Modality and the Infinitive:

Towards the Semantics of the Infinitive Marker *To* and the Complementizer

***For* as a Modalizer**

by

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Preliminary Illustrations

We can find many mysterious phenomena in infinitival constructions. Observe the following examples:

(1) a. It is true of America that many different ethnic groups are living side by side.

b. It is wrong that anyone should have to live on the street.

(*Youth Progressive English-Japanese Dictionary*)

First, why is it that it is impossible for (1a), but not (1b), to be paraphrased by using a *for* complement, as in?

(2) a. *It is true of America for many different ethnic groups to be living side by side.

b. It is wrong for anyone to have to live on the street.

Second, why is it that emotive modal *should* can occur in the *that* complement in (1b), but not in (1a)?

The following sentence is ill-formed when *should* is emotive:

(3) *It is true of America that many different ethnic groups should be living side by side.

(*should* is emotive)

Furthermore, observe the following sentences:

(4) a. I was delighted to win.

b. I was ashamed to see that.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))

(5) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.

b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))

According to Wierzbicka (1988: 111), native speakers of English don't hesitate to accept 'factive'

TO sentences in (4), but they often do hesitate to accept the corresponding FOR TO sentences in (5). On the other hand, she states that, if the FOR TO sentences are generic, or refer to the future, or are openly hypothetical, they are usually accepted much more readily. For example, she adduces the following sentence, which is usually accepted as felicitous:

(6) I am ashamed for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

She concludes from this that the basic semantic function of FOR TO emotion sentences consists in expressing attitudes as such rather than actual emotions.

In order to explain these linguistic facts, we have to take into consideration crucial elements, including complementizers, the properties of *for* complement and *to* complement, the speaker's construal of the situation, modality, mental attitudes, emotion and the emotivity of predicates.

1.1.1. Complementizer

Since Rosenbaum (1967: 24) introduced the term "complementizer" into modern linguistics for the first time, complementizers have generally been regarded as markers which introduce complement clauses. However, little attention has been paid to their inherent meanings. "Complementizers" in Rosenbaum (1967: 24), are composed of *that*, *for*, *to*, Poss (the possessive case), *-ing*, and interrogative adverbs such as *when*, *why*, *where*, *how*, *what*, *if*, and *whether*. *To* and *-ing* can be combined with *for* and POSS, while POSS cannot be used alone and is always combined with *-ing*:

(7) One of the properties of predicate complements that distinguishes them from other types of complements is a unique set of markers taking the form of single and paired morphemes. Such markers, including the morphemes that, for, to, Poss, ing, and others will be referred to as complementing morphemes or simply complementizers.

(Rosenbaum (1967: 24)) (Underline is original)

"Complementizers" in Rosenbaum (1967) are shown by the underlined morphemes below:

(8) a. I think <u>that</u> Fords are too expensive.

    b. I dislike argu<u>ing</u> about silly matters.

    c. I'm concerned about John<u>'s</u> be<u>ing</u> so lazy.

    d. The king ordered the proclamation <u>to</u> be read.

    e. I should like very much <u>for</u> you <u>to</u> reconsider your refusal.

    f. I doubt <u>if</u> he is going.

    g. I dislike it <u>when</u> you do that.

    h. I often wonder (about) <u>why</u> he does these things.

    i. I know <u>where</u> he went.

    j. Everyone understands <u>how</u> he does it.

    k. <u>What</u> he is doing is useless.

    l. I wonder <u>whether</u> he is going.

<div align="right">(Rosenbaum (1967: 24, 32)) (Underline is original)</div>

It was Bresnan (1972) who refined the concept of complementizers by classifying them into four types: *that*, *for*, WH, and *if*. Based on this classification, POSS and *-ing* are excluded from the class of complementizers and the examples in (8g)-(8l) are all regarded as including WH. We assume in this dissertation that the category of "complementizer" needs to be divided into two subcategories: the one which introduces a sentence and the other which introduces a verb phrase. This is because *to* differs from the other complementizers in that it introduces a VP, a part of a complement sentence, rather than a complement sentence itself. If we take into consideration this fact, *to* can be regarded as a "VP complementizer". This claim essentially accords with Huddleston and Pullum's (2002) analysis which regard it as a "marker of subordination" and Sawada's (2016) analysis which regards it as a "VP complementizer" (see Bresnan (1972)).

In addition, the *to* complement and the *for* complement are independent constructions in the sense of Goldberg (1995: 4). The concept of construction is defined as follows from the viewpoint of Construction Grammar:

(9) C is a construction iff$_{def}$, C is a form-meaning pair $\langle F_i, S_i \rangle$ such that some aspect of F_i or some aspect of S_i is not strictly predictable from C's component parts or from other previously established constructions.

1.1.2. Interrelationship between Complementizers and Matrix Elements

We assume that all complementizers have their inherent meanings. This assumption is supported by the fact that the kind of complementizers is chosen depending on the presence or absence of their interrelationship with a matrix element. I will adduce three arguments in support of this analysis:

First, in principle, the choice between *whether* (= WH) or *that* as a complementizer is determined depending on the presence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element (e.g. predicates such as *undetermined* and (not) *determined*):

(10) a. It is still <u>undetermined</u> [<u>whether</u> she has escaped].

b. #It is still <u>undetermined</u> [<u>that</u> she has escaped].

(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 70))

(11) a. It has not yet been <u>determined</u> [<u>whether</u> she has escaped].

b. It has not yet been <u>determined</u> [<u>that</u> she has escaped].

(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 70-71))

The difference of the acceptability in (10) indicates that the complementizer *whether* has an interrelationship with the matrix predicate *undetermined*, and that *that* does not. Furthermore, the difference of the acceptability in (11) indicates that both *whether* and *that* have an interrelationship with the matrix element (*not*) *determined*. In other words, the predicate *undetermined* selects a *whether* complement in (10), while the predicate *determined* selects a *whether* complement or a *that* complement in (11).

Second, the choice between *that* or *for* as a complementizer is determined depending on the presence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element (e.g. the indicative mood):

(12) a. It's rather odd [<u>that</u> a man is chairing a women's meeting].

b. *It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

The difference of the acceptability in (12) indicates that the complementizer *that* has an interrelationship with the indicative mood, shown by *is* in the matrix clause, and that the complementizer *for* does not.

Third, the choice between *-ing* or *to* as a complementizer is determined depending on the presence or absence of its interrelationship with the matrix element (e.g. the verbs *enjoy* and *want*):

(13)　a.　I enjoyed swimming.

　　　b. *I enjoyed to swim.

(14)　a. *She wanted talking to him.

　　　b.　She wanted to talk to him.

The difference of the acceptability in (13) indicates that the gerundive marker *-ing* has an interrelationship with the matrix verb *enjoy*, and that the infinitive marker *to* does not. The difference of the acceptability in (14), on the other hand, shows that *to* has an interrelationship with the matrix verb *want* and that *-ing* does not.

We can conclude based on the above three facts that it is adequate to assume that complementizers have their own inherent meaning because it would be difficult to give natural explanations to these three facts without postulating their inherent meanings.

1.1.3. *For* Virsus *To*

The complementizer *for* has often been regarded as a marker with no inherent meaning which is introduced to explicitly express the semantic subject of the following *to* complement. This claim indicates that the underlined parts in (15) are regarded as the semantic subjects of the *to* complement and thus can be mechanically omitted when the semantic subjects do not need to be

explicitly expressed:

   (15) a. It's important <u>for you</u> to read the first one immediately.

        b. <u>For you</u> to give up now would be tragic.

                 (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1182)) (Underline is mine)

   (16) a. It's important (for us) to read the first one immediately.

        b. (For us) To give up now would be tragic.

If we follow this claim, the main role will be attributed to *to* when the complementizer *for* and *to* co-occur. For example, in (15a), just as in (16a), it is *to*, but not the complementizer *for*, that has an interrelationship with the matrix predicate *important*. Furthermore, in (15b), just as (16b), it is *to*, but not the complementizer *for*, that interrelates with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*.

   This claim, however, is not general enough to be applied to another similar cases: in (17), where a complementizer (i.e. WH) appears before the *to* complement, just like in (15). In this case, it is clear that matrix predicate such as *wonder*, *ask*, *tell*, *decide*, and *uncertain* interrelates with the complementizer WH, but not with *to*:

   (17) a. They are <u>wondering</u> <u>what</u> <u>to</u> do.

        b. <u>Ask</u> him <u>when</u> <u>to</u> stop.

        c. She wouldn't <u>tell</u> me <u>how</u> <u>to</u> finish it.

        d. He's trying to <u>decide</u> <u>whether</u> <u>to</u> disqualify himself.

        e. I am <u>uncertain</u> <u>who</u> <u>to</u> speak to about this.

                            (Cf. Bresnan (1972: 68))

(17a) indicates that the matrix verb *wonder* interrelates with *what*, rather than with *to*. Similarly, in (17b)-(17e), the matrix elements interrelate with the complementizers (i.e. *when*, *how*, *whether*, *who*). These facts enable us to postulate the following principle on the interrelationship between

the matrix elements and complementizers:

(18) When a complementizer *for* and *to* co-occur, the former interrelates with the matrix element.

According to this principle, when the complementizer *for* and *to* co-occur, *for*, but not *to*, interrelates with the matrix element. In other words, *for*, but not *to*, has the priority of the interrelationship. Therefore, to regard the complementizer *for* as an arbitrary subject marker with no inherent meaning would violate this principle.

It should be noted that the present claim that the complementizer *for* has its inherent meaning has often been made in the literature of modern linguistics: Bresnan (1972: 79-81), for example, argues that the key to the meaning of the *for* complementizer lies in the meaning of the preposition *for*, which is schematized as follows (see Chapter 6 for more detail):

(19) for (X) → Y   X is the reason or subjective cause for Y

(20) for (X) ← Y   X is the purpose or goal of Y

Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988) argues that an analysis which regards *to* as equivalent to the combination of *for-to* is singularly unilluminating. According to her analysis, not only does it fail to explain facts which at first sight seem mysterious, but it also obscures those which are otherwise relatively clear. As for the differences between the two patterns, she adduces the following two differences (see Chapter 3 and 6 for more detail):

First, the *for* complement, but not the *to* complement, is often unacceptable in factual contexts:

(21) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.
      b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))

(22) a. I was delighted to win.
      b. I was ashamed to see that.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))

Second, in the *to* complement, but not in the *for* complement, the subject of the complement

clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause:

(23) a. *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.

b. I want very much for him (*for me, *for myself) to be present.

c. It is desirable for him (for me) to be present.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 120, 125))</div>

Third, the version with *for* sounds more helpless and less confident than the version without *for*:

(24) a. He wanted her to kiss him.

b. He wished for her to kiss him.

c. ?He wished her to kiss him

d. I want very much for him to come.

e. ?I want for him to come.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 109, 166))</div>

Furthermore, notice that there are constructions in which the *to* complement, but not the *for* complement, occurs:

(25) a. To be frank with you, I don't think you're competent for the job.

b. To tell the truth, I don't agree with you.

c. Strange to say, the cat was able to speak with the owner.

d. He is, so to say, an all-round player.

<div align="right">(*A New Comprehensive Guide to English Grammar*)</div>

The above examples imply that the *for* complement and the *to* complement are distinct constructions.

By taking these arguments into consideration, the present dissertation assumes that the *to* complement and the *for* complement are distinct complements and adopts the position that the complementizer *for*, but not the infinitive marker *to*, plays a crucial role in the interrelationship with the governing elements when *for* and *to* co-occur.

1.2. Aim

The primary aim of the present dissertation is to examine the meanings and functions of the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* and to demonstrate the following two points from semantic points of view ("modalizer" refers to a grammatical category which expresses modality):

(26) The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

(27) The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of "non-epistemic modalizer".

On the basis of (26) and (27), the present dissertation takes a semantic and cognitive approach towards the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* by adopting the viewpoint of CG (Cognitive Grammar) (Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008); Yamanashi (1995, 2000, 2009)). Langacker (2008) states on the fundamental claim of CG as follows:

(28) CG's most fundamental claim is that grammar is symbolic in nature. What does this mean, exactly? Let us first define a symbol as the pairing between a semantic structure and a phonological structure, such that one is able to evoke the other. A simple lexical item, such as skunk, is thus symbolic because it resides in the pairing between a meaning and a phonological shape. Grammar, of course, is concerned with how such elements combine to form complex expressions. The basic tenet of CG is that nothing beyond symbolic structures need be invoked for the proper characterization of complex expressions and the patterns they instantiate. More specifically: lexicon and grammar form a gradation consisting solely in assemblies of symbolic structures. <u>An immediate consequence of this position is that all constructs validly posited for grammatical description (e.g. notions like "noun", "subject", or "past participle") must in some way be meaningful</u>. (Langacker (2008: 5)) (Underline is mine)

Furthermore, as is stated by Yamanashi (2009: 7), the form of everyday language as symbol reflects the conceptualizer's cognitive process whether it is a morpheme, a word, a phrase, or a sentence.

Therefore, on the basis of CG, all constructions including the *for* complement and the *to* complement contain some inherent meanings.

Aijmer (1972: 86) analyzes the *for* complement ("*for* infinitive" in her term) bases on its meaning. Observe the following examples:

(29) a. I like Mary to sing.

b. I don't like Henry to be here.[1]

(30) It is annoying for Mary to buy so many new dresses.

According to Aijmer (1972: 86), (29a), (29b), and (30) show that the emotive predicates can occur with infinitival complements.

(31) a. For John to eat ice-cream shows that he must be hungry.

b. *That John eats ice-cream shows for him to be hungry.

(31a) and (31b) show that the verb *show* requires two sentential complements the subject complement can be a for complement, but not object.

Therefore, it is difficult to explain the above examples without taking into consideration the semantics of the *for* complement.

This section make concrete the content of the present dissertation. First, in the present dissertation, "modality" is regarded as a semantic category which expresses or construes how the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) is, and it is defined as follows (Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6)):

(32) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or its part comes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.

Second, generally speaking, the infinitive marker *to* has been regarded as having the function

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[1] We regard *Mary to sing* and *Henry to be here* as *for* complements, because the object of *like* is not

to introduce "future" situations through the original meaning of the preposition *to*, which expresses a "direction" (Cf. Curme (1931), Jespersen (1933), Visser (1984)). There are, however, a number of cases which cannot be explained only in terms of "futurity": cases in which the infinitive marker *to* introduces situations which have already occurred (i.e. nonfuture situations), cases in which it introduces someone's "thoughts" or "judgments," and cases in which the result of an action or event is described (i.e. "the infinitive of result"). Therefore, it is impossible to explain these nonfuture cases in a unified way only by having recourse to the notion of "futurity".

Third, the complementizer *for*, on the other hand, has been regarded as a meaningless grammatical marker which is introduced to explicitly express the semantic subject of the infinitive complement. However, if we pay close attention to specific linguistic facts, we will encounter a lot of cases which we cannot explain in terms of a traditional approach that analyzes the complementizer *for* as having no inherent meaning: in some cases, the complementizer *for* refers to different times, and, in other cases, it has a cooccurrence restriction on the matrix predicate. Therefore, it is impossible to explain these cases naturally by adopting the traditional analysis which regards the complementizer *for* as a grammatical marker with no inherent meaning.

Fourth, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the complementizer *for* differs semantically from the infinitive marker *to* in that only the former has a feature called "other-orientedness" and that it shows the conceptualizer's less confidence than the latter. This claim makes it clear that they belong to different semantic categories from each other.

The above points enable us to conclude that it will be theoretically possible to give an adequate semantic and cognitive explanation to grammatical behaviors of the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* by regarding them as modalizers.

1.3. Organization

The organization of this dissertation is as follows:

Chapter 2 introduces the essence of some selected previous studies which are significant for the present dissertation and discusses the relationship between the infinitive and modality. The

first half of this chapter discusses the relationship between modality and the notion of "nonfactuality" (i.e. "irreality") on the basis of Declerck (2011) and Langacker (1991). Then, after taking a brief look at how modality has been classified on the basis of Palmer (2001[2]) and Sawada (2016), we analyze the relationship of the infinitive with the notion of "nonfactuality" and other modalizers.

The latter half of this chapter introduces Jespersen's (MEG V) and Bolinger's (1968) traditional analyses by which the infinitive is regarded as being likely to be used in imaginative contexts. Then, after adducing Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), Dixon (1991) as suggestive previous studies, we discuss their claims that the meaning expressed by the infinitive can be classified into "counterfactuality", "possibility", "future-orientedness", "wanting", "opinion", and "judgement".

Chapter 3 introduces Wierzbicka's (1988) analysis, which we regard one of the most suggestive researches for this dissertation, and clarifies some problems which cannot be solved by her analysis. Wierzbicka (1988) classifies meanings expressed by the *to* complement into "wanting", "opinion", "emotion", and "aspect", and discusses in detail the semantic formula implied by the infinitive marker *to* (the following examples are quoted from Wierzbicka (1988: 31, 48, 77)):

(33) Wanting: He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go.

(34) Opinion: I believe/judge Mary to be dishonest.

(35) Emotion: I blush to think of it.

(36) Aspect: John began to peel the potato.

Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* differs from each other in that the latter shows the conceptualizer's less confidence than the former. This claim supports our approach proposed in the present dissertation.

Chapter 4 reconsiders Declerck's (2011: 27) definition of modality as shown in (37):

(37) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.

His definition is noteworthy in that the notion of modality is expanded and many expressions

other than modals or modal adverbs are regarded as belonging to modalizers. By reconsidering his definition of modality, we claim that the infinitive marker *to* is a modalizer and that the modality expressed by *to* can be classified into the following modality types: evidential modality, epistemic modality, counterfactual modality, deontic modality, and dynamic modality.

Chapter 5 puts its focus on the infinitive of result, which is shown in the underlined parts in the following examples:

(38) a. Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, <u>to find</u> that her husband had not yet
    returned.   (A. C. Doyle, *The Naval Treaty*) (Underline is mine)
 b. In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew <u>to be</u> a woman.

                        (Sherwood Anderson, *Winesburg, Ohio*) (Underline is mine)

The infinitive of result (i.e. "the resultative infinitive") is different from the other infinitive in that can refer to the situation which has already occurred.

In this chapter, based on the traditional analysis in terms of "realization", "intentionality", and "predictability", we propose Transparentizing Phenomena of the matrix verb followed by the infinitive marker *to* in order to explain why the resultative infinitive is interpreted as nonfuture:

(39) Transparentizing Phenomena:

    The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* is relatively weakened, and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.

Thus, the following example is interpreted through the following two processes:

(40) On August 27 they <u>awoke</u> (to) find that food had gone on ration, …
        (awake)   –<u>ed</u>

                                        (Cf. BNC)

First, the finite verb *awoke* in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form *awake* and the past tense morpheme -*ed*, and *awake* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, -*ed* transfers, over the transparent *awake* and *to,* to the complement verb *find*. Since the meaning of the transparent *awake* is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like a kind of an "adverb." The

complement verb *find*, on the other hand, is interpreted like a "main verb" with a past tense, because the past tense has transferred to it. Chapter 4 concludes that the fact that the infinitive marker *to* does not function as a modailzer is attributed to the fact that the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent and loses its original function to introduce the complement.

Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship of the complementizer *for* and its complement sentence (i.e. the *for*-complement) and demonstrates the following two hypotheses:

(41) A. The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.

B. The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into the following types: emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

The first half of this chapter demonstrates the following points: the complementizer *for* has long been regarded as a grammatical marker which is mechanically introduced to explicitly express the subject of the following infinitive and which has no inherent meaning. However, based on the fact that (i) the complementizer *for* can refer to both "future" and "nonfuture" situations, that (ii) the acceptability of the *for*-complement varies depending on what kind of matrix predicates are chosen, (iii) the *for* complement and the *to* complement are independent construction, and that (iv) the acceptability of the *for*-complement also varies depending on whether the matrix clause is in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically expressed by the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*, it is clear that there are a number of cases which cannot be explained by the analysis that regards complementizer *for* as lacking any inherent meaning. In order to give a unified explanation to these cases, it is necessary to reanalyze the complementizer *for* from a semantic and cognitive viewpoint.

The main aim to the latter half of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between the modality expressed by the complementizer *for* and the one expressed by the matrix elements, and to argue for the following hypothesis:

(42) There must be a "modal harmony" between the complementizer *for* and the matrix elements.

Chapter 7, the final chapter, summarizes main arguments and conclusions in the whole

dissertation, and mentions some residual problems for a future research.

Most of the supporting data used in the present dissertation are adduced from corpora such as British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), and from novels by Agatha Christie (some parts in the data which we put emphasis on are indicated by a single underline, and, when necessary, the *for* complements are indicated by square brackets in order to distinguish the complementizer *for* from the preposition).

Chapter 2 Selected Previous Studies on Modality and the Infinitive

2.0. Introduction

   The present chapter takes a brief look at some essentials of the selected previous studies which are important and influential to the present dissertation. The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.1. divides major previous studies on modality into two categories: studies on the definition of modality such as Palmer (2001[2], 2003), Portner (2009), Declerck (2011), Sawada (2006, 2016, 2018a) and Langacker (1991) and those on the classification of modality such as Palmer (2001[2], 2003) and Sawada (2014). Then, Section 2.2. discusses Declerck (2011) in support of the claim upon the semantic relationship between modality and the *to* complement. Section 2.3. adduces two important previous studies concerning the meaning and use of the infinitive on the basis of the traditional-grammatical approaches: Jespersen (MEG V) and Bolinger (1968). Section 2.4. provides some major recent semantic studies on the meaning and the classification of the *to* complement and the *for* complement: Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Hamawand (2003).

2.1. Selected Previous Studies on Modality

2.1.1. Definition of Modality

2.1.1.1. Introduction

   This section takes a brief look at four important previous studies on the definition of modality: Palmer (2001[2]) as the most standard theory on modality, Portner (2009) from a logical perspective, Declerck (2011) from a semantic perspective, and Langacker (1991) from a cognitive perspective.

2.1.1.2. Palmer's Approach

   Palmer (2001[2]: 1, 2003: 5) describes modality as a category closely related to tense and aspect. According to Palmer (2001[2]: 1), the three categories can be defined as follows:

(1) Tense, rather obviously, is concerned with the time of the event, while aspect is concerned with the nature of the event, particularly in terms of its 'internal temporal constituency' (Comrie 1976: 3). Modality is concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event.

2.1.1.3. Declerck's Approach

Declerck (2011: 27) characterizes modality as follows:

(2) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.

Here, "nonfactual world" must not be confused with 'counterfactual world' which is realized by counterfactual modalizers such as modal auxiliary *would*. With regard to the relationship between nonfactual and factual worlds, Declerck (2011: 27) states as follows:

(3) It should be stressed that by 'nonfactual world' we do not mean a world that is necessarily different from the factual world but rather a possible world that is not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world. This is clear from *John may be here*, which refers to a nonfactual world in which the state of John being here actualizes and which may or may not coincide with the factual world. A nonfactual world could not be represented as possibly coinciding with the factual world if 'nonfactual world' were defined as 'world that is necessarily different from the factual world'.   (Declerck (2011: 27))

Furthermore, he expands the classification of modalizers, linguistic devices which express modality, in the following way:

(4) A. A Modal Auxiliary (can, must, may…)

B. A Modal Adverb (perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily…)

C. An Intentional Verb (believe, suppose, imagine…)

D. An Attitudinal Verb (like, intend, want, hope, wish…)

E. The Subjunctive Mood

F. The Imperative Mood

G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)

H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (will, be going to, be about to…)

I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority

J. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（I think…）

K. "Modal Backshifting"

L. "Modal Conditionalization"

M. A Combination of K and L

(Declerck (2011: 28))

Among all the nonfactual worlds expressed by these modalizers, tense auxiliaries creating a future world or expressing posteriority, namely H and I, are regarded as a world which is incompatible with the factual world at a certain time and will be compatible at a future time.

2.1.1.4. Langacker's Approach

Langacker (1991) defines modality as the conceptualizer's attitude towards a proposition and proposes the following configuration as showing the grammaticalization of modal auxiliaries such as *will*, *can*, and *may* from original content verbs:

(5)

(Langacker (1991: 270))

According to Langacker, modals, which are "grounding predicates" in his term, represents the designated situation as irreal. This is shown as in (c).

Furthermore, he advocates two distinct notion, "reality" and "irreality" in defining modality:

Fig. 1: Dynamic Evolutionary Model (Langacker (1991: 242))

According to his analysis, "reality" refers to the history of what has happened in the world. For example, the domain of "reality" in Figure 1 contains "(known) reality", the cylinder which glowing to the present time along the temporal axis, and "present reality", the section of the cylinder. Here, "(known) reality" corresponds to the situations which the speaker knows to be true, while "present reality" corresponds to the situations which is actualizes in front of the speaker.

On the other hand, "irreality" refers to all the situations which is not included in the domain of "reality". For example, the domain of "irreality" in Figure 1 contains "non-reality", the part outside of the cylinder, and "projected reality (or "potential reality")", the part cylinder envisaged with the dotted line. Here, "non-reality" refers to the situations which is not factual or which the speaker does not recognize to be factual (i.e. Unknown reality). "Projected reality" refers to the situations which is certain to happen in the future, while "potential reality" to the situations which is possible to happen. It is important to note that the future situations which is usually expressed by *will* (i.e. projected reality) are included in the domain of "irreality".

According to Langacker (1991), modality indicates that the situation is located in the domain of "irreality".

2.1.2. Classification of Modality
2.1.2.1. Introduction

This section adduces some essence from several studies on the classification of modality:

Palmer (1990[2], 2001[1], 2003) and Sawada (2014).

2.1.2.2. Palmer's Approach

Palmer (2001[2]: 7, 2003: 8) classifies modality into two significant categories: "Propositional modality" and "Event modality". These two categories can also be divided into four different subcategories: evidential, epistemic, dynamic, and deontic. This classification can be schematized as follows:

Palmer (2001[2]: 7-8) argues that the following sentences:

(7) a. Kate may be at home now.

b. Kate must be at home now.

(8) a. Kate may come in now.

b. Kate must come in now.

can be paraphrased, in terms of "possibility" and "necessity", with the following sentences:

(9) a. It is possible (possibly the case) that Kate is at home now

b. It is necessarily the case that Kate is at home now

(10) a. It is possible for Kate to come in now.

    b. It is necessary for Kate to come in now.

In addition, according to his analysis, the important distinction between *may* and *must* is indicated by the complementizers *that* and *for*. This clearly suggests that the first pair are concerned with the speaker's judgment of the proposition that Kate is at home, whereas the second are concerned with the speaker's attitude towards a potential future event, that of Kate coming in. For that reason, a basic distinction may be made between "prepositional modality" and "event modality".

Furthermore, "propositional modality" can be classified into "epistemic modality" and "evidential modality". The two subcategories have distinct meanings, as in:

(11) The essential difference between these two types is (as is implicit in the discussion) that with epistemic modality speakers express their judgments about the factual status of the proposition, whereas with evidential modality they indicate the evidence they have for its factual status.   (Palmer (2001[2]: 8))

The difference of the subcategories of "event modality", namely, "deontic modality" and "dynamic modality" can be explained in the following way:

(12) The basic difference between deontic and dynamic modality is that with dynamic modality the conditioning factors are external to the person indicated as the subject (that he is permitted, ordered, etc., to act), whereas with deontic modality they are internal (that he is able, willing, etc., to act).   Palmer (2001[2]: 70))

2.1.2.3. Sawada's Approach

Sawada (2014: 328) expands Palmer's classification by claiming that it lacks "existential modality" realized by *can*, "speech act modality" realized by *should* and *may*, and "counterfactual modality" realized by *would*, and reclassifies modality as follows:

(13) Modality
- Propositional
  - Attitudinal
    - Knowledge
      - Evidential
      - Epistemic
    - Counterfactual
    - Sensory
      - Emotive
      - Spontaneous
  - Speech Act
- Event
  - Existential
  - Actional
    - Dynamic
    - Deontic

2.2. The Semantic Relationship between Modality and the *To* complement

2.2.1. Declerck (2011)

In the field of modality, it has been often discussed whether futurity should be categorized as modality. Declerck (2011) puts its focus on "posterity" and states as follows:

(14) Some nonfactual *t*-worlds can be characterized in terms of a modal concept that has been neglected in the literature on modality, viz. the idea that the *t*-world in question is envisaged by the speaker but not yet factual at the time *t* to which the world in question is anchored. (Declerck (2011: 32))

The *t*-world in question, by his definition, is the world realized by tense auxiliaries such as *will*, *be going to*, and *be about to* and coordinating conjunctions such as *before*. He regards these auxiliaries as modalizers expressing "not-yet factual world".

The present dissertation claims that the infinitive marker *to* can be regarded as a kind of modalizer in that it can realize the world which is seen to be not-yet-factual. A more detailed claim will be made in chapter 4 and 6.

2.3. Selected Traditional-Grammatical Appoaches to the Meaning and Use of the Infinitive

2.3.1. Introduction

The aim of this section is to adduce some essentials of two important previous studies: Jespersen (MEG V) and Bolinger (1968), concerning the meaning and use of the infinitive on the basis of the traditional-grammatical approaches.

2.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V)

Jespersen (MEG V: 166) compares the use of the infinitive with the gerund and claims that the infinitive seems more appropriate than the gerund to denote the imaginative (unreal). Thus, it follows from the following sentence,

(15) To arrest her on insufficient evidence would be dangerous.   (Jespersen (MEG V: 166))

that the event denoted by the *to complement* has not yet actualized in the factual world, but rather, it only actualizes in the speaker's imagination.

2.3.3. Bolinger (1968)

Bolinger (1968: 124), along the similar lines, states that the infinitive represents "reification", while the gerund represents "hypothesis or potentiality". For example, in the following pair,

(16) a. He started to get mean (but thought better of it).

b. He started getting mean (so I got out of there).

(Bolinger (1968: 125))

the context shown in the parentheses in (16a) is not compatible with that in (16b), because, while the infinitive in (16a) denotes that he has not yet got mean, the gerund in (16b) shows that he has already been mean. The context shown in (16b) is compatible with that in both sentences since

the possibility for him to get mean could be the reason for my getting out of there.

2.4. Recent Semantic Approaches to the *To* complement and the *For* Complement

2.4.1. Introduction

This section adduces some important points from five recent semantic approaches to the meaning and classification of the *to* complement: Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Hamawand (2003).

2.4.2. Quirk et al. (1985)

Quirk et al. (1985: 1191) compares *to* and *-ing* and defines the meaning of the *to complement* as "mere 'potentiality' for action" and the *-ing* as "the actual 'performance' of the action itself". In order to establish the definitions, it assumes three groups of verbs taking both complements: emotive verbs, aspectual verbs, and retrospective verbs.

First, emotive verbs include *dread*, *hate*, *like*, *loathe*, and *prefer*. According to their analysis, verbs in this group can basically take both complements, but, in "hypothetical and nonfactual contexts", the *to complement* tends to be chosen:

(17) a. Would you like {to see / ?*seeing} my stamp collection?

b. I hate {to seem / ?seeming} rude, but you're blocking the view.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))

Second, in the case of aspectual verbs such as *start*, *continue*, and *cease*, there is no significant difference in meaning between *to* and *-ing*:

(18) Lucy started/continued/ceases {to write / writing) while in hospital.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))

In the following sentence, however, there is an observable difference between them:

(19) a. He started to speak, but stopped because she objected.

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b. He started speaking, and kept on for more than an hour.

<div align="right">(Quirk et al. (1985: 1192))</div>

According to their analysis, the action referred to by the *to complement* in (19a) has not yet been carried out, whereas *-ing* complement in (19b) refers to an actual "performance".

Last, verbs such as *forget*, *remember*, and *regret* imply the event denoted by the *to* complement has been actually performed. Nevertheless, the complement expresses "potentiality" since the action or event takes place after (and as a result of) the mental process denoted by the verb has begun, as in:

(20) I remembered to fill out the form. ['I remembered that I was to fill out the form and then did so'] (Quirk et al. (1985: 1193))

In the case of *-ing* complements, on the other hand, it is implied that the action denoted by the complements has actually been performed, which is shown by the following sentence:

(21) I remembered filling out the form. ['I remembered that I had filled out the form']

<div align="right">(Quirk et al. (1985: 1193))</div>

2.4.3. Wierzbicka (1988)

Wierzbicka (1988: 26) divides the *to* complement, as well as the *for* complement, into three semantic categories: "wanting," "opinion," "emotion." This is shown by the following sentences:

(22) "Wanting" (Wierzbicka (1988: 27-44))

a. To be or not to be – that is a question.

b. Did you think to ask Brown?

c. I intended to go.

d. He failed to hit the target.

e. He refused to go.

f. I order you to do it.

g. The rain forced me to go inside.

(23) "Opinion" (Wierzbicka (1988: 46-56))

    a. Mary is known to be dishonest.

    b. John is likely to win.

    c. John seems to be a Mormon.

(24) "Emotion" (Wierzbicka (1988: 98-99))

    a. I was delighted to win.

    b. I would be delighted to see Peter here.

    c. It is desirable for him to be present.

This classification will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

2.4.4. Dixon (1991)

Dixon (1991: 220) also classifies the use of the *to* complement. The categories he proposes are "Modal" and "Judgement," both of which are represented in (25). (25a) is an example of "Modal," while (25b) "Judgement":

(25) a. I want Mary to be a doctor.

    b. I discovered him to be quite stupid.

(Dixon (1991: 220))

According to his analysis, "Modal (FOR) TO" complements relate to the subject of the complement clause becoming involved in the activity or state referred to by that clause, or to the potentiality of such involvement. On the other hand, "Judgement TO" complements relate to the subject of the main clause verb ventures a judgement or opinion about the subject of the complement clause predicate.

Furthermore, he also argues that a judgment and an opinion expressed by the "Judgement TO" complement must be subjective, which is shown by the fact that it is anomalous to use it with verbs expressing a conclusion, while it is natural with verbs of thinking.

2.4.5. Huddleston and Pullum (2002)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241) point out that the infinitive marker *to* derives from the proposition *to*, which expresses a goal, and that the meaning of the former reflects that of the latter.

Furthermore, they divide verbs which take both the *to* complement and *-ing* complement into six groups in order to demonstrate the difference in meaning between *to* and *-ing*.

The first group includes *bother*, *intend*, *plan*, and *propose*. In this case, there is no difference between the *to* complement and the gerund:

(26) a. He didn't bother to tell us.

b. He didn't bother telling us.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))

(27) a. He intended to leave tomorrow.

b. He intended leaving tomorrow.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))

In case of (27b), the gerund form is used together with an adverb *tomorrow*. They point out concerning this point that futurity is not incompatible with a gerund-participle.

