for damages, in (26) and (27), the subject’s purpose is to determine whether or not to buy the house. This then makes a difference in what is implied by “seeing” a house, though in all three examples, the meaning of “see” may be interpreted as a series of activities that involves “checking”. There is a semantic shift in the meaning of the phrase “see the house” depending on the purpose. Our real world knowledge enables us to interpret the kinds of activities one might engage in when one “sees the house” for the possibility of purchasing it, as opposed to checking one’s own house for damages. As is expressed in sentence (27), the checking the neighborhood would be an important part of “see the house,” while in the situation such as the one depicted in (22), such would not be included. The subject in (22) had probably checked the neighborhood when she had bought the house in the previous year, but not at the time when she went to check the house for damages in the subsequent year as is depicted by sentence (22).

Another usage of “see,” to mean to “check” or “confirm,” is found in sentences such as the following in the construction [“see” + that] or [“see” + to it that], both of which are usually considered as idiomatic expressions.

(28) I'll see that everything is going O.K.

(29) See to it that you are fully prepared.

While “checking” and “confirming” are part of “see” in (28) and (29), there is an additional implication that the subject will engage in whatever activities that are necessary to realize the condition described in the that-clause. In other words, the subject is held responsible for bringing out the expected result. The sentences with a longer context demonstrate this more clearly.

(30) There were nine young Seviers, but I was the eldest, and I thought I should **see to it that** the younger ones were kept fed. Perhaps it is a burden to feel responsible for so many mouths at so young an age, but the gift for leadership that was to show later in life may have sprung from those days when I was the oldest of so many. (McCrumb, Sharyn. *King's mountain: a ballad novel*. (2013))

(31) The rules also say that lunchroom staff must **see to it** that a child serves him or herself at least three food items. No adult is allowed to hand a child, no matter how young, a tray of food. (San Francisco Chronicle (2009))

In (30), from the context, it is possible to infer that the subject would take responsibility and make sure that the younger ones would be kept fed. The subject was not only going to “check” whether the younger ones were fed, but when they were found to have been not properly fed, the subject was determined to do whatever was necessary to get food for them. Likewise, in (31), the responsibility of the lunchroom staff is not only to “check” or “confirm” that the children serve themselves at least three food items, but if a staff member finds a child serving oneself less than three food items, it is implied in the rule that it is the staff's responsibility to encourage, or even force, the child to take at least three food items.

Thus, as demonstrated in this section, the meaning of “see” that has shifted to profile the concepts of “checking” or “confirming” makes additional adjustments as necessary depending not only on linguistic contexts but also largely on the contexts that can be inferred from our real world knowledge.

6.2.1.3. To Find Out

Another typical use of “see,” which includes the implication of “checking” or

“confirming,” but with the meaning of “finding out” being more profiled, is witnessed in the construction [“see” + interrogative], as in:

(32) His parents came to Kobe to see how their son was doing.

(33) Let’s see which of the members are going to be at the party.

The construction with an interrogative profiles more of the concept of “finding out” than that of “checking” or “confirming” as in (21) ~ (31) in the previous section, precisely because the interrogative is a sign of an unknown, something that needs to be found out. Thus, while (32) and (33) are similar to (21) ~ (31) in that they all require visual perception for accomplishing the intended task and that some sense of “checking” is involved to complete the task, “see” in (32) and (33), followed by an interrogative profiles the fact that the task, when accomplished, will lead to an answer. In (32), the parents went to Kobe in search of an answer to the question “how is our son doing?” and the intended purpose in (33) is to answer the question “which of the members are going to be at the party?”.

A clearer example to demonstrate this is the use of “see” in the following commonly used sentence.

(34) Please see who’s at the door.

In this sentence, as in (32) and (33), the purpose is to “find out” something unknown, that is, who it is that is at the door. A person who hears this sentence would not interpret it as the speaker asking one to just visually detect someone at the door. It would be awkward for the hearer to perform what has been asked by only physically “seeing” someone at the door and come back. Both the speaker and the hearer understand that this “see” implies that whoever agrees to perform the task is expected to go to the door, open it, or at least take a position where one can visually detect the visitor standing outside the door, identify the person, and report what one has found as an answer to the speaker who has made the request.

Having been combined with an interrogative, the meaning of “finding out” an answer implied by “see” is profiled. It must be noted, however, that while physical visual

perception is a necessary part of the entire process implied by “see” in the respective contexts given in sentences (32) ~ (34), “see” with a meaning shift that profiles the implication of “find out” does not necessarily require visual perception. While visual perception is the major means of accomplishing the task implied by “see” under the circumstances presented in this section, “see” can be used in situations where visual perception in the physical sense is not necessary. In other words, the meaning to “find out” in an abstract sense can be also profiled through the use of the verb “see,” as will be examined in more detail in 6.2.2. below.

Finally, another common usage of “see” to mean “find out” is its use in the phrase “see if,” as in the following sentences.

(35) I’ll see if he’s here.

(36) You need to go see if the door is locked.

Understandably, “if” in the phrase “see if” may be taken as a type of interrogative since it implies a search for a yes-or-no answer. In this sense, the meaning of “see” in these sentences is similar to that of the “see” in [“see” + interrogative] construction, with the implication of “finding out” being profiled. Again, visual perception is a means to find out the answer in the contexts of (35) and (36) which questions physically perceivable states.

Below are some more examples of the use of the phrase “see if” to mean finding out a yes-or-no answer regarding a certain physical state.

(37) Chris Rustin, director of the state Department of Health's environmental health section, said inspectors are looking for health and safety risks. They will perform a water chemical analysis, **see if** filters and pumps are operating properly, make sure the deck is in good repair and check that there is adequate lighting and a child-proof, latching gate. (Atlanta Journal Constitution (2015))

(38) Doctors often track the progression of these wounds over months, sometimes years, switching up treatments if they don't see improvements. The tools used for such tracking are decidedly old-fashioned: a plastic ruler or measuring tape to **see if** the wound has gotten smaller, a plunging cotton swab into the sensitive lesion to check its depth and a simple look to spot any new tissue growth. (Washington Post (2015))

In the above examples, visual perception plays a major role in determining the answer to the question posed by the phrase “see if”. However, the following example suggests that “see if” can be used to mean finding out an answer through one’s senses other than vision, as is demonstrated by the following sentences.

- (39) Chase and Tyrus shake their eggs by each other's ears, presumably to **see if** their different colors make different sounds. (Journal of Research in Music Education (2015))
- (40) The second aisle of shelves was empty. I paused to **see if** I could hear anyone talking. Two bikes outside besides mine meant someone had to be in the warehouse, didn't they? (Coco, Nancy. *Oh say you fudge*. (2015))
- (41) And then if you're just going to push down on the mattress, if you're the inhibited type, the only thing you're meaningfully going to learn from just pushing down is, with both hands, go down and **see if** you can feel individual springs. If you can feel springs with your hands, chances are it's a lousy mattress. (ABC_GMA (1997))

In (39) and (40), the sense required for finding out the answer is auditory, while that in (41) is tactile. In these sentences, since vision is no longer the primary means of obtaining information, the meaning of visual perception implied by the verb “see” is greatly backgrounded, as is the case with the use of the verb in more abstract contexts.

6.2.2. Mental Imagery-Dependent Meanings

As was discussed in the beginning of this chapter, in the field of neuroscience, as well as through our experiences and intuition, it is known that humans can have “visual mental imagery” even in the absence of sensory input. (Kosslyn 2005, p. 334) This mental imaging is mostly unconsciously performed as has been demonstrated in the application of proto-scenes to the use of prepositions discussed in Section 4.3. This type of subconscious mental-imaging needs to be differentiated from what is called visualization. The subconscious mental-imaging, as its name suggests, is not the type of imaging one might do by actually visualizing specific scenes or events, as in the form of a movie-like imagery. Rather, it refers to our subconscious application of bodily experiences to abstract realms. As is discussed in Section 2.1.2.1., what Lakoff (1987) describes as the basic-structure of our

conceptual system consists of our ability to form mental images and the kinesthetic image-schematic structure that is comprised of images. Needless to say, however, these are not specific images which we constantly recall when using a language. They are what may be regarded as our subconscious understanding, or even a feeling, that we have of the world around us based on our common as well as idiosyncratic experiences we have gained since birth.

With this in mind, in this section, the figurative meanings of “see” are considered to examine how this visual perception verb is used in different situations and contexts. The meanings that are covered hereunder are those that do not require physical vision, and therefore, may be accomplished either with or without one’s eyes open.

6.2.2.1. To Understand/Find Out

Probably the most widely used figurative meaning of to “see” is to “understand” or to “find out”. The idea that children learn the word “see,” first by conflating the meaning to “visually perceive” and more figurative meanings of to “understand/find out” and deconflating the different meanings later on in the course of development, as proposed in Johnson (1999), may sound convincing. This view, however, falls short of explaining how children learn to make finer distinctions among the different figurative meanings. As will be examined in this section, the use of “see” as a near synonym of either to “understand” or to “find out” depends on the context. If the theory of conflation/deconflation holds, then children would have to continue to deconflate different figurative meanings of “see,” after they had initially deconflated them from the more physical meaning of “visually perceive”.