The second group consists of aspectual verbs such as *continue*, *begin*, and *start*. In this case, there is no significant difference between the *to* complement and the gerund, but in case of *begin*, and *start,* the difference will appear:

(28) a. ?Don't start to tell me how to run my life.

b. Don't start telling me how to run my life.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1241))

According to their analysis, the gerund-participial tends to suggest ongoing activity. Thus, in (28b), the addressee has already said something which the speaker interpret as telling him or her how to his or her my life.

The third group consists of verbs of liking:

(29) a. I like to stay home at weekends.

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b. I like staying home at weekends.

<div align="right">(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1242))</div>

They claim that (29a) is more appropriate than (29b) when the speaker is asked to go bushwalking next weekend but he or she wishes to decline. In contrast, (29b) will be more appropriate when the speaker currently enjoys a week-end at home.

The fourth group consists of memory verbs, such as *remember*, *forget*, and *recollect*:

(30) a. I remembered to lock up.

b. I remembered locking up.

<div align="right">(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1242))</div>

According to their analysis, in case of (30a), the action of locking up and remembering is simultaneous, but the speaker remembered some kind of prior obligation to lock up and hence there is projection into the future with respect to that implicit earlier time, while in (30b), the action of locking up has been carried out at the time prior to the time referred to by the main verb *remember*.

In the fifth group, the gerund-participle expresses progressive meaning:

(31) a. I've finally got the program to work.

b. I've finally got the program working.

<div align="right">(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1243))</div>

There is an aspectual difference between (31a) and (31b): in (31a), the program now works, while, in (31b), it is working now.

Finally, verbs categorized in the sixth group are shown in the following sentences:

(32) a. She tried to open the window.

b. She tried opening the window.

<div align="right">(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1243))</div>

(33) a. They fear to go out at night.

b. They fear going out at night.

<div align="center">28</div>

They state about the above sentences that, in (32a), *to open the window* refers to a potential action, whereas (32b) implies that the action of opening the window has been actually done. In (33a), *fear to go* expresses an element of volition/intentionality. Thus, (33a) as a whole means that they intentionally won't go out at night. (33b), on the other hand, does not have this kind of elements.

2.4.6. Hamawand (2003)

Hamawand (2003: 171) claims from the viewpoint of Cognitive Grammar that all linguistic elements posited in grammar are ascribed some kind of conceptual import. On the basis of this claim, *for-to* complement clauses have not only a syntactic function but also meaning of their own which conditions its behavior. He also claims that the syntax of an expression is a reflection of its conceptual organization, which represents the specific construal imposed on their content. In this sense, the *for-to* complement can be regarded as a "construction" in Cognitive Grammar.

According to him, *to* complement clauses represent a "self-related" construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject's involvement in the complement event, and so implying his or her high degree of interest in its realization. By contrast, *for-to* complement clauses represent an "other-related" construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject's distance from the complement event:

(34) I like [to win the race].   (Hamawand (2003: 172))

(35) I like [for Jane to win the race].   (Hamawand (2003: 172))

According to his analysis, in (34), for example, the main clause subject relates the content of the complement clause to himself and so opts for the *to* complement. In (35), on the other hand, the main clause subject relates the same content to *Jane* and so chooses the *for-to* complement.

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Chapter 3 Wierzbicka's (1988) Analysis and Its Problems

3.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces Wierzbicka's (1988) analysis, which we regard as one of the most suggestive researches in this dissertation, and clarifies some problems which cannot be solved by her analysis. Wierzbicka (1988) classifies meanings expressed by the *to* complement into "wanting", "opinion", "emotion", and "aspect", and discusses in detail the semantic formula implied by the infinitive marker *to*. The present chapter adduces some essentials of Wierzbicka's (1988) analysis of the relationship the infinitive and the notions of "wanting", "opinion", and "emotion", and semantic differences between the complementizer *for* and the infinitive marker *to*.

3.2. *To* and "Wanting"

Wierzbicka (1988) puts its focus on the meaning of following sentence:

(1) To go or not to go? – that is the question.　　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

The meaning of (1) can be shown as follows:

(2) Should I decide: 'I want this: I will do it' or should I decide: 'I want this: I will not do it'? Should I decide: 'I want this: I will be' or should I decide: 'I want this: I will not be'?　　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

According to her analysis, this meaning must be due largely to the construction used, because if *-ing* is used instead of *to*, it is no longer there, and in fact the whole utterance loses its original sense:

(3) ?Being or not being — that is the question.　　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

However, the meaning in question does not apply to the verb *know* regardless of the use of *to*:

(4) ?To know or not to know — that is the question.　　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

This is because "knowing" is not something one can control at will. For example, one cannot say the following:

(5) a. *I decided to know it.

   b. *I decided not to know it.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 27))

She also argues that the element "*should*", which she has detected in Hamlet's question may or may not be implied by volitional *to* complements, but the elements of 'thinking', 'wanting' and 'future time' are always there. For example, consider the following sentence with the infinitive of purpose (i.e. the purpose infinitive in our term):

(6) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of *Language*.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 28)) (Italics is original)

That the above sentence can be roughly paraphrased as follows also supports her analysis of the meaning of volitional TO complement:

(7) Mary went to the Library

   because she thought this:

   I want this: I will read the latest issue of Language

(Wierzbicka (1988: 28))

To summarize, she proposes that the following semantic formula applies to all sentences where the *to* complement is compatible with the idea of volition:

(8) X V$_{vol}$ to be Z $\Rightarrow$

   X thought this: I want this: I will be Z.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 28))

The following sections adduces three cases (verbs of volition, verbs of attempting, and verbs of speech act) in support of her claim that the infinitive marker *to* implies the notions of "thinking", "wanting", and "future time" when it is compatible with the idea of volition.

3.2.1. Verbs of Volition

Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the infinitive marker *to* implies the notions of "thinking", "wanting", and "future time" when it is used with verbs of volition:

(9) He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go. ⟹

      he thought this: I want this: I will go

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 31))</div>

In order to demonstrate this claim, she gives her attention to the different phrases such as *decide on* and *decide to*, which have been thought to have no difference in meaning, and argues that the three notions in question are only implied by *decide to*, but not by *decide on*: according to her analysis, *decide on* implies that a number of possibilities have been considered ('gone through' in a person's mind) and that the subject decided to "stop" on one of those possibilities, whereas *decide to* does not imply any such series of possibilities.

She also gives her attention to the semantic relationship between *afraid of -ing* and *afraid to*:

(10) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up.

      b. She was afraid of waking her mistress up.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))</div>

According to her analysis, In (10a), the maid thinks that she should wake her mistress up, and a tentative intention to do so is formed in her head; and this tentative intention is accompanied by fear. In (10b), on the other hand, the idea of deliberately waking her mistress up never enters the maid's head. She concludes based on this analysis that only (10a) has the notions in question in its semantic formula:

(11) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up. ⟹

        when she thought this: I want this: I will do it

        she felt afraid

      b. She was afraid of waking her mistress up. ⟹

when she thought this:

this might happen because of what I am doing

she felt afraid

(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))

3.2.2. Verbs of Attempting

Wierzbicka (1988) argues that t the semantic formula of the infinitive marker *to* can also apply to sentences with verbs of attempting:

(12) He tried/attempted/strove/managed/failed/endeavored to go.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 35))

According to her analysis, the claim that *to* has the semantic formula in question when it is used with verbs of attempting becomes evident by comparing the meaning difference between *succeed in* and *manage to*. The verbs *succeed* and *manage* are similar in meaning, but only the latter can take *to*. She compares the following:

(13) a. Most people failed to hit the target, but Mary, who was hardly looking, accidentally succeeded in hitting it.

b. *Most people failed to hit the target, but Mary, who was hardly looking, accidentally managed to hit it.

c. She applied for the job, and she managed to get it (isn't she crafty).

d. She applied for the job, and she succeeded in getting it (isn't she lucky).

(Wierzbicka (1988: 35))

She explains the difference of acceptability of the above sentences as follows: *manage* refers to the interested person's action, and it implies a causal relation between the action and the desired outcome; this is why, if this outcome is achieved, it can be attributed to the agent's craftiness or skill. *Succeed* refers to an event and it does not imply a causal relation between the desired outcome and the interested person's action (this outcome may be due to luck). Furthermore, *manage* implies an effort and an intention aimed at the desired outcome (one cannot *manage to* do something by accident, without really trying); and this effort creates a natural expectation that

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the desired outcome might indeed eventuate. In the case of *succeed* the desired outcome can be due to accident and luck; and there is no reason to expect that it will eventuate.

Based on the above analysis, she postulates the following semantic formulae of *manage* with *to* and *succeed* with *-ing* (notice that the configuration "X thought this: I want this: I will do Z" is included in the explication of *manage* but not in the explication of *succeed*.):

(14) X managed to do Z. ⇒

　　　　one could think this: X cannot do Z

　　　　X thought this: I want this: I will do Z

　　　　X did some things because of that

　　　　One could think at that time: Z will happen because of that

　　　　Z happened because of that

(Wierzbicka (1988: 36))

(15) X succeeded in doing Z. ⇒

　　　　X wanted this: Z will happen

　　　　X did something because of that

　　　　One couldn't know this: Z will happen because of that

　　　　Z happened

(Wierzbicka (1988: 36))

3.2.3. Verbs of Speech Act

Wiezbicka (1988) argues that the same semantic formula also applies to sentences with verbs of speech act. According to her analysis, these verbs can take the *to* complement not only in cases of positive volition (= (16a)) but also in cases of negative volition (= (16b)):

(16)　a. He vowed/agreed/consented to go.

　　　　b. He refused/declined to go.

(Wiezbicka (1988: 37))

The semantic formula of the sentence with the intransitive verb *refuse* in (16b) can be shown as

34

follows:

(17) I refuse to do Z (go) $\Rightarrow$

I know this: someone wants this:

I will think this: 'I want this: I will do Z (go)'

And I will do it because of that

I know this: one could think this of me:

I will do it because of that

I say: I don't want it

I will not do it

(Wierzbicka (1988: 37))

According to her analysis, "negative" acts such as refusing or declining can be actually performed with utterances containing a *to* complement: *I am not going to do it*, just as acts of positive intention can: *I intend to do it, I promise to do it*. This *to* indicates that, at the end of the relevant "script", there is a future oriented thought in the speaker's mind: "I will (not) do it".

Furthermore, she argues that the same semantic formula can also apply to the transitive verbs of speech act, such as *order* and *beg* and that the speaker is not considering his own future action, but he is considering a future action of the addressee:

(18) I order/beg you to do it. $\Rightarrow$

I think this: I want this: you will do it

I say: I want this: you will do it

(Wierzbicka (1988: 38))

She also argues, however, that the above semantic formula does not apply to all transitive speech act verbs which take the *to* complement. The following sentences do not imply that I want you to do these things:

(19) a. I remind you to take your medicines.

b. I advise you to appeal against this decision.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 38))

She concluded based on the above analysis that the combination of a transitive verbs of speech act does not always imply that X said to Y "I want this: you will do Z".

3.3. *To* and "Opinion"

Wierzbicka (1988) puts its focus on the function of the infinitive marker *to* in sentences expressing "opinion":

(20) She is thought/believed/said/alleged/reported/rumoured to be dishonest.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 46))</div>

She argues, based on the fact that the *to* of opinion occurs most commonly (and for some verbs, exclusively) in the passive form, that in sentences of this kind the speaker is clearly distancing himself from other people's opinion. Thus, the meaning of these sentences can be represented as follows:

(21) Mary is said (thought, believed etc.) to be dishonest. $\Rightarrow$

      people say (think, believe etc.) this of Mary:

        she is dishonest

      I don't (want to) say: I say this

      I say: people say this

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 46))</div>

She also suggests that it is this distancing function inherent in the English 'passive of opinion' which explains the lesser acceptability, or the nonacceptability, of the corresponding active constructions:

(22) a. Mary is rumored/said to be a Mormon.

      b. *They rumor/say Mary to be a Mormon.

      c. Mary is alleged to be a Mormon.

      d. ?They/I allege Mary to be a Mormon.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 47))</div>

According to her analysis, (22b) is unacceptable because it is the only one which would not allow the speaker to diminish his responsibility for what is being said and thus contradicts the following formula:

(23) "I say this; I don't (want to) say: I think this"　　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 48))

Believe, on the other hand, allows the speaker to do even when it is used in the active form. In that case, it refers to the speaker's private thoughts. She distinguishes the function of the passive constructions from that of the active constructions by pustulating the following semantic formulae:

(24)　a. Mary is believed to be dishonest.　⇒

　　　　　people believe this of Mary: she is dishonest

　　　　　I don't want to say: I say this

　　　　　I say: people say this

　　　b. I believe Mary to be dishonest.　⇒

　　　　　I believe this of Mary; she is dishonest

　　　　　I don't want to say: people say this

　　　　　I don't want to say: I know this

　　　　　I say: I believe this

3.4. *To* and "Emotion"

After pointing out that the *for* complement appears in the sentences expressing emotions along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Wierzbicka (1988) classifies these sentences into (i) sentences expressing intention, (ii) sentences expressing emotional evaluations, and (iii) sentences expressing intellectual judgment and discusses the semantic formulae implied by each of the sentences.

3.4.1. The *For* Complement and Intention

Wierzbicka (1988) discusses the relationship between the *for* complement and personal intention in sentences with the verbs, such as *long* and *ask*, which require personal subjects and predicates such as *desirable* and *necessary*, which do not. Verbs such as *long* and *ask* express weak confidence of the possibility for the situation to occur. Taking this fact into consideration, Wierzbicka (1988) states that these verbs imply the following semantic formula:

(25) "I don't want to say: one could think this: it will happen (because of that)"

(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))

(25) expresses weak confidence that the situation denoted by the *for* complement will occur, but, at the same time, these verbs also imply a strong desire for the possibility. According to Wierzbicka, generally speaking, we do not tend to have a strong desire for the realization of the situation which is quite possible to occur: the lower the possibility becomes, the stronger the desire will be. This general claim enables us to give a semantic explanation to the difference of the acceptability of the following pair:

(26) a. I want very much for you to come.

 b. ?I want for you to come.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))

According to Wierzbicka (1988), the insertion of *very much* in (26a) expresses the speaker's strong desire for the realization of the situation referred to by the complement and, at the same time, his weak confidence in it. In (26b), on the other hand, the absence of *very much* expresses the speaker's weak desire and, at the same time, his or her strong confidence. Therefore, the unacceptability of (26b) comes from the incompatibility between strong desire (i.e. weak confidence) implied by the *for* complement and strong confidence (i.e. weak desire) implied by the whole sentence. Wierzbicka's (1988) hypothesis that the *for* complement expresses "strong desire" (i.e. "weak confidence") can be supported by the fact that it is used in the sentence whose subject is impersonal, which is shown in the following sentences:

(27) a. It is desirable for him to be present.

38

b. It is necessary for him to be present.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))

According to Wierzbicka (1988: 121), in (27), the speaker conceals his or her desire and expresses it as a public necessity by using an expletive *it*. Thus, "there is perhaps more urgency and more authority" to (27) than to sentences with personal subjects. Therefore, the following, in addition to (25) can be postulated as one of the semantic formulae of sentences with impersonal subjects:

(28) "I don't want to say: I want it"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

To summarize the above discussions, the semantic formulae implied by impersonal sentences and the personal sentences with the *for* complements can be shown by (29) and (30), respectively:

(29) I want (very much) for him to be present. ⇒

   I think this: I want this: he will be present

   I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen

(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

(30) It is desirable for him to be present. ⇒

   if one knew this: he will be present

   one would think this:

      this will be good

      he should do it

   I don't want to say: I want it

   I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen

(Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

3.4.2. The *For* Complement and Emotional Evaluation

Predicates which express "emotional evaluation" include *right*, *wrong*, *not fair*, *appropriate*, *inappropriate*. According to Wierzbicka (1988), if we consider the fact that these predicates are

used in the sentences with impersonal subjects, the semantic formula shown in (28) (i.e. "I don't want to say: I want it") will apply to them. Furthermore, they express an evaluation such as "*good*" or "*bad*" *towards* the situation referred to by the *for* complement, which is shown by the underlined part below:

(31) It is {right / wrong etc.} for X to do Z. ⇒

    when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

    <u>I think this: it will be good/bad</u>

                    (Wierzbicka (1988: 128) (Underline is mine)

Thus, *clear* and *true*, which do not express such evaluation, cannot occur with the *for* complement:

(32) a. It is {illegal / *clear} for these houses to be occupied.

    b. It is {right / *true} for God to punish sinners.

                    (Wierzbicka (1988: 127))

Notions such as "*good*" or "*bad*" implied by these sentences do not express their literary meanings, but rather they express "obligation", which is usually expressed by *should*. Therefore, (31) can be changed into the following:

(33) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. (It is right/wrong for X to cause Z.) ⇒

    when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

    I think this: X should/shouldn't do it

    I don't want to say: I don't want this

                    (Wiezbicka (1988: 128))

Wierzbicka (1988) also points out that the *for* complement used in the sentences of this kind refers exclusively to human actions:

(34) a. It is illegal for these houses to be occupied.

    b. ?It is bad for this soil to be so poor.

    c. It was crazy for her to leave that job.

40

d. ?It was a tragedy for the babies to die.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))</div>

Wierzbicka (1988) claims, based on this fact, that the matrix predicates of emotive judgment express an evaluation of the action itself rather than of the agent of the action. Thus, the semantic formula implied by the sentences of this kind includes (35) below (in (35), X refers to the agent of the action):

(35) "I don't want to say something good/bad about X"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the semantic formula implied by emotive evaluation sentences expressing is the following:

(36) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. ⇒

      when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

      I think this:

        it will be good/bad

        X should/shouldn't do it

      I don't want to say: I don't want it

      I don't want to say something good/bad about X

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))</div>

3.4.3. The *For* Complement and Intellectual Judgment
3.4.3.1. Expectability

Wierzbicka (1988: 130) discusses the relationship between the situation denoted by the *for* complement and an expectation of the realization of it. Predicates which express an intellectual judgment includes *unexpected*, *odd*, *strange*, *surprising*, *normal, natural*, and *usual*. According to her analysis, intellectual judgment sentences imply that the realization of the situation is expectable or unexpectable:

(37) "one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will happen"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

In (37), the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* is used because the exprectation of the realization of the situation referred to by the *for* complement is a "hypothetical expectation" (Wierzbicka (1988: 130)). Therefore, sentences of this type imply the following semantic formula:

(38) It is unusual for the train not to leave late. $\Rightarrow$

      if someone said: the train will not leave late

      one would have thought: one should not think that

      if I knew: it happened

      I would have thought: it is unusual

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

(38) shows that the *for* complement in intellectual judgment sentence refers to a factual situation and that the speaker made a prediction that the situation would occur.

   She argues that, in intellectual judgment sentences, but not emotive evaluation sentences, the emphasis is on the intellectual judgment rather than the speaker's personal emotion:

(39) a. I was delighted / sorry for Mary to win.

      b. ?I was surprised for Mary to win.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

In (39), *delighted* and *sorry* express emotional evaluations, while *surprised* expresses an intellectual judgment. (39b) is unacceptable because the emphasis is on the speaker's personal emotion though the whole sentence is an intellectual judgment sentence. Wierzbicka (1988: 130) postulates the following semantic formula for intellectual judgment sentences:

(40) "I don't want to say: I felt …"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

3.4.3.2. The Parallelism between the *For* Complement and Evaluative *Should*

   According to Wierzbicka's analysis, "expectability" expressed by the *for* complement used in intellectual judgment sentences is parallel to that by evaluative *should*. Evaluative *should* implies

that there is or was no expectation that the situation would occur:

(41) It was interesting/amusing/funny that X <u>should</u> have done Z.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 131))</div>

In (41), *interesting*, *amusing*, and *funny* co-occur with evaluative *should*. This shows that these predicates have "unexpectability" in their semantic formulae. Thus, (41) can be changed into (42):

(42) It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.　　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

3.5. The Semantic Difference between *For* and *To*

Wierzbicka (1988) criticizes the traditional analysis that there is no semantic difference between the *for* complement and the *to* complement and claims that they are quite different from each other. This claim is supported by the following evidence:

First, the *for* complement, but not the *to* complement, is often unacceptable in factual contexts:

(43)　a. I was delighted for Mary to win.

　　　b. I was ashamed for Mary to see that.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))</div>

(44)　a. I was delighted to win.

　　　b. I was ashamed to see that.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))</div>

In (44), the *to* complements, *to win* and *to see that*, express factual situations. In (43), however, the *for* complements do not express them.

Second, in the *to* complement, but not in the *for* complement, the subject of the complement clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause.

(45) *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.　　　(Wierzbicka (1988: 113))

(45) is unacceptable because the agent of the emotion expressed by the emotive predicate

delighted is coreferential with that of the verb *win*. Wierzbicka (1988: 113) refers to this feature of the *for* complement as "other-orientedness".

The "self-orientedness" of *to* and the "other-orientedness" of *for* can be shown as in the following semantic formulae:

(46) I shall be only too pleased to take over the pew. ⇒

 when I imagine this: I know this: this will happen to me

 I think this: this will be good, I will feel pleased

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 115))</div>

(47) I shall be only too pleased for Albert to take over the pew. ⇒

 when I imagine this: I know this:

  this will happen to someone

 I think this: this will be good, I will feel pleased

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 116))</div>

The "other-orientedness" of *for* allows the *for* complement to occur in the context of impersonal predicates as in the following sentences:

(48) a. It was unexpected for him to do that.

 b. ?It was unexpected for me to do that.

 c. It was odd for him to fail.

 d. ?It was odd for me to fail.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 116))</div>

According to her analysis, the oddness of (48b) and (48d) can be explained in terms of the other-orientedness of the complementizer *for*: sentences of this kind imply that one is looking at oneself from outside, as if one were looking at someone else.

She also argues that impersonal *to* implies self-orientedness, even though, formally speaking, its subject is no more coreferential than that of the corresponding sentences with the complementizer *for*:

(49) a. It was good to see them.

<div align="center">44</div>

b. It was nice to talk to them.

According to her analysis, the above sentences imply that the experiencer of the "good feeling" is identical with the subject of the complement clause.

Based on the above discussion, she concludes that the real difference between FOR TO and TO, then, is one of perspective: the infinitive marker *to* implies an experiential, internal, first person perspective, whereas the complementizer *for* implies an external, third person perspective.

3.6. Problems

It is true that Wierzbicka (1988) is very suggestive for the approach adopted in the present dissertation in that it focusses on the meanings and functions of the infinitive marker *to* as well as the complementizer *for* based on various linguistic facts and that it demonstrates the semantic difference between these two categories. There are however some problems left to be solved.

First, Wierzbicka (1988) does not clarify the temporal reference of the infinitive marker *to*. Although she clarifies that *manage* implies the subject "will" in its semantic formula, it should be noted that the verb *manage* functions as an implicative verb and thus necessarily implies the truth of the complement (Cf. Karttunen (1971)). For example, in the following sentence, the verb *manage* implies that the action referred to by the complement verb *go* was performed.

(50) He managed to go.

In this respect, *manage* is different from the other verbs of attempting (see Chapter 5 for a further discussion).

Second, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the *for* complement expresses a "strong desire" by comparing the combination of *want* + the *for* complement with that of *want very much* + the *for* complement. Generally speaking, however, it is not only because *very much* is inserted but because they are separated by some grammatical operation that *want* can be used with the *for* complement. *Very much* insertion only constitutes one of those operations:

(51) a. What I want is [for you to feel great].   (COCA)

  b. She wants very much [for her friends to be truthful].

Therefore, her claim is not convincing enough.

Third, if we take into consideration the fact that the *for* complement favors unreal contexts, we should postulate a certain semantic formula for the complementizer *for*:

(52) a. I'd be delighted for you to stay with me.

b. ?I was delighted for you to stay with me.

The difference of acceptability of the above sentences indicates that there is an interrelationship between the complementizer *for* and the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* in the matrix clause (see Chapter 4 and 6 for more detail).

Chapter 4 The Infinitive Marker *To* as a Modalizer

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. Aim

This chapter puts its focus on the relationship between the infinitive marker *to* as well as the content of the *to* complement and modality and demonstrates the following three points (we will discuss the definition of "modalizer" in Section 2.1.):

(1) A. The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

B．The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into the following types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

C. There must be a "modal harmony" between the infinitive marker *to* and the matrix elements.

The classification of modality expressed by the infinitive marker *to* can be schematized as follows:

(2) Modality

Propositional
- Epistemic
- Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
- Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)

Event
- Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose, Possibility)
- Deontic (Obligation)

Generally speaking, the infinitive marker *to* has been regarded as having the function to introduce "future" situations through the original meaning of the proposition *to*, which expresses a "direction". As for this point, Curme (1931: 456), Jespersen (1933: 330), and Visser (1984: 947) states as follows:

(3) This *to*, as can still be seen in many sentences, originally meant *toward* and pointed to

that toward which the activity of the principal verb was directed.

(Curme (1931: 456)) (Italics is original)

(4) This [*to*] was at first the ordinary preposition indicating direction or purpose...

(Jespersen (1933: 330))

(5) The particle *to* preceding the infinitive was originally a preposition with the sense of 'direction towards'…   (Visser (1984: 947)) (Italics is original)

The typical use of the infinitive marker *to* which introduces a future situation is shown by (6):

(6) To see her is to love her.   (Jespersen (MEG III: 11))

In (6), the two situations referred to by the infinitive are interpreted as not yet factual. This is evident from the fact that they can be paraphrased with a conditional with *if* and auxiliary *will* which introduces a future situation:

(7) If you see her, you will (definitely) love her.

The actual linguistic data concerning the infinitive marker *to*, on the other hand, exhibit the facts (i) that the infinitive marker *to*, when used after implicative predicates or aspectual verbs, or when used as the resultative infinitive, can introduce a situation which has already occurred, (ii) that it can introduce the subject's "thought" or "opinion", and (iii) that it can introduce an evidence of some emotion:

First, in (8), the infinitive marker *to* follows the implicative predicates *manage* and *happen* to refer to the situation which has already occurred:

(8) a. He managed *to speak* then. 'Thank you ... I've washed in cold ... '

(Agatha Christie, *The ABC Murders*) (Italics is mine)

b. The first time I played this competition my team happened *to come first*.

(BNC) (Italics is mine)

Second, in (9), *to* follows the aspectual verb *continue* to refer to the situation which has already occurred:

(9) He continued *to* read.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 24))</div>

Third, in (10), the *to* complement is used as the resultative infinitive to refer to the situation which has already occurred:

(10) I awoke *to find* a burglar in my room.

<div align="right">(*Shogakkan Progressive-Japanese Dictionary*, Forth Edition)</div>

Fourth, in (11), the *to* complement expresses the speaker's "thought" or "opinion":

(11) She is {thought / believed / said / reported} *to be* dishonest.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 46))

Fifth, in (12), the *to* complement constitutes the evidence of the emotion expressed in the matrix clause:

(12) I'm pleased *to meet* you.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 98))

The aim of this chapter is to give sufficient explanations to the above linguistic facts in a unified way.

4.1.2. Organization

The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 puts its focus on Declerck's (2011) definition of modality and the notion "nonfactuality" and redefines modality essentially based on Sawasda (2016, 2012 2018a). Section 3 proposes that the modality expressed by it can be classified into "epistemic modality", "emotive modality", "deontic modality", "dynamic modality", and "counterfactual modality". Section 5 summarizes main arguments and conclusions in this whole chapter.

4.2. Modality and Non-factuality

This section puts its focus on Declerck's (2011) definition of modality and the notion of

"nonfactuality" and redefines modality essentially based on Sawasda (2006, 2012, 2018a).

4.2.1. Declerck's (2011) Definition of Modaliy

Declerck (2011: 27) defines the notion of modality as follows:

(13) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.

"Nonfactual world" here refers not only so called a counterfactual world, which is made by the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*, but also any kinds of world which cannot be asserted to be equivalent to the factual world.

(14) If I were you, I wouldn't do such a thing.

"Nonfactual world" contains a world which is imagined (and, thus, not asserted). Thus, in the following example, the nonfactual world expressed by the epistemic modal auxiliary *may* is not the counterfactual world but the world which cannot necessarily be asserted to be equivalent to the factual world:

(15) John may be here.[1]   (Declerck (2011: 27))

In (15), the situation corresponds to the infinitive clause, namely *John be here*, and the modalizer *to* to the epistemic modal *may*.[2] Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is not asserted to be true and thus consists of an uncertain situation. In other words, it cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in "a possible world that is not

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[1] The modal *may*, in the combination with *but*, can express "admission", as the meaning of speech act:

(i) He *may* be a university professor, *but* he sure is dumb.   (Sweetser (1990: 70))

In (i), the modal *may* is used to indicate that the speaker admits the truth of the residue proposition (*he be a university professor*). See Section 2.2. for a further discussion on whether *may* of this kind can be regarded as a modalizer.

[2] Declerck (2011: 26) refers to "subject + bare infinitive", which remains after removing the modalizer from the whole sentence, as "residue situation" or "residue proposition".

represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world" (Declerck (2011: 27))) and therefore it is regarded as nonfactual.

On the other hand, a nonfactual world expressed by the root modal *must* is obligatorily compatible with the factual world. This world is equivalent to the world expressed by the epistemic modal *may* in that the residue proposition does not realize in the factual world:

(16) The fugitives must leave the country.   (Declerck (2011: 39))

In (16), "the situation" corresponds to the infinitive clause, *the fugitives leave the country*, and the modalizer *to* to the root modal *must*. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is not asserted to be true and thus constitutes an uncertain situation. In other words, the situation in question cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in "a possible world that is not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world" (Declerck (2011: 27))), and therefore it is regarded as nonfactual.

Furthermore, he argues that a "nonfactual world" also contains the world which is not yet compatible with the factual world at the speech time. The world of this kind is usually expressed by the modal *will* (= simple future) and called "not-yet factual world": [3]

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[3] Declerck's (2011) definition of "factual world" and "nonfactual world" is compatible with Langacker's (1991) definition of "reality" and "irreality" respectively. Langacker (1991: 242) advocates two distinct notion, "reality" and "irreality".

Fig. 1: Dynamic Evolutionary Model

According to Langacker (1991: 276), "reality" refers to "the history of what has happened in the world". For example, the domain of "reality" in Figure 1 contains "(known) reality", the cylinder which glowing to the present time along the temporal axis, and "present reality", the section of the cylinder. Here, "(known) reality" corresponds to the situations which the speaker knows to be true, while "present reality" corresponds to the situations which is actualizes in front of the speaker.

On the other hand, "irreality" refers to all the situations which is not included in the domain

(17) John will trim the hedge.   (Declerck (2011: 32))

In (17), the world in which the residue situation, *John trim the hedge*, actualizes is expressed as the one which is not yet compatible with the factual world at the time of speaking. Declerck (2011: 33) refers to the world in question as "not-yet-factual world" and states that this world consists of a kind of nonfactual world.[4]

4.2.2. Some Problems on Decleck's (2011) Definition of Modality

Declerck (2011) is epoch-making from the viewpoint of the present dissertation in that he expands the classification of modality which has traditionally been regarded as only containing modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs.[5] There are, however, the following two problems:

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of "reality". For example, the domain of "irreality" in Figure 1 contains "non-reality", the part outside of the cylinder, and "projected reality (or "potential reality")", the part cylinder envisaged with the dotted line. Here, "non-reality" refers to the situations which is not factual or which the speaker does not recognize to be factual (i.e. Unknown reality). "Projected reality" refers to the situations which is certain to happen in the future, while "potential reality" to the situations which is possible to happen. It is important to note that the future situations which is usually expressed by *will* (i.e. projected reality) are included in the domain of "irreality".

Considering these definitions, "reality" and "irreality" can be diagrammed in the following way:

(ii) Reality ⟨ (Known) Reality
              Present Reality

(iii) Irreality ⟨ Non-reality (Unknown Reality)
                  Potential Reality
                  Projected Reality

According to Langacker (1991), modality indicates that the situation is located in the domain of "irreality". His definition is parallel to that of Declerck (2011).

[4] The notion of "not-yet factual world" is an important theme which must be further explored.

[5] Declerck's (2011) classification of modalizers is as follows:

(iv) A. A Modal Auxiliary (*can*, *must*, *may*…)
     B. A Modal Adverb (*perhaps*, *possibly*, *duly*, *obligatorily*…)
     C. An Intentional Verb (*believe*, *suppose*, *imagine*…)
     D. An Attitudinal Verb (*like*, *intend*, *want*, *hope*, *wish*…)
     E. The Subjunctive Mood
     F. The Imperative Mood
     G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)
     H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (*will*, *be going to*, *be about to*…)
     I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority

First, there are a number of cases which cannot be explained in Declerck's(2011) definition of modality. Here, we adduces two of them as follows:

The first case is related to the emotive *should*. The situation referred to by the emotive *should* is a factual situation:

(18) It's odd [that the letter <u>should</u> mention the 21st of the month].

<div align="right">(A. Christie, The ABC Murders) (Underline is mine)</div>

In (18), the situation referred to by the emotive *should* (the letter mentions the 21st of the month) is a factual situation. It is difficult to explain this sentence in terms of "nonfactuality".

The second case is related to closed conditionals. As shown in the following sentence, when a conditional clause is interpreted as closed, the situation referred to by the conditional clause is a situation which the speaker admits to be true:

(19) ["The picture you are now looking at is a Van Gogh."] – "Well, if this is a Van Gogh, I'm rather disappointed by it."

In (19), it is presupposed that the situation referred to by the closed conditional clause is a fact. According to Declerck (2011: 31), the world expressed by the clause is assumed (or ostensibly assumed) to coincide with the factual world:

This explanation contradicts his definition of modality: the emotive *should* and a closed conditional clause do not evoke any "nonfactual world", but rather, they express the speakers' construal of a fact.

Second, Declerck's classification of modality is not elaborate enough. As was mentioned in Section 4.2.1., he expands the classification of modality to the modal *will* expressing simple future. According to his classification, the infinitive marker *to* must be included in the category of modalizer. This is because the infinitive marker *to*, as well as the modal *will*, can express the

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J. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（*I think…*）
K. "Modal Backshifting"
L. "Modal Conditionalization"
M. A Combination of K and L

<div align="right">(Declerck (2011: 28))</div>

See Chapter 6 for a further discussion on the above classification.

"not-yet factual world".[6] In order to regard the infinitive marker *to* as a modalizer, we must first regard the definition of modality as expressing a construal of a part of the situation as well as the whole situation.

We adduce Sawada's (2006, 2012, 2018a) definition of modality as a significant suggestion to solve the first problem. Sawada regards the emotive *should* as a kind of modalizer and defines modality as follows:

(20) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) comes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.

(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))

According to his definition, modality expresses a construal of a situation rather than locating a situation in the "nonfactual world". The situation in question includes not only an uncertain situation introduced by the modal *may* or a "not-yet factual" situation introduced by the modal *will*, but also a factual situation introduced by the emotive *should*. Based on the above claim, we can conclude that Declerck's (2011) definition of modality is not elaborate enough to be applied to any kind of modality.

If we take into consideration the above discussion, it is now clear that Declerck's (2011) and Sawada's (2006, 2012, 2018a) definitions of modality can be revised as follows:

(21) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or a part of it comes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.

(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))

If we follow this definition, we can postulate the following hypothesis:

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[6] The reason why Declerck does not regard the infinitive marker *to* as a modalizer is presumably because it introduces a verb phrase (i.e. a part of a situation) rather than a whole situation.

(22) The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

"Not-yet factuality" expressed by the infinitive marker *to* is paralleled to that of the modal *will* expressing simple future. The only difference between the two is that, while the modal *will* expresses a construal of the whole situation (i.e. X do Y), the infinitive marker *to* expresses its part (i.e. do Y).

Furthermore, the emotive *should*, as well as the infinitive marker *to*, can also be regarded as expressing a construal of a factual situation.

4.3. Suggestion

4.3.1. Introduction

This section classifies the modality expressed by the infinitive marker *to* and adduces some evidence for the present claim that the infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

4.3.2. Counterfactual Modality

First, the infinitive marker *to* can function as a counterfactual modality when it is used in a counterfactual situation and compatible with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* in the matrix clause. Bolinger (1968) compares the infinitive marker *to* with the gerundive marker *ing* and argues that only the latter can refer to the factual situation:

(23) a. To wait would have been a mistake.

b. *To wait has been a mistake.

c. Waiting has been a mistake.

d. Waiting would have been a mistake.

(Bolinger (1968: 124))

The difference of the acceptability of the above sentences can be explained as follows: In (23a), the infinitive marker *to* introduces a counterfactual situation and modally harmonizes with the counterfactual modal *would* in the matrix clause. By contrast, (23b) is unacceptable because the

indicative mood in the matrix clause does not modally harmonize with the infinitive marker *to*. (23c) is acceptable because the *-ing* complement refers to a factual situation and thus is compatible with the indicative mood in the matrix clause. These explanations can be schematized as follows (MH is the abbreviation of "Modal Harmony"):

(24) a. To wait <u>would</u> have been a mistake.

      (MH)

  b. *<u>To</u> wait <u>has</u> been a mistake.

  c. Wait<u>ing</u> <u>has</u> been a mistake.

      (MH)

The reason why (23d) is acceptable is not because the gerund marker *-ing* modally harmonizes with the modal *would* in the matrix clause but because there is a modal harmony between *would* and a certain counterfactual element implied in the sentence:

(25) Wait<u>ing</u> <u>would</u> have been a mistake (if …).

      (MH)

These explanations can be applied to the following similar example.

(26) a. It would be perverse to reject his offer.

  b. Oh, to be in England now that April's there.

                (*Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fourth Edition)

The situation referred to by the *to* complement in (26a) is counterfactual. In this case, the infinitive marker *to* modally harmonizes with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* in the matrix clause. On the other hand, the modal harmony cannot be found in (26b). However, if we postulate that a certain phrase expressing a counterfactual desire (i.e. *I wish*) is implied in the sentence, we can conclude that there is a modal harmony in (26b). The claim that the *to* complements in (26) refer to counterfactual situations is supported by the fact that they can be paraphrased with the subjunctive mood:

(27) a. It would be perverse if you rejected his offer.

b. Oh, I wish I were in England now that April's there.

<div align="right">(Genius English-Japanese Dictionary, Fourth Edition)</div>

Furthermore, observe the following sentence:

(28) To have seen him again would have pained me.   (Jespersen (MEG V: 166))

(28) is acceptable because the to complement clause functions as a conditional clause with a subjunctive past perfect and modally harmonizes with the counterfactual modal auxiliary would in the matrix clause.

We can conclude based on the above discussion that the infinitive marker to functions as a counterfactual modalizer in the combination with the counterfactual elements in the matrix clause.

The above discussion enables us to postulate the following principle as for the interrelationship between the infinitive marker to and the matrix elements:

(29) There must be a "modal harmony" between the infinitive marker to and the matrix elements.

4.3.3. The Relationship between Futurity and Modality

The infinitive marker to functions to introduce a future situation. The following sections, essentially along the lines of Wierzbicka (1988), argues for the following two points: first, the infinitive marker to can introduce a future situation (i) when it co-occurs with verbs of volition, verbs of attempting, and verbs of speech act, and (ii) when it is used alone to express "purpose", "plans", or "necessary conditions"; second, the infinitive marker to can function as a modalizer expressing "deontic modality" and "dynamic modality".

4.3.3.1. Verbs of Volition

Observe the following sentence:

(30) He wanted/planned/meant/intended/proposed/chose/decided to go.

<p align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 30))</p>

As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the infinitive marker *to* , in the combination with verbs of volition, implies the following three notions: "thinking", "wanting", and "future time", which are shown by the following semantic formula (X refers to the matrix clause subject):

(31) "X thought this: I want this: I will go"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 30))

The above semantic formula is suggestive in that it explicitly shows that the infinitive marker *to* expresses the subject's "desire" and "future time". In the following sentence, for example, a future situation is referred to by the infinitive marker *to*:

(32) Science can be embedded in many other activities. For example, children planning <u>to tell a story</u> might decide to use shadow puppets.   (BNC) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the partial situation (*tell a story*) is regarded as not-yet factual. This is evident from the matrix volitional verb *planning*.

4.3.3.2. Verbs of Attempting

Observe the following sentence:

(33) He tried/attempted/strove/endeavored to go.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 35))

According to Wierzbicka (1988), the infinitive marker *to* in the above sentence also implies the three notions of "thinking", "wanting", and "future time" in its semantic formula.

4.3.3.3. Verbs of Speech Act

Observe the following examples.

(34) a. I promise to do it. ⇒

I think this: I want this: I will do it

I say: I will do it

b. I order/beg you to do it. ⇒

I think this: I want this: you will do it

I say: I want this: you will do it

(Wierzbicka (1988: 37))

(34a) and (34b) are paralleled with each other in that the infinitive marker *to* in both examples expresses the three notions of "thinking", "wanting", and "future time".

4.3.3.4. The Purpose Infinitive

The infinitive marker *to* also introduces a future situation when its complement constitutes the purpose infinitive. Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the purpose infinitive implies its subject's "thinking", "wanting", and "future time":

(35) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of *Language*. ⇒

Mary went to the Library

because she thought this:

I want this: I will read the latest issue of *Language*

(Wierzbicka (1988: 24)) (Italics is original)

Based on (35), the situation referred to by the purpose infinitive is expected to occur in the future.

4.3.4. Deontic Modality and Dynamic Modality

If we take into consideration the above discussion, we can conclude that the infinitive *to* belongs to the category of modalizer expressing "futurity". However, the notion of "futurity" expressed by *to* needs to be subclassified.

For example, Wierzbicka (1988) compares the following sentences:

(36) a. She was afraid to wake her mistress up..

　　b. She was afraid of waking her mistress up.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 33))</div>

According to her analysis, (36a) and (36b) is paralleled with each other in that the situations following the matrix predicate *afraid* are both not-yet factual. However, they differ from each other in that only (36a) contains the subject's "intention" to wake up her mistress up. The implication of the subject's "intention" can only be attributed to the presence of the infinitive marker *to*. The present claim that *to* expresses "intention" is supported by the fact that *to* of this kind cannot be followed by any unintended verbs such as *fall down*. According to Goldberg (1995), (37a) is infelicitous unless the falling is interpreted as somehow volitionally intended:

(37) a. *I am afraid to fall down.

　　b. I am afraid of falling down.

<div align="right">(Goldberg (1995: 4))</div>

The above discussion enables us to conclude that the infinitive marker *to* can express an "intention" to do something as well as "futurity".

Furthermore, in some cases, the infinitive marker *to* can also be regarded as expressing an "obligation". Observe the following sentence:

(38) a. You came out of the gate with a big list of things [to do].

　　b. It's imperative [to think things through clearly and completely].

<div align="right">(COCA)</div>

In (38), the *to* complements express an "obligation" as well as "futurity".

If we take into consideration these linguistic facts, we can subclassify the "not-yet factuality" expressed by the infinitive marker *to* into at least two subcategories: "deontic" and "dynamic".

4.3.4.1. Deontic Modality

The infinitive marker *to* can function as a deontic modality when it occurs after adjectives such as such as *urgent*, *vital*, *important*, *essential*, and *imperative*, and nouns such as *order*, *importance*, and *request*:

(39) Adjectives

　　a. … it's <u>urgent</u> [to develop a conservation strategy for the African wolf].

　　b. … it is <u>absolutely vital</u> [to keep Trump's base angry and riled up and active].

　　c. But as we build and deploy intelligent systems, it is <u>vital</u> [to understand them so we can design with awareness and hopefully avoid potential problems].

　　d. It is <u>essential</u> [to teach letters as well as phonemic awareness to beginners].

　　e. It's <u>imperative</u> [to think things through clearly and completely]. (= (38b))

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

(40) Nouns

　　a. He also issued an <u>order</u> [to freeze all new regulations from agencies across the board]

　　　…

　　b. It's a <u>request</u> [to hurry up and have a life again].

(COCA)

(39) and (40) express "importance" or "obligation" for the partial situations denoted by the *to* complements. For example, in (39), by using *urgent*, *vital*, *essential*, and *imperative*, the speakers indicate that the "importance" or the "obligation" for the situations in question should be realized. In these cases, the infinitive marker *to* also expresses the "obligation" of the realization of these situations and thus interrelates with the "importance" or "obligation" expressed by the matrix predicates. In other words, there is a "modal harmony" between the two.

Furthermore, the infinitive marker *to* can express deontic modality when it is used with some nouns implying "obligation", such as *thing* and *work*, and WH phrases:

(41)　a. And don't worry because I have so many <u>things</u> [to do] every day.　　(COCA)

　　　b. I don't know where [to go].　　　　　　(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1264))

(41) expresses "obligation" for the partial situations denoted by the *to* complement. In (41a), by using a noun *thing*, the speakers indicate the "obligation" for the situation in question to occur. In these cases, the infinitive marker *to* also expresses the "obligation" of the realization of the situation and thus interrelates with the "obligation" expressed by its antecedent. The claim that the *to* complement in (41b) expresses "obligation" is supported by the fact that it can be paraphrased with a free relative clause containing the deontic modal *should*:

(42) I don't know where I <u>should</u> go.

<div align="right">(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1264)) (Underline is mine)</div>

4.3.4.2. Dynamic Modality

The complementizer *to* can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs after predicates which express "desire", "acceptance", or "intention", such as *anxious* and *willing*:

(43) a. You must be <u>anxious</u> [to return home].

　　　b. I am <u>willing</u> [to give up my life for this position].　　　　　　(COCA)

Both sentences in (43) indicate that the future situations referred to by the *to* complement constitute the object of desire, acceptance, or intention denoted by the matrix predicates *anxious* and *willing*. In the above sentences, we can see that the *to* complement modally harmonizes with the matrix predicates.

Furthermore, the complementizer *to* can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs after some nouns and express "possibility":

(44) Give me <u>something</u> [to eat].

<div align="right">(*Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fourth Edition) (Underline is mine)</div>

In (44), the *to* complement modifies a noun *something*. In this case, the infinitive marker *to* refers to "possibility", which is evident from the fact that the *to* complement in (44) can be paraphrased with a relative clause with the dynamic modal auxiliary *can*:

(45) Give me something (which) I can eat.

If we take into consideration the above facts, we can conclude that the infinitive marker *to* can function as a dynamic modalizer and express "desire", "acceptance", "intention", and "possibility".

4.3.5. Emotive Modality

The infinitive marker *to* can function as an emotive modalizer and express a feeling of "surprise" when it occurs after emotive predicates such as *fool*, *crazy* and *delighted* (the underlines in the following sentences are mine):

(46) a. Boehner must have been <u>crazy</u> [to invite him].   (COCA)

      b. I am <u>delighted</u> [to see Peter here].   (Wierzbicka (1988: 98))

In (46a), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a factual situation referred to by the *to* complement is expressed by the matrix predicate *crazy*. In (46b), in the same way, a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a future situation referred to by the *to* complement is expressed by the matrix predicate *delighted*. It should be noted here that the emotional judgment is expressed not only by the matrix predicates but also the infinitive marker *to* itself. By using the infinitive marker *to*, the speakers express the situations in question as surprising situations which are divorced from his or her assumptions.

Furthermore, the infinitive marker *to* can also function as an emotive modalizer and express a feeling of "disdain" when it occurs after emotive predicates expressing a calm judgment, such as *usual*:

(47) … it is <u>usual</u> [to give some small amount to the poor and destitute].

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

In (47), a subjunctive, emotive judgment of a situation referred to by the *to* complement is expressed by the matrix predicate *usual*. In the present case, the infinitive marker *to* functions as an emotive modalizer, and a feeling of "disdain" is expressed concerning the situation it

introduces.

The above facts enable us to conclude that the infinitive marker *to* can function as an emotive modalizer and that the emotion expressed by *to* can be classified into "surprise" and "disdain" (see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

4.3.6. Epistemic Modality

The infinitive marker *to* can function as an epistemic modalizer when it occurs after verbs such as *discover*, *find*, etc. (the underlines in the following sentences are mine):

(48) a. I <u>discovered</u> [him to be quite stupid].   (Dixon (1991: 220))

  b. I <u>find</u> [sewing to be refreshing to Jane].   (Borkin (1984: 79))

In (48), the situations referred to by the infinitive marker *to* constitute the speaker's judgment based on his or her experience. The interpretation of (48) is paralleled to that of the sentences with the epistemic verb *seem*:

(49) Sewing seems to be refreshing to Jane.

(49) expresses the speaker's subjective thought based on his or her experience. Borkin (1984: 79) puts its focus on *to be* deletion in the constructions of this kind and states that *to be* is deleted when the speaker represents the report of his or her experience:

(50) a. I found that this chair is comfortable.

  b. I found this chair to be comfortable.

  c. I found this chair comfortable.

(Borkin (1984: 79))

According to her analysis, the complement in (50a) represents a proposition viewed as based on evidence, while the complement in (50c) represents the report of an experience.[7] (50a), but not

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[7] According to Borkin's analysis, *to be* in (49) cannot be deleted because it is impossible to directly report a sensory experience of someone else's:

  (v) *I find sewing refreshing to Jane.   (Borkin (1971: 79))

(50c), might be used as a statement about consumer reaction tests, but (50c), but not (50a), would be used as a statement about how the chair feels to the speaker. (50b), on the other hand, might be used in either circumstance. This is presumably because the *to* complement in (50b) merely expresses the speaker's "thought" or "judgment" rather than his or her own "experience".

The present claim that the infinitive marker *to* can express epistemic modality is supported by the fact that it can co-occur with epistemic verbs such as *think*, *mean*, *imply*, *believe*, or *seem*.[8]

(51) a. I <u>believe</u> [John to be beaten].

b. I <u>reported</u> [John to be absent today].

c. I <u>suspect</u> [him to be hiding in the shrubbery].

d. I <u>consider</u> [myself to be cleverer than Fred].

e. I <u>know</u> [Mary to have raced giraffes in Kenya].

(Dixon (1991: 223)) (Underline is mine)

f. They <u>thought</u> [him to be a spy].   (Swan (2017: 664)) (Underline is mine)

In the cases in which *to* co-occurs with these epistemic verbs, *to* modally harmonizes with these verbs.

It should be noted that verbs such as *conclude*, *infer,* or *argue* do not take the *to* complement.

(52) ?I {concluded / inferred / argued} John to be stupid.   (Dixon (1991: 255))

This shows that these verbs do not take "thought" or "judgment" as their complement. According to Dixon (1991: 255), the epistemic *to* complement can only be related to some "straightforward impression" or "opinion", not to "the result of a process of reasoning". "The result of a process of reasoning" has stronger factivity than "thought" or "judgment" has.

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[8] Notice that the *for* complement cannot co-occur with epistemic verbs.

(vi) a. *What I <u>believe</u> is [for Mary to be shy].
b. *It is <u>clear</u> [for these houses to be occupied].
c. *I <u>know</u> (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].
d. *It is <u>true</u> [for God to exist]
e. *It is <u>false</u> [for there to be only finitely many primes]

(Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)

This linguistic fact suggests that the complementizer *for* cannot function as an epistemic modalizer (see Chapter 6 for a further discussion).

The above discussions enable us to conclude that the infinitive marker *to* can function as an epistemic modalizer when it co-occurs with epistemic verbs and modally harmonizes with them.

4.3.7. Possible Counterevidence for the Infinitive Marker *To* as a Modalizer

4.3.7.1. Introduction

This section adduces two cases as possible counterevidence for the present claim that the infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer: (i) the cases in which the *to* complement is used as the resultative infinitive, and (ii) the cases in which infinitive marker *to* follows an implicative predicate.

4.3.7.2. The Resultative Infinitive

First, the infinitive marker *to* cannot be regarded as a modalizer when the *to* complement is used as the resultative infinitive because the resultative infinitive merely refers to a fact and do not express any construal of the fact:

(53) a. I woke up to find myself lying on the grass.

(*Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fifth Edition)

b. "Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, *to find* that her husband had not yet returned. She dressed herself hastily, called the maid, and set off for the stables. The door was open; inside, huddled together upon a chair, Hunter was sunk in a state of absolute stupor, the favorite's stall was empty, and there were no signs of his trainer.

(A. C. Doyle, *The Naval Treaty*) (Italics is mine)

The situations referred to by the resultative infinitive in (53a) and (53b) are interpreted as factual situations which occurred in the past. The infinitive of this kind differs in meaning from the purpose infinitive in that only the former does not allow preposing of the infinitive or *in order* insertion:

(54) a. ?*To find myself lying on the grass,* I woke up.

66

b. ?*To find that her husband had not yet returned,* Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning…

(55) a. ?I woke up *in order* to find myself lying on the grass.

b. ?Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, *in order to find* that her husband had not yet returned.

The present chapter regards the resultative infinitive as exceptional to the claim that the infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer and attributes the reason to "Transparentizing Phenomena" proposed by Sawada (2016, 2018a).

Sawada (2016, 2018a) puts its focus on pseudo modal *have to* and proposes the following effect:

(56) The Transfer Effect of Tense, Aspect, and Modality:

Tense, aspect, and modality in the matrix verb transfers to the complement verb.

(Sawada (2018a: 156))

Based on (56), we can analyze the construction as in (57) by postulating the interpretation process shown in (58) below:

(57) Although I've trained and worked in this area since 1982 I am having to learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural. (BNC)

(58) …I am <u>having</u> (to) learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural.

(have) -<u>ing</u>

(Cf. Sawada (2016: 399))

According to his analysis, (57) is interpreted through the following two processes: First, the present participle *having* in the present progressive form *am having to* divided into the verb *have* and progressive morpheme *-ing*. Second, the progressive morpheme *-ing* transfers to the complement verb *learn* after *the verb have* as well as the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized.

The deontic modality expressed by *have to* is transparentized (= backgrounded) and, thus, interpreted "adverbially". The complement verb, by contrast, is foregrounded and thus interpreted as the matrix verb. The infinitive marker *to*, in this case, cannot be regarded as a

modalizer because it loses its function as the VP complementizer. See Chapter 5 for further discussion.

4.3.7.3. Implicative Predicates

Second, the infinitive marker *to* cannot be regarded as a modalizer when it is used after implicative predicates because it merely introduces a fact and do not express any construal of the fact:

(59) a. He managed to solve the problem.   (Karttunen (1971: 341))

   b. I just happened *to be looking* out of the window - the blind was flapping.

(A. Christie, *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd*) (Italics is mine)

According to Karttunen (1971), implicative verbs theoretically imply the truth of the complements. Thus, the situations referred to by the infinitive in (59) are regarded as factual.

The present chapter also regards these cases as exceptional to the claim that the infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer and attributes the reason to "Transparentizing Phenomena". Observe the following example:

(60) He remembered to solve the problem.   (Karttunen (1971: 341))

(60) shows the following two processes: First, the finite verb *remembered* in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form *remember* and the past tense morpheme *-ed*, and *remember* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, *-ed* transfers, over the transparent *remember* and *to,* to the complement verb *solve*. Since the meaning of the transparent *remember* is relatively weakened (= backgrounded), it is interpreted like an "adverb." The complement verb *solve*, on the other hand, is interpreted as a "main verb" with the past tense because the past tense has transferred to it.

The infinitive marker *to*, in this case, cannot also be regarded as a modalizer because it loses its function as the VP complementizer. See Chapter 5 for further discussion.

4.4. Conclusion

The present chapter put its focus on the relationship between the infinitive marker *to* as well as the content of the *to* complement and modality and demonstrated the following three points:

(61) A. The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

B．The modality expressed by the complementizer for can be classified into the following types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

C. There must be a "modal harmony" between the infinitive marker *to* and the matrix elements.

The classification of modality expressed by the infinitive marker *to* can be schematized as follows:

(62) Modality
- Propositional
  - Epistemic
  - Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
  - Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)
- Event
  - Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose, Possibility)
  - Deontic (Obligation)

We hope that the present chapter will make a substantial contribution to the area of studies on the infinitive as well as on modality in that (i) it expands the definition of modality by clarifying that modality expresses not only a "nonfactual situation" but also the speaker's construal of the factual situation and his or her mental attitude towards it, and that (ii) it emphasizes the necessity to reanalyze the infinitive marker *to* as a modalizer.

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Chapter 5 The Resultative Infinitive and Transparentizing Phenomena

5.1. Introduction

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the infinitive marker *to* has generally been regarded as having the function to introduce "future" situations through the original meaning of the proposition *to*, which expresses a "direction" (Curme (1931), Jespersen (1933), and Visser (1984)).

The resultative infinitive, which is focused on in the present chapter, differs from the other infinitive in that only the former expresses an event which occurred after an event referred to by the matrix verb (the underlines in the following sentences are mine):

(1) a. Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, <u>to find</u> that her husband had not yet

    returned.   (A. C. Doyle, The Naval Treaty)

   b. In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew <u>to be</u> a woman.

                                                                    (Sherwood Anderson, Winesburg, Ohio)

   c. I ran all the way to the station only <u>to find</u> the train had just left.

                                                                    (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1224))

The situations referred to by the resultative infinitive in (1a)-(1c) are interpreted as factual situations which occurred in the past.

Visser (1984: 1009-1011) divided the resultative infinitive into result type and action type. The former expresses a result which follows the event referred to by the matrix verb, while the latter expresses an action which immediately follows the action referred to in the matrix clause.:

(2) Result type

     a. Many of the familiar landmarks had vanished, to leave new squares and avenues.

     b. None of them lived to grow up.

     c. …I could never talk to poor people to do them any good.

                                                                    (Visser (1984: 1010))

(3) Action Type

     a. He awoke suddenly to find the car had stopped outside the hotel.

     b. He went away, never to return.

c. …he opened surprised eyes to find himself flying on the beach.

<div align="right">(Visser (1984: 1011))</div>

The present chapter, however, will not make a classification between the two types and regard them as one single type. Furthermore, this chapter will propose the notion of "Transparentizing Phenomena" as a decisive factor conditioning the interpretation of the resultative infinitive as nonfuture (see Chapter 3 for more detail).

5.1.1. Organization

The Organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 will introduce the essence from some previous studies on the resultative infinitive and clarify the syntactic and semantic constraints on it. Section 3 will propose the notion of "Transparentizing Phenomena" on the matrix verbs and the infinitive marker *to*. Section 4 will summarize the whole chapter and discuss some residual problems.

5.2. The Semantic and Syntactic Constraint on the Resultative Infinitive

5.2.1. Introduction

To the best of my knowledge, the number of semantic studies discussing the resultative infinitive in detail is rather limited, and almost all the studies merely provide a list of the examples. The majority of previous studies conducted in Japan put their focus on the comparison between the resultative infinitive and the other infinitive, while most of the previous studies in foreign countries focus on whether the actions referred to by the resultative infinitive is taken intentionally.

The present section will classify the previous studies on the resultative infinitive into three in terms as "realization", "intentionality", and "predictability" and clarify the syntactic and semantic constraints on it by pointing out their problems.

5.2.2. Actualization

5.2.2.1. Previous Studies and Problems

This section will adduce two previous studies in support of the claim that the resultative infinitive expresses "realization": namely Yasui (1996) and Yamaoka (2014). Yasui (1996: 217) points out that, when the matrix verb is in the past tense, the situation referred to by the following resultative infinitive implies that it was realized. According to his analysis, (4a) implies (4b):

(4) a. He grew up to be a fine gentleman.

    b. He became a fine gentleman.

(Yasui (1996: 217))

Yamaoka, on the other hand, compares the resultative infinitive (= (5a)) and the purpose infinitive (= (5b)) and argues as follows:

(5) a. Alan lived to be ninety-nine. [Result]

    b. Derek worked energetically to support his family. [Purpose]

(6) The infinitive will be interpreted to be "resultative" when the truth of it is presupposed, while the infinitive will be interpreted to be "purpose" when the truth of it is uncertain.

(Yamaoka (2014: 350))

According to Yamaoka's (2014) analysis, the resultative infinitive in (5a) presupposes that Alan actually became 99, while the purpose infinitive in (5b) does not presuppose that Derek actually worked energetically to support his family.

Yasui (1996) and Yamaoka (1996) have the following two problems:

First, the truth of the situation referred to by the resultative infinitive is not "implied" but "asserted". This is because the focus of the whole sentence is on the infinitive rather than the matrix clause. For example, asserting (7a) is equivalent to asserting (7b) (for the sake of convenience I will requote (4) as (7) below):

(7) a. He grew up to be a fine gentleman.

    b. He became a fine gentleman.

Second, the resultative infinitive is a kind of "assertion" rather than "presupposition". Generally speaking, "assertion", but not "presupposition", can be operated by sentence-negation. For example, since the truth of the *that* complement in (8a) is presupposed to be true, the complement will not be operated by the sentence-negation even if the whole sentence is negated as in (8b). Thus, in (8b), the matrix clause constitutes the "assertion", while the *that* complement "presupposition".

(8) a. It is odd that the door is closed.

b. It is not odd that the door is closed.   (Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 351))

However, the resultative infinitive will never be presupposed to be true, because the scope of the sentence negation in the matrix clause contains the resultative infinitive. Thus, (9a) is theoretically equal to (9b):

(9) a. Yehiel Erlich did not live to see the marriage of his only son.   (COCA)

b. Yehiel Erlich did not see the marriage of his only son.

If we take this fact into consideration, the resultative infinitive is not "presupposition" but "assertion" (Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Leech (1981), Levinson (1983)). See Section 3 for further discussion on the scope of negation.

Third, it is not necessarily true that he situation referred to by the resultative infinitive occurred in the past:

(10) a. The day after tomorrow they'll wake up to find themselves in Madeira.

b. He'll probably live to be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his old college, and I shan't mind at all.

(BNC)

The situations referred to by the matrix clauses in (10a) and (10b) are not yet factual. In the same way, the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive are also something which will occur in the future. Thus, (10a) asserts that they will find themselves in Madeira, and (10b) asserts that he will probably be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his   old college. Therefore, the resultative infinitive does not always refer to the situation which occurred in the

past, but rather, its time is simultaneous with that of the matrix clause. By contrast, the purpose infinitive always refers to the situation which follows the situation referred to by the matrix verb, because it expresses the "purpose", "aim", or "intention" (Jespersen (MEG V: 247)). Thus, (11a) and (11c) below does not always assert (11b) and (11d), respectively:

(11) a. I went to see my aunt on Saturday.   (Jespersen (MEG V: 247))

    b. I saw my aunt on Saturday.

    c. I will leave for Tokyo tonight (in order) to participate in the meeting tomorrow.

    d. I will participate in the meeting tomorrow.

Based on the above discussion, we can postulate the following temporal constraint on the resultative infinitive and the purpose infinitive:

(12) Temporal Constraint on the Purpose Infinitive and the Resultative Infinitive:
The purpose infinitive refers to the situation which follows the situation referred to by the matrix clause, while the resultative infinitive refers to the situation which is simultaneous with the situation referred to by the matrix clause.

5.2.2.2. Syntactic and Semantic Differences between the Resultative Infinitive and the Purpose Infinitive

This section adduces 6 syntactic/semantic differences between the resultative infinitive and the purpose infinitive: (i) the possibility for preposing, (ii) the possibility for *in order* insertion, (iii) the scope of the sentence negation, (iv) the paraphrasability into the cleft sentence, (v) the paraphrasability with *so that … can/may* construction, and (vi) the presence or absence of the complementizer *for*.

5.2.2.2.1. Preposing of the Infinitive

First, the purpose infinitive allows preposing when it is focused, while the resultative infinitive always does not:

(13) a. To open the carton, pull this tab. [Purpose] (Quirk et al. (1985: 1107))

b. To get out of the country it is necessary to have a passport. [Purpose]

(Jespersen (MEG V: 254))

c. To switch on, press red button. [Purpose] (Swan (2017⁴:143))

(14) a. *To be ninety-nine, Alan lived. [Result]

b. *To find myself lying on the grass, I woke up. [Result]

c. *To find that her husband had not yet returned, Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning… [Result]

Quirk et al. (1985: 1079) supports this claim and states on the preposing of the resultative infinitive as follows:

(15) These clauses [infinitive clauses expressing the outcome of the situation] are restricted to final position … (Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))

The reasons for the resultative infinitive's nonacceptability of the preposing are as follows: First, since the situation referred to by the resultative infinitive constitutes the result of the situation referred to by the matrix clause, to prepose the infinitive would lead to a contradiction of the time order between the matrix clause and the infinitive. Second, the infinitive could not share the tense with the matrix verb after the preposing.

5.2.2.2.2. *In Order* Insertion

Second, the purpose infinitive allows the *in order* insertion, while the resultatie infinitive does not:

(16) a. In order to open the carton, pull this tab. [Purpose]

b. In order to get out of the country it is necessary to have a passport. [Purpose]

(Jespersen (MEG V: 254))

c. In order to standardize children's learning, teachers tend to standardize their approach to teaching. [Purpose] (BNC)

(17) a. *Alan lived <u>in order</u> to be ninety-nine. [Result]

    b. *I woke up <u>in order</u> to find myself lying on the grass. [Result]

    c. *Mrs. Straker awoke at seven in the morning, <u>in order</u> to find that her husband had

        not yet returned. [Result]

5.2.2.2.3. The Scope of Sentence Negation

Third, the purpose infinitive is ambiguous when the matrix clause contains a sentence negation, while the resultative infinitive is not:

(18) a. He didn't go to the library to study. [Purpose]

    b. He didn't live to be 90. [Result]

In (18a), where the purpose infinitive is used, the scope of the sentence negation can or can not contain the infinitive. In other words, it can mean either that he studied or that he did not. (18b), on the other hand, can only mean that he did not reach 90 although he lived long. In this case, the scope of the negation does not contain the matrix verb *live*. The above facts enable us to conclude that the following principle is applied to resultative infinitive construction:

(19) The Affirmation Principle for the Resultative Infinitive:

    The matrix predicate of the resultative infinitive is always affirmative and not negated.[1]

According to the above principle, even if the matrix clause contains negation, its scope can only contain the resultative infinitive. Thus, in (20) below, the scope of negation only contains the resultative infinitive:

(20) I didn't wake up to find myself lying on the grass.

Therefore, (20) receives the same interpreted as (21):

(21) Although I woke up, I didn't find myself lying on the grass.

---

[1] We can assume that, in the resultative infinitive construction, *not* in the matrix clause transfers to the complement verb. See Section 5.3.7. for a further discussion on the transfer of *not*.

In the resultative infinitive construction, the situation referred to by the infinitive is expressed as the result of the realization of the situation referred to by the matrix clause. If the matrix clause is negated, any results could not be realized. Thus, if (20) received the interpretation that I did not wake up, then it would be impossible for me to find myself lying on the grass. In the present case, the resultative infinitive loses the meaning of its existence.

5.2.2.2.4. Cleft Sentence

Forth, the purpose infinitive can be the focus of a cleft sentence, while the resultative infinitive cannot. For example, in (22a), the purpose infinitive can be the focus of its corresponding cleft sentence (= (22b)):

(22) a. Mary drove all the way to Maine to visit some friends. [Purpose]

b. It was to visit some friends that Mary drove all the way to Maine.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 629))

By contrast, in (23a), the resultative infinitive cannot be the focus of its corresponding cleft sentence (=(23b)):

(23) a. Mary drove all the way to Maine, to find that her friends had moved to Florida.

[Result]   (Quirk et al. (1985: 629))

b. *It was to find that her friends had moved to Florida that Mary drove all the way

to Maine.

5.2.2.2.5. Paraphrasing with "*So That…Can/May*" Construction

Fifth, the purpose infinitive can be paraphrased with *so that … can/may* construction, while the resultative infinitive cannot. For example, (24a), where the purpose infinitive is used, can be paraphrased with (24b):

(24) a. Endill went to the library to find pictures of a catapult to help them on their way.

(BNC)

b. He went to the library so that he can find pictures of a catapult to help them on their way.

By contrast, (25a), where the resultative infinitive is used, cannot paraphrased with (25b):

(25) a. He awoke to find himself lying on the grass.

b. *He awoke so that he can find himself lying on the grass.

5.2.2.2.6. The Presence/Absence of the Complementizer *For*

Sixth, in a sentence with the purpose infinitive, the subject of the infinitive is explicitly expressed by the complementizer *for*:[2]

(26) a. The hunters encircled the deer in order <u>for the animal</u> not to escape.

(Declerck (1991: 478)) (Underline is mine)

b. In order <u>for you</u> to be eligible for a student grant, your parents must receive less than a stipulated annual income.　　　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1004)) (Underline is mine)

By contrast, in the resultative infinitive construction, the complementizer *for* is not used. Thus, the following sentences are not accepted by any native English speaker:[3]

(27) a. *I woke up for Mary to find herself lying on the grass.

b. *I lived for Tom to be 90.

Furthermore, (28a) cannot contain the complementizer *for* even if the verb is passivized.

(28) a. But they lived to see the light of day.　　　　　　　　　(COCA)

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[2] According to Quirk et al. (1985: 696), the preposition *for* can be used to express a purpose. For example, in the following sentences, the prepositional phrase *for money* and *for shelter* mean *in order to gain money* and *in order to reach shelter*, respectively:

(i) a. He'll do anything <u>for money</u>.
b. Everyone ran <u>for shelter</u>.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 696))

[3] The fact that there is no similar examples in British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) also support the present clam.

b. *But they lived for the light of day to be seen (by them).

The presence/absence of the complementizer *for* plays a vital role in explaining the "Transparentizing Phenomena" which is discussed in detail in Section 3. When the complementizer *for* is used, it prevents any matrix elements from transferring to the complement. See Section 3 for further detail.

5.2.2.2.7. The Possibility of "*Only*" Insertion

The possible difference between the two types of infinitive is that the resultative infinitive, but not the purpose infinitive, allows *only* insertion before it. Palmer (1965) and Inoue (1971) support this claim: Palmer (1965: 176) adduces (29) in support of this claim and states as follow:

(29) He arrived at last, only to see that the others had all left.