Under the framework of the present study, all of these concepts, or meanings, remain present in “see” all the way into adulthood. The verb “see” is regarded as a single lexical item composed of overlapping domains that represent different concepts associated with it. In other words, the supposedly discrete meanings of “visually perceive” and “understand” and “find out” that are thought to require deconflation are all present in the conceptual domains that make up the overall meaning of the verb “see”.

Consider the following sentence often used in daily conversations.

(42) I see what you mean.

The verb “see” in (42) may be substituted by “understand,” though pragmatically, as well as intuitively, “I understand what you mean” sounds more formal. There are a total of 111 instances of “I see what you mean” in COCA, compared to 23 for “I understand what you mean,” as of October 2016. The expression “I see what you mean” is used more or less as a set phrase in various contexts. Consider the following excerpts.

(43) I said. "I felt it was better to begin from scratch." // "Yes," he said, "from scratch." He stopped to think about an American idiom that was evidently new to him. "From scratch. **I see what you mean.** What I wonder now is whether I can convince you to share the credit with Mrs. Belzner as co-translator of the book...." (Commentary (2008))

(44) The pieces are assembled by other bored functionaries who are also ignorant of the big picture. # "**I see what you mean.**" Lamar says. # "No you don't. You really don't." Voss says. "What I am telling you is that there is a great dark... consensus... that sweeps things along to their inevitable conclusion...." (Antioch Review (1992))

The examples (43) and (44) are just two of the many instances found in COCA. The phrase “I see what you mean” is basically used as it is, as a single sentence on its own, which makes it seem more like a set phrase or an idiom, though “see” in these sentences may be replaced by “understand” without making it sound awkward or changing much of the implied meaning. The interchangeability of “see” and “understand,” however, is not symmetrical. “I see what you mean” is more restricted in use, which makes it more idiomatic. Nunberg (1994) defines an idiom as set phrases that “appear only in a limited number of syntactic frames or construction, unlike freely composed expressions. (p.492)”. For example, the following sentences would sound awkward when the verb “understand” is replaced by “see”.

(45) “Yeah, okay, and I think **I understand what you mean** by synergy,” said Jennifer. (Webb, Aliske. *Twelve Golden Threads*. (1999))

(46) Bernie, I'm not quite sure **I understand what you mean** by columnists. You're talking about editorial writers and people who are paid to express opinions? (CNN_Reliable (2000))

(47) ?I see what you mean by synergy/columnist.

Sentence (47) sounds superfluous with extra words added to where the phrase should normally end. Since the phrase “mean by X” with X being a word or an expression is also a set phrase, [“I see what you mean” + “mean by X”] results not in a merger but a clash because of their respective conventionality. There seems to be a problem with what is conventionally accepted as an independent set phrase sharing its part with another conventionalized phrase. If “see” is indeed a near synonym of “understand,” (47) should be fully acceptable, but it is not, though there may be variations regarding the acceptability of (47) among native speakers.

The similarity between “see” and “understand” can be demonstrated through further examination of the sentences of the construction [“see” + interrogative] as the following, in which either “see” or “understand” may be used.

(48) I (see/understand) why he is here.

(49) I don't (see/understand) how he can do such a thing.

(50) I (see/understand) what has happened.

In (48) ~ (50), “see” may be substituted by “understand” without any significant changes in the overall meaning of the sentence. This does not mean that all uses of “see” in this construction are substitutable with “understand”. As already discussed in the previous section, [“see” + interrogative] often conveys the meaning of “finding out” as in “Let's see what's in here” or “I'll (go) see who's at the door,” in which case, the meaning of physical visual perception is profiled. In such a case, “see” cannot be substituted by the verb “understand,” which, in principle, does not cover the domain that has to do with vision under normal interpretation.

Needless to say, because “find (out)” is an achievement verb as described in Chapter 5, the verb is rarely used in simple present tense but often used in the future tense, or else, preceded by a phrase such as “let us” or “let's”. In contrast, while “understand” may be used in either present or future tense, the verb preceded by the expression “let's” sounds

rather awkward.

(51a) Let's go and see what has happened.

(51b) Let's go and find out what has happened.

(51c) ?*Let's go and understand what has happened.

Sentence (51c) is questionable, if not unacceptable. This is because one cannot synchronize or share the very moment one “understands” something as one can do with “find out” or “see,” because “understand” is a totally internalized mental activity which is difficult for one to control the timing of its inception. One cannot plan ahead to “understand” something exactly in five minutes, for instance. The best one can do together with someone else is to “try to understand”.

Therefore, the permissibility of the use of “find out” or “understand” instead of “see” in [“see” + interrogative] construction depends on the tense as well as on how the verb is used.

(52) Let's (find out/see/?*understand) what is in that closed black box.

(53a) I (*find out/?*see/understand) what is in that closed black box.

(53b) I (found out/?*saw/understood) what was in that closed black box.

(54) I'm going to (find out/?see/?understand) what's in that closed black box.

The use of the verb “understand” is not acceptable in (52) for the reason described above. The use of the verb “see” is not possible in (53a), since the most natural reading of “see” in (53a) is that in which the meaning of “visually perceive” is profiled and visually perceiving something in a closed black box is normally impossible unless the subject is a clairvoyant. The use of “find out” is not possible, either, because of it being an achievement verb which is rarely used in simple present tense. In sentence (53b), however, which is in past tense, the use of “found out” is permissible, but not that of “saw” for the same reason as in (53a). In other words, with regard to sentences (53a) and (53b), the use of “see” is permissible only if it is interpreted to mean physical visual perception, not as a figurative near synonym of

either “find out” or “understand”. In contrast, (54) allows the use of either “find out” or “see,” but the use of “understand” is questionable. While the use of “understand” or “understood” in (52) ~ (54) requires deeper scrutiny beyond the scope of the present study, the discrepancy in acceptability among “find out,” “see,” and “understand” is sufficient to demonstrate that the apparent near synonymy between “see” and “understand” as observed in usages such as those in (48) ~ (50), as well as in the common expression “I see,” is not as prevalent as it is believed to be. The visual perception verb “see” shares its meaning with both “find out” and “understand” in [“see + interrogative] construction under contexts such as those of (48) ~ (50), but not necessarily so in cases such as (52) ~ (54). Also, it is worth noting here that [“see” + interrogative] takes on the meaning of “find out” most naturally when preceded by “let’s” and when the process of “finding out” is interpreted as being highly dependent on actual visual perception, as in (54).

Furthermore, the mental-imagery dependent, or figurative, use of “see” as a near synonym of “understand” in [“see” + interrogative] construction is more limited compared to the visual perception-dependent usages such as “go and see who’s at the door” considered in Section 6.2.1.3. In the following sentences neither “see” nor “understand” are permissible, though they appear to be very similar in construction and usage to (48) ~ (50).

(55) I don’t ?*see/*understand when he is arriving.

(56) I ?*see/*understand where he is now.

(57) I ?*see/*understand what is in the box.

What makes (55) ~ (57) unacceptable is the nature of the question expressed by the interrogative clause. While the use of “see” is quite natural in the structures [“see” + why] and [“see” + how], such is not the case in [“see” + when], [“see” + where], or [“see” + what]. This is because, in general, interrogatives starting with “why” or “how” must be answered by an explanation of the reason or through a description of a process. Regardless of the situation or the time when sentences such as (48) ~ (50) are uttered, an appropriate answer to the interrogative clause cannot be expressed as a single specific entity. An explanation or a reason as an answer to a “why” question involves verbal abstraction of an

event or a series of events, and a description as an answer to a “how” question requires verbal abstraction of the process that is involved.

On the other hand, with regard to sentences such as (55) ~ (57), the answer to the interrogative clause is a specific time or place. For this reason, as it has been found through an interview with a native speaker, “see” in (55) ~ (57) is interpreted more in the physical sense than the figurative. In the case of (55), for example, the sentence makes sense if the person saying this utterance is in an airport looking at the list of arrivals or checking a forwarded flight schedule and not able to find the time when the person is expected to arrive. This interpretation, however, relies much more on the physical vision sense of the verb “see” and can no longer be considered to have a similar meaning as “understand”. By the same token, (56) makes perfect sense and quite normal if the subject is actually visually perceiving where he is. In sentence (57), which closely resembles (53a), (53b), and (54) above in structure, “see” is more likely to be interpreted as physical perception rather than as “understanding,” just like “see” in (53a), (53b), and (54) are also interpreted more as physical perception than “finding out”.

From the above observations one may be tempted to conclude that [“see” + why/how] leads to figurative interpretation of “see” as a kind of synonym of “understand,” while [see + when/where/what] leads to more physical perception meaning of the verb. However, further consideration reveals that there are cases in which the latter structure also evokes the “understanding” meaning of the verb “see,” as in the following examples.