(Palmer (1965: 176)) (Underline is mine)

(30) Here, of course, there is no possibility of ambiguity. The occurrence of *only* and *never* illustrates quite clearly that this is an infinitive of result.   (Palmer (1965: 176))

Furthermore, Inoue argues that, when the resultative infinitive follows verbs of intention, the adverb *only* is used before the infinitive to avoid its confusion with the purpose infinitive:

(31) a. He went abroad only to die.[4]

b. They went out, only to get wet.

(Inoue (1971: 1192))

If we take into consideration the fact that the situations referred to by the infinitive in (31a) and (31b) is something which occurred in the past, the infinitive should be regarded as the resultative infinitive. Inoue (1971) regards these sentences as examples of the resultative infinitive. It follows that *only* occurs only in the resultative infinitive construction. However, Quirk et al.

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[4] The verb *die* is usually regarded as an unaccusative verb without the subject's intention, but, in some cases, it can be regarded as an unergative verb with the subject's intention (see Section 5.2.3.3. for more detail).

(1985: 629) argues that the adverb *only* can occur with the purpose infinitive:

(32) Mary drove all the way to Maine (only) to visit some friends.

If the infinitive in (32) is interpreted as the resultative infinitive, the whole sentence means that Mary drove all the way to Maine, but she only visited some friend. Therefore, in that case, (32) asserts (33) below:

(33) Mary visited some friends.

However, based on the fact that *only* can occur in the purpose infinitive construction,   the situation referred to by the infinitive in (32) can be expressed even when it is not yet factual:

(34) Mary drove all the way to Maine (only) to visit some friends, but in fact she couldn't visit any of them.

This fact enables us to conclude that *only* insertion cannot be a crucial factor which helps us to distinguish the resultative infinitive from the purpose infinitive.

5.2.2.3. Ambiguity

Section 5.2.2.2. argued that the resultative infinitive differs from the purpose infinitive in the following 6 points:

(35) 1. The possibility for preposing of the infinitive

2. The possibility of *order* insertion

3. The scope of sentence negation

4. The paraphrasability with a cleft sentence

5. The paraphrasability with *so that … can/may* construction

6. The presence/absence of the complementizer *for*

These differences can be a crucial factor in analyzing the sentences which has ambiguous interpretation.

(36) He came into the room to shut the windows while we were still in bed and I saw he looked ill. (Hemingway, "A Day's Wait")

The infinitive in (36) means that he actually shut the windows, but, if the whole sentence is uttered when it is uncertain whether he shut them or not, the infinitive will be ambiguous in meaning: it can mean either that he actually shut the windows and that he did not. If we take the different syntactic/semantic features of the two types of the infinitive in order to interpret this example correctly, we can argue as follows:

First, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be preposed:

(37) *To shut the windows, he came into the room…

Second, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it does not allow *in order* insertion:

(38) *He came into the room <u>in order</u> to shut the windows...

Third, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if the negation in the matrix clause does not contain the matrix verb. As was mentioned earlier, the matrix predicate of the resultative infinitive is always affirmative and not negated. Although the matrix verb appears to be negated in the following sentence, the actual scope of the negation contains only the complement verb. Therefore, (39) below means that he did not shut the windows although he came into the room:

(39) He didn't come into the room to shut the windows…

Fourth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be the focus of its corresponding cleft sentence:

(40) *It was to shut the windows that he came into the room…

Fifth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if it cannot be paraphrased with *so that … can/may* construction:

(41) *He came into the room so that he {could / might} shut the windows…

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Sixth, the infinitive in question is the resultative infinitive if we cannot use the complementizer *for* to express the semantic subject of the infinitive:

    (42) *He came into the room <u>for her</u> to shut the windows…

5.2.3. Intension

5.2.3.1. The Constraint on Matrix Predicates

This section adduces Jespersen (MEG V) and Ando (2010) as previous studies which analyzes the resultative infinitive in terms of "intention". Ando (2010: 212) argues that the resultative infinitive can only co-occur with verbs with no intention:

    (43) a. He will live to be ninety.

           b. In 1980 he left Japan never to return.

           c. I woke that night to find my house in flames.

           d. She opened her eyes to see a tall, dark-haired man standing beside her.

                                           (Ando (2010: 212))

In (43a)-(43d), where predicates such as *be*, *return*, *find*, and *see*, the situations referred to by these verbs dos not express the subject's intention.

Jespersen (MEG V: 256), by contrast, divides the result expressed by the resultative infinitive into two types: *Live* Type and *Find* Type. The former type can express either intended or unintended result, while the latter type expresses an unintended result:

                         Live Type

(44) Result

                         Find Type

According to Jespersen (MEG V), the infinitive classified in *Live* type is used after the verb *live* which means "*live long enough to experience*". In the present type, the infinitive can express either an intended result or an unintended result:

(45) a. My papa lived to bail Mr. Micawber several times.

b. … we shall not live to make other friends.

c. …the son, who grew up to be killed in the Great War.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))

In (45a), the situation referred to by the infinitive expresses the subject's intention, while, in (45b), the situation referred to by the infinitive constitutes the subject's oath and expresses their intention. By contrast, in (45c), where the resultative infinitive is used in a relative clause, the situation referred to by the infinitive does not involve the subject's intention. This is because no one is killed by intention.

The infinitive in classified in *find* type always does not involve the subject's intention:

(46) a. I opened my eyes to find that we were standing still before a large building.

b. She woke suddenly to find some one standing in her open doorway and holding a candle.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))

In both (46a) and (46b), the infinitive refers to situations which unintentionally happened to the subjects, and thus does not involve any intentions. Furthermore, according to Jespersen's observation, the adverb *only* can co-occur with the infinitive of *find* type:

(47) a. I am sorry to have raised your expectations only to disappoint them.

b. You have only ended courting to begin marriage.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 256-7))

The situations referred to by the infinitive in (47a) and (47b) are not those which usually do not involve any intentions.

The above discussion enables us to summarize Jespersen's (MEG V) subclassification of the resultative infinitive with the following schema.

(48) The Resultative Infinitive

- *live* type
  - Intentinal
  - Unintentional
- *find* type ― Unintentional

5.2.3.2. *…, and S Do Too* Construction

This section adduces *…, and S do too* insertion as one of the factors to clarify whether the situation involves some intention. Generally speaking, the present construction can only be used to refer to a situation which involves some intention:

(49) a. Tom went to the library, and Mary did too.

b. *It rained heavily yesterday, and it did the day before yesterday too.

Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 85) adduces some examples with the purpose infinitive and argues that the purpose infinitive allows *…, and S do too* insertion:

(50) a. The plumber came into the room to fix the sink.

b. John went off to the store to buy a chocolate bar.

(51) a. John came into the room to fix the sink, and Mary did too.

b. John went off to the store to buy a chocolate bar, and Mary did too.

(Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 85)) (Underline is mine)

In (51), the verb *did* in the clause after *and* is the substitution of the whole verb phrase including the purpose infinitive in the former clause. Thus, *did* in (51a) and (51b) refers to actions of "coming into the room to fix the sink" and "going off to the store to buy a chocolate bar", respectively. The both sentence in (51) are acceptable because the actions referred to by the purpose infinitive involve the subject's intention just as the actions referred to by *did* involves the subject's intention. By contrast, based on the fact that the resultative infinitive refers to an unintended action, we can predict that the resultative infinitive does not allow *…, and S do too* insertion. The nonacceptability of the following example proves this prediction to be correct.

(52) ??He woke up to find himself in jail, and she did too.

Furthermore, based on Jespersen's (MEG V) claim that the infinitive in *live* type can refer to either an intended or unintended action, we can predict that the infinitive in this type can be subclassified into the following two subtypes: the one which does not allow *…, and S do too* insertion, and the other which does allow it. The nonacceptability of the following sentences proves this prediction to be current:

(53) a. ??He lived to be 90, and she did too.

   b. ?My papa lived to bail Mr. Micawber several times, and Mary did too.

According to a native speaker of English, (53a), where the verb *be* is used in the infinitive sounds infelicitous, while (53b), where the verb *bail* is used, sounds better than (53a). We can conclude based on these data that *live* type is divided into intentional subtype and unintentional subtype, depending on the presence or absence of the verb used in the infinitive. [5]

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[5] Oe (1983: 181), in terms of the coreferentiality of the subjects, adduces the following sentence in support of the claim that the resultative infinitive does not involve the subject's intention:

(ii) He$_i$ rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill, to give him$_i$ a sense of reality
    again.   (Oe (1983: 181))

According to his analysis, in (ii), the subject of the matrix clause and that of the infinitive are not coreferential. If the both subjects are coreferential, the object of the verb *give* will be *himself* instead of *him*. Based on this explanation, he concludes that the semantic subject of the infinitive is not a person (*he*) but rather the whole matrix clause which, of course, cannot have intention. Therefore, the infinitive used in (ii) can only be the resultative infinitive, and thus it cannot be preposed and does not allow *in order* insertion. This is shown in the following examples:

(iii) a. ??<u>To give him a sense of reality again</u>, he rose and stood a moment clutching the
       window-sill.
    b. ??He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill <u>in order</u> to give him a sense
       of reality again.

Furthermore, the subject of the purpose infinitive is coreferential with that of the matrix clause unless it is explicitly expressed by the complementizer *for*. Thus, if the infinitive in (iii) is the purpose infinitive, *himself,* but not *him*, will be chosen as the object of the verb *give*. It can be predicted that, if the object of *give* in (iii) is substituted with *himself*, the whole sentence will be acceptable under the coreferentiality of subject. The acceptance of the following sentences proves this prediction to be correct:

(iv) He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill, to give {himself / ?him} a sense
    of reality again.
(v) a. He rose and stood a moment clutching the window-sill in order to give {himself /
       *him} a sense of reality again.
    b. To give {himself / *him} a sense of reality again, he rose and stood a moment

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5.2.3.3. Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, the differences between the resultative infinitive and the purpose infinitive can be summarized as follows:

(54) In the case of the purpose infinitive, the action referred to by the infinitive involves the subject's intention. In the case of resultative infinitive, the action referred to by the infinitive in *live* type involves the subject's intention, while the action referred to by the infinitive in *find* type either can or cannot involve the subject's intention.

If we follow this principle, we can postulate that the infinitive will be ambiguous if none of the grammatical operations, such as preposing or *in order* insertion, is applied or if it is uncertain whether the infinitive involves the subject's intention. In order to make sure the validity of this hypothesis, (31) will be requoted as (55) below. Notice that Inoue (1971) regards both of the following sentences as examples of the resultative infinitive:

(55) a. He went abroad only to die.

b. They went out, only to get wet.

In (55a) and (55b), the expressions *die* and *get wet* are used, respectively. While the verb *die* can

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clutching the window-sill.

The following sentence is similar to the above examples in this respect:

(vi) Nothing happened the next day to weaken her terror.　　　(Jespersen (MEG V: 256))

(vi) will be unacceptable if we regard the semantic subject as coreferential to that of the matrix clause. Thus, the subject of the infinitive is interpreted to be the matrix clause as a whole. The fact that the infinitive in question can be paraphrased with (viia) below or that the semantic subject of the infinitive can be expressed with *it* which refers to the matrix clause supports this claim:

(vii) a. Nothing happened the next day, which weakened her terror.

b. Nothing happened the next day, and it weakened her terror.

Here, the situation referred to by the matrix clause, the subject of the infinitive, cannot be regarded as involving its intention.

The infinitive discussed here differ from the resultative infinitive discussed in the present chapter in that the subject of the former is not coreferential with that of the matrix clause. Therefore the present chapter excludes these example from the objects of its analysis.

express a change of a state which cannot be controlled by the subject's intention, it also can mean to commit a suicide, which expresses an intended action. The verb phrase *get wet* can express either a change of a state or an intended action. Thus, the above sentences are both ambiguous. In the first interpretation, the infinitive is regarded as the purpose infinitive which involves the subject's intention. In this case, the situations in question are expressed as not yet factual. In the second interpretation, on the other hand, the infinitive is regarded as the resultative infinitive without the subject's intention. In this case, the situations in question are expressed as actually occurring after the situations referred to by the matrix clauses actualize. The infinitive allows its preposing or *in order* insertion when it is interpreted as the purpose infinitive.

5.2.4. Expectability

Declerck (1991: 479) argues that the result or outcome referred to by the resultative infinitive is not predictable:

(56) a. He rushed to her bed, only to find that it was empty.

b. The next thing I knew. I woke to find myself in jail.

c. He rose to be Chief Superintendent.

d. You will live to regret this foolish decision.

(Declerck (1991: 479))

According to his analysis, in (56), all the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive are something which was unexpected to occur.

Here, it is questionable why the result or outcome referred to by the resultative infinitive is regarded as unpredictable. The present dissertation takes the position that the unexpectability of the resultative infinitive is related to its nonintentionality: that the situation does not involve any intention means that the situation is not expected to occur. By contrast, the situation referred to by the purpose infinitive cannot be unexpected because the situation involves the subject's intention. Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the purpose infinitive implies its subject's "thinking", "wanting", and "future time":

(57) Mary went to the Library to read the latest issue of *Language*. ⇒

　　Mary went to the Library

　　because she thought this:

　　I want this: I will read the latest issue of *Language*

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 24)) (Italics is original)</div>

Based on (35), the situation referred to by the purpose infinitive is expected to occur in the future because it is the object of the subject's desire. On the other hand, the situation referred to by the resultative infinitive cannot be the object of the subject's desire, and thus it must be the one which happens (or happened) to occur.

5.2.5. Conclusion

　The present section classifies the previous studies on the resultative infinitive into three in terms as "realization", "intentionality", and "predictability" and clarified the syntactic and semantic constraints on it by pointing out their problems. The features of the resultative infinitive and the purpose infinitive can be summarized as follows:

	The Resultative Infinitive	The Purpose Infinitive
Time	Simultaneous with the matrix verb	Posterior to the matrix verb
Intention	○/×	○
Expectability	×	○
Preposition	×	○/×
In Order Insertion	×	○
The Scope of Negation	the infinitive	the matrix clause /

		the infinitive
So That … Can/May Construction / Cleft Sentence	×	○
The complementizer *for*	×	○
…, and S Do Too Construction	○/×	○
The Coreferentiality of Subject	○/×	○/×（introduced by *for*）

Fig. 1: The Features of the Resultative Infinitive and the Purpose Infinitive

5.3. Transparentizing Phenomena

5.3.1. Introduction

This section puts its focus on the temporal relationship between the resultative infinitive and the matrix clause and adduces "Transparentizing Phenomena" proposed by Sawada (2016, 2018a) in support of the temporal constraint on the resultative infinitive (as was mentioned in (12) in Section 5.2.2.1.).

Sawada (2016, 2018a) puts its focus on pseudo modal *have to* and proposes the following effect:

(58) The Transfer Effect of Tense, Aspect, and Modality:

Tense, aspect, and modality in the matrix verb transfers to the complement verb.

(Sawada (2018a: 156))

Based on(58), we can analyze the construction as in (59) below by postulating the interpretation process shown in (60):

(59) Although I've trained and worked in this area since 1982 I am having to learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural. (BNC)

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(60) … I am <u>having</u> (to) learn a whole new dimension that is multi-cultural.

(have)　-<u>ing</u>

(Cf. Sawada (2016: 399))

According to his analysis, (59) is interpreted through the following two processes: First, the present participle *having* in the present progressive form *am having to* divided into the verb *have* and progressive morpheme *-ing*. Second, the progressive morpheme *-ing* transfers to the complement verb *learn* after *the verb have* as well as the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized.

The deontic modality expressed by *have to* is backgrounded (= transparentized) and thus interpreted adverbially. The complement verb, by contrast, is foregrounded and, thus interpreted as the matrix verb.

The present section further generalizes this effect and expands its application range to the resultative infinitive construction. First, the notion of "transparentizing" which Sawada (2016, 2018a) proposes is redefined as follows:

(61) Transparentizing Phenomena：

The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* is relatively weakened, and the matrix elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, and negation transfer to the complement verb.

These general phenomena on the resultative infinitive construction enable us to explain the facts that the time of the matrix is simultaneous with that of the resultative infinitive and that the scope of the sentence negation in the matrix clause contains the resultative infinitive. The next sections argue that the tense, aspect, modality, and negation in the matrix clause transfer to the complement verb after the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized.

5.3.2. Past Tense

Observe the following sentence:

(62) On August 27 they <u>awoke to</u> find that food had gone on ration, as had petrol and many
　　other necessities.　　　　　　　　　　　　　(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (62), the matrix verb *awake* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized, and the past tense morpheme *-ed* contained by the verb *awoke* transfers to the complement verb *find*. This interpretation process can be shown schematically as follows:

(63) On August 27 they <u>awoke</u> (to) find that food had gone on ration, …

        (awake)   –<u>ed</u>

(63) shows the following two process: First, the finite verb *awoke* in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form *awake* and the past tense morpheme *-ed*, and *awake* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, *-ed* transfers, over the transparent *awake* and *to,* to the complement verb *find*. Since the meaning of the transparent *awake* is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like an "adverb." The complement verb *find*, on the other hand, is interpreted as a "main verb" with the past tense because the past tense has transferred to it. The claim that the past tense morpheme transfers to the complement verb is supported by the fact that in (62) the tense in the *that* clause is backshifted depending on the tense which transfers to thecomplement verb *find*. Therefore, (62) receives the same interpretation as (64) below:

(64) On August 27 they <u>found</u> that food <u>had gone</u> on ration, as had petrol and many other necessities.

The same explanation can apply to (65) below:

(65) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved grew to be a woman.

In (65), *grew* is divided into the verb *grow* and the past tense morpheme *-ed*, and the past tense morpheme transfers to the complement verb *be* after *grow* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized:

(66) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved <u>grew</u> (to) be a woman.

        (grow)   -<u>ed</u>

As a result, the meaning of the matrix verb *grow* is relatively weakened, and the verb is interpreted adverbially. Therefore, (65) receives the same interpretation as (67) below:

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(67) In Winesburg the girl who had been loved was a woman.

It is clear from the above analysis that, in the resultative infinitive construction, the relationship of subordination between the matrix verb and the complement verb is reversed. That is to say, the matrix verb is interpreted adverbially by being transparentizing (or backgrounding), while the complement verb is interpreted as the matrix verb after the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. Quirk et al. (1985) agrees with this claim and states as follows:

(68) The sentences can usually be paraphrased by reversing the relationship of subordination

　　　…　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Quirck et al. (1985: 1079))

For example, (69a) and (70a) can be paraphrased with (69b) and (70b), respectively:

(69)　a. I awoke one morning to find the house in an uproar.

　　　b. When l awoke one morning, I found the house in an uproar.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))

(70)　a. He survived the disgrace, to become a respected citizen.

　　　b. After he survived the disgrace, he became a respected citizen.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079))

Furthermore, the fact that (71a) and (72a) can be paraphrased with (71b) and (72b), respectively, shows that the complement verb semantically functions as the matrix verb. In the following resultative infinitive, which is classified in *live* type, the matrix verbs *live* and *went on* are transparentized and regarded as the adverb *eventually*:

(71)　a. You'll <u>live</u> to regret it.

　　　b. You'll <u>eventually</u> regret it.

(72)　a. The show <u>went on</u> to become a great success.

　　　b. The show <u>eventually</u> became a great success.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1079)) (Underline is mine)

(71b) and (72b) show that the matrix verbs function as adverbs and that the complement verbs

function as the matrix verbs.[6]

Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that the interpretation of the resultative infinitive depends on the phenomena in which the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized.

5.3.3. Present Tense

The number of examples in which the matrix verbs have the present tense is rather limited, because the result expressed by the infinitive tends to be something which occurred in the past. Observe the following sentence:

(73) According to the U.N. secretary-general's report, despite progress in narrowing the gap between rich and poor countries, "significant health inequities remain across countries and regions." For example, <u>on average, people in high-income countries live to be 80 years old, compared with those in low-income countries who live to be 61.</u>

<p align="right">(COCA) (Underline is mine)</p>

(73) describes the difference among the people's health condition depending on where they live. Here, the resultative infinitive is used twice, and, in both examples, the matrix verb *live* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. This process can be schematized as follows:

(74) …people in high-income countries <u>live</u> (to) be 80 years old, …

(live)   <u>-es</u>

(74) shows the following two processes: First, the finite verb *live* in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form *live* and the present tense morpheme *-es*, and *live* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, *-es* transfers, over the transparent *live* and *to,* to the complement verb *be*. Since the meaning of the transparent *live* is relatively weakened (or backgrounded), it is interpreted like an "adverb." The complement verb *be*, on the other hand, is

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[6] (71a) and (71b) indicates that *will* transfers to the complement verb. See Section 5.3.6. for further detail.

interpreted as a "main verb" with the present tense because the past tense has transferred to it. Therefore (73) receives the same interpretation as (75) below:

(75) … on average people in high-income countries <u>are</u> 80 years old, compared with those in low-income countries who <u>are</u> 61.

5.3.4. Progressive

Observe the following sentences:

(76) a. But Israelis <u>have been waking up to find</u> that many of their goals have gone unrealized.

b. If you're a space dreamer like me, then believe it when I say that you<u>'re waking up to find</u> that it's really happening.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

In these examples, the progressive morpheme *-ing* in the present perfect progressive *have been waking up* and the present progressive *are waking up* transfers, over the transparent *wake* and the infinitive marker *to*, to the complement verb *find*. This process can be schematized as follows:

(77) a. … Israelis have been <u>waking</u> (up) (to) find that …

           (wake)   -<u>ing</u>

b. … you're <u>waking</u> (up) (to) find that ...

       (wake)   -<u>ing</u>

After these processes, the meaning the verb *wake* is relatively weakened, and the verb is interpreted adverbially. Thus, (76a) and (76b) receives the same interpretations as (78a) and (78b), respectively:

(78) a. But Israelis <u>have been finding</u> that many of their goals have gone unrealized.

b. If you're a space dreamer like me, then believe it when I say that you<u>'re finding</u> that it's really happening.

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Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the matrix verb in the resultative infinitive construction does not contain the progressive aspect. Since the resultative infinitive refers to a situation which actually occurs after the realization of the situation referred to by the matrix clause, the situation referred to by the matrix clause is obligatorily expressed to have realized. If the matrix verb contains the progressive aspect, it indicates that the situation does not completely realize. In that case, the resultative infinitive loses the meaning of its existence.

5.3.5. Subjunctive Past Perfect

Observe the following examples:

(79) a. He knew so little of women that he felt as though he <u>had woken up to find</u> himself halfway across a vast mountain in a blizzard without map or rope or compass.

b. It was as if she <u>had</u> been having a nightmare -- terrible, perhaps, but still only a dream in which the money could vanish like fairy gold -- and <u>woken up to find</u> it was true.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (79a) and (79b), the situations referred to by the resultative infinitive are interpreted as counterfactual. As is interesting, in (79b), the tense of the verb in the *that* clause is backshifted. This linguistic fact cannot be explained unless we postulate the following process:

(80) … had <u>woken</u> (up) (to) find …
        (wake) -<u>en</u>

(80) indicates the following two processes: First, the finite verb *woken* in the matrix clause is divided into the nonfinite form *wake* and the present tense morpheme *-en*, and *wake* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, *-en* transfers, over the transparent *wake* and *to,* to the complement verb *find*. Since the meaning of the transparent *wake* is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like an "adverb". The complement verb *find*, on the other hand, is interpreted as a "main verb" with the present tense because the past tense has transferred to it. Therefore, (79a) and (79b) receive the same interpretation as (81a) and (81b), respectively:

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(81) a. … as though he <u>had found</u> himself halfway across a vast mountain in a blizzard without map or rope or compass.

   b. It was as if she <u>had</u> been having a nightmare -- terrible, perhaps, but still only a dream in which the money could vanish like fairy gold -- and <u>found</u> it was true.

5.3.6. Modality

Observe the following example.

(82) I used to be frightened to fall asleep at night sometimes, afraid <u>I'd stick my head out from under the clothes while I was asleep and wake up to find my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died</u>.   (BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (82), since the matrix verbs *stick* and *wake* are in the coordinate relationship, the modal *would*, which expresses the past habit, apparently expresses the subject's construal of the both of them:

(83) <u>I'd stick</u> my head out from under the clothes while I was asleep and <u>would wake up</u> to find my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died.

However, the modal *would* is interpreted to transfer to the matrix verb *find* after the matrix verb *wake* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. Eventually, the meaning of the matrix verb *wake* is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like an "adverb". Thus, *would* expresses the subject's construal of the complement verb *find*. This process can be schematized as follows:

(84) I<u>'d</u> stick … and (wake up) (to) find my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died.

Therefore, (82) receives the same interpretation as (85):

(85) I'd stick my head out from under the clothes while I was asleep and *find* my head in a dragon's mouth, before I died.

In addition, in (86) below, the modal *would* (= simple future), whose tense is backshifted as

the result of the sequence of tense, expresses the subject's construal of the complement verb *see*, because the matrix verb *live* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized:

(86) It was doubtful that he would live to see either of his daughters marry.

(COCA)

Therefore (86) receives the same interpretation as (87) below:

(87) It was doubtful that he *would see* either of his daughters marry.

In (87), what was doubtful is not that he will live but that he will see his daughter's marriage. Furthermore, in (88), two matrix verbs are in the coordinate relationship:

(88) He'll probably live to be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his old college, and I shan't mind at all. (BNC)

In the present case, the modal *will* (= simple future) and the modal adverb *probably* in the matrix clause appear to modify the matrix verbs *live* and *make* at the same time. However, what they actually modify is the complement verb *be* and the matrix verb *make*. This is evident from the fact that the matrix verb *live* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. Thus, (88) receives the same interpretation as (89)below:

(89) He'll probably be a hundred, and make a will leaving whatever he's got to his old college, and I shan't mind at all.

5.3.7. Negation

In Section 5.2.2.2.3., we argued that "The Affirmation Principle for the Resultative Infinitive" is applied to resultative infinitive construction. According to the principle, the matrix verb of the resultative infinitive is always affirmative and not negated. This section attributes the evidence for the principle on the resultative infinitive construction to "Transparentizing Phenomena". First, observe the following sentence:

(90) Unfortunately, Elizabeth did not live to be Queen. (BNC)

In (90), the matrix verb *live* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized, and the scope of the sentence negation in the matrix clause contains the complement verb *be*. Interestingly, the past tense morpheme *-ed* also transfers, over the transparent *live* and *to*, to the complement verb. In this case, the meaning of the matrix verb *live* is not negated, and the whole sentence receives the same interpretation as (91) below:

(91) Unfortunately, Elizabeth wasn't Queen.

Furthermore, in (45b) in Section 5.2.3.1., the negation *not* co-occurs with the modal *shall* (for the sake of convenience, (45b) will be requoted as (92) below):

(92) …we shall not live to make other friends.

The same analysis can be applied here: the modal *shall* and the negative *not* transfer to the complement verb *make*:

(93) … we <u>shall</u> <u>not</u> (live) (to) make other friends.

5.3.8. Others

This section generalizes "Transparentizing Phenomena" and puts its focus on (i) the participial construction and (ii) the gerundive construction.

5.3.8.1. Participial Construction

Observe the following sentence:

(94) Mia, <u>waking up to find her companion still sleeping</u>, hardly gives the impression that she has spent a passionate night. (BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (94), the whole resultative infinitive construction constitutes a participial construction. In this

case, the participial clause functions as a subordinate clause and, thus, can be preposed:

(95) <u>Waking up to find her companion still sleeping,</u> Mia hardly gives the impression that she has spent a passionate night.

(95) indicates the following two processes: First, the verb *waking* in the governing clause is divided into the nonfinite form *wake* and the present participle morpheme *-ing*, and *wake* and the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, *-ing* transfers, over the transparent *wake* and *to,* to the complement verb *find*. These processes can be schematized as follows (the following analysis is paralleled to that of the progressive morpheme which was shown in Section 5.3.4.):

(96) … <u>waking</u> (up) (to) find her companion still sleeping …
    (wake)   -<u>ing</u>

5.3.8.2. Gerund

Observe the following sentences:

(97) a. "I've never even thought about <u>living to be</u> over a hundred," he said.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

b. Branson's role in the Atra deal had been negligible, and his first reaction on <u>waking up to find</u> three men standing at the bottom of his bed demanding 5,000 was one of confusion and outright terror.   (BNC) (Underline is mine)

In (97a) and (97b), the governing verbs *living* and *waking* are expressed as the objects of the prepositions *about* and *on*. In (97a), the verb *live* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. The gerundive marker *-ing* transfers, over the transparent *live to*, to the complement verb *find*. In (97b), in similar way, the gerundive marker *-ing* transfers, over the transparent *wake up to*, to the complement verb *find*. These processes can be schematized as follows:

(98) a. … never even thought about <u>living</u> (to) be over a hundred …
        (live) -<u>ing</u>

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b. … his reaction on <u>waking</u> (up) (to) find three men …

(wake) -<u>ing</u>

The followings are similar examples:

(99) a. I went to sleep that night not afraid of <u>waking up to find</u> him dead.

b. Martin et al. give an example of one boy feeling a bit sick at <u>waking up to see</u> all

the pins in his leg.

c. "It is a sight worth <u>living to see</u>," I avowed.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

d. The conclusion is that we need enthusiasm for <u>living to be</u> healthy and energetic.

e. Mrs Gorman even made a little joke about <u>living to be</u> ninety.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

5.3.9. Conclusion

This whole section put its focus on the temporal relationship between the resultative infinitive and the matrix clause and argued that various elements in the governing clause transfer to the complement verb. The transferring elements proposed in this whole section can be summarized as follows:

(100) Tense morphemes (the past tense and the present tense), progressive morphemes, modality (including *will* of simple future), negation, participle morphemes (the present participle and the past participle), and gerund morpheme.

Sawada (2016, 2018a) adduces three elements (tense, aspect, and modality) as the transferring elements in the sentences with pseudo modal *have to*, but this whole section expanded the range of these elements to "negation", "participle", and "gerund". Based on these additional elements, "Transparentizing Phenomena" can be redefined as follows:

(101) Transparentizing Phenomena:

The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* are relatively weakened

(or backgrounded), and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.

These elements transfer to the complement verb because the governing verb and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized. Therefore, it can be predicted that the transfer does not occur when there is a certain element blocking the transfer. The following examples prove this prediction to be correct:

(102) a. John went to the library (~~for him~~) to study.

b. John opened the door for Mary to come into the room.

In (102), where the purpose infinitive is used, no transfer can be seen. As was mentioned in Section 5.2.2.2.6., the purpose infinitive contain the complentizer *for* (either explicitly or implicitly), and, when the subject of the infinitive and that of the matrix clause are coreferential, *for* does not appear (= (102a)). In the case in which the complementizer *for* exists in the position between the matrix verb and the infinitive, the transfer is prevented by its existence:

(103) John <u>opened</u> the door <u>for</u> Mary to come into the room.

open –<u>ed</u>

Since the complementizer *for* is derived from the preposition *for* expressing "purpose" or "goal" (Bresnan (1971: 81)), it still has "futurity" in its meaning even after the grammaticalization from the preposition to the complementizer. Therefore, Transparentizing Phenomena cannot be seen in sentences containing the complementizer *for*. Verbs taking the *for* complement contain *hope*, *want*, *need*, *require*, or *expect*, for example (Cf. Dixon (1991)).

(104) a. I'm hoping for John to beat up the bully.

b. I want very much for Mary to win.

(Dixon (1991: 244, 246))

The transfer cannot occur in (104) because the *for* complement refers to the future situation.

5.4. Generalization of Transparency Phenomena

5.4.1. Introduction

   The present section argues that Transparentizing Phenomena are more general phenomena by expanding its application range to implicative predicates constructions.

5.4.2. Implicative Predicate Constructions

5.4.2.1. Implicative Predicates and Their Implicature

   "Implicative predicates" (proposed by Karttunen (1971)) are predicates which theoretically imply the truth of the complement. Karttunen (1971) divides English predicates into two major categories: "implicative predicates" and "non-implicative predicates":

(105) Implicative Predicates：*manage*, *remember*, *bother*, *get*, *dare*, *care*, *venture*, *consider*, *happen*, *see fit*, *be careful*, *have the misfortune/sense*, *take the time/opportunity/trouble*, *take it upon oneself*

     Non-implicative Predicates：*agree*, *decide*, *want*, *hope*, *promise*, *plan*, *intend*, *try*, *be likely*, *be eager/ready*, *have in mind*

(Karttunen (1971: 341))

According to his analysis, (106a)-(106c), where non-implicative predicates are used, do not theoretically imply the truth of the complements (= (107a)-(107c)). Thus, all the infinitive used in (106) refers to future situations:

(106) a. John hoped to solve the problem.

      b. John had in mind to lock his door.

      c. John decided to remain silent.

(Karttunen (1971: 341))

(107) a. *John solved the problem.

      b. *John locked his door.

      c. *John remained silent.

(Karttunen (1971: 341))

By contrast, (108a)-(108c), where implicative predicates are used, theoretically imply the truth of the complements (= (109a)-(109c)):

(108) a. John managed to solve the problem.

b. John remembered to lock his door.

c. John saw fit to remain silent.

(109) a. John solved the problem.

b. John locked his door.

c. John remained silent.

（Karttunen (1971: 341)）

The above claims are supported by the fact that, while (110a) is acceptable, (110b) is unacceptable:

(110) a.　John hoped to solve the problem, but he didn't solve it.

b. *John managed to solve the problem, but he didn't solve it.

(Karttunen (1971: 342))

Furthermore, since the complement verb is regarded as simultaneous with the matrix verb, the temporal adverb modifies not only the matrix verb but also the complement verb. For example, (111a) implies (111b) below:

(111) a. Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem.

b. John solved the problem yesterday.

(Karttunen (1971: 346))

The next sections argue that Transparentizing Phenomena can be applied to the implicative predicates construction.

5.4.2.2. Past Tense

Observe the following sentence:

(112) … she also <u>remembered to ask</u> for another ten-shilling note a week later.

If we take the fact that (112) implies that she asked for another ten-shilling note a week later, we can assume that the past tense morpheme *-ed* transfers to the complement verb:

(113) … she also <u>remembered</u> (to) ask for another ten-shilling note…

       (remember)   -<u>ed</u>

As a result, the meaning of the matrix verb *remember* is relatively weakened, and the verb is interpreted adverbially. In the same way, since the complement verb *ask* received the past tense morpheme, it is interpreted like a matrix verb. Therefore, (113) receives the same interpretation as (114) below:

(114) … she also asked for another ten-shilling note a week later.

5.4.2.3. Present Tense

Observe the following sentence:

(115) My wife works hard all day, but she <u>manages to find</u> the energy to cook us something original every night.