(58) I see where he has made a major decision in his life.

(59) I see when she began to become more ambitious about her career.

(60) I now see what’s been bothering her throughout this morning.

In the sentences (58) ~ (60), although the same structure [“see” + where/when/what] is maintained, the content of the interrogative part is more abstract and complex than in the previous set of sentences. In (58) ~ (60), the verb “see” may be substituted with “understand” or perhaps “realize” without making a major change to the meaning of the sentence. While more extensive analysis is necessary to further substantiate the above

tendency, it is highly possible that the verb “see” is interpreted either in more of a physical sense or a figurative sense according to the degree of abstractness of the object.

Furthermore, when a person utters a sentence like (55) while checking the list of arrivals, for instance, one is not using the word “see” in an entirely physical sense, either. The subject may have used one’s visual perception to look at the list of arrivals, but when one uttered this sentence, one is also expressing one’s mental state of not having been able to obtain the information. Alm-Arvius (1993) gives the following examples to illustrate “see” as having both physical and figurative, or mental, meanings.

(61) When I looked at the blueprint, I saw immediately what should be changed.

(62) He said nothing, but I could see from his expression that he was disappointed.

(p. 270)

She argues that “see” in the above sentences cannot be categorized as belonging to either the physical or the figurative sense along the line of “understanding”. Regarding these two coexisting meanings of “see,” she explains that “...the two senses here mingle in quite an inextricable way, and as a result we would hardly speak of these *see* examples as even theoretically ambiguous” (p.270). She goes on to suggest that there may be “psychological processes spanning an uninterrupted experiential continuum between straightforward visual perception and understanding...”(p.271) by giving the following examples.

(63) Many experts have called the double begonia the “Queen of flowering plants”, and it’s not difficult to see why. The beautiful formation of the flowers is matched by the warm, vibrant colours and rich green foliage. (XIII:54)⁴

(64) ...and it’s not hard to see why this blue-eyed six-footer with his mop of elegantly untidy hair has earned film-star appeal with the public. (XIII: 42)

(p .271)

In both (63) and (64), it is not possible to exactly determine whether the meaning evoked by “see” is physical perception or some kind of cognitive activity. The verb simultaneously evokes both of these meanings. Alm-Arvius, however, does not explicitly explain or

hypothesize about the possible factors involved in determining where along the proposed continuum the meaning of a particular “see” in a sentence falls.

As suggested above through the analysis of [“see” + interrogative] construction, it is likely that the interpretation of “see” in usage shifts more towards its figurative, or more mental-imagery dependent, meaning as the object becomes increasingly abstract, and more towards physical perception-dependent meaning as the object becomes increasingly concrete, specific, and visible as shown in Fig. 6-2.




Fig. 6-2

Shifts in figurative meanings of verb “see” according to object

Again, it must be noted that with regard to sentences such as (63) and (64), neither the speaker/writer nor the hearer/reader are aware of exactly where in the above continuum either the object or the figurative meaning of “see” lies. The meaning of “see” remains vague, versatile, and indiscrete, yet, it causes no problem in communication. Both the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader feel perfectly comfortable with the sentences and have no difficulty expressing or understanding the intended meanings. The same holds for the figurative meaning of “see” used in the sense of gaining an impression of an object, as will be examined in the following section.

6.2.2.2. To Gain Impression/Make Judgment

To gain a certain impression of someone or an event or entity is another figurative meaning that can be expressed by the verb “see”. While physical vision can play a part, one can gain an impression of someone without having to physically “see” the person or the situation. One may as well get an impression of a person just by talking with that person on the phone, or of a situation by just hearing the news on the radio.

(65a) I see that he is a rich man.

(65b) I know that he is a rich man.

(66a) I see that this is total chaos.

(66b) I know that this is total chaos.

In sentences (65a) and (65b) differ in meaning and so do (66a) and (66b). There is a sense of judgment involved and impression gained by the subject implied by “see,” which is practically absent in the meaning of “know,” in which the subject presupposes the truth of the proposition expressed in the that-clause. Therefore, “see” and “know” are not interchangeable. The best possible substitute for “see” in the above sentences may be “have an impression” or “have a feeling”. The subject does not assume the truth of what one is “seeing”. Instead, one is expressing an impression which may or may not be true. Below are additional examples of the use of the expression “I see (that)”.

(67) "**I see** that you're unhappy. And I want to make you happy. Your grandmother told me about the trouble your mother is going through, and how she won't give you what you need." (Literary Review (2014))

(68) As I look at you, **I see** that strong woman your mother was. Confident and caring and full of life. (Fabry, Chris. *Every waking moment* (2013))

(69) **I see** that your melody rises and falls within this same note set. (Points to page.) Have you thought of maybe extending the range beyond the note range that you used at the beginning of the line? (Music Educators Journal (2013))

As it has been demonstrated by the sentences such as (61) ~ (64), it is difficult to determine to what degree “see” in (67) is figurative. In (67), the subject is talking directly to whom one “sees” as being unhappy. Therefore, one is receiving visual input. There is no way to

tell how much of the subject's impression comes from the visual input one is receiving at the time when this utterance is made and how much is from other sources. Nevertheless, the expression "I see that" in (67) has the effect of expressing "you're unhappy" is the subject's judgment and not necessarily a fact. Sentence (68) is different from (67) in that the subject is "looking at" a person in front, but making judgment or inference from the visual input not about that very person but about the person's mother who is not present at the time this utterance is made. The phrase "your mother was" suggests that the mother is no longer alive. Yet, the subject indirectly "sees" that she was a strong woman from the visual input one is currently receiving. Thus, compared to (67), there is more inferencing involved from the visual input, and if so, it is possible to assume that the visual perception-dependent meaning of "see" in (68) is less than that of "see" in (67).

Sentence (69), on the other hand, is a case where "see" is used to express one's judgment about sensory input other than vision. Since the subject is referring to "your melody" and how it "rises and falls," there is no visual input involved in reaching one's judgment. The judgment is based on one's auditory input, and therefore, "see" in (69) is considered to express the most figurative meaning of the three. Thus, the same type of continuum depicted in Fig. 6-2 also holds for this type of figurative meaning of "see" which refers to the cognitive activity of gaining a certain impression of and/or making judgments about the object. The more directly visible the object is, the more visual perception-dependent the meaning of "see" may become, though the degree to which this occurs depends on far more than linguistic clues alone.

This use of "see" which involves the act of gaining a certain impression and making judgments about the object also overlaps with the meaning of "find out" and "understand" examined in the previous section. Consider the following examples.

(70) People pointed out that David never intended to hurt me or our family, but it took a while for that idea to sink in. Now **I see that** he made some shortsighted decisions, but he had good intentions. (Good Housekeeping (2009))

(71) I read history books and **I see that** there are certain things with humanity that have been going on for a long time and basically it's just not paying attention or caring about the other guy. (the Environmental Magazine (2011))

The verb “see” in (70) and (71) evokes the meaning of not only “gaining impression” or “making judgment” about what is expressed in the that-clause, but also “finding out” and “understanding”. In (70), the subject has found out, understood, gained some kind of impression, and made judgment about what David had done. Likewise, in (71), by reading history books, the subject has experienced all of the aforementioned cognitive activities to reach one’s certain view on the nature of humanity. These examples suggest that the supposedly different figurative meanings of “see” covered by different conceptual domains may be profiled simultaneously under appropriate contexts.

Finally, there are cases where the meaning of “see” as a physical perception, discussed in Chapter 5, converges with the figurative meanings examined in this chapter. The following examples from Alm-Arvius (1993) illustrate this point.

(72) Every morning when I enter the hall I see this big modern painting — and always differently.

(73) They both saw the incident, but obviously not in the same way.

(p.311)

In the above examples, a single instance of the verb “see” covers both physical and figurative meanings. In (72), the subject physically perceives the painting every morning. Yet, the qualification at the end of the sentence, that is, that one “sees” it differently each morning evokes figurative meaning of the same “see” in the sentence, implying that one finds, gains different impressions, and makes various judgments about the painting, perhaps largely depending on the subject’s state of mind or external factors, such as the weather influencing the way sunlight shines upon the painting. There are two subjects involved in (73) and both physically perceived the incident. They were both physically present when the incident took place and witnessed it through physical vision. The second half of the sentence, however, implies that though both of the subjects physically “saw” the incident with their vision, they gained different impressions, made different judgments, and perhaps understood it differently.

These sentences demonstrate that the widely accepted dichotomy between physical and figurative meanings of the verb “see” is not as absolute or clear-cut as it is believed to

be. A single instance of “see” in a sentence can cover many different conceptual domains, and the degree to which the respective domains are either backgrounded or profiled is adjusted according to the context to enable successful communication between the interlocutors.

6.3. Summary

Various figurative meanings of the verb “see” were examined in this chapter by broadly classifying them into two groups: those that are more visual perception-dependent and those that are more mental-imagery dependent. The figurative meanings that are classified as being more visual perception-dependent are those that use physical vision as a primary means for accomplishing the intended tasks, such as reading, interpreting, checking, confirming, and finding out. On the other hand, the meanings that are more mental imagery-dependent are those that are used to express the types of activities that do not necessarily require physical visual perception, such as understanding, finding out, gaining impression, and making judgment about the object. The existence of the meaning of “finding out” in both of the two groups indicates that one can “find out” something either with or without using visual perception.

While “understanding” is often taken up as a typical figurative meaning of “see,” perhaps because of the prevalence of the expression “I see,” the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that the use of “see” as a synonym of “understand” is very limited and restricted in both syntactic structure and semantic context. Furthermore, this chapter brought into question the validity of the conflation-deconflation theory regarding the linguistic development of a child, on the grounds that mere deconflation between physical and figurative meanings of “see” is not adequate for one to acquire innumerable further ramifications of the figurative meanings.

A closer examination of the mental imagery-dependent figurative meanings of “see” has revealed the possibility of the meanings shifting towards either more physical or more figurative side of the semantic continuum covered by the verb, according to the abstractness and the degree of visibility of the object in question. For example, in the case of the use of “see” in [“see” + interrogative] construction, the meaning shifts more towards physical

perception as the object in question becomes more concrete and specific, while, in contrast, it shifts more towards figurative meaning of “understand” as the object becomes more abstract. This shift, however, takes place on the subconscious level of native speakers of American English, and therefore, is often overlooked.

In the final part of this chapter, the possibility of the meaning of “see” as a near synonym of “gaining impression” and “making judgment” overlapping with the verb’s other figurative meanings such as “finding out” and “understanding” was explored. Moreover, the overlap of physical and figurative meanings of the verb has been proposed, where a single instance of the verb “see” can evoke the meaning of physical perception as well as figurative meanings such as “understanding,” “gaining impression,” and “making judgment”.

Notes

1. As an example to illustrate that native speakers are somewhat unconscious of different senses of “see,” He writes:

Before we take leave of *seeing*, I shall mention two borderline senses. If one tells us that he saw *Carmen* last night, he means that he saw all four acts of *Carmen*. Besides, he might say that it took three hours to see *Carmen*. Perhaps one might even answer the question *What are you doing?* by *I am seeing Carmen on TV*. Thus there is a queer accomplishment sense of seeing. There is another strained usage. A “seer” sees things, and now and then he actually is seeing ghosts or pink rats. Such strained or stretched employment should not worry us. It would be a very serious mistake if one tried to explain the stock uses of seeing on the basis of such employment. (Vendler 1967: 119-120)

2. In Japanese the verb “miru” (look) takes several different characters depending on its use. For example, when you see something entertaining, such as, a play, a TV program, a movie, the Chinese character is 観る(miru), while when you see a page, an article, data, etc., the character which is commonly used is 見る(miru).
3. See Appendix I and II for more examples of “see the data” and “look at the data”.
4. In Arm-Arvius (1993), XIII stands for Women’s Realm, March 3, 1979, XXXV:1077. London: IPC Magazines Ltd.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 Discussion

The purpose of this study has been to elucidate the meanings conveyed by the visual perception verbs “look” and “see”. The survey and analyses of the verbs have been conducted to examine how these verbs are interpreted according to different contexts. In this sense, the study could be said to have taken a top-down usage-based approach by placing much weight on how the verbs are actually used in today’s American English. By doing so, my intention was to capture the ways in which the meanings of these verbs shift, or fluctuate, to adjust to various linguistic, as well as external, environments.

As has been presented in Chapter 2, I view the meaning of a lexical item as a cluster of multiple concepts as suggested in Langacker (2013). At the time of this writing, however, no previous studies on visual perception verbs conducted along this theoretical framework could be found. While Alm-Arvius (1993) presents a thorough survey and analyses of the meanings of the verb “see,” and I am deeply indebted to the author for many of the intriguing examples which I have cited in this study, her study regards figurative uses simply as different types of “pragmatic diversions” and does not consider the verb in terms of the concepts that are evoked by the verb in usage. On the other hand, the previous cognitive linguistic studies on the figurative uses of visual perception verbs, as well as those of body parts, seem to have relied too heavily on the idea of semantic “extension” without giving it due consideration. While these studies do take account of conceptual basis that has led to the emergence of figurative meanings of various lexical items, they do not adequately describe how or why the literal meanings came to convey the figurative meanings. Moreover, the problem I see in the theory of semantic extension lies in its resultant assumption of different meanings of a single lexical item being discrete. Claiming that the meaning of “see” may be extended to convey the meaning of “consider,” for instance, assumes that “see” and “consider” are discrete, as if the latter had stemmed from the former.

In contrast, this study has been conducted on an assumption that lexical items are neither as discrete nor stable as they are believed to be. Rather, they function as “prompts” (Evans 2005, Fauconnier 1997, Langacker 1987, Turner 1991, Tyler & Evans 2003) for

accessing our encyclopedic knowledge. If so, it then follows that the “meaning” of a lexical item needs to be flexible and adjustable enough to cover all the encyclopedic knowledge of all of the speakers of a given language. In addition, the meanings of lexical items must be contextually based, since it is the context in which the language is used that enables one to determine how and what to access and retrieve from our encyclopedic knowledge. Moreover, as stated in Evans (2006), “. . . , the range of linguistic units available to the language user massively undermine the range of situations, events, states, relationships and other interpersonal functions that the language user may potentially seek to use language to express and fulfil” (p. 497). In other words, no matter how large one’s vocabulary may be, it is impossible to express or understand the entire encyclopedic knowledge and experiences of the entire language community, if the components of a language are fixed and discrete.

On the basis of the above principles, in this study, I have conducted and explained the meanings of “look” and “see” by broadly distinguishing them as being either physical or figurative. The study first examined the meanings of the verb “look,” which can be either used independently without a preposition or more or less as a verbal phrase followed by a preposition or an adverb. The analysis of the former type of “look” without a preposition has revealed that while this use of the verb without a noun found immediately after it may make it seem like an intransitive verb, and is often classified as so, the object of “looking” is always found within a wider context. This resonates with Langacker (2015) which claims that grammatical categorizations are not always valid, though the arguments he presents refer more to categories such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives. The findings regarding “look” without a preposition in this study also point to the fact that grammatical categories, such as the part of speech, the type of verb, and the word order, fall short of accounting for all usage events. There are cases such as the independent “look,” whose use and meanings can be inferred only through consideration of a context larger than that of a sentence.

Further analysis of this first type of “look” demonstrated that “the movement of visual line,” “activation of visual capacity,” and “movement/activation of attention” are found in the central meanings of “look”. While these concepts, or conceptual domains, seem to be prompted in a number of usage events of “look,” the degree to which they are profiled or

backgrounded varies, as has been demonstrated in Fig. 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5. Thus, the gradient adjustment of the meaning takes place even among the seemingly central or prototypical meanings of a lexical item. Furthermore, the use of the verb in phrases such as “look and look” and “just looking” has indicated that “look” can prompt the meanings of desperation together with activated visual attention and movement of visual line and capacity, or, in the case of the former, of pretended indifference through backgrounding of the concepts of attention, one of the central meanings of “look”. The analyses of the construction [“look” + interrogative-pronoun] as in “Look what you did,” on the other hand, demonstrates that it may be interpreted negatively or positively depending on the circumstances in which the sentence is uttered, though the negative reading is probably more prevalent. Finally, I have suggested that in this construction, the degree to which the meaning of “attention” in “look” is profiled may be a function of where on the scale, extending from pronoun to interrogative, the succeeding interrogative-pronoun is interpreted to fall. (See Fig. 3-7) What is normally regarded simply as an interrogative-pronoun is also gradient and scalar in nature.

Having considered the meanings of independent “look” in Chapter 3, I proceeded to examine the meanings of “look” followed by a preposition (or prepositions) or an adverb. I first focused on “look at,” the most widely used construction of “look” by starting with the analyses of the meaning of the preposition “at”. There are at least two types of “at”: one that is location-oriented, and the other, action-oriented. The results revealed that even when “at” is used to indicate a location, its connotations can vary depending on the degree of abstractness of the location, as well as on the overall context implied by the sentence. For example, “at” in “stand at the bus stop” prompts different meanings from “meet at a party,” particularly in terms of temporal connotations, as is presented in the study as another piece of evidence to demonstrate the mutual influence and adjustment among the lexical items. A similar phenomenon has been observed with regard to the action-oriented “at” as well. Phrases such as “throw a stone at someone or something” and “direct one’s anger at a company,” for instance, evokes very different meanings of “at,” though the difference is commonly dismissed by native speakers.