Based on the fact that a temporal adverb modifies both the matrix verb and the complement verb in the implicative predicates construction, we can assume that the habitual adverb *every night* in (115) modifies both *manage* and *find* at the same time. Thus, both verbs express a habitual action. Therefore, it is possible to analyze that the present tense morpheme *-es* transfers to the complement verb:

(116) … but she <u>manages</u> (to) find the energy to cook …

       (manage)   -<u>es</u>

It follows from the analysis that (115) receives the same interpretation as (117) below.

(117) … but she finds the energy to cook …

5.4.2.4. Progressive

Observe the following sentence:

(118) I thought I <u>was managing to hide</u> it.   (BNC) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the matrix verb *managing* is divided into the nonfinite verb *manage* and the progressive morpheme *-ing*. Then, the progressive morpheme transfers to the complement verb *hide*:

(119) I thought I was <u>managing</u> (to) hide it.

              (manage) -<u>ing</u>

Therefore, (118) receives the same interpretation as (120) below:

(120) I thought I was hiding it.

5.4.2.5. Modality

Observe the following sentence:

(121) a. I <u>will remember to treat</u> each student as an individual first …

     b. … these plants <u>may manage to produce</u> a good crop.

     c. I found it strange that she <u>should see fit to tell</u> me this.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

In (121), the modal *will*, *may*, *should* do not express the speakers' construal of implicative predicates *remember*, *manage*, and *see fit*, but rather, they express the speakers' construal of the situations referred to by the complements. Thus, (121) implies (122) below:

(122) a. I will treat each student as an individual first …

b. … these plants may produce a good crop.

c. I found it strange that she should tell me this.

Based on the present analysis, we can conclude that the implicative predicates and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized in sentences with modals:

(123) I <u>will</u> (remember) (to) treat each student as an individual first …

5.4.2.6. Negation

Observe the following sentence:

(124) a. John <u>didn't manage to solve</u> the problem.

b. John <u>didn't see fit to remain</u> silent.

According to Karttunen (1971), (124) implies (125) below:

(125) a. John didn't solve the problem.

b. John didn't remain silent.

Since the implicative predicates *manage* means to do something to accomlish some action referred to by the complement verb, it does not contradict even if the action is not completely accomplished. Therefore, *S didn't manage to V* means that the subject did not accomplish the action referred to by the complement verb although he or she did something. In this case, the scope of negation does not contain the matrix verb *mamage*. In other words, the implicative predicates *manage* and theinfinitive marker *to* are transparentized. This can be schematized as follows:

(126) John <u>didn't</u> (manage) (to) solve the problem.

did   <u>not</u>

The same explanation can be applied to (124b): since the implicative predicate *see fit* and the infinitive marker *to* are transparentized, the meaning of *see fit* is not negated:

(127) John <u>didn't</u> (see fit) (to) remain silent.

        did   <u>not</u>

5.4.3. Conclusion

The transferring elements in the matrix clause in the implicative predicates construction are as follows:

(128) Tense morphemes (the past tense and the present tense), progressive morphemes, modality (including *will* of simple future), negation

If we take into consideration the above discussion, we can conclude that "Transparentizing Phenomena" are general phenomena which can be seen in the in the implicative predicates construction.[7]

5.5. Conclusion

The present chapter argued the resultative infinitive construction syntactic/semantic features

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[7] "Transparentizing Phenomena" can be applied to the aspectual verb construction with *continue*:

    (viii) Mary continued to paint her car.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 82))

In (viii), first the main verb *continued* is divided into the nonfinite verb *continue* and the past tense morpheme *-ed*, and the nonfinite verb and the following infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent. Second, the past tense morpheme *-ed* transfers, over the transparent *continue* and *to*, to the complement verb *paint*. Since the meaning of the transparent *continue* is relatively weakened, it is interpreted like an "adverb". The complement verb *paint*, on the other hand, is interpreted as a "main verb" with the past tense because the past tense has transferred to it. These processes can be schematized as follows:

    (ix) Mary <u>continued</u> (to) paint her car.

      (continue)   -<u>ed</u>

by analyzing it in terms of "realization", "intentionality", and "expectability" and attributed the evidence for the principle on the resultative infinitive construction to "Transparentizing Phenomena" which is proposed by Sawada (2016, 2018a). "Transparentizing Phenomena" is redefined as follows (for the sake of convenience, (101) will be requoted as (129) below):

(129) Transparentizing Phenomena:

The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* are relatively weakened (or backgrounded), and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.

In the sentences where Transparentizing Phenomena occurs, the matrix verb is interpreted adverbially because its meaning is backgrounded, while the complement verb is interpreted as the matrix verb because its meaning is foregrounded.

5.6. Residual Problems

This section adduces a few residual problems. Transparentizing Phenomena cannot explain the following example:

(130) John didn't remember to lock his door.   (Karttunen (1971: 343))

According to Karttunen (1971), (130), where the implicative predicate *remember* is used, implies that John did not lock his door. In this case, the scope of the sentence negation in the matrix clause seems to contain the complement verb *lock*. However, the scope also contains the matrix verb *remember*. Thus, (130) can be paraphrases with both (131) and (132):

(131) John didn't remember his obligation and didn't fulfill it.

(132) John forgot to lock his door.

According to this paraphrase, we can assume that Transparentizing Phenomena can be applied to sentences with *remember*.

On the other hand, Dixon (1991) states that the infinitival complement of *remember* contains

the complementizer *for* and that *for* is omitted when the subject of the complement is coreferential with that of the matrix clause. For example, in (133b), *for me* is omitted under the coreferentiality of the subjects:

(133) a. I remembered <u>for Mary</u> to sign the visitors' book.

   b. I remembered to sign the visitors' book

(Dixon (1991: 224)) (Underline is mine)

As was mentioned in Section 5.3.9., the presence of the complementizer *for* prevents any elements from transferring from the matrix clause to the complement verb, and thus the complement refers to a future situation. Therefore, the whole sentence is acceptable even if it implies the assertion referred to by the infinitive:

(134) I remembered to lock the door (but then Mary took the key and pushed it down a grating, so I couldn't). (Dixon (1991: 221))

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that *remember* does not function as an implicative predicate. However, if we take into consideration the fact that the infinitive following *remember* can refer to the situation which occurred in the past, we can analyze *remember* as ambiguous between an implicative meaning and a non-implicative meaning, which is similar to the one of *have in mind*, as in (106b). Transparentizing can be applied to the former use, but not to the latter use. However, we would like to leave this interesting problem as a topic of a future research.

Chapter 6 The Complementizer *For* as a Modalizer

6.1. Introduction

6.1.1. Aim

This chapter puts its focus on the relationship among the complementizer *for*, the complement clause introduced by *for*, the *for* complement in our term, and modality, and clarifies the following two points:

(1) A. The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.

B. The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

The classification of modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be schematized in the following way:

(2) Modality

- Propositional
  - Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
  - Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)
- Event
  - Dynamic (Desire, Accetance, Intention, Purpose, possibility)
  - Deontic (Obligation)

As will be shown in the following, traditional grammar has regarded the complementizer *for* as a marker which introduces tenseless clauses, and it can occur in various position in a sentence (the following examples are based on Jespersen (MEG V: 314)).

(3) A. in the beginning of a sentence: [*For* a man to tell …] is hard.

B. in a position separated from the governing verb: What I like best is [*for* a nobleman to marry …]

C. after *than* and *as*: Nothing can be more absurd than [*for* a prince to employ …]

D. after a noun: It is my wish [*for* you to be happy].

E. after an adjective: I was so impatient [*for* you to come].

Generally speaking, the complementizer *for* has been regarded as a meaningless marker which is mechanically introduced to explicitly express the subject of the *to* complement. However, if we pay attention to the situation expressed by the *for* complement and its environment, it will be clear that there are a number of cases which cannot be explained by the analysis that the complementizer *for* has no inherent meaning.

First, the *for* complement can refer to the situation which has not yet occurred and the one which has already occurred. For example, the following sentences show that the situation referred to by the *for* complement is the one which has not yet happened at the time expressed in the matrix clause:

(4) a. We got to the church first, and when the four-wheeler drove up we waited [for him to step out], but he never did, and when the cabman got down from the box and looked there was no one there! (A. C. Doyle, "A Case of Identity")

b. They planned [for the mayor to arrive on the following day].

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1194))

c. It's important [for the meeting to start at eight]. (Swan (2005³: 266))

d. The hunters encircled the deer in order [for the animal not to escape].

(Declerck (1991: 478))

e. The book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away]. (Bresnan (1972: 79))

In (4), the *for* complement refers to a situation which the subject of the main clause wants it to occur (= (4a)), a situation which the subject of the main clause plan to actualize (= (4b)), a situation which the subject of the main clause thinks should occur (= (4c)), and the purpose of the action referred to by the verb or the event referred to by the subject of the main clause (= (4d, e)). In each case, the situation referred to by the *for* complement is what has not yet occurred (i.e. a future situation) rather than what has already occurred (i.e. a nonfuture situation).

(5), on the other hand, suggests that the situations denoted by the *for* complements are nonfuture ones:

(5) a. Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)]? (Bresnan (1972: 82))

b. It's natural [for them to be together]. (Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

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In (5), all the complement sentences consist of the reason of the subjects' feelings denoted by the matrix predicates. Thus, in (5a), the *for* complement refers to a situation which has actually occurred, and the *for* complement in (5b) refers to a present situation in a similar way. In both cases, the *for* complements refer to nonfuture situations.

Taking these differences among the *for* complements into consideration, we can assume that the complementizer *for* can be classified into the following two types: one which introduces a future situation, and the other one which introduces a nonfuture situation:

(6) *for* ⟨ Future type

Nonfuture type

If it is presumed that the complementizer *for* has no inherent meaning, it will be difficult to naturally explain where the temporal difference shown in (6) comes from.

Second, the acceptance of the *for* complement varies depending on what kind of matrix predicates are chosen:

(7) a. It is <u>right</u> [for God to punish sinners].

b. It is <u>wrong</u> [for there to be such inequalities].

c. It's <u>a sin</u> [for you to do that].

d. It is <u>illegal</u> [for these houses to be occupied].

e. I consider it <u>unfair</u> [for them to win all the time].

(Bresnan (1972: 79, 83)) (Underline is mine)

(8) a. *It is <u>true</u> [for God to exist].

b. *It is <u>false</u> [for there to be only finitely many primes].

c. *It is <u>clear</u> [for these houses to be occupied].

d. *I {<u>believe</u> (with good reason) / <u>know</u> (for a fact) / <u>assume</u> (on these grounds) /

<u>infer</u> (from the above)} [for them to win unfairly].

(Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)

The examples in (7) and (8) clearly show that the *for* complement can co-occur with   adjectives

such as *right*, *wrong*, *illegal*, and *unfair* and a noun *sin*, while it cannot co-occur with adjectives such as *true*, *false*, and *clear* and verbs such as *believe*, *know*, *assume*, *infer*. If we take these facts into consideration, it is evident that there is a co-occurrence restriction or a compatibility relationship between the *for* complement and its matrix predicates. Therefore, it would be quite difficult to theoretically explain the cause of the restriction under the presumption that the complementizer *for* has no inherent meaning, for the restriction could only be attributed to the distinct features of the matrix predicates.

Third, the acceptability of the *for* complement varies depending on whether the matrix clause is in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically expressed by the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*:

    (9) a. ?It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

         b. It <u>would be</u> odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

<div align="right">(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)</div>

(9a) sounds unnatural since the matrix clause is in the indicative mood, while (9b) does not, since the matrix clause includes the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*. It would be difficult to explain the difference of acceptability unless it is presumed that the complementizer *for* itself has its inherent meaning. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a certain interrelationship of compatibility between the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* and the complementizer *for*.

The above three points clearly show that it is theoretically insufficient to analyze the complementizer *for* as merely consisting of a grammatical marker which shows the semantic subject of the following infinitive and thus as having no its inherent meaning. Therefore, we conclude that the complementizer *for* has its inherent meaning. This claim will play a significant role in explaining the temporal distinction as mentioned in (6), the compatibility between the complementizer *for* and the matrix predicates, and the interrelationship between the complementizer *for* and the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* in a unified way.

6.1.2. Complementizers

6.1.2.1. The Definition of Complementizers

Since Rosenbaum (1967: 24) first introduced the term "complementizer", complementizers have generally been regarded as markers which introduce complement clauses and their inherent meanings have almost never discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 1, "Complementizers", in Rosenbaum's (1967: 24) term, are composed of *that*, *for*, *to*, *Poss* (the possessive case), *-ing*, and interrogative adverbs such as *when*, *why*, *where*, *how*, *what*, *if*, and *whether*. *To* and *-ing* can be combined with *for* and *POSS*, while *POSS* cannot be used alone and is always combined with *-ing*:

> (10) One of the properties of predicate complements that distinguishes them from other types of complements is a unique set of markers taking the form of single and paired morphemes. Such markers, including the morphemes that, for, to, Poss, ing, and others will be referred to as complementing morphemes or simply complementizers.
>
> (Rosenbaum (1967: 24)) (Underline is original)

The examples of the "complementizer" introduced in Rosenbaum (1967) are shown in the underlined parts below:

> (11) a. I think that Fords are too expensive.
>
> b. I dislike arguing about silly matters.
>
> c. I'm concerned about John's being so lazy.
>
> d. The king ordered the proclamation to be read.
>
> e. I should like very much for you to reconsider your refusal.
>
> f. I dislike it when you do that.
>
> g. I often wonder (about) why he does these things.
>
> h. I know where he went.
>
> i. Everyone understands how he does it.
>
> j. What he is doing is useless.
>
> k. I doubt if he is going.
>
> l. I wonder whether he is going.

6.1.2.2. The Individual Meanings of Complementizers

In Rosenbaum (1967), the semantic differences in question are not discussed and explained under the transformational rule. Therefore, he analyzes that all the complementizers have the same deep structure. Bresnan (1971, 1972) states that every sentence in (12) is derived from the single deep structure shown in (13):

(12) a. It may distress John for Mary to see his relatives.

b. It may distress John that Mary sees his relatives.

c. Mary's seeing his relatives may distress John.

(Bresnan (1971: 297, 1972: 9))

(13)

(Bresnan (1972: 9))

However, it is essential to consider the difference of the kind of the complementizers in interpreting the individual sentences, because all the sentences in(12), which seem to have the same structure, are interpreted differently. For example, (12a) means that Mary has not yet seen John's relatives, while (12b) means that Mary has a plan to see John's relatives. Furthermore, (12c) means that it is a fact that Mary actually saw John's relatives. It is clear from these examples that the difference of the kind of the complementizers is influenced by the semantic difference of the sentences. Sawada (2016: 131) states as follows:

(11) Complementizers are quite an abstract notion and do not seem to have its inherent meanings in themselves. However, a close look at them will make it clear that they

express what kind of information the complement sentences show. If we compare the complement sentences to a drawer, the content of a complement sentence could be compared to a container of a drawer, while the complementizer to a handle of a drawer. (Sawada (2016: 131))

6.1.3. Organization

The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 puts its focus on Declerck's (2011) definition of modality and "nonfactuality", which are quoted in Chapter 2. Section 3 introduces Jespersen (MEG V), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972), Aijmer (1972), Spears (1973), Quirk et al. (1985), Wierbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), and Swan (2017[4]) as suggestive previous studies on the complementizer *for* and clarifies some problems which cannot be solved by their analyses. Section 4 proposes that the complementizer *for* functions as a non-epistemic modalizer and the modality expressed by it can be classified into "emotive modality", "deontic modality", "dynamic modality", and "counterfactual modality". Section 5 summarizes main arguments and conclusions in this whole chapter.

6.2. The Complementizer *For* as a Modalizer

6.2.1. Introduction

As mentioned earlier, the complementizer *for* has been regarded as a marker with no inherent meaning, and, to the best of my knowledge, any studies have been conducted that analyze it as a modalizer. This section will reconsider the definition of modality and will clarify what "nonfactual world" expressed by modalizers is by taking a view of Declerck's (2011) definition of modality. The latter half of this section will adduce several evidences in support of the claim that the complementize *for* can be regarded as a modalizer.

6.2.2. The Definition and the Classification of Modality

6.2.2.1. The Definition of Modality

This section takes a view of Declerck's (2011) definition of modality and discuss the relationship between modality and "nonfactuality". Declerck (2011) defines modality as follows:

(14) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.   (Declerck (2011: 21))

"Nonfactual world" here refers not only so called a counterfactual world, which is made by the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*, but also any kinds of world which cannot be asserted to be equivalent to the factual world.

(15) possible worlds that are not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world
                                                            (Declerck (2011: 5))

Thus, in the following example, the nonfactual world expressed by the epistemic modal auxiliary *may* is not the counterfactual world but the world which cannot necessarily be asserted to be equivalent to the factual world.

(16) John may be here.   (Declerck (2011: 27))

In (16), the situation corresponds to the infinitive clause, namely *John be here*, and the modalizer to the epistemic modal *may*. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is not asserted to be true and thus consists of an uncertain situation. In other words, it cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world (i.e. it actualizes in "a possible world that is not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world" (Declerck (2011: 27))) and therefore it is regarded as nonfactual.

The same explanation can be applied to the case of the root modal *must*:

(17) The fugitives must leave the country.   (Declerck (2011: 39))

In (17), "the situation" corresponds to the infinitive clause, *the fugitives leave the country*, and the modalizer to the root modal *must*. Here, the situation denoted by the infinitive clause is not

asserted to be true and thus constitutes an uncertain situation. In other words, the situation in question cannot be asserted to actualize in the factual world, and therefore it is regarded as nonfactual.

According to Declerck's (2011) definition of modality, a situation which actualizes in the factual world is equivalent to an "asserted" situation, while a situation which actualizes in the nonfactual world is equivalent to an "unasserted" situation. That is to say, modality is a semantic category which expresses the spear's construal of the situation, rather than asserting its truth value. Regarding this point, Declerck's (2011) definition of modality is parallel to that of Sawada's (2018a). Sawada (2018a) claims that the essence of modality is to express how the situation is and how the situation is construed and defines modality in the following way (Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6)):

(18) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) comes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing of the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.   (Sawada (2018a: 6))

6.2.2.2. The Classification of Modality

Traditionally speaking, modalizers have been composed mainly of modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs. Declerck (2011: 28) expands the classification of modalizers in the following way:

(19) A. A Modal Auxiliary (can, must, may…)

B. A Modal Adverb (perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily…)

C. An Intentional Verb (believe, suppose, imagine…)

D. An Attitudinal Verb (like, intend, want, hope, wish…)

E. The Subjunctive Mood

F. The Imperative Mood

G. A Conditional Clause (Closed, Open, Tentative, Counterfactual)

H. A Tense Auxiliary Creating a Future World (will, be going to, be about to…)

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I. A Tense Auxiliary Expressing Posteriority

J. An Inserted Comment Clause with an Intentional Verb（I think…）

K. "Modal Backshifting"

L. "Modal Conditionalization"

M. A Combination of K and L

(Declerck (2011: 28))

Among all the nonfactual worlds expressed by these modalizers, tense auxiliaries creating a future world or expressing posteriority, namely H and I, are regarded as a world which is incompatible with the factual world at a certain time and will be compatible at a future time. (20) refers to a situation which is not yet factual:

(20) John will trim the hedge.   (Declerck (2011: 32))

In (20), the world in which the residue situation, *John trim the hedge*, actualizes is expressed as the one which is not yet compatible with the factual world at the time of speaking. Declerck (2011: 33) refers to the world in question as "not-yet-factual world" and states that this world consists of a kind of nonfactual world.[1] It is now clear that the situation which actualizes in the factual world is something which can be asserted to have actually occurred at some time in the past or to be occurring at the time of speaking. Even if the situation is actually true, it cannot be regarded as actualizing in the factual world if the speaker does not recognize or deliberately assert the situation to be true. The situation which is not yet factual cannot be regarded as factual, either. It is important to note that all the situations located in the nonfactual world refer to "unasserted situations". Modalizers enable the speaker to avoid asserting that the situation is true and instead express their construal towards the situation.

6.2.3. The Complementizer *For* and Nonfactuality

  This section argues for the claim of the complementizer *for* as a modalizer. First, let us

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[1] Declerck's (2011) definition of "factual world" and "nonfactual world" is compatible with Langacker's (1991) definition of "reality" and "irreality" respectively. See Chapter 4 for detail.

reconsider Declerck's (2011) definition of modality:

(21) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.

According to his definition, the complementizer *for* can be regarded as a modalizer because it is, just as *will* and the infinitive marker *to*, a form which introduces future situations. For example, the *for* complement in the following sentence expresses a future situation:

(22) a. … it became essential [for there to be clear guidelines to distinguish county issues from district issues].   (BNC)

   b. As you can imagine, we are <u>eager</u> [for our niece to come to us].   (COCA)

In (22a, b), the situations referred to by the *for* complements, namely *there to be clear guidelines to distinguish county issues from district issues*, and *our niece to come to us*, are construed as "not-yet factual". In these cases, the modalizer corresponds to the complementizer *for*, and the situations to the following infinitive clauses are modalized.

Sawada (2018a) agrees for this claim and mentions the possibility for the complementizer *for* to be regarded as a modalizer.

(23) a. I'm anxious [for there to be plenty of time].   (Swan (2005[3]: 268))

   b. What I would like is [for there to be put in place a welcome center that could orient people who have questions] …   (COCA)

According to Sawada (2018a: 6), in (23), the situation, *there to be plenty of time*, is regarded as "not- yet factual".

Furthermore, the *for* complement in (24) refers to a counterfactual situation:

(24) It would be odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].   (Bresnan (1972: 71))

In (24), the *for* complement is harmonious with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*. The *for* complement is parallel to the counterfactual conditional clauses in this respect. In the present case, the situation referred to by the *for* complement is construed as a counterfactual situation.

"Futurity" and "counterfactuality" expressed by the situations referred to by the *for* complement constitute "nonfactuality" in Declerck's (2011) terms, as shown by (21). This is because these situations are not asserted to be true.

There are, however, a number of cases which cannot be explained only in terms of "nonfactuality". For example, modalizers can be used to refer to a fact:

(25) It's odd [that the letter <u>should</u> mention the 21st of the month].

(A. Christie, *The ABC Murders*) (Underline is mine)

In (18), the situation expressed by emotive *should*, *the letter mentions the 21st of the month*, is factual. It is impossible to give a sufficient explanation to the case of this kind in terms of "nonfactuality". Furthermore, when the conditional is regarded as closed, as in the following example, the situation is something which the speaker admits to be factual:

(26) ["The picture you are now looking at is a Van Gogh."] – "Well, if this is a Van Gogh, I'm rather disappointed by it." (Declerck (2011: 31))

In (19), the truth of the situation referred to by the closed conditional clause is presupposed in the context, which is shown in the square brackets. Declerck (2011: 31) states about this point as follows:

(27) … it [the world in which the situation in question is located] is assumed (or ostensibly assumed) to coincide with the factual world. (Declerck (2011: 31))

This explanation obviously contradicts his definition of modality that modality is "the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world."

Emotive *should* and the closed conditional do not create a nonfactual world but express the speaker's construal of a fact. If we take the fact into consideration, Declerck's (2011) definition of modality should be revised into the following:

(28) Modality constitutes a semantic category which shows how the information on the situation (i.e. the state of affairs, the proposition, or the possible world) or a part of it comes from, how the situation exists or should exist, or the perception/feeing towards

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the situation, rather than merely asserting that the situation exists or that it is true.

<div align="right">(Cf. Sawada (2006: 2, 2012: 64, 2018a: 6))</div>

(28) enables us to regard the complementizer *for* as a modalizer, because it expresses the speaker's construal towards the situations.

6.3. Some Previous Studies

6.3.1. Introduction

The present section adduce five significant previous studies on the complementizer *for*, such as Jespersen (MEG V), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972), Aijmer (1972), Spears (1973), Quirk et al. (1985), Wierzbicka (1988), Dixon (1991), and Swan (2017[4]), and clarifies some problems of their analyses.

6.3.2. Jespersen (MEG V)

6.3.2.1. The Environment of the *For* Complement

Jespersen (MEG V) mentions the following five environments of the *for* complement:

First, the *for* complement is used after particular verbs such as *long*, *wish*, *pray*, *care*, *and prepare*, which takes the preposition *for* in their complement position:

(29)   a. Pen <u>longed</u> [for the three years to be over].

b. He <u>wished</u> [for her to have con1e to him].

c. I <u>wished</u> and <u>prayed</u> [for you to come].

d. Unless you <u>care</u> [for me to do it], I don't care to do it   .

e. I don't think I should <u>care</u> [for it to be known that I was selling pictures].

f. I <u>wanted</u> [for yü to know, zurr, that …]

g. You must be <u>prepared</u> [for your children to bring you unhappiness].

<div align="right">(Jespersen (MEG V: 300-301)) (Underline is mine)</div>

Second, the *for* complement is also used after particular verbs such as *fix*, *choose*, *like*, *hate*,

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and *bear*, which do not take the preposition *for* in their complement position:

(30) a. He had <u>fixed</u> [for the marriage to take place at eleven].

b. I hardly know in what language you would <u>choose</u> [for me to reply].

c. You'd <u>like</u> better [for us both to stay home together].

d. She wouldn't <u>like</u> [for him to know anything].

e. I <u>hate</u> [for you to be giving lessons].

f. I couldn't <u>bear</u> [for us not to be friends].

g. I <u>mean</u> afore all else [for that woman to be happy].

h. I'd <u>sooner</u> [for her to die than have her go to you].

i. I suppose I don't much <u>deserve</u> [for you to write to me].

j. I could <u>arrange</u> [for you to be in the background].

k. she <u>planned</u> [for you not to know about it until after tomorrow].

l. She <u>said</u> [for you all to go in].[2]

(Jespersen (MEG V: 301)) (Underline is mine)

Third, the *for* complement is used after the combination of *too* + an adjective and an adjective + *enough*, which expresses degrees:

(31) a. The tempest was <u>too high</u> [for her to be heard].

b. One word is <u>too often profaned</u> [for me to profane it], One feeling <u>too falsely disdained</u> [For thee to disdain it]. One hope is <u>too like despair</u> [for prudence to smother].

c. Mr. Tulliver's own hand shook <u>too much under his excitement</u> [for him to write himself].

d. Am I <u>too wicked</u> [for you and me to live together]?

e. It often happens that the truth lies <u>too far back</u> [for us to discover].

f. Mr. Darcy had been standing <u>near enough</u> [for her to overhear a conversation

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[2] According to Jespersen (MEG V: 302), (30l) constitutes an interesting correspondence to "*She told you all to go in*". In (30l), [*for you all to go in*] constitutes a complement clause, and thus the object of her instruction is not explicitly expressed, while, in the latter sentence, [*you all to go in*] does not constitute a complement clause, and thus the object of the verb *tell* is *you all*.

between him and Mr. Bingley].

Fourth, the *for* complement is used after particular adjectives such as *keen*, *afraid*, *ashamed*:

(32) a. Nor am I <u>afraid</u> [for them to see it].

   b. Shouldn't you be <u>glad</u> [for me to have the same sort of happiness]?

   c. His mother was frightfully <u>keen</u> [for Michael to stay with them].

   d. Nora's husband is <u>content</u> [for her to be a doll].

   e. I'm <u>ashamed</u> [for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married].

   f. I was so <u>impatient</u> [for you to come to God].

   g. He was quite <u>willing</u> [for everyone else to do the same].

   h. We shall be only too <u>pleased</u> [for Albert to take over the pew].

Fifth, the *for* complement is used solely to express future situations such as "purpose", "design", and "necessary condition":

(33) a. I thought you had kindly left it [the book] here, on purpose [for me to read].

   b. In the pauses when she stopped [for the Judge to write it down] ...

   c. She held out her hand [for him to shake].

   d. He placed himself at a corner of the doorway [for her to pass him into the house].

   e. He unwrinkled the letter carefully [for it to be legible].

   f. Vernon stood aside [for her to enter].

   g. My parents had but to give me an order [for me to conceive at once some plan of disobeying it].

   h. We'll have to go round by Lippinghall, [for me to get some clothes].

   i. The tin mug with the hot water [for Alexis to drink from].

   j. She is now coming to town, in order [for me to make my addresses to her].

   k. In order [for a poet to be taken seriously by the public], it must first be abundantly clear that he takes himself seriously.

6.3.2.2. Counterfactuality

Jespersen (MEG V) makes the following claim in terms of "counterfactuality" on the sentences with the *for* complement:

(34) It should he noted that in nearly all sentences the combination of *for* and an infinitive
     denotes some vague possibility or something imagined.   (Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

This claim shows that, in almost all cases, the situations referred to by the *for* complement are not expressed as factual. For example, the *for* complement in the following sentence refers to the possibility that the Japanese will see it:

(35) He was ashamed [for the Japanese to see it].   (Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

Therefore, the *for* complement in (35) can be paraphrased with the *that* complement with the auxiliary *might* which expresses a possibility:

(36) He was ashamed [that the Japanese <u>might</u> possibly see it].

                                        (Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Underline is mine)

The claim that the *for* complement in (35) does not refer to a fact is supported by the fact that it cannot be paraphrased with *-ing* complement, which is shown in the following sentence:

(37) *He was ashamed of the Japanese seeing it.   (Jespersen (MEG V: 304))

6.3.3. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971)

Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345, 347) claims that English predicates can be semantically classified depending on whether they are factive or not:

	【Factive】	【Non-factive】
Subject Clause	significant	likely

	odd	sure
	tragic	possible
	exciting	true
	relevant	false
	matters	seems
	counts	appears
	makes sense	happens
	suffices	chances
	amuses	turns out
	bothers	
Object Clause	regret	suppose
	be aware (of)	assert
	grasp	allege
	comprehend	assume
	take into consideration	claim
	take into account	maintain
	bear in mind	believe
	ignore	conclude
	make clear	conjecture
	mind	intimate
	forget (about)	deem
	deplore	fancy
	resent	figure
	care	

Fig. 1: The Classification of Predicates Based on Factivity/Non-factivity

This classification is based on whether predicates presuppose a certain fact. For example, in the sentence with a factive predicate, the truth of the complement used as the subject or the object of the whole sentence is presupposed. This is justified by the fact that the proposition of the

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complement is not included in the scope of negation in the matrix clause:

(38) It is not significant that he has been found guilty.

(Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345))

Even if the factive predicate *significant* in (38) is negated, the proposition of the *that* complement is not negated. It follows from this fact that the proposition of the complement which follows factive predicates is presupposed to be true.

(39) It is not likely that he has been found guilty.   (Cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 345))

In (39), on the other hand, the non-factive predicate *likely* is used. Therefore, if the matrix clause contains negation, the proposition of the following *that* complement is also negated. It follows from this fact that the proposition of the complement which follows non-factive predicates is not presupposed to be true.

Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) expanded the classification in terms of emotional/non-emotional distinction, and mentions that the predicates which take the *for* complement is restricted to emotive predicates, which are shown in the underlined parts in the following sentences:

(40) a. It bothers me for John to have hallucinations.

b. I regret for you to be in this fix.

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 363))

The situations referred to by the *for* complements in (40a, b) are those which are already in thepresent, rather than those which will occur in the future. The speakers express their subjective emotion towards such situations.

According to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), emotive predicates express someone's subjective feelings towards a certain proposition, rather than showing their knowledge about it or its truth value. Thus, they do not follow the verbs such as *believe* and *force*, which have nothing to do with the truth value of the complement:

(41) a. *I believe for John to have liked Anselm.

b. *I forced John$_i$ for John$_i$ to say cheese.

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Kiparsky and Kiparsky's (1971: 363-364) cross-classification of factivity and emotivity is as follows:

【Factive】	Emotive	Non-emotive
Subject Clause	important	well-known
	crazy	clear
	odd	(self-evident)
	relevant	goes without saying
	instructive	
	sad	
	suffice	
	bother	
	alarm	
	fascinate	
	exhilarate	
	defy comment	
	surpass belief	
	a tragedy	
	no laughing matter	
Object Clause	regret	be aware (of)
	resent	bear in mind
	deplore	make clear
		forget
		take into account

【Non-factive】	Emotive	Non-emotive
Subject Clause	improbable	probable
	unlikely	likely

	a pipedream	turn out
	nonsense	seem
	urgent	imminent
	vital	in the works
Object Clause	intend	predict
	prefer	anticipate
	reluctant	foresee
	anxious	say
	willing	suppose
	eager	conclude

Fig. 2: The Cross-classification of Factivity and Emotivity

Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) points out the following three feathers of emotive predicates:

First, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, allow emotive *should* in their complement[3]:

   (42) a. It's interesting that you should have said so. [Emotive]

      b. *It's well-known that you should have said so. [Non-emotive]

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 364))

Second, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, allow the degree adverb *at all* in their complement:

   (43) a. It's interesting that he came at all.

      b. *It's well-known that he came at all.

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))

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[3] It should be noted that among all emotive predicates, *urgent* and *vital*, which introduce future situations as their complements, take *should* as a subjunctive substitute. *Should* as a subjunctive substitute is different from emotive *should* in that only the former can be substituted with a bare infinitive (*should* as a subjunctive substitute is used only in British English).

   (i) a. It is most urgent that they {should be / be / *is} treated properly.
                   (Cf. *Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fifth Edition)
     b. It is vital that he {should understand / understand /*understands} how to operate a computer.

Third, emotive predicates, but not non-emotive predicates, cannot be used in the relative clauses introduced by *as*.

(44) a. *As is interesting, John is in India.

    b. As is well-known, John is in India.

(Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))

If the complement sentences of emotive predicates are called "emotive complements", the *for* complements, which can be taken only by emotive predicates, can be referred to as "the emotive complements".

6.3.4. Bresnan (1972)

6.3.4.1. Two Types of the *For* Complement

Bresnan (1972: 81) claims that the complementizer *for* has its inherent meanings and that it is derived from that of the proposition *for*. The meanings in question is the following:

(45) "Reason/Evidence"

    a. He considers her a fool <u>for her generosity</u>.

    b. He considers it foolish <u>for her to help him</u>.

(Bresnan (1972: 79)) (Underline is mine)

(46) "Purpose/Use/Intention"

    a. This book is <u>for your amusement</u>.

    b. This book is <u>for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away</u>.

    c. I'm aiming <u>for victory</u>.

    d. I'm aiming <u>for my team to win</u>.

(Bresnan (1972: 79-80)) (Underline is mine)

In (45a), where the proposition *for* is used, the propositional phrase introduced by *for* expresses the reason why he considers her foolish. In (45b), in the same way, the *for* complement constitutes the reason why he does so. Furthermore, in (46a, c), the propositional phrases express

the use of the book and the speaker's aim respectively, while the corresponding (46b, d) show that the *for* complements express the same things. These meanings, i.e. "reason/evidence" and "purpose/use/intention", are incorporated into the complementizer *for*, which is derived from the proposition *for*, and they are not expressed by the complementizer *that*:

(47) a. *You're bastard that you do/did that.

b. *I'm aiming that my team will win.