The analyses of preposition “at” is followed by the analyses of the phrase “look at” as

a physical perception. As in the case of the independent “at,” “look” in the phrase “look at” also demonstrates as prompting the concepts “movement of visual line,” “activation of visual capacity,” and “movement of attention”. As I have shown in the preceding chapter on the independent use of “look,” even these central meanings shift, influenced by the context, both linguistic and otherwise. The same held for the phrase “look at”. Depending on how, why, and what one is “looking at” the implications of the phrase fluctuates through profiling and backgrounding of central, as well as non-central, concepts. Furthermore, I have shown that although not linguistically expressed, the context determines the timeframe or the duration of “look at”. As I have argued in Section 4.2.2.3, however, the phrase “look at” poses an issue as regards its temporal characteristics since it may be completed in an instant as do verbs such as “find,” “reach,” and “finish,” but can be also interpreted to last theoretically forever, when expressed in the progressive form as in “He is looking at the tree”.

The study then proceeds to consideration of figurative uses of “look at”. The analyses are performed on the basis of the characteristics of the target object and the context. For instance, to “look at a map” to locate a place on it greatly differs from to “look at a map” to savor its artistic beauty. Also, even when the object is something concrete as “the products,” for instance, “to look at the products that are currently available today” does not imply actually visually perceiving all of the products on the market. A single phrase “look at” can cover a wide variety of meanings ranging from the cursory direction of one’s attention to an object to relatively careful evaluation of an entity, which may be only partially visible. In general, as it is intuitively conceivable, there seems to be a tendency that the more abstract the object is, the more figurative the meaning of “look at” becomes, though the use of one’s physical visual capacity is implied as at least one of the means involved in carrying out the task connoted by the figurative meaning. The only exception to this are the cases in which the object of “look at” is either future or past, in which case, one’s present physical vision has less of a role to play.

The consideration of “look” with a preposition (or prepositions) other than “at,” as well as “look” followed by an adverb in Section 4.3 was carried out by organizing the prepositions according to their directionality. Here again, it has been shown that the

meanings of prepositions and adverbs, as well as those of “look” shift according to the context and through mutual influence. A close examination of prepositions based on the idea of the “proto-scene” proposed by Tyler and Evans (2003) has served to demonstrate how one’s kinesthetic experiences are linked to abstract concepts. For example, the concept of “forwardness” in the figurative sense, as in “look forward to,” is closely associated with the way we experience the world around us. Time elapses as we walk forward, which gives us the concept that the future is in front, not back. With regard to the phrase “look up to,” a near-synonym of respect, its comparison with the phrase “look up at” has suggested that the use of “at” indicates that one’s visual line reaches the target, while that of “to” conveys the meaning of distance being reserved between the end of one’s visual line and the object, perhaps because of the sense of awe that inhibits one to actually allow one’s visual line to be in contact with the entity that one “looks up to”. The comparison of the physical meanings of “look down at,” “look down on,” and “look down over” has demonstrated how these phrases are adapted to give rise to their figurative meanings.

The analysis of the physical meaning of the verb “see” undertaken in Chapter 5 centered on its temporal characteristics. By applying the classification of verbs proposed by Vendler (1957, 1967), I mainly examined the duration of “see”. As has been stated in Alm-Arvius (1993), the verb “see” has the meaning of “spotting” and “making out”. When only the “spotting” sense of the verb is profiled, it is possible to say “I saw something but I don’t know what it was”. Although this use is fully acceptable, the use of the verb “see” in this sense is not common. Under normal circumstances, “see” implies that one has recognized what the object is. Nevertheless, there are variations in which the act of “seeing” is thought to last. This again depends largely on context. While “see” is usually classified as a stative verb, it exhibits characteristics that are non-stative in nature, with regard to temporal implications, in particular. Stative verbs do not have any inception, for they are states and not events. The verb “see,” however, clearly has a point of inception, as described by the concept of “spotting”. Furthermore, unlike “look” or “look at,” which can be completed in an instant (though, at the same time, can go on forever), under the normal interpretation, to “see” something requires time. The time required for completing the act of “seeing,” starting from “spotting” up to “making out,” however, is restricted to within

somewhere around few seconds. There are no exact time limits, yet, native speakers are subconsciously aware of this limit so that their use of the verb follows this tacit and vague restriction. It is not the meaning of the verb itself they share. Rather, it is the experience of “seeing” that is shared, on the basis of which they infer the meaning when they encounter a usage event of the verb. Therefore, if one hears a sentence such as “I saw a deer family all morning,” the meaning of “saw” is interpreted as being a repetition of short-lasting events, rather than an event that has lasted for several hours. This then also has an influence on the meaning of “all morning”. The phrase “all morning” in this context is interpreted differently from “all morning” in a sentence such as “I slept all morning” or “I studied linguistics all morning”. The meaning of “see” is adjusted according to the phrase “all morning” and vice versa, which again implies that lexical items are flexible and that they mutually influence one another.

In Chapter 6, I have considered the figurative meanings of “see,” according to the type of activities they imply and grouped them into those that are more visual perception-dependent and those that are more mental imagery-dependent. Those that are considered visual perception-dependent evoke the meanings that refer to additional mental activity or activities. A simple phrase such as “see the dance,” for instance, prompts various other cognitive activities such as appreciating, evaluating, and understanding it, in addition to more emotional implications such as enjoying it or disliking it. These concepts are profiled when the verb “see” is followed by an object such as a dance, a movie, or any other kind of performance. While the physical perception is the means to obtain the visual input, what is profiled more in this usage are the cognitive activities that are associated with and inseparable from the act of “seeing”. This brings us back to the claim made by Arnheim (1969) that visual perception is, in itself, a cognitive activity. What must be noted here is that through one’s experience, one subconsciously holds various conceptual domains of cognitive activities together with the meaning of physical visual perception vis-à-vis the lexical item “see” and that these domains are selectively, though unconsciously, profiled or backgrounded to different degrees according to various factors implied by the context. There are no set rules to determine which domains are to be profiled or backgrounded to what degree, neither do native speakers need to consciously learn these subtleties that are too

vague to spell out to begin with.

The comparative analyses of the use of “look at” and “see” with a common object, “the data,” has served to gain deeper understanding of the cognitive activities and the domains that are elicited when these verbs are used. The neuroscientific description given in Fujita (2007) that to “look at” and to “see” are connected, yet not the same, has been also demonstrated through the analyses of “look at the data” and “see the data”. As shown in Fig. 6-1, in line with the neuroscientific findings, “look at” and “see” are both part of a cognitive continuum, with “look at” preceding “see”. The cognitive activities in between overlap. One can just “look at” an entity without recognizing it, but as has been presented in the Chapter 5, it is also possible for one to “see” an entity but not being able to recognize it, when the verb “see” is used to prompt only the “spotting,” or the inception, of the potential temporal continuum. The verbs “look at” and “see” are not discrete lexical items, but share many cognitive activities that are associated with them. Furthermore, the subsequent analyses of constructions such as [“see” + if] indicated that there are cases where the phrase is used even when visual perception plays no role, as in “see if you can hear” and “see if you can feel,” which indicates that the supposed dependency on visual perception in the use of “see” as a near synonym of “find out” is, again, a matter of degree, from null as in the above examples to highly-dependent as in “see if the window is open,” for instance.

In the latter half of Chapter 6, the figurative uses of see that do not require visual perception were considered. Although “see” is often considered as a synonym of “understand,” the analyses showed that the two verbs are not as interchangeable as it is commonly thought to be. Yet, the examination of [“see” + interrogative] has revealed that the use of “see,” as well as that of “understand,” in this construction tends to be limited when the answer sought by the interrogative is less specific. Moreover, the analyses showed that “see” in this construction is interpreted differently according to the context by speakers of American English. As I have depicted in Fig. 6-2, “see” is interpreted as being more visual perception-dependent when the object is more concrete, and more mental imagery-dependent when the object is more abstract. This again has no exact rules to it. It involves subtle semantic adjustments subconsciously carried out by native speakers when they encounter “see” in various contexts. Furthermore, the fact that a single “see” can be used to mean

both visual perception and to “gain impression,” which is one of the figurative meanings of “see,” as exemplified by the sentence “Every morning when I enter the hall I see this big modern painting—and always differently” cited from Alm-Arvius (1993, p.311).

Throughout this study, I have shown that the different meanings of “look” and “see” are evoked according to the context and that the meanings are gradient and flexible to the extent that their interpretations can vary from one end of the continuum to the other. While the meaning continuums presented in this study are limited, they are intended to illustrate the different degrees of profiling and backgrounding of the concept cluster that represents a lexical item. This means that, as stated in Givón (2001), our linguistic system and its components are relative, not absolute. A lexical item in my view is nothing more than a relatively grouped together and relatively stable set of concepts that are accessed when prompted by that particular lexical item in use. While the ways in which these concepts are accessed to evoke different meanings of the lexical item are relatively shared among the members of the given linguistic community, just as Fujita (2000) says that no two persons see exactly the same red color, no two persons share exactly the same meanings even under near identical circumstances. Furthermore, there is no way to test or prove that my meaning of a lexical item in a particular context is the same as another person’s. While this may sound counter-intuitive given that we are actually capable of communicating with one another, I believe that it is precisely because of this leeway allowed in the linguistic meanings that we are able to accomplish successful communication. If the meanings are completely stable and rigid we would not be able to communicate what we wish to, since, as stated in Evans (2006), the number of linguistic units that are available to us are by far fewer than the experiences and knowledge that we wish to share with others.