<div align="right">(Bresnan (1972: 80))</div>

Bresnan (1972:81) classifies the complementizer *for* into the "reason type" and the "purpose type" by considering these facts. In the following formulas, the theoretical relationship between the situation of the *for* complement (= X) and that of the matrix clause (= Y) can be expressed by using arrows expressing the directions of meaning:

(48) for (X) → Y

(49) for (X) ← Y

These formulas show the following theoretical relationship between X and Y: in the type of (48), X constitutes the reason or subjective cause for Y, while, in the type of (49), X constitutes the purpose or goal of Y. From the viewpoint of the temporal relationship, the situation referred to by the *for* complement (= X) in (48) is anterior to Y, while, in (49), X is posterior to Y, which is shown in the following time axes:

(50) Reason Type

(51) Purpose Type

Bresnan (1972) explains the use of the *for* complement in these types in the following way: In the type of (48), Y is expressed by emotive predicates such as *surprise*, *astound*, and *crazy*, and the *for* complement corresponds to X, which constitutes the reason or cause:

(52) Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)]?   (Bresnan (1972: 82))

Therefore, the sentences without emotive predicates do not allow the *for* complements. In (53), the verbs such as *believe*, *consider*, and *doubt*, which express "thoughts" or "judgment", are used, and thus the *for* complements are unacceptable:

(53) a. *He believes somehow for Frank to be here.

      b. *What I believe is for Mary to be shy.

      c. *They doubted very much for me to be capable.

(Bresnan (1972: 79))

In the type of (49), on the other hand, Y is expressed by the predicates showing a requirement or a desire, while the *for* complement corresponds to X, which constitutes the object of the requirement or desire:

(54) It's absolutely imperative for Nell to feign stupidity.

Since, as mentioned earlier, X must be posterior to Y in this type it cannot express any situations in the past:

(55) *It's absolutely imperative [for her to have acted stupid yesterday].

6.3.4.2. Counterfactuality

Bresnan (1972) compares the complementizer *for* and *that* to explain the differences between them in terms of the presence or absence of "definiteness" and "counterfactuality". According to Bresnan (1972), the *for* complement is "counterfactual", while the *that* complement is not, and it introduces a factual, or "definite" situation:

(56) a. It's rather odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting].

   b. ?It's rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

(Bresnan (1972: 71))

(56a), where the *that* complement is used, sounds natural, while the acceptability of (56b), where the *for* complement is used, varies among the native speakers of English. Bresnan claims that the insertion of the adverb *always*, as in (57), changes the acceptability of both sentences:

(57) a. *It's <u>always</u> rather odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting].

   b. It's <u>always</u> rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)

This difference in acceptability is parallel to that of the following pair, which includes the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*:

(58) a. It <u>would</u> be odd [that a man is chairing a women's meeting (but for the fact that…)].

   b. It <u>would</u> be odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

(Bresnan (1972: 72)) (Underline is mine)

Although both sentences are acceptable, the *that* complement in (58a), but not the *for* complement in (58b), presupposes that the situation is factual. That is to say, the *that* complement in (58a), unlike the *for* complement in (58b), cannot be counterfactual in any way. Thus, in order for the *that* complement to be combined with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*, a certain "counterfactual" phrases must be implied in the sentence. Bresnan (1972) uses a counterfactual conditional clause "*but for the fact that…*" as a suitable example for it. On the other hand, in (57), *always* functions as a counterfactual controller, and thus it is compatible with the *for* complement.

6.3.5. Aijmer (1972)

Aijmer (1972) puts her focus on the differences of the following two constructions with *like* and *believe* and demonstrates that the former has the complementizer *for* in the complement position in its deep structure and that the latter does not.

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(59) a. I like (for) Mary to sing.[4]

b. I believe Henry to be successful.

(Aijmer (1972: 86))

In (59a), the complement of *like* is not only *Mary* but also the whole complement sentence, namely [(*for*) *Mary to sing*], which is clear from the fact that the *for* complement, but not *Mary*, is chosen as the subject of the corresponding passive sentences:

(60) a. *Mary is liked to sing.

b. For Mary to sing is liked by everyone.

(Aijmer (1972: 86-87))

In (59b), on the other hand, *believe* does not take a complement sentence, but rather it only takes *Henry*. Therefore, it is impossible to choose the combination of the accusative + the infinitive as the subject of the corresponding passive sentence:

(61) a. Henry is believed to be successful.

b. *For Henry to be successful is believed by everyone.

(Aijmer (1972: 86-87))

Aijmer (1972), along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) and Bresnan (1972), claims that the *for* complement occurs in the complement position of the predicates which express "emotional reaction", and that it constitutes the "cause" of the reaction. Thus, *obvious*, which is a non-emotional predicate, does not take the *for* complement since it does not need a cause as its complement:

(62) *It is obvious for John to come.   (Aijmer (1971: 90))

Aijmer (1971) also compares the *for* complement with the *-ing* and *that* complement and explains the difference among them in terms of "presupposition" and "general validity":

First, the *-ing* and *that* complement can refer to a situation which has already occurred in the

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[4] According to Aijmer, (59a) is acceptable in American English, but many of British English speakers do not think it acceptable.

past, while the *for* complement can refer to a situation which will occur in the future or has already occurred in the past.

(63) a. John hates Peter's singing.

   b. John hates Peter to sing.[5]

<div align="right">(Aijmer (1972: 88))</div>

In (63a), it is presupposed that peter actually sang, while, in (63b), there is not such a presupposition.

Second, the situation referred to by the *for* complement is general rather than specific, while the *-ing* and *that* complement refers to an actual event. This claim is supported by the fact that (64a) implies the truth of (64b), but not vice versa:

(64) a. I like John to smoke a cigar.

   b. I like John's smoking a cigar right now.

<div align="right">(Aijmer (1972: 89))</div>

(64a) is interpreted to mean that the speaker likes it whenever John smokes a cigar, while (64b) that the speaker likes the present situation where John is smoking a cigar (, but I do not like yesterday's situation where John was smoking a cigar).

Third, the *for* complement, unlike the *that* complement, harmonizes with the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* in the matrix clause:

(65) a. *I would like it that John is at home.

   b. I would like John to be at home.

<div align="right">(Aijmer (1971: 89))</div>

(65a) is unacceptable because there is a logical crash between the counterfactuality of *would* in the matrix clause and factuality of the complementizer *that*. On the other hand, (65b) is

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[5] The verb *hate* can take the *for* complement.

    (ii) John hates [for Peter to sing].   (Cf. Aijmer (1972: 88)) (Underline is mine)

    (iii) I hate [for rice to be cooked this way].   (COCA) (Underline is mine)

acceptable because the *for* complement is counterfactual. Here, the *for* complement presupposes that it is uncertain whether the situation will occur or not.

6.3.6. Spears (1973)

Spears (1973) discusses "habituality" as a feature of the *significant*-class predicates (i.e. "SC predicates"). The features of SC predicates are as follows (Spears (1973: 627)):

First, they take the combination of POSS + *-ing* or *that* clauses as their complement:

  (66) a. <u>His doing that</u> is significant.

      b. It is significant <u>that he did tha</u>t.

Second, they take the *for* complements:

  (67) It is significant for him to do that.

Third, they do not take subjunctive complements:

  (68) *It is significant <u>that he do that.</u>

Fourth, they take factive *would* complement:[6]

  (69) It is significant <u>that she would even think such a thing</u>.

According to Spears (1973), SC predicates can be subclassified in the following way:

                    Judgmental Type: significant

  (70) SC Predicates ⟨

                    Experiential Type: strange, odd, tragic, interesting, amazing,

                            disheartening, awful, wonderful, fascinating

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
[6] According to Spears (1973), factive *would* complements are complements which presuppose its truth. In some dialect, *should* instead of *would* is used. This *should* is not what is called a subjunctive substitute but emotive *should* which express a mental distance between a fact and the speaker's assumption.

Spears (1973: 633) describes the features of the two types of SC predicates in the following way:

(71) To resume the discussion of judgmentality and experientiality, all of the experiential predicate-plus-complement constructions make reference to states of mind or feelings on the part of an experiencer or experiencers. Significant, the judgmental predicate, on the other hand, makes no reference to emotional states or feelings of experiencers; it simply characterizes the process itself referred to by the complement.

(Spears (1973: 633))

Following this explanation, (72), where an SC predicate of judgmental type is used, for example, is interpreted as meaning (73):

(72) It is significant for a bat not to be able to fly. (Spears (1973: 628))
(73) Any instance of a bat not being able to fly is significant. (Spears (1973: 633))

On the other hand, (74), where an SC predicates of experiential type is used, is interpreted as meaning (75):

(74) It's surprising for a Frenchman to speak flawless English. (Spears (1973: 633))

(75) a. Whenever a Frenchman speaks flawless English, it's surprising.
b. A Frenchman's speaking flawless English causes a feeling of surprise on the part of any experiencer(s) that perceive(s) or learn(s) of it.

(Spears (1973: 633))

Observe the following on these facts:

(76) It's surprising that Joe beat Hilda last night.
(77) It's surprising that Joe beats his wife.
(78) It's surprising for Joe to beat his wife.

(Spears (1973: 634))

In (76) and (77), the *that* complements refer to two different processes, one of which refers to a single past process that Joe beat his wife, and the other of which to Joe's present habit that he

beats his wife. On the other hand, (78), where the *for* complement is used, several processes are inferred. To put it another way, each (76) and (77), by using a *that* complement, shows that the speaker gets surprised at the single process at the time of t_1, the time shown in the matrix clause. The *for* complement in (78), on the other hand, refers to several processes, and the whole sentence indicates that the speaker will get surprised every time any one of the processes occurs. Spears (1973) names this feature of the *for* complement "habituality".

6.3.7. Quirk et al. (1985)

Quirk et al. (1985) claims that the situations referred to by the *for* complement can be divided into future situations which express "possibilities" and "suggestions" and nonfuture situations.

(79) It's natural <u>for them to be together</u>.　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

According to Quirk et al. (1985: 1063), if the situation denoted by the *for* complement is interpreted to be "not-yet factual", the complement can be paraphrased with the *that* complement with "putative *should*" (in this case, the *for* complement has a conditional meaning):

(80) It's natural <u>that they *should* be together</u>.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

If the *for* complement in (79) is interpreted to refer to a nonfuture situation, then the complement can be paraphrased with the *that* complement without modals:

(81) It's natural <u>that they are together</u>.　　(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

In this case, the complement verb *be* is interpreted to be a state verb, and the whole complement is assumed to be factual.

The *for* complement can often be paraphrased with a conditional clause because its putative feature is equivalent to that of the conditionals with *if*. For example, (82a) has the same interpretation as (82b) has:

(82)　a. It would be unwise [for you to marry him].

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b. It would be unwise [if you were to marry him].

<div align="right">(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))</div>

(82a) is paralleled with (9(9b), as was mentioned in Section 6.1.1.

6.3.8. Wierzbicka (1988)

6.3.8.1. The Environment of the *For* Complement

Wierzbicka (1988) puts her focus on the fact that the *for* complement prefers a nonfactual context and discusses the meanings and functions of the *for* complement:

(83) a. ?I'd be delighted for you to stay with me.

  b. ?I was delighted for you to stay with me.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 111))</div>

According to Wierzbicka (1988: 112), the *for* complement prefers the following cases:

(84) A. When referring to a generic situation

  B. When referring a future situation

  C. When referring a counterfactual situation

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))</div>

This claim accords well with Jespersen's (MEG V) claim in terms of "possibility" and "counterfactuality", Bresnan's (1972) claim in terms of "counterfactuality", and Spear's (1973) claim in terms of "habituality".

6.3.8.2. The Differences between the *For* Complement and the *To* Complement

Wierzbicka (1988) criticizes the traditional analysis that there is no semantic difference between the *for* complement and the *to* complement and claims that they are quite different from each other. This claim is supported by the following evidence:

First, the *for* complement, but not the *to* complement, is unacceptable in factual contexts:

(85) a. ?I was delighted for Mary to win.

b. ?I was ashamed for Mary to see that.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))</div>

(86) a. I was delighted to win.

b. I was ashamed to see that.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 112))</div>

In (22), the *to* complements, *to win* and *to see that*, express factual situations. In (21), however, the *for* complements do not express them.

Second, in the *to* complement, but not in the *for* complement, the subject of the complement clause is coreferential with that of the matrix clause.

(87) *I was delighted for me (myself) to win.   (Wierzbicka (1988: 113))

(45) is unacceptable because the agent of the emotion expressed by the emotive predicate *delighted* is coreferential with that of the verb *win*. Wierzbicka (1988) refers to this feature of the *for* complement as "other-orientedness".

6.3.8.3. The *For* Complement and Emotivity

After pointing out that the *for* complement appears in the sentences expressing emotions along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Wierzbicka (1988) classifies these sentences into (i) sentences expressing intention, (ii) sentences expressing emotional evaluations, and (iii) sentences expressing intellectual judgment and discusses the semantic formulae implied by each of the sentences.

6.3.8.3.1. The *For* Complement and Intention

Wierzbicka (1988) discusses the relationship between the *for* complement and personal intention in sentences with the verbs, such as *long* and *ask*, which require personal subjects and the predicates, such as *desirable* and *necessary*, which do not. Verbs such as *long* and *ask* express

weak confidence of the possibility for the situation to occur. Taking this fact into consideration, Wierzbicka (1988) insists that these verbs imply the following semantic formula:

(88) "I don't want to say: one could think this: it will happen (because of that)"

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))</div>

(25) expresses weak confidence that the situation denoted by the *for* complement will occur, but, at the same time, these verbs also imply a strong desire for the possibility. Generally speaking, we do not tend to have a strong desire for the realization of the situation which is quite possible to occur: the lower the possibility becomes, the stronger the desire will be. This general claim enables us to give a semantic explanation to the difference of the acceptability of the following pair:

(89)　a.　I want very much for you to come.

　　　　b. ?I want for you to come

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))</div>

According to Wierzbicka (1988), the insertion of *very much* in (26(26a) expresses the speaker's strong desire for the realization of the situation referred to by the complement and, at the same time, his weak confidence in it. In (26(26b), on the other hand, the absence of *very much* expresses the speaker's weak desire and, at the same time, his strong confidence. Therefore, the unacceptability of (26(26b) comes from the incompatibility between strong desire (i.e. weak confidence) implied by the *for* complement and strong confidence (i.e. weak desire) implied by the whole sentence. Wierzbicka's (1988) hypothesis that the *for* complement expresses "strong desire" (i.e. "weak confidence") is supported by the fact that it is used in the sentence whose subject is impersonal, which is shown in the following sentences:

(90)　a. It is desirable for him to be present.

　　　　b. It is necessary for him to be present.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988: 120))</div>

According to Wierzbicka (1988: 121), in (27), the speaker conceals their desire and expresses it as a public necessity by using an expletive *it*. Thus, "there is perhaps more urgency and more

authority" to (27) than to sentences with personal subjects. Therefore, the following, in addition to (25) can be postulated as one of the semantic formulae of sentences with impersonal subjects.

(91) "I don't want to say: I want it"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

To summarize the above discussions, the semantic formulae implied by the impersonal sentences and the personal sentences with the *for* complements can be shown in (29) and (30), respectively.

(92) I want (very much) for him to be present. ⇒

      I think this: I want this: he will be present

      I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen

                         (Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

(93) It is desirable for him to be present. ⇒

      if one knew this: he will be present

      one would think this:

         this will be good

         he should do it

      I don't want to say: I want it

      I don't want to say: one can think this: it will happen

                         (Wierzbicka (1988: 121))

6.3.8.3.2. The *For* Complement and Emotional Evaluation

Predicates which express "emotional evaluation" include *right*, *wrong*, *not fair*, *appropriate*, *inappropriate*. According to Wierzbicka (1988), if we consider the fact that these predicates are used in the sentences with impersonal subjects, the semantic formula shown in (28) (i.e. "I don't want to say: I want it") will be applied to them. Furthermore, they express an evaluation such as "*good*" or "*bad*" *towards* the situation referred to by the *for* complement, which is shown in the underlined part below:

(94) It is {right / wrong etc.} for X to do Z. ⇒

when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

<u>I think this: it will be good/bad</u>

(Wierzbicka (1988:128) (Underline is mine)

Thus, *clear* and *true*, which do not express such evaluation, cannot occur with the *for* complement:

(95) a. It is {illegal / *clear} for these houses to be occupied.

b. It is {right / *true} for God to punish sinners.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 127))

The notions such as "*good*" or "*bad*" implied by these sentences do not express their literary meanings, but rather they express "obligation", which is usually expressed by *should*. Therefore, (31) can be changed into the following:

(96) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. (It is right/wrong for X to cause Z.) ⇒

when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

I think this: X should/shouldn't do it

I don't want to say: I don't want this

(Wiezbicka (1988: 128))

Wierzbicka (1988) also points out that the *for* complement used in the sentences of this kind refers exclusively to human action:

(97) a. It is illegal for these houses to be occupied.

b. ?It is bad for this soil to be so poor.

c. It was crazy for her to leave that job.

d. ?It was a tragedy for the babies to die.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

Wierzbicka (1988) claims, based on this fact, that the matrix predicates of emotive judgment express an evaluation of the action itself rather than of the agent of the action. Thus, the semantic

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formula implied by the sentences of this kind includes (35) below (in (35), X refers to the agent of the action):

(98) "I don't want to say something good/bad about X"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the semantic formula implied by emotive evaluation sentences expressing is the following.

(99) It is right/wrong for X to do Z. $\Rightarrow$

     when I imagine this: I know this: X will do Z

     I think this:

       it will be good/bad

       X should/shouldn't do it

     I don't want to say: I don't want it

     I don't want to say something good/bad about X

(Wierzbicka (1988: 128))

6.3.8.3.3. The *For* Complement and Intellectual Judgment

6.3.8.3.3.1. Expectability

Wierzbicka (1988: 130) discusses the relationship between the situation denoted by the *for* complement and an expectation of the realization of it. The predicates which express an intellectual judgment includes *unexpected*, *odd*, *strange*, *surprising*, *normal, natural*, and *usual*. According to her analysis, intellectual judgment sentences imply that the realization of the situation is expectable or unexpectable:

(100) "one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will happen"

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

In (37), the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would* is used because the exprectation of the realization of the situation referred to by the *for* complement is a "hypothetical expectation" (Wierzbicka (1988: 130)). Therefore, the sentences is this type imply the following semantic

formula:

(101) It is unusual for the train not to leave late. ⇒

    if someone said: the train will not leave late

    one would have thought: one should not think that

    if I knew: it happened

    I would have thought: it is unusual

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

(38) shows that the *for* complement in intellectual judgment sentence refers to a factual situation and that the speaker made a prediction that the situation would occur.

    She argues that, in intellectual judgment sentences, but not emotive evaluation sentences, the emphasis is on the intellectual judgment rather than the speaker's personal emotion:

(102) a. I was delighted/sorry for Mary to win.[7]

      b. ?I was surprised for Mary to win.

(Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

In (39), *delighted* and *sorry* express emotional evaluations, while *surprised* expresses an intellectual judgment. (39(39b) is unacceptable because the emphasis is on the speaker's personal emotion though the whole sentence is an intellectual judgment sentence. Wierzbicka (1988: 130) postulates the following semantic formula for intellectual judgment sentences:

(103) "I don't want to say: I felt …"   (Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

6.3.8.3.3.2. The Parallelism between the *For* Complement and Evaluative *Should*

    According to her analysis, "expectability" expressed by the *for* complement used in intellectual judgment sentences is parallel to that by evaluative *should*. Evauative *should* implies

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[7] According to Wierzbicka (1988), native speakers of English often hesitate to accept (102a) (see (85) in Section 6.3.8.2.).

that there was no expectation that the situation would occur:

(104) It was interesting/amusing/funny that X <u>should</u> have done Z.

<div align="right">(Wierzbicka (1988:131))</div>

In (41), *interesting*, *amusing*, and *funny* co-occur with evaluative *should*. This shows that these predicates have "unexpectability" in their semantic formulae. Thus, (41) can be changed into (42):

(105) It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.　　　(Wierzbicka (1988:130))

6.3.9. Dixon (1991)
6.3.9.1. Modal (*FOR*) *TO* and Judgment *TO*

Dixon (1991) divides the infinitive into "Modal (FOR)TO" and "Judgement TO":

(106) Modal (FOR)TO

　　a. I want Mary <u>to be a doctor</u>.

　　b. She forced <u>him to recite a poem</u>.[8]

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 220)) (Underline is mine)</div>

(107) Judgement TO

　　a. I discovered <u>him to be quite stupid</u>.

　　b. We had assumed <u>Mary to be a doctor</u>.

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 220)) (Underline is mine)</div>

He argues that one of the differences between "Modal (FOR)TO" and "Judgment TO" is the following: in the former, the complementizer *for* is explicitly expressed, while, in the latter, it is

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[8]　*Him to recite a poem* in (106b) is probably not categorized in Modal (FOR)TO because *him* is not the subject of the infinitive clause but the object of the verb *force*. This is evident from the fact that *him* can be raised to the subject of the corresponding passive sentence:

　(iv) He was forced to recite a poem by her.

It is clear from this fact that "*him to recite a poem*" does not constitute a *for* complement, but a quite difference construction of "accusative + infinitive".

not expressed either explicitly or implicitly. In the present section, only "Modal (FOR) TO" will be discussed since "Judgment TO" is not included in the subjects of the present chapter.

6.3.9.2. Syntactic Features of Modal (*FOR*) *TO*

According to Dixon's analysis, Modal (FOR) TO complements is related to the subject of the complement clause becoming involved in the activity or state referred to by that clause, or to the potentiality of such involvement. The other syntactic features of the complements are as follows[9]:

First, in Modal (FOR) TO complements, the complementizer *for* exists in the underlying level, but its existence on the surface will be effected by the kind of the matrix verb: for example, it is obligatory after *hope*, while it is not after *wish*. After the verb *force*, unlike these two, *for* must obligatorily deleted:

(108) a. I hope *(for) Mary to accompany me.

b. I wish (for) Mary to accompany me.

c. I forced (*for) Mary to accompany me.[10]

(Dixon (1991: 220))

Second, the *for* phrase will be deleted if a Modal (FOR) TO complement functions as the subject of the sentence and the subject of the complement clause and the object of the matrix clause are coreferential:

(109) (*For Mary) to have to travel so much annoys Mary.[11]   (Dixon (1991: 220))

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[9] Dixon (1991) discusses another feature of Modal (FOR) TO in the following way: "If the complement clause is in object function then its subject may be omitted under the coreferentiality with main clause subject". The present section, however, omits this feature because no suitable example for it is found in Dixon (1991).

[10] (108c) is not a suitable example of Modal (FOR) TO complements since, as mentioned above, *force* does not take the *for* complement. Therefore, it can be said that Modal (FOR) TO complements only have two cases: where *for* can be omitted, and where it cannot.

[11] Dixon (1991) takes the following sentence as an example of the second feature:

(v) (For Mary) to have to travel so much annoys John.

The present dissertation, however, does not regard (v) as a suitable example and changes it into (109) because, in (v), the subject of the complement clause and that of the matrix clause are not

Third, if a Modal (FOR) TO is changed into a *that* complement, a modal auxiliary must be used in the complement (The underlines are drawn by the author):

(110) a. I wish (for) John to go.

b. I wish that John <u>would</u> go.

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 221))</div>

(111) a. I decided for Mary to give the vote of thanks.

b. I decided that Mary <u>should</u> give the vote of thanks.[12]

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 221))</div>

(112) a. I decided to give the vote of thanks.

b. I decided that I <u>would</u> give the vote of thanks.

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 221))</div>

(113) a. I expect Mary to be appointed.

b. I expect that Mary <u>will</u> be appointed.

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 221))</div>

(114) a. I ordered the flag to be raised.

b. I ordered that the flag <u>should</u> be raised.[13]

<div align="right">(Dixon (1991: 221))</div>

(115a) does not have its corresponding Modal (FOR) TO complement since it cannot have any modality in the *that* complement:

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coreferential.

[12] *Should* in (111b) is thought to be a subjunctive substitute rather than the epistemic or root modal auxiliary. This is clear from the fact that it is paraphrased with verbs in the subjunctive present form, as is shown in the following:

(vi) I decided that Mary <u>give</u> the vote of thanks.

Considering the above discussion, Dixon's (1991) insistence on the relationship between the *for* complement and the modal auxiliaries seems unconvincing.

[13] The same analysis of *should* in (111b) can be applied to that in (114b(114a).

(115) a. ?I decided that I was sick.   (Dixon (1991: 221))

       b. ?I decided to be sick.

In the present analysis of this dissertation, the reason why the *for* complement is unacceptable is because the verb *decide* expresses "thoughts" (for further discussion, see (53) in Section 6.3.4.1.).

6.3.10. Hamawand (2003)

6.3.10.1. The Difference between the *For* Complement and the *To* Complement

Hamawand (2003: 171), essentially along the lines of Wierzbicka (1988), claims that all linguistic elements posited in grammar are ascribed some kind of conceptual import. On the basis of this claim, he argues that *for-to* complement clauses have not only a syntactic function but also meaning of their own which conditions its behavior. He also claims that the syntax of an expression is a reflection of its conceptual organization, which represents the specific construal imposed on their content. In this sense, the *for-to* complement can be regarded as a "construction" in Cognitive Grammar.

According to him, *to* complement clauses represent a "self-related" construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject's involvement in the complement event, and so implying his or her high degree of interest in its realization. By contrast, *for-to* complement clauses represent an "other-related" construal in the sense of reflecting the main clause subject's distance from the complement event:

(116) I like [to win the race].   (Hamawand (2003: 172))

(117) I like [for Jane to win the race].   (Hamawand (2003: 172))

According to his analysis, in (116), for example, the main clause subject relates the content of the complement clause to himself and so opts for the *to* complement. In (117), on the other hand, the main clause subject relates the same content to *Jane* and so chooses the *for-to* complement.

6.3.10.2. Semantic Compatibility Analysis

Hamawand (2003: 180-183) argues that adjectival predicates evoke a number of domains such as evaluation, emotion, deontics, and epistemics. He explains these domains as follows (The examples are Hamawand's (2003: 180-183):

First, "evaluation" refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker makes an assessment of a situation based on personal beliefs. It evokes the following five subdomains:

A. Difficulty: *arduous*, *burdensome*, *difficult*, *hard*, *laborious*, *onerous*, *strenuous*, *toilsome*, etc.

(118) a. For him to climb the mountain is difficult.

b. It is difficult for him to climb the mountain.

B. Ease: *cushy*, *easy*, *effortless*, *elementary*, *light*, *painless*, *plain*, *simple*, etc.

(119) a. For her to do the exercise is easy.

b. It is easy for her to do the exercise.

C. Morality: (*in*)*appropriate*, (*in*)*correct*, (*in*)*decent*, (*un*)*ethical*, (*im*)*moral*, (*im*)*polite*, (*im*)*proper*, (*im*)*prudent*, etc.

(120) a. For him to answer back is impolite.

b. It is impolite for him to answer back.

D. Intellectuality: (*un*)*fair*, (*un*)*just*, (*un*)*lawful*, (*il*)*legal*, (*il*)*legitimate*, (*il*)*logical*, (*in*)*credible*, (*ir*)*rational*, (*ir*)*relevant*, etc.

(121) a. For the employee to demand more money for less work is unfair.

b. It is unfair for the employee to demand more money for less work.

E. Recurrence: *common*, *customary*, *habitual*, *natural*, *recurrent*, *regular*, *usual*, etc.

(122) a. For guests to see tears at a wedding is usual.

b. It is usual for guests to see tears at the wedding.

He argues that the co-occurrence of a complement clause with any predicate is possible under the condition of semantic compatibility between the two. According to the subdomains of evaluation, the predicates refer to the possibility that the event might happen in the future when the necessary conditions exist. This is so because the evaluation is based on personal beliefs rather than on known facts. He also argues that *for-to* complement clauses refer to an event that is essentially potential. In other words, the event is based on suggestion about what might happen or an idea which has not yet shown to be true. The event which *for-to* expresses is made only at the general level (Cf. Spears (1973)). It refers to a general situation applicable to many of its types. According to him, the *for-to* complement clauses in all the examples seem to be compatible with the governing predicates.

Second, "emotion" refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker tends to have strong feelings as a response to a certain action. It evokes the following two subdomains:

A. Positive emotion: *admirable*, *adorable*, *delightful*, *enjoyable*, *nice*, *pleasurable*, *lovely*, *amazing*, *amusing*, *astonishing*, *fascinating*, *interesting*, *intriguing*, *pleasing*, *surprising*, etc.

(123) a. For them to remember old acquaintances is nice.

b. It is nice for them to remember old acquaintances.

c. For her to give a speech in public is interesting.

d. It is interesting for her to give a speech in public.

B. Negative emotion: (disapproval) *awful*, *disagreeable*, *disdainful*, *scornful*, *contemptuous*, *horrible*, *ridiculous*, *terrible*, (sadness) *deplorable*, *lamentable*, *mournful*, *rueful*, *regrettable*, *woeful*, *alarming*, *annoying*, *disappointing*, *disgusting*, *distressing*, *disturbing*, *irritating*, *shocking*, etc.

(124) a. For her to discuss sexual matters openly is horrible.

b. It is horrible for her to discuss sexual matters openly.

c. For them to lose the match is regrettable.

d. It is regrettable for them to lose the match.

e. For anyone to see the increase in violent crime is alarming.

f. It is alarming for anyone to see the increase in violent crime.

He argues that the choice of a complement clause is the result of its semantic compatibility with the aspect of meaning the main predicate evokes. In both subdomains of emotion, the predicates express an attitude towards an event, which is triggered by merely a thought. He also argues that *for-to* complement clauses refer to an event that is prototypically potential. The speaker imagines the event before it actually happens, or rather predicts his emotional response. The *for-to* complement clauses express a type of event which is indistinguishable from events of similar types. They refer to a general situation which is applicable to every person in a similar position to perform the event. According to him, that is the reason why the *for-to* complement clauses and the governing predicates are compatible with each other in the above examples.

Third, "deontics" refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker tries to influence the course of reality and bring about a new facet of the world. It evokes the following three subdomains:

Ａ．Obligation: *obligatory*, *compulsory*, *imperative*, *imperious*, *mandatory*, *necessary*, *urgent*, *prescriptive*, etc.

(125) a. For children to go to school is compulsory.

b. It is compulsory for children to go to school.

Ｂ．Permission: *acceptable*, *acknowledgeable*, *admissible*, *allowable*, *authorisable*, *constitutional*, *permissible*, *warrantable*, etc.

(126) a. For the visitors to take photographs is admissible.

b. It is admissible for the visitors to take photographs.

C. Prohibition: *constrictive*, *forbidden*, *inadmissible*, *interdictive*, *preventable*, *prohibitive*, *proscriptive*, *restrictive*, etc.

(127) a. For them to smoke in school is forbidden.

b. It is forbidden for them to smoke in school.

He argues that the co-existence of *for-to* complement clauses and predicates expressing deontics is underpinned by the semantic compatibility between the two. In all subdomains of deontics, the predicates refer to a force that allows or forbids the happening of an event in the future. He also argues that the for-to complement clauses refer to a move forward, in a series of events, that is to happen. When the situation has a tinge of importance, the speaker has high expectation for the occurrence of the event. The *for-to* complement clauses express a type of event which cannot be distinguished from events of similar types. This is so because the event is a general situation. According to him, it is this semantic compatibility that permits the co-occurrence of *for-to* complement clauses and the governing predicates in a construction.

Fourth, "epistemics" refers to the area of knowledge where the speaker passes a judgement on a situation based on practical or known facts. It evokes the following three subdomains:

A. Possibility: *supposable*, *thinkable*, etc.[14]

(128) a. For her to win the game is possible.

b. It is possible for her to win the game.

B．Probability: *feasible*, *foreseeable*, *inevitable*, *likely*, *plausible*, *presumable*, *probable*, *tenable*, etc.

(129) a. *For the mechanic to repair the machine is likely.

b. *It is likely for the mechanic to repair the machine.

C. Certainty: *clear*, *certain*, *factual*, *obvious*, *self-evident*, *true*, *well-founded*, *well-known*, etc.

(130) a. *For her to lose weight after a severe diet is obvious.

b. *It is obvious for her to lose weight after a severe diet.

He argues that the occurrence of a *for-to* complement clause in a construction containing a predicate expressing epistemics is also conditioned by semantic compatibility. In this respect, not

---

[14] Leech (2004[3]: 82) states that *possible* in (128) is not "factual" but "theoretical".

every predicate allows a *for-to* complement clause as its subject. According to his analysis, predicates which denote possibility are felicitous with a *for-to* complement clause because they imply that the complement event is forward-looking. By contrast, predicates which denote probability are infelicitous with a *for-to* complement clause because they imply that the complement event is almost sure to happen. Likewise, predicates which denote certainty are infelicitous with a *for-to* complement clause because they imply that the complement event has already taken place.

6.3.11. Swan (2017[4])

Swan (2017[4]:145) classifies the situations referred to by the *for* complement in the following way:

(131) A. Possibility

      B. Necessity

      C. Frequency

      D. Wishes

      E. Suggestions

      F. Plans

      G. Personal reaction to situations

(132) a. She's <u>anxious</u> for us to see her work.

      b. I'm <u>eager</u> for the party to be a success.

      c. Robert says he'd be <u>delighted</u> for Emily to come and stay.

      d. It's <u>impossible</u> for the job to be finished in time.

      e. It's <u>important</u> for the meeting to start at eight.

      f. It seems <u>unnecessary</u> for him to start work this week.

      g. I consider it <u>essential</u> for the school to be well heated.

      h. Is it <u>usual</u> for foxes to come so close to the town?

      i. I thought it <u>strange</u> for her to be out so late.

      j. It's not <u>good</u> for the oil tank to be so close to the house.

According to him, the *for* complement which refers to "wishes", "recommendations", or "plans" can be paraphrased with the *that* complement with evaluative *should* or verbs in the subjunctive present form:

(133) a. It is important that there should be a fire escape.

b. I'm anxious that the party should be a success.

(Swan (2017[4]: 146))

(134) a. His idea is that we should travel in separate cars.

b. It is essential that the meeting start at eight.

(Swan (2017[4]: 146))

He also argues that *likely* and *probable* are not used with the *for* complement:

(135) a. *It's <u>likely</u> for her to arrive this evening.

b. *It's <u>probable</u> for her to be …

(Swan (2017[4]: 177)) (Underline is mine)

6.3.12. Problems

It is now clear from the above previous studies that the *for* complement can follow the predicates which express emotion. These studies essentially accord with the present dissertation in that they discuss the correlationship between the *for* complement and the governing predicates. However, all the studies, except Bresnan (1972), which divided the function of the complementizer *for* into (i) Reason / Evidence and (ii) Purpose / Use / Intention, only remain at the level of observation of its usage. Thus, the inherent meaning of the *for* complement has not fully clarified yet. It is still questionable whether it is mechanically chosen depending on whether the governing predicates are emotive or not.