The approach taken in this study adequately accounts for the relativity of the meanings of lexical items, while also shedding light on the manners in which human cognition works. We live in a world of gradations and continuums, in which no experience or knowledge can be isolated. We grasp the world around us and our experiences in relativistic way, by constantly associating and adjusting our understanding of them. If our linguistic system is to reflect our cognition, and if our cognition is reflected in our linguistic system, linguistic meanings need to be analyzed to represent their relativity.

7.2. Conclusion and Future Issues

The close examination of visual perception verbs “look” and “see” has demonstrated that these verbs manifest different meanings by graded profiling and backgrounding of the concepts that are associated and grouped around these lexical items. The study has revealed some of the gradient nature of the meanings conveyed, as well as the ways in which the meanings shift to fit the given context.

The approach taken in this study has been strictly usage-based with a majority of example sentences taken from the Corpus of Contemporary American English. This is primarily because the study has been advanced within a cognitive linguistic framework that takes an encyclopedic view of lexical meanings, according to which lexical items are considered as prompts to access relevant concepts depending on the context. In other words, contexts are indispensable for narrowing down the meanings conveyed by a lexical item. I believe that this view of lexical meaning is also useful for pedagogical purposes. It is possible, and perhaps more effective, to learn the meanings of words and expressions of a second language not only through one-to-one correspondence with the words and expressions of one’s native language, but also through acquisition of concepts that are accessed by a lexical unit. This may prove effective in enhancing one’s creativity in the second language, since words and expressions learned as groups of concepts should allow the learner to experiment with the “shifting” of their meanings. At least, such would be more fun than rote memorization of dictionary meanings.

There still remains a number of issues that deserve due consideration in the future. First, although I have presented some examples of Japanese visual perception verbs in some places in this study, there remains much to be studied regarding them, in relation to English visual perception verbs, in particular. While this study has briefly touched on the different behaviors of Japanese perception verbs “miru” and “mieru” from those of “look” and “see,” a deep and thorough comparative analysis of the visual perception verbs is required for a convincing presentation of semantic discrepancies of “miru” vs. “look” and “mieru” vs. “see”.

Second, there remains a need to analyze the verbs in relation to modal auxiliaries such

as “may,” “can,” “must,” “would,” and “should”. The ways in which “look” and “see” interact with these auxiliaries should help deepen our understanding of the verbs as well as the auxiliaries.

Third, other English visual perception verbs, such as “watch,” “observe,” and “glimpse,” need to be incorporated to fully understand the concept-based network of visual perception verbs in American English. Also needed is an examination of more idiomatic phrases related to vision such as “take a look at,” “catch sight of,” etc.

Finally, there is a need to devise specific ways to effectively and efficiently incorporate usage-based and concept-based acquisition of words and expressions in teaching and learning a second language. If successful, it should prove highly effective in enhancing linguistic creativity of second language learners, one of the important factors for the development of their communicative competence.

Appendix I

Samples of “Look At the Data”
(from the Corpus of Contemporary American English)

<p>Source: PBS (2015)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>Jeffrey Brown has our look. JEFFREY-BROWN# On the one hand, information is everywhere and more people around the world have access to it. On the other, for journalists, those who have traditionally gathered and disseminated so much of that information, the times are more dangerous than ever. JOEL-SIMON, -Execut# Absolutely. That's the paradox. We live in an age defined by information. And yet the people who bring us this information are dying, being imprisoned, being killed in record numbers. If you look at the data, it is shocking, but press freedom, freedom of expression is actually in decline around the world. JEFFREY-BROWN# In his role as executive director of the advocacy group the Committee to Protect Journalists, Joel Simon watches all of this unfold on a daily basis. In a new book, " The New Censorship, " he's looked at case studies and some of the causes behind growing dangers for journalists. We talked yesterday at the Newseum in Washington, D.C., JOEL-SIMON# One of the fundamental things that</p>
<p>Source: CNN (2014)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>I mean, is this woman short of drinking buddies? It's absolutely unacceptable. PINSKY# Well, Karamo, I know you'll back me up on this. It actually isn't that different of having a significant amount of alcohol versus a taste. If you're going to be an alcoholic, your first drink is in the home, the overwhelming probability. And everyone who out there who says, oh, the Europeans, they teach their kids to drink. They dilute it with water. They start them at five. Look at the data on alcoholic liver disease and deaths from alcohol in Italy and France. It's off the charts. They just don't choose to call it alcoholism and they don't seem to look at what they've done by exposing earlier. Listen, Karamo, but yeah, I'll give the floor in second, but if you take mice of equivalent age and adolescent like say, if you expose them to alcohol, the younger you expose them, the more trouble they're going to have controlling the</p>

<p>Source: Popular Science (2014)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>overturned a state ban in Utah and tabled a proposed ban in California. # Even so, as we talked I started thinking about the life cycle of databases: When they start, their users tease out a few simple connections between data points. But as they evolve, they can support sophisticated predictive models of consumer habits. When I spoke with DRN's Metaxas, he talked about the company's interest in exploring how license-plate-scan data could boost customer service by predicting a consumer's financial trouble. Banks, he said, are starting to look at the data before a car goes into default.' The real goal is not to repossess the vehicle, " said Metaxas.' If you can look at data to more effectively predict where the car may be, you will help the finance company improve its customer life cycle. " # For example, if a series of plate scans indicates that a certain car no longer parks at the owner's usual workplace, the bank could infer a change of employment and may make a phone call to offer a lower</p>
<p>Source: USA Today (2013)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>dropping about 20% more rain within 60 miles of their center. On the plus side, global warming might mean that fewer storms form -- as many as 34% fewer -- in the years ahead. So we might see fewer, meaner storms, across the planet. Though the frequency question is one of the many unsettled areas of climate science, as some experts such as MIT's Kerry Emanuel predict a proliferation of storms with these warmer conditions. The debate matters not, Keim says. " We don't need to know the answer to look at the data and know that hurricanes have hit the Gulf Coast hard in the past, " Keim says. " And the numbers tell us that where something has happened in the past, it will happen again. " WHAT CAN BE DONE? Once a stomping ground of the pirate Jean Lafitte, Isle Grand Terre is a patch of sandy scrub curving before the Gulf of Mexico next to Grand Isle, a barrier island that shelters salty lagoons, marshes and bayous from the open sea. The island is home to</p>

<p>Source: ABC (2013)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>You're gon na be on your own. GEORGE-STEPHANOPOU# (Off-camera) Okay. But you do all these things and still 95% of the gains go to the top 1%. Do you look at that four and a half years in and say, maybe a president can't stop that accelerating inequality? PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (UNITED STATES) No, a president can stop it. The problem is that there continues to be a major debate here in Washington. And that is, how do we respond to the underlying trends? If you look at the data, a couple of things are creating these trends. Number one, globalization. Right? Capital, companies, they can move businesses and jobs anywhere they want. And so they're looking for the lowest wages. That squeezes workers here in the United States even if corporations are profitable. Technology. If you go to a lot of companies now, they've eliminated entire occupations because they're now robotized. We don't have travel agents, we don't bank tellers. GEORGE-STEPHANOPOU# (Off-camera) It's bigger</p>
<p>Source: CBS (2013)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>people who get prostate cancer don't die of it. Well, now, here's the thing. Thirty thousand people, as you say, die of prostate cancer each year. So what do you do about them? How do you prevent them with some kind of screening test and algorithm without over- testing and over-treating, and that is David Agus is going to tell us. DR-DAVID-AGUS- (CBS# I mean, come on. It's a crazy, crazy argument because they-- they kind of lose it all. So when you start to look at the data, since we started screening in the United States, death rate is down by forty-five percent. Countries that screen have half the death rate of countries that don't. At the same time, we dramatically over treat this disease, so it's both. So I do PSA testing on all men irregardless of their age, you know, as long as they have at least a five-year life expectancy. But there are many patients, when we do a biopsy and it's got of a low-grade</p>