As pointed out in various previous studies, in addition to the fact that the complementizer *for* is often used after the emotive predicates such as *imperative* or *foolish*, it is also clear that these

predicates can take the *that* complement as well:

(136) a. It was <u>imperative</u> [that the state should intervene to preserve the higher life of the nation].

   b. We've been talking so much, it's <u>foolish</u> [that we don't even know each other' s names].

<div align="right">(BNC) (Underline is mine)</div>

The non-emotive predicates such as *well-known* and *conclude*, by contrast, can only take the *that* complement:

(137) a. It's <u>well-known</u> [that vitamin D is important for bone health].

   b. From these results, we <u>conclude</u> [that the genomic distribution of GR binding sites does not explain the gene-specific regulatory activity of GR in macrophages].

<div align="right">(COCA)</div>

It follows from this fact that the *that* complement is used regardless of whether the governing predicates are emotive or not. As pointed out in Bresnan (1972), the *that* complement can follow either emotive or non-emotive predicates because it only has a function to show that its propositional content is "definite". In other words, the speaker can either express or not express his or her emotional attitude towards the situation denoted by the *that* complement.

   The *for* complement, by contrast, can only follow the emotive predicates. Therefore, it must be presupposed that some semantic feature compatible to the emotivity expressed by the matrix predicates is attributed to the complementizer *for* itself.

   Furthermore, there are a number of counterexamples to the claim that *likely* cannot take the *for* complement, which is pointed out by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Swan (2017[4]), and Hamawand (2003):

(138) a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making it less <u>likely</u> [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].

   b. She believes that's also made it more <u>likely</u> [for minorities to be racially profiled and stopped].

<div align="center">156</div>

c. In his view, it was just as <u>likely</u> [for News Feed to highlight fake news about Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

In (138), *likely* takes the *for* complement. These linguistic facts cannot be explained by the analysis which regards *likely* as non-emotive.

In addition, Wierzbicka (1988) claims that the *for* complement expresses a "strong desire" by comparing the combination of *want* + the *for* complement with that of *want very much* + the *for* complement. Generally speaking, however, it is not only because *very much* is inserted but because they are separated by some grammatical operation that *want* can be used with the *for* complement. *Very much* insertion only constitutes one of those operations:

(139) a. What I <u>want</u> is [for you to feel great].   (COCA)

b. She <u>wants</u> very much [for her friends to be truthful].

(Bresnan (1972: 154)) (Underline is mine)

Therefore, her claim is not convincing enough.

Finally, Hamawand's (2003) analysis is partly parallel to the analysis in the present dissertation in that he analyses the *for* complements in terms of their semantic compatibility with the main predicates. His analysis, however, has the following two problems:

First, his classification of the predicates is rough and inconsistent. For example, *possible* can be interpreted not only epistemically but also dynamically (= ability): *It is possible for her to win the game* can be paraphrased with *She can* (or *is able to*) *win the game* (see Leech (2004³: 82)). Furthermore, it is questionable whether *imaginary* and *thinkable* belong to the category of epistemicity. The fact that *It was hardly thinkable* means *I would never have believed it* suggests that at least *thinkable* belongs to the category of counterfactuality.

Second, it is questionable whether predicates which denote certainty necessarily imply that the complement event has already taken place. For example, *certain* can take the *to* complement or the *that* complement which refer to a future situation.

(140) a. He is certain to come.

b. It is certain that he will come.

Hamawand's (2003) semantic compatibility analysis may be interesting, but it is not convincing enough.

Based on these problems, the following sections will discuss the semantic features of the *for* complements and explain them in terms of the concept of "Modal Harmony".

6.4. Some Suggestions

6.4.1. Reconsideration of Kiparsky and Kiparsky's (1971) Analysis

As mentioned earlier, the complementizer *for*, in almost all cases, occurs in the sentences with emotive expressions (For the sake of convenience, Fig. 2 will be requoted as Fig. 3 below).

【Factive】	Emotive	Non-emotive
Subject Clause	important	well-known
	crazy	clear
	odd	(self-evident)
	relevant	goes without saying
	instructive	
	sad	
	suffice	
	bother	
	alarm	
	fascinate	
	exhilarate	
	defy comment	
	surpass belief	
	a tragedy	
	no laughing matter	
Object Clause	regret	be aware (of)

	resent	bear in mind
	deplore	make clear
		forget
		take into account

【Non-factive】	Emotive	Non-emotive
Subject Clause	improbable	probable
	unlikely	likely
	a pipedream	turn out
	nonsense	seem
	urgent	imminent
	vital	in the works
Object Clause	intend	predict
	prefer	anticipate
	reluctant	foresee
	anxious	say
	willing	suppose
	eager	conclude

Fig. 3 : The Cross-classification of Factivity and Emotivity

The following sections will divide these predicates into (i) Factive Emotive Predicates, (ii) Factive Non-emotive Predicates, (iii) Non-factive Emotive Predicates, and (iv) Non-factive Non-emotive Predicates and discuss each of these cases.

6.4.1.1. Factive Emotive Predicates

Factive emotive class consist of predicates such as *significant*, *important*, *regret*, *odd*, and *foolish*. These predicates express an emotive evaluation of the situation referred to by the complement. Furthermore, they are equivalent to *significant*-class predicates proposed by Spears (1973) and can take the *Poss + -ing* complement as well as the *that* complement with emotive

would (or *should* in some dialects). It should be noted that the complement following the predicates in this class must be non-future and factual:

(141) a. But bitterly I <u>regret</u> [that I needed another man's hands to help me] ...

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

b. [His doing that] is <u>significant</u>.

c. It is <u>significant</u> [that she would(/should) even think such a thing].

(Spears (1973: 627)) (Underline is mine)

In (141), emotive evaluations are made of factual situations located in the present or past. Predicates in this class only express non-future, factual situations because the complements constitute the cause of the emotion expressed by the predicates. Generally speaking, it is not possible to make an emotional evaluation of future, nonfactual situations. The predicates in this class can also take the *for* complement, as is stated by Bresnan (1972) (For the sake of convenience, (45b) will be requoted as (142) below):

(142) He considers it <u>foolish</u> [for her to help him].

(Bresnan (1972: 79)) (Underline is mine)

The *for* complement in (142) refers to a factual situation which has already occurred. Here, the main clause subject, the agent of the judgment, makes a subjective and emotive judgment of the situation. The following are the examples from Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and British National Corpus (BNC), where factive emotive predicates take the *for* complement (All the underlines were drawn by the author):

(143) a. It is <u>sad</u> [for me to see the medical practice close], but …

b. … it was very <u>sad</u> [for a girl to lose her father in her teens].

c. It's kinda <u>crazy</u> [for an almost 33-year-old big man to adapt to a new point guard].

d. Darlington MP Michael Fallon said it was <u>crazy</u> [for the brochure to encourage people to stay so far from the town].

e. The formal incantation of such words would <u>suffice</u> [for the tribunal to remain within the scope of its authority].

f. No longer does it <u>suffice</u> [for a teacher to retype overheads into PowerPoint and have students take notes].

g. … it is <u>relevant</u> [for this court to have regard to the fact that …]

h. What <u>a tragedy</u> [for the king to lose his only son and heir].

6.4.1.2. Factive Non-emotive Predicates

Factive non-emotive class consist of predicates such as *clear* and *forget*. These predicates express an non-emotional evaluation of a fact (= (144a)) or the presence/absence of the memory of it (= (144b)):

(144) a. It is <u>clear</u> [that their damage control effort saved their ship and saved lives].

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

b. I <u>forgot</u> [meeting her in 1980].

(Quirk et al. (1985: 553)) (Underline is mine)

It should be noted here that these predicates express a non-emotive mental process such as "thought" or "recognition", but not an emotive judgment. Thus, it can be predicted that the sentence with these predicates will be unacceptable if they take the *for* complement which only follows the emotive predicates. The following examples supports this prediction:

(145) a. *What I <u>believe</u> is [for Mary to be shy].

b. *It is <u>clear</u> [for these houses to be occupied].

c. *I <u>know</u> (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].

d. *It is <u>true</u> [for God to exist]

e. *It is <u>false</u> [for there to be only finitely many primes]

(Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)

f. *They <u>decided</u> very much [for them to be sick].

6.4.1.3. Non-factive Emotive Predicates

Non-factive emotive class consist of predicates such as *improbable*, *unlikely*, *urgent*, *vital*, *anxious*, and *intend*. These predicates can be classified into those which take nonfuture complements and those which can take either nonfuture or future complements. Thus, *urgent* and *anxious* express "desire" or "requirement" for future situations, while *improbable* and *unlikely* can express "possibility" for either past or future situations. The former type can be referred to as "Desire Type", while the latter as "Possibility Type".

(146) Non-factive
Emotive Predicates

    Desire Type: *urgent*, *vital*, *intend*, *prefer*, *reluctant*, *anxious, willing, eager*）

    Possibility Type: *improbable*, *unlikely*, *a pipedream*, *nonsense*）

When the predicates classified in both types refer to a future situation, they are basically compatible with the *for* complement which expresses "purpose", "use", and "intention" (Bresnan (1972: 79-80)):

(147) The students started to put away their books, <u>anxious</u> [for him to finish].

          (COCA) (Underline is mine)

(148) And as she and Steve are together it's not <u>unlikely</u> [for him to pick up the phone if it rang].   (BNC) (Underline is mine)

The *for* complement in (147) refers to a future situation, and the main predicate *anxious* expresses the students' desire. Likewise, in (148), the *for* complement also refers to a future situation, and the matrix predicate *unlikely* expresses a negative emotion by referring to the low possibility for the situation to occur.

By contrast, when predicates classified in "Possibility Type" refer to nonfuture situation, they are compatible with the *for* complement which constitutes the object of an emotional evaluation

rather than "purpose", "use", or "intention":

> (149) Although possible, we think it <u>unlikely</u> [for this to have occurred for risk factors such
>
> as smoking and parity]. (BNC)

In (149), the matrix predicate *unlikely* expresses an emotive evaluation of a past situation denoted by the *for* complement.

6.4.1.4. Non-factive Non-emotive Predicates

Non-factive non-emotive class consist of predicates such as *probable*, *likely*, *predict*, and *anticipate*. These predicates can either refer to "possibility" for future situations or express "prediction" of them. Thus, they take a *that* complement which refers to a future situation ((150) is quoted from *Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fifth Edition):

> (150) a. It is <u>likely</u> [that he will live to ninety].
>
>   b. The radio report <u>predicts</u> [that snow is coming].

Generally speaking, these predicates do not take a *for* complement:

> (151) a. *It is <u>likely</u> [for him to live to ninety].
>
>   b. *The radio report <u>predicts</u> [for snow to be coming].

However, as mentioned earlier, there are a number of examples where *likely* takes a *for* complement (For the sake of convenience, (138) is requoted here as (152)):

> (152) a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making
>
>   it less <u>likely</u> [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].
>
>   b. She believes that's also made it more <u>likely</u> [for minorities to be racially profiled
>
>   and stopped].
>
>   c. In his view, it was just as <u>likely</u> [for News Feed to highlight fake news about
>
>   Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters
>
>   ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.

It should be noted that, in (152), *likely*, which is classified in the category of Non-factive Non-emotive predicates, is modified by comparative expressions such as *less*, *more*, or *just as*. It follows from this fact that the present dissertation regards these cases as different from the cases where only *likely* is used in the main clause and reanalyze them in terms of the presence/absence of emotivity, which will be discussed in detail in Section 6.4.3.1.3.

6.4.2. From "The Emotivity Constraint" to "Non-epistemicity Constraint"

The above sections, essentially along the lines of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), divided English predicates into four distinct types in terms of "factivity" and "emotivity". As a result, it was clarified that there are some differences of the acceptability of *that* and *for* among these four types. In Table 4, the acceptance and non-acceptance are shown as ✓ and *, respectively:

	that	*for*
Factive Emotive	✓	✓
Factive Non-emotive	✓	*
Non-factive Emotive	✓	✓
Non-factive Non-emotive	✓	*/✓

Table 4：The Difference in Acceptability in Terms of "Factivity" and "Emotivity"

Table 4 indicates the following: the acceptance of *that* is not influenced by either "factivity" or "emotivity", while that of *for* depends on the presence/absence of "emotivity". This result essentially supports the claim postulated by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Bresnan (1972), Aijmer (1972), Hamawand (2003), and Swan (2017[4]).

However, as seen in Section 6.3.11. and 6.4.1.4., the fact that the *for* complement can follow

likely might contradict the claim that it can only co-occur with the emotive predicates.[15] If not, the reason why the complementizer *for* can co-occur with these predicates will remain unclear. In Kiparsky and Kiparsky's (1988) position, the following hypothesis could be postulated:

(153) "The Emotivity Constraint"

The complementizer *for* expresses an emotional attitude towards the situation referred to by its complement.

If (153) was correct, it would be quite natural that the matrix predicates followed by the *for* complement obligatorily have emotivity. This is because it is logically impossible to express non-emotive mental process towards the situation construed emotionally. Thus, the following examples are unacceptable because there is a logical crash between "emotivity" expressed by the *for* complement and "non-emotivity" by the matrix predicates *clear*, *know*, and *predict* (For the sake of convenience, (145a), (145c), and (151b) is requoted as (154)):

(154) a. *It is clear [for these houses to be occupied].

b. *I know (for a fact) [for them to win unfairly].

(Bresnan (1972: 79-83)) (Underline is mine)

c. *The radio report predicts [for snow to be coming].

The following example, on the other hand, shows that there is no such logical crash between "non-emotivity" expressed by the *that* complement and "emotivity" by the matrix predicate. In the following example, the *that* complement, which introduces a "definite" situation, follows an emotive predicate *surprising*:

(155) It is surprising [that none of the mothers said that listening to music was her child's favorite music activity], although the majority of participants cited listening to music as a common daily activity the mother and child did together.

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

---

[15] The emotivity expressed by *likely* will be discussed in detail as a case study in Section 6.4.3.1.3.

In (155), the *that* complement expresses a fact with no emotion. The speaker makes an emotional evaluation of the non-emotional situation. The claim that the complementizer *that* expresses emotivity could not explain the following cases where it co-occurs with non-emotive predicates:

(156) a. It is <u>clear</u> [that people are still eager to send their children to school].

b. He <u>knows</u> [that he's looking for a one-way result].

(BNC)

c. The radio report <u>predicts</u> [that snow is coming]

The sentences in (156) are all acceptable because there is no logical crash between "non-emotivity" expressed by the *that* complements and "non-emotivity" by the matrix predicates.

However, although it has been verified that emotive predicates can take the *for* complement, it is still not questionable whether the complementizer *for* always expresses "emotivity". The following are the cases where the complementizer *for* cannot be analyzed only in terms of "emotivity":

First, the complementizer *for* does not express "emotivity" after *fix*, *choose*, *like*, *hate*, and *bear* (For the sake of convenience, (30) is requoted as(157) below):

(157) a. He had <u>fixed</u> [for the marriage to take place at eleven].

b. I hardly know in what language you would <u>choose</u> [for me to reply].

c. You'd <u>like</u> better [for us both to stay home together].

d. She wouldn't <u>like</u> [for him to know anything].

e. I <u>hate</u> [for you to be giving lessons].

f. I couldn't <u>bear</u> [for us not to be friends].

g. I <u>mean</u> afore all else [for that woman to be happy].

h. I'd <u>sooner</u> [for her to die than have her go to you].

i. I suppose I don't much <u>deserve</u> [for you to write to me].

j. I could <u>arrange</u> [for you to be in the background].

k. she <u>planned</u> [for you not to know about it until after tomorrow].

l. She <u>said</u> [for you all to go in].

(Jespersen (MEG V: 302)) (Underline is mine)

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The *for* complements in (157) express "desire" or "obligation" rather than "emotion".

Second, the complementizer *for* does not express "emotivity" after the combination of "*too* + an adjective" or "an adjective + *enough*" (For the sake of convenience, (31) is requoted as (158) below):

(158) a. The tempest was <u>too high</u> [for her to be heard].

b. One word is <u>too often profaned</u> [for me to profane it], One feeling <u>too falsely disdained</u> [For thee to disdain it]. One hope is <u>too like despair</u> [for prudence to smother].

c. Mr. Tulliver's own hand shook <u>too much under his excitement</u> [for him to write himself].

d. Am I <u>too wicked</u> [for you and me to live together]?

e. It often happens that the truth lies <u>too far back</u> [for us to discover].

f. Mr. Darcy had been standing <u>near enough</u> [for her to overhear a conversation between him and Mr. Bingley].

(Jespersen (MEG V: 303)) (Underline is mine)

g. The weather was <u>too fine</u> [for us to keep the children inside].

h. The wall is <u>too thick</u> [for the drill to pierce through].

i. The bridge was not <u>strong enough</u> [for the tank to cross].

j. That boulder is <u>too heavy</u> [for you to lift].

(Declerck (1991: 484)) (Underline is mine)

The *for* complements in (158) express "possibility".

Third, the complementizer *for* does not express "emotivity" when it is used alone and expresses "purpose", "plans", or "necessary conditions" (For the sake of convenience, (33) is requoted as (159) below):

(159) a. I thought you had kindly left it [the book] here, on purpose [for me to read].

b. In the pauses when she stopped [for the Judge to write it down] ...

c. She held out her hand [for him to shake].

d. He placed himself at a corner of the doorway [for her to pass him into the house].

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e. He unwrinkled the letter carefully [for it to be legible].

f. Vernon stood aside [for her to enter].

g. My parents had but to give me an order [for me to conceive at once some plan of disobeying it].

h. We'll have to go round by Lippinghall, [for me to get some clothes].

i. The tin mug with the hot water [for Alexis to drink from].

j. She is now coming to town, in order [for me to make my addresses to her].

k. In order [for a poet to be taken seriously by the public], it must first be abundantly clear that he takes himself seriously.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304-305))

Fourth, the complementizer *for* does not express "emotivity" after *possible* (the following are quoted from *Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fifth Edition):

(160) a. It is not <u>possible</u> [for humans to breath under water].

b. It is <u>possible</u> [for me to read the book in a day].

The combination of *possible + for* in (160) expresses "external situation" or "internal ability". Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 6.3.9.2., the combination of *possible + for* in (161) expresses "theoretical possibility" rather than "emotion".

(161) It is theoretically <u>possible</u> [for aerosols to explode].   (Declerck (1991: 397))

Thus, (161) can be paraphrased with the *that* complement including existential *can*:

(162) Aerosols <u>can</u> explode if you do not treat them properly.

(Declerck (1991: 397)) (Underline is mine)

If we take these cases into consideration, "the Emotivity Constraint" shown in (153) should be regarded to be theoretically too weak to explain the behavior of the complementizer *for* in a unified way. Therefore, the present chapter proposes the following new condition for the complementizer *for*:

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(163) "Non-epistemicity Condition on the Complementizer *for*":

   The complementizer *for* cannot express epistemic modality

This condition shows that the complementizer *for* belongs to the category of modalizer which expresses any kinds of modality except epistemic modality.[16] This condition enable us to give a semantic explanation to the fact that the complementizer *for* can occur not only after emotive predicates but also non-emotive predicates based on the above four conditions. The fact that the complementizer *for* cannot occur after verbs such as *believe*, *know*, *assume*, and *infer* (as mentioned in Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971)) or after some predicates such as *true*, *false*, and *clear* (as mentioned in Bresnan (1972)) can be explained by analyzing all these predicates as expressing "epistemicity" (For the sake of convenience, (8) and (41a) is requoted as (164) below):

(164)   a. *It is <u>true</u> [for God to exist].

   b. *It is <u>false</u> [for there to be only finitely many primes].

   c. *It is <u>clear</u> [for these houses to be occupied].

   d. *I {<u>believe</u> (with good reason) / <u>know</u> (for a fact) / <u>assume</u> (on these grounds) / <u>infer</u> (from the above)} [for them to win unfairly].

                    (Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)

   e. *I believe [for John to have liked Anselm].

                    (Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971: 365))

The following sections will classify the modality expressed by the complementizer *for* into "emotive", "dynamic", and "counterfactual" and discuss each of them based on concrete examples.

6.4.3. Emotive Modality

The present section will argue that the modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into a feeling of "surprise" and "disdain" and that the complementizer *for* is

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[16] Consider the fact that epistemic *may* cannot be paraphrased with *possible for*.

semantically parallel to emotive modalizer *should*.

6.4.3.1. Surprise/Disdain

The complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "surprise" or "disdain" when it occurs after intellectual judgment predicates. As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.1., Wierzbicka (1988) adduces some examples of the predicates in question as follows:

(165) *unexpected、odd、strange、surprising、normal、natural、usual,* …

These predicates belong to the category of emotive predicates since the following *that* complement contains emotive *should* (the underlines in the following examples are drawn by the author):

(166) a. He did not find it <u>unexpected</u> [that a man who was not generous with words <u>should</u> lose his capacity to say them as well as to hear them].   (COCA)

b. It is <u>extremely odd</u> [that the Labour party <u>should</u> propose that women should be barred from jobs because of their husband's position in public life].

c. How <u>strange</u> [that critics <u>should</u> not have remarked the possibility]!

d. It was <u>hardly surprising</u> [that this <u>should</u> result in the coup of January 1971 in which Amin overthrew Obote while he was absent abroad].

e. But while it seems at first <u>quite normal</u> [that this <u>should</u> happen at an inquest involving the opera's central character one soon notices that the process is in fact highly artificial, like the narrations which open several of Britten's later operas, designed in this instance to have the dramatis personae stand up and be recognised but in a context which fits the story].

f. It was <u>natural</u> [that their products <u>should</u> be in great demand].

g. It has become <u>usual</u> [that there <u>should</u> be a generally drafted indemnity against all taxation liabilities arising from trading transactions prior to the last balance sheet date and which were not provided for in such accounts, or which arose from transactions outside the ordinary course of business since that date].

According to her analysis, when the predicates take the *for* complement, they imply that the situation denoted by the complement is expected or is not expected to occur. Concretely speaking, predicates which express a negative emotion, such as *unexpected*, *odd*, *strange*, and *surprising*, imply that the situation in question is not expected to occur, while predicates which express a calm judgment, such as *normal*, *natural*, and *usual*, imply that the complement in question is expected to occur. The former type can be referred to as "Predictable Type", and the latter as "Unpredictable Type":

(167) Emotive Predicates

> Predictable Type (*unexpected*, *odd*, *strange*, *surprising*)
>
> Unpredictable type (*normal*, *natural*, *use*)

The following sections will regard the emotion expressed by the predicates classified in "Predictable Type" as "surprise" and the emotion expressed by the predicates classified in "Unpredictable Type" as "disdain" and discuss each case in detail.

6.4.3.1.1. Surprise

Consider the following examples:

(168) a. And yet it was just as <u>improbable</u> [for a white child to be colored].

b. … it is very <u>unlikely</u> [for two very different methods to have same bias].

(COCA) (Underline is original)

In (168a), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a future situation referred to by the *for* complement is expressed by the governing predicate *improbable*. In (168b), in the same way, a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a future situation referred to by the *for* complement is expressed by the governing predicate *unlikely*. It should be noted here that the emotional judgment is expressed not only by the matrix predicates but also the complementizer *for* itself. For example, the situations denoted by the complements in (168a, b) are generally thought to be hardly possible. By using the complementizer *for*, the speaker expresses them as surprising

situations which are divorced from his or her assumptions. Both *improbable* and *unlikely* can be classified into "Unpredictable Type".

The claim that a *for* complement which occurs after *improbable*, *unlikely*, *unexpected*, *odd*, *strange*, or *surprising* express a feeling of "surprise" is parallel to Wierzbicka's (1988) claim that it expresses "unexpectability". As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.1., she claims that a *for* complement which follows intellectual judgment predicates indicates that the situation in question was generally not expected to occur and postulates the following semantic formula:

(169) "one wouldn't have thought this: this will happen"[17]   (Wierzbicka (1988: 130))

Since the situation referred to by the *for* complement is generally not expected, the complement expresses a feeling of "surprise".

6.4.3.1.2. Disdain

Consider the following example: In this scene, Mr. Lestrade of Scotland Yard comes to visit Holmes in order to ask him for help with the incident:

(170) It was <u>no very unusual thing</u> [for Mr. Lestrade, of Scotland Yard, to look in upon us of an evening], and has visits were welcome to Sherlock Holmes, for they enabled him to keep in touch with all that was going on at the police head-quarters.
                    (A. C. Doyle, "The Adventure of the Six Napoleons") (Underline is mine)

In (170), a subjunctive, emotive evaluation of a factual situation referred to by the *for* complement is expressed by the governing predicate *not very unusual*. In the present case, the complementizer *for* functions as a modalizer, and a feeling of "disdain" is expressed concerning the situation it introduces. In other words, the situation referred to by the *for* complement may be based on a fact, but it is not asserted merely as a fact itself. What is expressed here is the

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[17] (169) is essentially a re-quotation of (37) ("one would (wouldn't) have thought this: this will happen"), but *would* is deliberately deleted in (169) because it is implied that the situation denoted by the complement was not expected to occur when the *for* complement express a feeling of "surprise".

speaker's subjective construal of the fact. Therefore, it can be concluded that the emotion expressed by the complementizer *for* is "disdain".

6.4.3.1.3. Case Studies of *Likely*

In Section 6.4.1.4. and 6.4.2., it was suggested that the fact that *likely*, which is classified into the category of non-emotional predicates, can take the *for* complement might be a counterexample for the claim that the *for* complement can express "emotivity". However, if we take into consideration the present analysis that the complementizer *for* functions as an emotive modalizer, *likely* could be regarded as an emotive predicate in the combination with the *for* complement. The following sections will discuss individual examples after dividing the examples which contain *likely* + the *for* complement into the following cases: (i) where *likely* is modified by negative adjuncts, (ii) where it is modified by positive adjuncts, and (iii) where it is modified by Equality Adjuncts.

6.4.3.1.3.1. *Likely* with Negative Modifiers

Consider the following sentences:

> (171) a. And in the process, he is undermining the Democratic process in America and he is making it <u>less likely</u> [for people to vote in the future].
>
> b. Oh, it's going to take a long, long time to determine whether having gay marriage will make it <u>less likely</u> [for kids to be raised in settings where there's a mom and a dad].
>
> <div align="right">(COCA) (Underline is mine)</div>

In (171a, b), *likely* with a negative modifier *less* co-occurs with the *for* complement. Here, the complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "disdain" towards the future situations. Furthermore, a negative expression *less likely* expresses a negative feeling towards the situation where the usual situation is becoming uncommon.

Likely can sometimes be used in a metaphorical construction with *no more … than*, as shown

by the following:

(172) A general who seized power during the last military coup announced, at the time, that it was <u>no more likely</u> [for Aristide to return] <u>than</u> [for an egg to be put back in a chicken]. (COCA) (Underline is mine)

Generally speaking, the expression, *A is no more B than C* (*is B*), is used to claim that the former proposition (= "*A is B*") is false by regarding it as possible to be true as the latter (= "*C is B*") under the presupposition that the latter is false (see O. Sawada (2004) and Sawada (2014) for detail). (172) indicates a proposition (= *it is likely for Aristide to return*) is false by regarding it as possible to be true as the latter (= *it is likely for an egg to be put back in a chicken*) under the presupposition that the latter proposition is false. In the present case, the complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "surprise" towards the former proposition (= *Aristide to return*) as well as the latter (= *an egg to be put back in a chicken*).

Furthermore, consider the following:

(173) There are some fundamental differences between fantasy sports and gambling websites that offer online poker or roulette that make it <u>less likely</u> [for the former to lead to problems], according to Peter Schoenke, chairman of the Fantasy Sports Trade Assn. (COCA) (Underline is mine)

In (173), fantasy sports[18] and gambling websites are compared with each other. I this case, the speaker regarded the situation referred to by the *for* complement as unfavorable for society, and the complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "surprise" towards the situation.

It should be noted here that *likely*, which is classified into the category of non-emotive predates, functions as a emotive predicate in the combination of a negative modifier *less* and the *for* complement. Therefore, it can be included that there is an interrelationship between the complementizer *for* as an emotive modalizer and "emotivity" expressed by the matrix predicate *less likely*.

---

[18] Fantasy sports are a kind of gambling. The participants choose some players on the active list and gain some points depending on how the player actually made a spectacular showing. The participants can also gain some prize money depending on their points.

The followings are similar examples (underline is mine):

(174) COCA

   a. The minimum height requirement for being a Cavalier mascot is 5 feet 10, making it <u>less likely</u> [for a woman to be tall enough to audition].

   b. When biased legislators make it harder [for certain communities to vote], they are also less likely to serve alongside lawmakers from those communities - thus making it <u>less likely</u> [for a coalitional experience to change their biases]

   c. This has caused tension and in some cases violence which increases distrust between the two groups and makes it <u>less likely</u> [for an infected migrant worker to seek out medical care from, or to cooperate with, Saudi officials]

   d. Whether it was Dodd-Frank or pushing card check or cap and trade or higher taxes, higher marginal tax rates, all these things, Obamacare, all of them make it <u>less likely</u> [for a business to grow].

   e. Romney said Obama's policies have "made it harder for entrepreneurs to start a business" and have " made it <u>less likely</u> [for businesses like this to hire more people]

   f. Just as the openness of American society has made it <u>less likely</u> [for Jews to marry other Jews], so, too, it is less likely that Jews will give primarily to Jewish causes.

   g. One of the sources I talked to said as soon as this becomes public, it is probably <u>less likely</u> [for it to happen].

   h. She knew it was<u>n't likely</u> [for a married man to leave his wife for another woman].

   i. It can be, but the effort, of course, is to create a climate that makes it <u>less likely</u> [for people to convert powder to crack]

   j. I think that Alan Greenspan made a terrible mistake when he raised interest rates over and over again, increasing the cost of homes, of automobiles, making it <u>less likely</u> [for new businesses to start]

   k. For one thing, we have lots of horizontal stabilization that will -- that makes the aircraft more stable, <u>less likely</u> [for the pilot to get into pilot-induced oscillations]; and secondly because we can reduce collective pitch in flight.

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l. "But that," said Glen kindly, "would make it even <u>less likely</u> [for someone to break in], wouldn't it? If they could tell somebody's home?"

m. In the end, each investment decision, each positive news story, each company statement gave Bre-X a tougher veneer of legitimacy and made it <u>less likely</u> [for the next person in line to question the underlying facts], said Toronto Stock Exchange President Fleming and others who followed the company.

n. That's what the research is showing because what happens is it diffuses the responsibility amongst a number of people, making it <u>less likely</u> [for one individual to act].

o. The EPA and the Justice Department believe that this threat will make it <u>less likely</u> [for a member of the regulated community to consider willful or calculated evasion of the environmental laws]

p. Early signs of weakness would make it <u>less likely</u> [for Dirksen to join as an ally down the road].

(175) BNC

Identification of polymer samples can be made by making use of the 'finger-print' region, where it is <u>least likely</u> [for one polymer to exhibit exactly the same spectrum as another]

6.4.3.1.3.2. *Likely* with Positive Modifiers

In the following sentences, *likely* with the *for* complement is modified by a positive modifier *more*:

(176) a. One issue debated was whether playing professional football made it <u>more likely</u> [for men to abuse their families]

b. Sternheimer says birthday parties in America didn't become popular until the early 20th century, when medical advances made it <u>more likely</u> [for children to survive illnesses in infancy and childhood].

(COCA)

In (176a), the complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "surprise" towards the situation referred to by its complement. In the same way, the governing predicate *more likely* expresses a subjective emotion as well as the meaning that the unfavorable situation denoted by the *for* complement is more realistic. The complementizer *for* in (176b), on the other hand, expresses a feeling of "surprise" or "praise" of the situation. A feeling of "surprise" is also expressed by the governing predicate *more likely*.

The following are similar examples (underline is mine):

(177) COCA

    a. It's <u>more likely</u> [for you to see a male who says "Hey!"] and females are like " Don't do that, Billy " said in a weak, whiney voice.

    b. This space is removed from the landscape, which makes it <u>more likely</u> [for people to feel safe here].

    c. And because many proposed state voucher programs are aimed at " at-risk " or troubled youth, presumably this would make it <u>more likely</u> [for Christian reform schools to be involved].

    d. The structure makes it <u>more likely</u> [for them to stick with their workout routines], experts say.

    e. Sternheimer says birthday parties in America didn't become popular until the early 20th century, when medical advances made it <u>more likely</u> [for children to survive illnesses in infancy and childhood].

    f. It is this twin dynamic that makes it <u>more likely</u> [for many to tilt away from modern, pluralistic secularism toward a religious political system].

    g. Because learning tasks are less complicated in the primary grades, implementing the use of technology at this stage could help teachers of students with visual impairments to become more knowledgeable about technology and make it <u>more likely</u> [for the teachers to use more technology at earlier ages with students who read braille].

    h. In the Calender, it would be <u>much more likely</u> [for the object to be dropped], and [for the grammatical subject of the new stanza to appear forthwith].

i. Because such evaluation involves effort, it is easier and often <u>more likely</u> [for people to ignore, reinterpret, or reject competing beliefs rather than to reorganize their belief systems].

j. Despite this overall level of change, however, it does appear that learner characteristics make it <u>more likely</u> [for certain students to change their beliefs].

k. Participants were instructed to indicate, by checking the appropriate box, if a particular item made it <u>more likely</u> [for an individual to develop osteoporosis], less likely [for an individual to develop osteoporosis], had nothing to do with developing osteoporosis, or that the participant was not sure of the correct response.

l. In Arnheim's view, it is <u>more likely</u> [for a painter to create visual tensions], but for photographers, the reality of a physical subject comprises the total course of its existence in time.

m. One of the things that you found is that it's <u>a lot more likely</u> [for a mother to either stop working altogether or to reduce her workload having a second child than having a first].

n. The format of the UCT, not directly asking participants to endorse sensitive behaviors, makes it <u>more likely</u> [for persons to admit to not using a condom and not using a condom when drinking].

o. There have also been changes in social and economic conditions that may have made it <u>more likely</u> [for women to consider other women as sex partners].

p. In fact, because online usage has jumped dramatically in the past few years, it's now estimated to be <u>about 20 times more likely</u> [for the average user's computer to contract a virus].

q. When you compare the races of the victims of homicides, white, Latino, and black, you find that it is <u>more likely</u> [for the crime to go unpunished if the victim was a minority victim]?

r. By contrast, it is <u>very likely</u> [for brothers to live in the same neighborhood], and, therefore, [for patrilateral parallel cousin marriages to be between neighbors].

s. The countries of the Ngbandi and Ngombe lie in about the same latitude as the Gabon estuary; but since the rivers run in a southwestward direction, it would have

been <u>more likely</u> [for spears from that region to be acquired by a European on the lower Zaire].

    t. It's <u>more likely</u> [for swimsuit weather to grace Chicago in January] than it is [for baseball's most color player to be left alone].

    u. Consequently, as shown in Table 3, it was <u>approximately 27 times more likely</u> [for respondents not to identify repeating the lesson] (i.e., " no current no ideal "), as compared to " yes current, no ideal, " " no current, yes ideal, " and " yes current, yes ideal.

    v. So, as shown in Table 3, although it was always <u>somewhat more likely</u> [for teachers not to identify increasing practice] (i.e., " no current, no ideal "), that likelihood was disproportionately high in the assisted idea generation format.

    w. Since Reagan and Bush appointees began to dominate his court, Reinhardt says, it has become more and <u>more likely</u> [for civil cases to be thrown out because of missed filing deadlines].