<p>Source: PBS_NewsHour (2012)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>it doesn't get rid of the Alternative Minimum Tax. It doesn't get rid of any special loophole. It doesn't get rid of any special tax preference. So it really doesn't move the ball on tax reform either. (CROSSTALK) JEFFREY-BROWN: Now, wait a minute. I asked you a question though first about fairness. Is there a fairness argument here? Is it a problem.. (CROSSTALK)DOUGLAS-HOLTZ-EAKI: There's always a fairness argument. I agree with that. There's always a fairness argument in tax policy. And if you look at the data, on average, those who are making a million dollars have a higher effective tax rate than those making less. Indeed, as incomes go up, average effective tax rates do go up. So it's indisputable that we have a progressive tax code. You can find it from the CBO. You can find it from any of those entities. JEFFREY-BROWN: But he was citing a number just now, 400 of the wealthiest who pay, what was it, 18 percent or 19 percent. DOUGLAS-HOLTZ-EAKI:</p>
<p>Source: The Saturday Evening Post (2012)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>" Statins clearly decrease one's chance " of having a heart attack or stroke, agrees Buffalo's Farhi. But the real-life importance of the decrease depends on how high your risk is in the first place. If your 10-year risk is extremely slim- a value judgment, but many clinicians regard anything under 10 percent as low- then " it would be of minimal benefit to take a statin, " says Farhi. " You could treat thousands of such people without preventing a single event. " # One useful way to look at the data is to consider something called " number needed to treat " (NNT). NNT simply means how many people must be given a medication, undergo surgery, have a diagnostic test, or have any other medical intervention in order for a single one of them to benefit from it. That number can be surprisingly high even for interventions with unquestioned benefits. For instance, 16 people with open fractures need to receive antibiotics for one to benefit; eight people need to take inhaled steroids during an asthma attack</p>

<p>Source: Fox (2012)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>RealClearPolitics averages are right? Which is the best number to look at for people who really care about this on a daily basis? AYERS# the best number to look at is the average of credible, professionally done polls and you've mentioned several right now. But if you take a look at the average of the polls and even out some of the sampling differences, and it's fair to say right now, President Obama is ahead by somewhere around 3 percentage points. GIGOT# 3 percentage points. The other thing happening, if you look at the data, is the president's approval rating has been creeping up. It's now, in some polls, 49, 50 percent, not too far, pretty close to where it was with George W. Bush in 2004 when he later won reelection in November when he was creeping town 49, 50, in September. Is that a very important number to watch? AYERS# Yes, it is. President Obama is right on the cusp. He's well below the job approval ratings of Bill Clinton and</p>
<p>Source: NPR (2012)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>text and drive, kind of you name it. People just don't think about the long-term consequences. Now in dishonesty it's particularly crucial because the theory of dishonesty is that people think about the consequences of their actions, and that means if they punishment will be high enough, people would never engage in that. So, for example, if we have the death penalty, if there's a death penalty, why would anybody ever commit a crime because they could get killed for it? But you know what? When you look at the data, there's no evidence that states that have the death penalty have a lower crime rate. Or California, three strikes and you're out. Under those conditions, who would commit the third offense? But you know what? People just do. People don't think about the long-term consequences of their actions. And even judges that I've talked to said that it's rare that anybody in their court case thinks about the long-term consequences, that crime is mostly, white-collar crime, is mostly</p>

<p>Source: NPR_TellMore (2011)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>got this great opportunity to be at a great institution in Ohio getting a degree. Why lose that opportunity because you caught yourself up into something that you hadn't done anything wrong? WATKINS: But also... MARTIN: One of the points that Professor Watkins made, Vice President Gill, in his blog post is that - is the conversation with the police appropriate and their conduct? GILL: Absolutely. MARTIN: And why is that conversation going on? GILL: We've had those conversations. That's the point. WATKINS: And also, make sure you look at the data. If the black male students are being stopped by police more than the white students, that's racial profiling. That's a problem. GILL: Absolutely. WATKINS: This isolation of black males and applying the certain rules to them that are a set of rules that wouldn't be applied to everyone else is a little bit problematic, so... MARTIN: Well, Professor Watkins, but from the standpoint of the incidents that were under investigation, there were, in fact, a series of robberies and the</p>
<p>Source: NPR_FreshAir (2009)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>hands on more capital, make more investments and the whole boom, or bubble, goes on for quite a while until, of course, it explodes. GROSS: You think that part of the problem we have in the United States is that the finance sector became more powerful under Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and Bush. In what way did that sector become more powerful? Prof-JOHNSON: Well, I think the financial sector has always been important in this country, it's always been involved in economic policy- making. But if you look at the data, the government data, from 1980, you see a dramatic increase in how much of corporate profits are earned in the financial sector. And of course you see a very big increase in the average compensation in that sector, relative to the rest of the country. So I think that it was - it was a boom that made sense. There was some deregulation initially that, you know, probably was also sensible. But as the firms made this money and as the individuals involved made this</p>

<p>Source: San Francisco Chronicle (2006)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>it more expensive to borrow money. Some experts say the pace of increases has been so measured and the economy is so strong that the impact will be minimal. Others see high interest rates as the prologue to a slowdown or even a recession. # James Paulsen, chief investment strategist at Wells Capital Management in Minneapolis, is so bullish on the economy that he says talk of rate increases hurting it is silly. # " People ought to lighten up, " he said. " Is there any financial crisis out there? If you look at the data, we're close to 5 percent real GDP growth, 10 percent profits growth, the best job creation since the first quarter of 2000. Consumer confidence is at a five-year high. None of that sounds like an economy ready to die -- yet that's what I read in the paper every day. " # Tracy Herrick, chief economist at the Private Bank of the Peninsula in Palo Alto, takes an entirely different view, citing a classic monetarist approach to economics. He said rising interest rates</p>
<p>Source: Rural Special Education Quarterly (2006)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>Many of the parents are unable to meet the educational needs of children in my elementary school. # Special educators, particularly teachers and administrators, were also more likely to indicate that there would be pressure on teachers/students. One teacher wrote that " the teachers feel pressure which then puts pressure and too high of demands on the students. " # Another teacher noted that: # ALL students can make progress, BUT with the penalties districts face, students with disabilities will get the brunt of the blame. Again, it is important to look at the data of each student. NCLB defines progress too specifically, but with a more global definition, without such punitive requirements, it would be attainable. # When responses to this question were broken down by role, teachers were most likely to say that the emphasis on AYP would lead to diminished individualization for students, while administrators were somewhat likely to indicate this; however, teacher educators did not indicate this at all. One administrator noted that, " from my perspective, there is not a good understanding of</p>

Appendix II

Samples of “See the Data”

(from the Corpus of Contemporary American English)

<p>Source: Teaching Exceptional Children (2014)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>in class thanks to the general educators and paraprofessional preplanning material for her device, and her parents and paraprofessional learning to program the device. While a lot of progress had been made over the last 5 months, there are always areas for continued improvement related to communication skills. This second meeting illustrated how happy Rosa was with her friends and how excited her parents were that she had developed true friendships. # In May, the team reconvened to celebrate Manuel's progress and to plan for the summer and upcoming school year. The team was happy to <u>see the data</u> showing Manuel's more consistent use of his device to communicate. His peers even commented on how much easier it was to understand Manuel when he used his device and how he communicated more often now. His teachers agreed and noted that Manuel is more likely to initiate conversations and ask questions. His mom excitedly shared that Manuel takes his device everywhere in the community and has seen a great increase in his language skills. She is hopeful to see even more progress over the next year. The team completed</p>
<p>Source: Education (2012)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>To prevent possible performance bias, the participating teachers received no feedback regarding their test scores until after the study was completed. # Observers and data collection procedures. Mrs. Cox and three undergraduate students from a local university were the main observers in this study. During baseline and intervention phases, the teacher observed the target student daily and graphed the observed behavior to monitor response to intervention. To ensure reliability of the data, three undergraduate students served as independent primary and secondary observers during both baseline and intervention conditions. Mrs. Cox did not <u>see the data</u> collected by the independent observers until the completion of the study. # After being trained in several data collection methods during one of the group instruction sessions, Mrs. Cox selected frequency recording as her data collection method of choice, as part of one of her applied activities. The undergraduate observers were subsequently trained in this method by the first author. Mrs. Cox chose to focus the observations on the student's target behavior, reasoning that this behavior would be more feasible for her to record while teaching because it</p>

<p>Source: Education (2008)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>, he reframes the situation once again " (pp. 131-132). Each new understanding calls for more reflection, and produces a spiral pattern of work from appreciation to action to reappreciation. " The unique and uncertain situation comes to be understood through the attempts to change it, and changed through the attempts to understand it " (p. 132). Rethinking Teacher Reflection Each of the four conceptions of reflection described above are undoubtedly useful in understanding teacher reflection, and examples of each were found in our data. Each is a perspective from which to <u>see the data</u>, each revealing and concealing different things. But we concluded that none of them--individually, or collectively--accounted for what we observed about Mary and her reflection as a teacher. As only one example, all four of the models of reflection presented above are episodic; that is, they are based on interpreting specific episodes of teacher practice. Because of this, there is much they do not give an adequate account of--such as long-term teacher change. Below is a brief presentation of Mary's long-term change story. She</p>
<p>Source: New York Times (2007)</p>	<p>Expanded data:</p> <p>to Carlson. A Type 2 diabetic " costs us about \$13,000 a year on average in medical costs and time off work, " Mr. Montreuil says. # Every six months, employees who participate in Carlson's program and show improvement in at least three of the five measures will be able to choose between cash or merchandise worth in the range of \$100. # Such detailed medical monitoring by employers raises privacy concerns. # Ms. Wilkins of Intuit said that when her company introduced its health questionnaire last year, she fielded many questions about who would <u>see the data</u>. She said that she reassured workers that no one at Intuit would have access to the questionnaires, which are overseen by Optum, a unit of the insurer United HealthCare. She also reminded them that the survey was voluntary. # Typically, such programs are meant to comply with the federal privacy and nondiscrimination provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Americans With Disabilities Act, or A.D.A. Under these laws, with few exceptions, an employer is not allowed to see specific</p>