(178) BNC

    a. Had a more diverse stock existed it would have been <u>more likely</u> [for a less familiar tale to have been selected].

    b. The performance of modern gliders makes it much easier and <u>more likely</u> [for a pilot to fly himself into a potential death trap unless he uses his imagination or has already learned to have a healthy respect for the elements].

6.4.3.1.3.3. *Likely* with Equality Modifiers

Consider the following sentences. In the following sentences, the matrix predicate *likely* with equality expression *just as* co-occurs with the *for* complement:

(179) a. In his view, it was just as likely [for News Feed to highlight fake news about Clinton] -- but the media remains steadfast in ignoring that Trump supporters ultimately believed their candidate can bring them a better life.

    b. We have to get to the point where it's just as likely [for a woman or a person of

color to be the president], and we just get used to that, get past it.

<div align="right">(COCA)</div>

In (179a), the complementizer *for* expresses a feeling of "surprise" towards the situation referred to by its complement. Furthermore, the matrix predicate *just as likely* also expresses an emotional attitude towards the situation by regarding it as a dangerous inclination. In (179b), the complementizer *for* is used to refer to the situation that a woman or a person of color to be the president. At the time of speaking, the situation in question had generally been regarded as unrealistic since a woman was not at the time nor ever had been president of the U.S. In this case, however, the speaker does not regard the situation as something surprising or rare, but rather, she regards it as highly realistic, and so expressing a feeling of "disdain" towards it by using the complementizer *for*. At the same time, he expresses his subjective, emotive opinion about the realistic situation by using *just as likely* in the matrix clause.

The followings are similar examples (underline is mine):

(180) COCA

    a. But it is <u>just as likely</u> [for the sounds of children's musical play to remain outside the realm of lessons organized by teachers], even when music making is both a natural and necessary part of childhood.

    b. In terms of character performance, which is what I'm always interested in, I think it is <u>just as likely</u> [for it to be good on television].

(181) BNC

    However, it is <u>equally likely</u> [for Dwarf troops to wear clothes or uniforms they have devised themselves].

6.4.3.1.4. Parallelism between the Complementizer *For* and Emotive *Should*

The above sections revised Wierzbicka's (1988) claim that the *for* complement can be analyzed in terms of "expectability" and states "surprise" and "disdain" as a emotion expressed by the complementizer *for*. The present section will compare the complementizer *for* with

emotive *should* and discuss the parallelism between the two.

As mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3.3.2., Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the *for* complement and emotive *should* are parallel to each other in that they both express "unexpectability". According to her analysis, (182a) and (182b) are semantically parallel and imply (183):

(182) a. It was interesting/amusing/funny that X <u>should</u> have done Z.

b. It was interesting/amusing/funny for X to Z.

(Wierzbicka (1988:130-131))

(183) one wouldn't have thought this: this will happen

Emotive *should* usually occurs in a *that* complement after certain emotive predicates such as *odd*, *glad, a pity, incredible*, and *impossible*. It is regarded as a marker which shows that the whole complement is construed emotionally. Sawada (2016) proposes the following principle on emotional *should*:

(184) "Principle of Psychological Conflict" :

English emotive *should* … indicates that the proposition p (i.e. situation or world) deviates from the evaluation subject's assumption about p.

(Sawada (2016: 291))

He argues that emotive *should* indicates that the situation referred to is construed as "hard to accept", "hard to expect", or "hard to bring about".

(185) It's <u>odd</u> [that the letter <u>should</u> mention the 21st of the month].

(A. Christie, *The ABC Murders*) (Underline is mine)

In (185), emotive *should* is used in the *that* complement after a emotive expression *odd*. According to his analysis, in this case, emotive *should* expresses that it was unexpected for the conceptualizer to assume that the situation in question would occur. The notion of "unexpectation" here is parallel to "surprise" as mentioned in detail in Section 6.4.3.1.1. This is because these two notions indicate that a situation deviates from the conceptualizer's assumption about it. Therefore, a *that* complement with emotive *should* is parallel to a *for* complement expressing a feeling of

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"surprise":

    (186) It's odd [for the letter to mention the 21st of the month].

Emotive *should* as well as the complementizer *for* is also used to express a feeling of "disdain". In the following sentence, an emotive predicate *surprising* is negated:

    (187) It is <u>not surprising</u>, therefore, [that we <u>should</u> find a sharp contrast in style and outlook between Maugham's early and late work].   (Behre (1955: 71)

According to Sawada (2016), (187) expresses a calm judgment of the situation referred to by the *that* complement, but *not surprising* is used to express a feeling of "disdain" towards the situation. Thus, the use of emotive *should* is not unnatural here. Emotive *should* in this sentence is parallel to the complementizer *for* in that it expresses a feeling of "disdain".

    The following are similar examples (underline is mine):

    (188) a. It is <u>wrong</u> [for you to blame him].

            b. It is <u>wrong</u> [that you <u>should</u> blame him].

                           (*Shogakkan Progressive-Japanese Dictionary*, Forth Edition)

It follows from the above discussion that the validity of the complementizer *for* as an emotive modalizer is guaranteed by the present claim that it is semantically parallel to another emotive modalizer *should*.

6.4.4. Deontic and Dynamic Modalities

This section will introduce a number of examples where the complementizer *for* functions as a deontic or dynamic modalizer and argue that it is semantically parallel to *should* as a subjunctive substitute.

6.4.4.1. Deontic Modality

The complementizer *for* can function as a dynamic modality when it occurs after some

expressions categorized in the subtype of "Desire Type" as shown in Section 6.4.1.3., including adjectives such as such as *urgent*, *vital*, *important*, *essential*, and *imperative*, verbs such as *say* and *ask*, and nouns such as *order*, *importance*, and *request*:

(189) Adjectives

    a. … it is <u>urgent</u> [for school personnel to uncover the factors related to suicide].

    b. Also, it is <u>vital</u> [for pupils to use modern technology in information gathering].

(COCA) (Underline is mine)

    c. It's <u>important</u> [for him to be more careful].

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1173)) (Underline is mine)

    d. It is <u>essential</u> [for the teen to continue to question who is telling the truth and whom to trust]. (COCA) (Underline is mine)

    e. Tell your mother it's <u>imperative</u> for me to reach the other side of the river.

(BNC) (Underline is mine)

(190) Verbs

    a. She <u>said</u> [for you all to go in]. (Jespersen (MEG V: 301)) (Underline is mine)

    b. He <u>asked</u> [for Pat to be interviewed].[19]

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230)) (Underline is mine)

(191) Nouns

    a. My parents had but to give me <u>an order</u> [for me to conceive at once some plan of disobeying it]. (Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Underline is mine)

    b. It is of <u>importance</u> [for him to know, as soon as possible, if what is said should be taken as a simple positive statement, as a negative statement, as a question, or as a wish]. (Jespersen (MEG VII: 58-59)) (Underline is mine)

    c. The court denied <u>the defense's request</u> [for a special master to investigate].

(COCA)

---

[19] According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230), (190b) is interestingly parallel to *He asked Pat to be interviewed*. In the latter, *Pat* is the object of *ask* and serves as both the object of the request and the object of the interview. By contrast, in the former, *pat* can serve as the object of the interview but not the object of the request because it does not constitute the object of *ask*.

(189)-(191) express "importance" or "obligation" for the situations denoted by the *for* complements. For example, in (189), by using *urgent*, *vital*, *important*, *essential*, and *imperative*, the speakers indicate that the "importance" or the "obligation" for the situations in question to occur. In these cases, the complementizer *for* also expresses the "obligation" of the realization of these situations and thus interrelates with the "importance" or "obligation" expressed by the matrix predicates. In other words, there is "a modal harmony" (i.e. "modal concord") between the two (see Lars (2019) for detail[20]).

6.4.4.2. Dynamic Modality

The complementizer *for* can function as a dynamic modalizer when it occurs after predicates which express "desire", "acceptance", or "intention", such as *anxious*, *willing*, *intend*, *aim*:

(192) a. The Queen is <u>anxious</u> [for the negotiations between our two parties to be concluded satisfactorily].

b. I'm <u>willing</u> [for people to be critical of us].

(BNC)

c. Yes, our conclusion is that he didn't <u>intend</u> [for there to be any back-channel communications].[21]

(COCA)

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[20] Lars (2019: 403) argues that "modal concord" occurs when a single modality is realized as two modal expressions.

(vii) <u>Possibly</u> this gazebo <u>may</u> have been built by Sir Christopher Wren.
(Lars (2019: 403), Halliday (1970: 328)) (Underline is mine)

In (vii) epistemic modality (i.e. "epistemic possibility" in his term) is realized as two modal expressions, namely *possibly* and *may*. In other words, there is a modal concord between the two. He insists that a modal concord can be seen in the following five modalities: "epistemic modality", "dynamic modality", "deontic modality" and "emotivity".

[21] The verb *intend* can very rarely take the combination of "an accusative + the *to* complement", but American English prefers using the *for* complement. According an native American English speaker, for example, prefer (ix) to (viii):

(viii) I intend [him to help me with drafting the proposal].

(ix) I intend [for him to help me with drafting the proposal].

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1230) argues that there is no semantic difference between the two.

d. I'm <u>aiming</u> [for my team to win].   (Bresnan (1972: 80)

All the sentences in (192) indicate that the future situations referred to by the *for* complement constitute the object of desire, acceptance, or intention denoted by the matrix predicates *anxious*, *willing*, *intend,* and *aim*. In the above sentences, the situations referred to by the *for* complement are "not-yet factual", and the complementizer *for* functions to express "desire", "acceptance", or "intention".

Furthermore, the complementizer *for* can also be regarded as a dynamic modalizer when it is used alone to express "purpose" (= (193a)) or when it is used in the complement position to express "use" or "intention" (= (193b) and (193c)):

(193) a. In order [for him to maintain interest] he needed to work in short spurts.   (BNC)

       b. This book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away].

                                                      (Bresnan (1972: 80))

       c. The intention is [for all 16 teams to come back for the 2010 season].   (COCA)

The situation referred to by the coplementizer *for* in (193a) constitutes the purpose of the action denoted in the main clause, while, in (193b), the situation constitutes the utility of the main clause subject *this book*. Besides, in (193c), the situation is expressed as the object of the "intention", which is evident from the fact that the *for* complement is in apposition to the subject *the intention*. Consider the following sentence:

(194) It is possible [for me to read the book in a day].

(194) indicates "I am able to read the book in a day". Here, the complementizer *for* itself functions as a dynamic modalizer which express "possibility" (or "ability"), and shows its interrelationship with the matrix predicate *possible* which expresses "possibility". In this case, the modality, referred to as "possibility", is expressed not only by the complementizer *for* but also the matrix predicate *possible*. Considering these discussion, it should be concluded that, in (194), the modality in question is expressed by both *possible* and *for* and that there is a modal concord between the two (see the discussion in Section 6.3.10.2.).

Also, consider the following sentences. In the sentences, the modality "possibility" is

expressed when some expression of degree, such as *too* or *enough*, are used:

(195) a. The case was too heavy [for a child to carry].

b. He spoke too quickly [for me to understand].

c. The case is light enough [for me to carry].

d. He spoke slowly enough [for everyone to understand].

(Thompson and Martinet (1986[4]: 223-224))

In (195), the complementizer *for* functions as a dynamic modalizer after *too* and *enough*. This is demonstrated by the fact that these complements can be paraphrased with the *that* complement with the dynamic modalizer *can* (or *could*) expressing "possibility":

(196) a. The case was too heavy [that a child <u>couldn't</u> carry it].

b. He spoke too quickly [that I <u>couldn't</u> understand].

c. The case is so light [that I <u>can</u> carry].

d. He spoke so slowly [that everyone <u>could</u> understand].

(Cf. Thompson and Martinet (1986[4]: 223-224))

Finally, observe the following sentence. It seems that the modality "possibility" can be expressed even when the *for* complement lacks the governing predicate:

(197) Well, it is not [for me to judge you], ...

(A. C. Doyle, "The Boscombe Valley Mystery")

(197) indicates "I'm not able to judge you" (i.e. "I'm not in a position to judge you"). Here the complementizer *for* functions as a dynamic modalizer to express "possibility", while the main clause *it is not* constitutes an idiomatic construction to express "disability". It should be concluded from the above discussion that there is a modal harmony between the main clause and the complementizer *for*.

6.4.4.3. Parallelism between the Complementizer *For* and the Modal *Should* as a

Subjunctive Substitute

The above sections divided the functions of the complementizer *for* into the following: (i) to express "obligation" and (ii) to express "desire" or "possibility". The present section compares *for* with *should* as a subjunctive substitute and argues for the parallelism between the two.

As mentioned in Swan (2017) and Leech (2004[3]), *should* as a subjunctive substitute is used in the *that* complement after the expressions which express "desire", "suggestions", or "plans", such as *suggest*, *propose*, and *insist*, as an expression of asking for the realization of the situation referred to by the complement:

(198) a. It is important [that there should be a fire escape].

b. I'm anxious [that the party should be a success].

c. His idea is [that we should travel in separate cars].

(Swan (2017: 146)) (Underline is mine)

d. The judges have decided / decreed / insisted / voted [that the existing law should be maintained]. (Leech (2004[3]: 78)) (Underline is mine)

Furthermore, as pointed out in Leech (2004[3]) and Ando (2005), *should* as a subjunctive substitute differs from emotive *should* in that, in only the former case, bare infinitive can be used instead of *should* + verb. The difference in acceptability of the following sentences supports this claim ((199) corresponds to (198), and (200) to the sentences with emotive *should*):

(199) a. It is important [that there {be / *is} a fire escape].

b. I'm anxious [that the party {be / *is} a success].

c. His idea is [that he {travel / *travels} in separate cars].

d. The judges have decided / decreed / insisted / voted [that the existing law {be / *is} maintained].

(200) a. It's surprising [that she {*say / says / said} that sort of thing to you].

(Swan (2017[4]: 359))

b. It is interesting [that the play {*be / should be} a huge success].

(Leech (2004[3]: 118))

The complementizer *for* as a deontic or dynamic modalizer is parallel to *should* as a subjunctive substitute in that they both refer to "obligation", "desire", or "intention" for the realization of the situation denoted by the complement. According to Swan (2017[4]), the only difference between the *that* complement with *should* as a subjunctive substitute and the *for* complement is that the former is more formal than the latter. It follows from this explanation that it can be predicted that, despite the slight difference in style, (198) can be changed into (201). This prediction is corroborated by the fact that the following sentences are acceptable as correct paraphrases of (198):

(201)　a. It is <u>important</u> [for there to be a fire escape].

　　　　b. I'm <u>anxious</u> [for the party to be a success].

　　　　c. <u>His idea</u> is [for us to travel in separate cars].

　　　　d. The judges have <u>decided</u> / <u>decreed</u> / <u>insisted</u> / <u>voted</u> [for the existing law to be maintained].

All the above sentences, as well as those in (198), indicate that the future situations referred to by the complement are the object of desire.

　The same paraphrase can apply to all the *for* complements in (193) except for (193b)[22]:

(202)　a. In order [that he should maintain interest] he needed to work in short spurts.

　　　　b. The intention is [that all 16 teams should come back for the 2010 season].

Furthermore, the following sentences support the parallelism between the two. The following example can be paraphrased with the *for* complement:

(203)　a. We invited her husband too, in order [that he should not feel left out].

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 187))

　　　　b. They met on a Saturday in order [that everybody should be free to attend].

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Swan (2017[4]: 652))

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[22]　The reason why the paraphrase does not apply to (193b) (= This book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away].) is because the *that* complement cannot function as "purpose" or "use".

It can be concluded from the above discussions that the complementizer *for* is parallel to *should* as a subjunctive substitute when it functions as either a deontic or dynamic modalizer.

6.4.5. Counterfactual Modality

As mentioned in various previous studies, the *for* complement is often used in imaginative contexts. The following are the quotations from the previous studies introduced in Section 6.3: For example, Jespersen (MEG V) states as follows:

(204) It should be noted that in nearly all sentences the combination of *for* and an infinitive

denotes some vague possibility or something imagined.

(Jespersen (MEG V: 304)) (Italics is original)

Wierzbicka (1988) supports this claim to postulate the following semantic formula as for the *for* complement. The following underlined part indicates that the situation referred to by the *for* complement is a generic situation:

(205) I am ashamed for any of my friends to see what sort of man I've married. ⇒

<u>when I imagine this: I know this</u>:

this will happen to someone [X will see Y]

I think this: this will be bad, I will feel ashamed

(Wierzbicka (1988: 112)) (Underline is mine)

In addition, Bresnan (1972) argues for the following (here, a "modal" situation refers to a "generic" situation rather than a factual situation):

(206) …which [the *for* complement] is open to, and may even require, a "modal" context.

(Bresnan (1972: 72))

Furthermore, Spears (1973) refers to the feature of the *for* complement as "habituality". Here again, it seems possible to regard the term "habituality" as equivalent to "generic":

(207) … all the FOR complements of *significant*-class predicates make reference not to one

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process, but a class of processes, and the embedding predicate assigns a property to any process that qualifies for membership in that class. This property of these FOR complements will be termed habitual aspect. (Spears (1973: 634))

These claims are common in that the situation introduced by the complementizer *for* refers to a generic situation rather than a single fact. This clearly explains the reason why the *for* complement, but not the *that* complement, can co-occur with *always* (For the sake of convenience, (57b) is requoted as (208) below):

(208) It's <u>always</u> rather odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

(Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)

The reason why (208) is acceptable is because there is a modal harmony between "habituality" expressed by the complementizer *for* and the adverb *always*.

As mentioned in Section 6.3.7., according to Quirck et al. (1985:1063), the *for* complement is parallel to a conditional clause introduced by *if*:

(209) This putative feature of the infinitive clause may often be paraphrased by a conditional clause. (Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

It can be concluded from the above claims that the complementizer *for* functions as a counterfactual modalizer. For example, the *for* complement in the following sentences refers to counterfactual situations and the complementizer *for* modally harmonizes with counterfactual *would* in the matrix clause:

(210) a. It would be catastrophic for the economy [for there to be a sudden massive influx of women into the job market]. (Bresnan (1972: 77))

b. It would be unwise [for you to marry him]. (Quirk et al. (1985: 1063))

c. [For you to hear him talk], you would take him for a genius.

d. [For you to have seen him again] would have pained me.

(Cf. Jespersen (MEG V: 166))

The claim that the situations referred to by the *for* complement in (210) are all counterfactual is

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supported by the fact that they can be paraphrased with counterfactual conditional clauses. In the following sentences, the conditional clauses as counterfactual modalizers modally harmonize with *would* in the matrix clause:

(211) a. It <u>would</u> be catastrophic for the economy [if there were a sudden massive influx of women into the job market].   (Cf. Bresnan (1972: 77)) (Underline is mine)

b. It <u>would</u> be unwise [if you were to marry him].

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1063)) (Underline is mine)

c. [If you heard him talk], you <u>would</u> take him for a genius.

d. [If you had seen him again], it <u>would</u> have pained me.

(Cf. Jespersen (MEG V: 166))

Observe the following sentence:

(212) { *[For John to eat cabbage] / [That John eats cabbage] } means that he is of low birth.

(Bresnan (1972: 85))

Bresnan (1972: 85) claims that the *for* complement is unacceptable here because the verbs such as *mean*, *prove*, *imply*, and *entail* all require a factual situation as their complement. Thus, it will be acceptable if the complementizer *that* is chosen.

Bresnan's (1972) claim, however, should be revised in terms of the present analysis: the *for* complement in (212) is unacceptable because it does not modally harmonize with epistemic verbs *mean*, *prove*, *imply*, and *entail*. However, it may still be impossible to explain why (213) is acceptable:

(213) [For John to eat cabbage] <u>would</u> mean that he is of low birth.

(Bresnan (1972: 85)) (Underline is mine)

In the present case, the complementizer *for* does not modally harmonize with *mean*, but rather, it harmonizes with the counterfactual modal *would*. The following is a similar example:

(214) [For Mary to giggle a lot] <u>would</u> indicate that she is silly.

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In (214), the complementizer *for* co-occurs with an epistemic verb *indicate*, but the whole sentence is regarded as acceptable because there is a modal harmony between the counterfactuality expressed by the complementizer *for* and by counterfactual.

6.5. Conclusions

This chapter put its focus on the complementizer *for* and the *for* complement and demonstrated the following three claims:

(215) The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.

(216) The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

(217) "Non-epistemicity Condition for the Complementizer *for*":
The complementizer *for* cannot express epistemic modality

According to the present study, the classification of modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be schematized in the following way:。

(218) Modality

Propositional
- *Epistemic
- Counterfactual (Hypothesis)
- Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)

Event
- Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose, Possibility)
- Deontic (Obligation)

The classification shown in (2) differs from that of the *to* complement shown in (219) in that the former lacks epistemic modality (For the sake of convenience, the classification proposed in Chapter 4 is quoted here as (219)):

(219) Modality

- Propositional
  - Epistemic (Thought, Judgment)
  - Counterfactual (Hypothetical)
  - Emotive (Surprise, Disdain)
- Event
  - Dynamic (Desire, Acceptance, Intention, Purpose, Possibility)
  - Deontic (Obligation)

As mentioned in Chapter 4, notice that the infinitive marker *to* can function as an epistemic modalizer when it co-occurs with epistemic verbs such as *believe*, *report*, *suspect*, *consider*, *know*, *think*, and *conclude*. The following sentences clearly show the difference between the complementizer *for* and the infinitive marker *to* (the underlines are all mine):

(220) a. I <u>believe</u> {John to be beaten / *for John to be beaten}.

b. I <u>reported</u> {John to be absent today / *for John to be absent today}.

c. I <u>suspect</u> {him to be hiding in the shrubbery / *for him to be hiding in the shrubbery}.

d. I <u>consider</u> {myself to be cleverer than Fred / *for myself to be clever than Fred}.

e. I <u>know</u> {Mary to have raced giraffes in Kenya / *for Mary to have raced giraffes in Kenya}.

(Cf. Dixon (1991: 223))

f. They <u>thought</u> {him to be a spy / *for him to be a spy}.   (Cf. Swan (2017[4]: 664))

g. From his explanation, I <u>conclude</u> {him to be right / *for him to be right}.

(Cf. *Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, Fifth Edition)

If we take the above distinction into consideration, it is clear that the traditional analysis that, where the infinitive marker *to* exist, the complementizer *for* also exists either implicitly or explicitly and that the complementizer *for* is mechanically introduced to explicitly express the subject of the infinitive. The presence/absence of the complementizer *for* depends on whether there is a modal harmony with each other: It can be concluded that the reason why the

complementizer *for* does not occur when the infinitive marker *to* functions as an epistemic modalizer is because there cannot be a modal harmony between the two.

The present claim that the complementizer *for* belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer and that a *for* complement is a "construction" can be the sufficient semantic explanation to a number of linguistic facts which otherwise cannot be explained under the traditional hypothesis that the complementizer *for* is a meaningless marker which is introduced to explicitly express the subject of the infinitive.

First, as shown in the following sentences, the *for* complement can refer to future situations because the complementizer *for* functions as either a deontic or dynamic modalizer to refer to the situation as the object of "obligation", "desire", "acceptance", or "intention". These notions can only apply to future situations (For the sake of convenience, (4) is requoted as (221) below)

(221) a. We got to the church first, and when the four-wheeler drove up we waited [for him to step out], but he never did, and when the cabman got down from the box and looked there was no one there!   (A. C. Doyle, "A Case of Identity")

   b. They planned [for the mayor to arrive on the following day].

(Quirk et al. (1985: 1194))

   c. It's important [for the meeting to start on time].   (Swan (2005³: 266))

   d. The hunters encircled the deer in order [for the animal not to escape].

(Declerck (1991: 478))

   e. The book is [for you to amuse yourself with while I'm away].

(Bresnan (1972: 79))

The *for* complement in the following sentences refers to future situations because it functions here as an emotive modalizer to express a certain emotion towards a future situation (For the sake of convenience, (168a) and (171a) are requoted as (222a) and (222b) respectively):

(222) a. … it is very unlikely [for two very different methods to have same bias].

   b. And in the process, he is undermining the Democratic process in America and he is making it less likely [for people to vote in the future].

(COCA)

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By contrast, the *for* complement can refer to non-future situations because it can also function as an emotive modalizer to express a subjective emotion towards a certain situation in the past (For the sake of convenience, (5) and (170) are requoted as (223a) and (223b) respectively):

(223) a. Is it really so crazy [for Valerie to have shot him (yesterday)] ?

<div align="right">(Bresnan (1972: 82))</div>

b. It was no very unusual thing [for Mr. Lestrade, of Scotland Yard, to look in upon us of an evening], and has visits were welcome to Sherlock Holmes, for they enabled him to keep in touch with all that was going on at the police head-quarters.

<div align="right">(A. C. Doyle, "The Adventure of the Six Napoleons")</div>

The above facts cannot be explained at all under the analysis that complementizer *for* has no inherent meaning.

Second, the acceptance of the *for* complement varies depending on what kind of matrix predicates are chosen. This fact can be explained by the presence/absence of a modal harmony between the two. Thus, predicates such as *right*, *wrong*, *a sin*, *illegal*, and *unfair* are compatible with the *for* complement because there is a modal harmony between these predicates and *for* (For the sake of convenience, (7) is requoted as (224) below):

(224) a. It is right [for God to punish sinners].

b. It is wrong [for there to be such inequalities].

c. It's a sin [for you to do that].

d. It is illegal [for these houses to be occupied].

e. I consider it unfair [for them to win all the time].

<div align="right">(Bresnan (1972: 79, 83)) (Underline is mine)</div>

On the other hand, predicates such as *true*, *false*, *clear*, *believe*, *know*, and *infer* are incompatible with the *for* complement because these predicates does not express any emotion and thus does not harmonize with the complementizer *for* (For the sake of convenience, (8) is requoted as (225) below):

(225) a. *It is true [for God to exist].

b. *It is <u>false</u> [for there to be only finitely many primes].

c. *It is <u>clear</u> [for these houses to be occupied].

d. *I { <u>believe</u> (with good reason) / <u>know</u> (for a fact) / <u>assume</u> (on these grounds) / <u>infer</u> (from the above) } [for them to win unfairly].

(Bresnan (1972: 83)) (Underline is mine)

Furthermore, another explanation could be that there is a semantic crash between these predicates and the complementizer *for* as a non-epistemic modalizer because they do not refer to the subject's cognition.

Third, the acceptability of the *for* complement also varies depending on whether the matrix clause is in the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood which is typically expressed by the counterfactual modal auxiliary *would*. This is because *for* as a counterfactual modalizer modally harmonizes with the hypothetical modal *would*. Following this claim, it can be predicted that the *for* as a counterfactual modalizer will be compatible with another counterfactual marker. This prediction is corroborated by the following sentence:

(226) It <u>might</u> be odd [for a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

(Cf. Bresnan (1972: 71)) (Underline is mine)

If it is postulated that *might* in (226) can be paraphrased with *perhaps + would*, then it is possible to think that *might*, as well we *would*, expresses counterfactuality. Therefore, the reason why (226) is acceptable is because *for* as a counterfactual modalizer modally harmonizes with the counterfactuality expressed by *might*. The interrelationship between the two can be schematized in the following way (MH is the abbreviation of "Modal Harmony"):

(227) It <u>might</u> be odd [<u>for</u> a man to be chairing a women's meeting].

perhaps   <u>would</u>

(MH)

Consider, furthermore, the following. The following schema below shows that *for* modally harmonizes with counterfactual *could* in the main clause:

(228) [For John to be operated by the excellent doctor] could save him.

 would   can

(MH)

Finally, observe the following sentences:

(229) a. [For her to have known chemistry] would have indicated that she was a witch.

 b. [That she knew chemistry] would have indicated that she was a witch (if she hadn't

 died during the poison test)

(Bresnan (1972: 19))

In (229a), there is a modal harmony between the complementizer *for* and the counterfactual modal *would*, while, in (229b), the *that* complement refers to a fact, and thus there is no modal harmony. In the present case, *would* modally harmonizes with *if* clause in the bracket (= subjunctive past perfect) rather than the *that* clause. These facts could not be explained at all if it would be postulated that the complementizers have no inherent meanings.

The above discussions lead to the conclusion as follows:

(230) There must be a "modal harmony" between the complementizer *for* and the matrix elements.

This chapter argued against the traditional claim that the complementizer *for* is a grammatical category with no inherent meaning and demonstrated that (i) the complementizer *for* belongs to the category of modalizer, (ii) the *for* complement is an independent "construction", (iii) the modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality, and that (iv) the complementizer *for* cannot express epistemic modality.

We hope that the conclusions of this chapter will make a substantial contribution to the area of studies on the infinitive as well as on modality in that they emphasize the necessity to reanalyze the complementizer *for* as a modalizer.

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Research

7.1. Conclusion

This dissertation discussed meanings and functions of the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* to argue for the following two points from the viewpoint of semantics and Cognitive Grammar:

(1) The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

(2) The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of "non-epistemic modalizer".

Chapter 1, after adducing some mysterious phenomena in infinitival constructions, presented the aim of this dissertation: to argue that the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* can be regarded as different types of modalizer. Furthermore, we stated that the present approach adopts the "semantic approach" in Wierzbicka's (1988) terms and that most of the supporting data are adduced from corpora such as British National Corpus (BNC) and Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), and from novels by Agatha Christie.

Chapter 2 introduced essentials of some selected previous studies which are significant to the present dissertation and discussed the relationship between the infinitive and modality.

Chapter 3 discussed Wierzbicka's (1988) analysis, which we regard as one of the most suggestive researches in this dissertation, and clarified some problems which cannot be solved by her analysis.

Chapter 4 reconsidered Declerck's (2011: 27) definition of modality as shown in (8):

(3) Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world.

His definition is noteworthy in that the notion of modality is expanded and many expressions other than modals or modal adverbs are regarded as belonging to modalizers. By reconsidering his definition of modality, we demonstrated the following two points:

(4) The infinitive marker *to* belongs to the category of modalizer.

(5) The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into the following types: epistemic modality, emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

Furthermore, Chapter 4 also put its focus on the interrelationship between the infinitive marker *to* and the matrix elements and demonstrated the following principle:

(6) There must be a "modal harmony" between the infinitive marker *to* and the matrix elements.

Chapter 5 put its focus on the infinitive of result, in which, based on the traditional analysis in terms of "realization", "intentionality", and "predictability", we proposed Transparentizing Phenomena of the matrix verb followed by the infinitive marker *to* in order to explain why the resultative infinitive is interpreted as nonfuture:

(7) Transparentizing Phenomena:
The meanings of the matrix verb and the infinitive marker *to* is relatively weakened, and the elements (either words or morphemes) which mark tense, aspect, modality, negation, participle, and gerund transfer to the complement verb.

Chapter 5 concluded that the fact that the infinitive marker *to* does not function as a modalizer is attributed to the fact that the infinitive marker *to* becomes transparent and loses its original function to introduce the complement.

Chapter 6 focused on the relationship of the complementizer *for* and its complement sentence (i.e. the *for* complement) with modality and demonstrated the following two hypotheses:

(8) A. The complementizer *for* belongs to the category of non-epistemic modalizer.

B. The modality expressed by the complementizer *for* can be classified into the following types: emotive modality, deontic modality, dynamic modality, and counterfactual modality.

Finally, we demonstrated the following principle:

(9) There must be a "modal harmony" between the complementizer *for* and the matrix elements.

Where are original points of this dissertation? We can point out the following four points:

First, this dissertation put its focus on the meanings of the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* as well as their interrelationship with modality and demonstrated with that the infinitive marker *to* and the complementizer *for* functions as modalizers and that an epistemic modality is not included in the modality expressed by the complementizer *for*.

Second, this dissertation clarified that the traditional, grammar-oriented analysis that the infinitive is composed of the complementizer *for* and the infinitive marker *to* and that *for* is optionally added (or omitted) cannot give a sufficient explanation to all linguistic facts.

Third, the present dissertation focused on the resultative infinitive, which has not been fully discussed so far, and gave a semantic and cognitive explanation to the grammatical phenomena and its interpretation process by explicitly schematizing the process under the notion of "transparentizing of the infinitive marker *to*".

Fourth, the present dissertation is expected to make a substantial contribution to the area of studies on modality in that it clarified that the essential of modality is to express a construal or a mental attitude towards a situation (i.e. proposition or event) or its part rather than merely referring to a nonfactual situation.

7.2. Future Research

There still remain issues that deserve due consideration in the future:

The first issue is related to the gerundive marker *-ing*. The function of the gerund marker *-ing* has long been analyzed by comparing it with the infinitive marker *to*. For example, Bolinger (1968) states that the following sentence are all infelicitous because there is no temporal or locational reference:

(10) a. ?It's nice resting.

　　b. ?lt' s easy working.

　　c. ?lt is fun playing.

d. ?It 's hard guessing.

e. ?It was a mistake waiting.

<p align="right">(Bolinger (1968: 125))</p>

If we take into consideration his analysis, we may be able to state that the gerundive marker *-ing* can function to express a construal of a concrete situation rather than of a generic one.

Furthermore, Wierzbicka (1988: 24) states as follows:

> In my view, all this is insightful, and true, but it is not sufficient to explain why, for example, one cannot say:
>
> *He imagined to be blind.
>
> or why one can say:
>
> He imagined being blind.
>
> Surely, Jespersen's description "imaginative, unreal" does apply here, and yet TO cannot be used, whereas ING can. Does Bolinger's description "projected" apply here? Of this, one cannot be sure, since one doesn't really know what exactly Bolinger meant by this term. In any case, the distinction between "something projected versus something actually done" is not sufficient to explain why one CAN say:
>
> He managed to do it.
>
> Nor is it sufficient to explain the contrast between manage and succeed:
>
> *He succeeded to do it.
>
> He succeeded (*managed) in doing it.

We would like to leave the interesting problem such as in what cases *-ing* is used or in what cases *to* complement is used, how general Transparentizing Phenomena are, and whether *-ing* can be regarded as a kind of modalizer for a future research.

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