<p>Source: Saving Cascadia (2006)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>They had been so pathetically predictable! Once the firm had anointed the island as buildable, the managers were arrogantly certain that not even God would dare to second-guess their decision. She'd had no authority to push it any further, nor any desire to do so. After all, she was an engineer, not a seismologist. That gave her an ironclad out when the truth finally exploded into the public arena. How could anyone have expected a mere engineer to know what seismic data revealed? Especially since she wasn't even supposed to see the data. Even if she had known, who was she to say the data was right, the Chadwick and Noble cognoscenti were wrong, and Cascadia Island was doomed? But the data was right and the island was indeed doomed. She wondered if an answer from Dr. Lam would be waiting for her on her computer. The anonymous e-mail she'd carefully worded and sent contained a way for him to answer through an intermediate e-mail address that would prevent her having to reveal her name -- a bit of necessary</p>
<p>Source: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (2006)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>is 15 years (instead of 12.2 years for the next-to-last period in Chart 1), and the nine post-1975 retirees average 25.1 years on the bench (instead of 26.1 years in the last period in Chart 1). In other words, even if the two longest-serving Justices in the last half-century are lumped with an earlier period, the most recent period still shows a dramatic increase of ten years in the length of judicial tenure over the prior period and over the historical average tenure on the Supreme Court. # For those who would like to see the data on time in office without any period selected by the researcher, we present these same data as a set of overlapping averages to smooth out variations enough to see a trend line, but without assigning Justices to just one period. Chart 2 presents the same data as Chart 1 without any periodization. We chart the mean of the last nine Justices to leave the Court for every retirement or death starting with the ninth Justice to resign, retire, or die in office (in 1804). This graph</p>

<p>Source: USA Today (2006)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>prefer to act on big trial results because such studies determine scientifically -- using a large number of patients who are randomly assigned to be tested -- whether the treatment works. # " In the old days, manufacturers would come up with a whiz-bang product, and we'd buy it and try it, " says Michael Poniatowski, operations director for EVAC Ambulance in Daytona Beach, Fla. # " If it didn't work, we chucked it, " he says. " If it worked, we kept it. Today, we need to see the data to back those statements up. " # The AutoPulse trial # One trial that was conducted amid swirling accolades and anecdotes of lives being saved was halted early after a sizable number of test subjects died. # The results of the trial, published today in the Journal of the American Medical Association, illustrate the key role that independent trial monitors play in intervening when test subjects need protection. # The device known as the AutoPulse -- a portable, battery-operated device that wraps around an adult's chest and squeezes</p>
<p>Source: Physics Today (2005)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>unambiguously that without neutrino oscillation no plausible tweaking of the solar model was consistent with all the solar-neutrino data. # Before 1996, Hans often expressed the hope that he would learn the result of the SNO experiment in time for his 90th birthday. In fact, the results did not come until June 2001, when Hans was almost 95. Arthur McDonald, leader of the SNO effort, phoned Hans a few days before the public announcement to tell him that -- although he couldn't reveal the result yet he knew that we would be pleased to see the data. The result, when it was posted on the Web, was a strong confirmation of the solar model that had its beginnings with Hans's 1939 paper. # Collaborating with Hans was an honor and an enormous pleasure for both of us. He was a wonderfully enthusiastic coworker, with tremendous insight and mastery of an extraordinary range of physics. He was particularly skilled at making effective approximations. # We admired Hans as much for his personal qualities of decency, friendliness, honesty, and dedication to moral</p>

<p>Source: Atlanta Journal Constitution (2002)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>to launch another product in April -- a nicotine-free cigarette with genetically modified tobacco that will look, smoke and taste just like a regular cigarette. LeBow said he hopes this new product will help people stop smoking altogether. # Some smokers will take him at his word. But health experts are wary. # " It's scientifically conceivable that a cigarette can be produced that would reduce harm, relative to the products currently on the market, " said Leischow of the NCI. " However -- and this is a big however -- we need to <u>see the data</u>. # " It is critically important that extensive, scientific, independent analysis of those products takes place. Claims or suggestions on packaging is one thing; it's a whole other thing to have the scientific data to prove that safety is really established. " # ON THE WEB: To view the NCI's latest report on smoking and tobacco control: **27;5627;TOOLONG # CORRECTION-DATE: January 17, 2002 # CORRECTION: A story in Tuesday's Living section about " light " cigarettes shold have said that while</p>
<p>Source: NPR_Science (1999)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>No, I am going to answer that as part of my -- the National Research Council report of which Kathleen and I were members gave several areas where we thought it was mandatory for providers to be able to meet standards of confidentiality. The first one is that data that go over the wire should be encrypted so that people can't intercept them. The second is you need to authenticate who it is that's requiring. Right now people share passwords. A physician will give the password to her nurse or vice versa so they can <u>see the data</u>. We don't want to have sharing of passwords. We want to have individual authentication. Then you have to delineate access privileges. An insurance clerk might be able to see what tests were ordered but not the results of those tests. An X-ray file clerk can see X-ray results but nothing else. Finally then, to answer your question is that there should be an audit trail. And at Columbia Presbyterian there is such an audit trail which patients and employers can actually look and see every single</p>

<p>Source: Futurist (1995)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>are dangerous. That's my message in a nutshell. Why Do Prophets and Others Get It So Wrong? Why do people hold beliefs contrary to all of human experience for thousands of years -- beliefs such as that raw materials will become more scarce and their prices will rise? One can say that people are under the sway of a convincing theory -- that the supply ultimately is limited. But why do people hold onto such a theory even when it is contradicted by the evidence? Again and again over the past quarter century, after people see the data showing that all trends pertaining to human welfare have been improving rather than deteriorating -- health, wealth, education, leisure, availability of natural resources, cleanliness of our air and water, you name it -- the question arises: Why, then, do our media and political leaders tell us the opposite - - that life is more dangerous, our planet is "plundered" and "in crisis," we are running out of resources, pollution is increasing -- that is, that things are getting worse</p>
<p>Source: Newsweek (1994)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>half the incidence of heart disease as their compatriots in Lille and Strasbourg (butter maven) may be the difference in the dairy fats they consume. So far, alas, nobody but Renaud is as confident about these early findings as he is. Most American nutritionists approve of the fat-free cheeses now on the market; too bad they taste like rubber. # Most scientists say that it's way too soon for people to put their faith in one fat as opposed to another, because - - sorry -- more research is needed. I'd rather see the data accumulate over a few years,' says Greenwald. The exception may be the monounsaturated oils. Many experts are willing to recommend a change from butter to olive or ca-nola oil, as long as total fat remains low. If you switch from saturated fat to olive oil, there's no question that it's probably a benefit to your heart,' says John Potter, head of the Cancer Prevention Resource program at the Fred Hutchinson Research Center in Seattle. But if you're already eating a huge</p>

<p>Source: Mother Earth News (1993)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>11 A.M. one day, the next day they may take pictures at either 11:30 or 12:30. NOAA satellites can pinpoint areas of clouds as small as two miles wide; Russia's can record features on the Earth as small as one mile wide. TAPPING SIGNALS FROM SPACE Images can be recorded on plain old audio tape since the satellite signals are FM radio waves between 137 and 138 MHz (a hertz is a unit of frequency equal to one cycle per second; megahertz are equal to 1 million hertz) -- but that won't help you see the data that you want to see. Photographic facsimile machines make nice images from satellite signals and can be obtained from surplus outlets for as little as a few hundred dollars to as much as a couple of thousand. Other options are available, of course, but the method I heartily recommend uses what many households already have on hand: a personal computer. An interface circuit -- which is an actual card you stick into one of the expansion slots in the computer -- converts the satellite signals into smaller bits of</p>
<p>Source: ReVision (1990)</p>	<p>Expanded context:</p> <p>spiritual qualities in the cosmos, its repudiation of any intrinsic meaning or purpose in nature, its demand for a univocal, literal interpretation of a world of hard facts -- all of these ensure the construction of a disenchanting and alienating worldview. As Hillman points out: " The evidence we gather in support of a hypothesis and the rhetoric we use to argue it are already part of the archetypal constellation we are in.... The ' objective' idea we find in the pattern of data is also the ' subjective' idea by means of which we see the data. " # In this view, the Cartesian-Kantian vision reflects the dominance in the modern mind of a specific archetypal gestalt, a specific stage in the archetypal birth process. In a sense, the Cartesian-Kantian worldview is the elaborate articulation of a particular archetypal domain, but it is that domain in which the archetypal resonance of reality has been selectively filtered out: it is a specific state of consciousness in which the sense of the unitive spiritual depths of reality has been extinguished, leaving the world opaque and disenchanting</p>

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